The Volokh Conspiracy
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Court Ordered Divorcing Husband Not "to Post Anything on Facebook … in Regards to This Action"
Fortunately, the California Court of Appeal has just reversed the decision, on First Amendment grounds.
From yesterday's California Court of Appeal decision in Molinaro v. Molinaro:
[T]he part of the order prohibiting Michael [Molinaro] from posting "anything about the case on Facebook" is overbroad and impermissibly infringes upon his constitutionally protected right of free speech….
To establish a valid prior restraint under the federal Constitution, a proponent has the heavy burden to show the countervailing interest is compelling, the prior restraint is necessary and would be effective in promoting this interest, and less extreme measures are unavailable. A permissible order restraining future speech "must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order." …
Applying these principles, the court in In re Marriage of Candiotti (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) held a custody order limiting a parent's right to communicate with third parties about matters related to the custody proceeding was an unconstitutional prior restraint. There, the order prohibited a mother from disclosing negative information about her former husband's new wife to anyone except certain specified professionals. The Candiotti court recognized that courts "are given broad authority to supervise and promote the welfare of children" and may constitutionally order parents to refrain from disparaging their former spouse in front of their children. However, the court observed the challenged order "went further, actually impinging on a parent's right to speak about another adult, outside the presence of the children."
The court held the order was overbroad in this respect and constituted an undue prior restraint of speech under the California Constitution, reasoning the order "would prevent [the mother] from talking privately to her family, friends, coworkers, or perfect strangers about her dissatisfaction with her children's living situation." Although the trial court "certainly ha[d] the power to prevent [the mother] from undermining [the father's] parental relationship by alienating the children from [the stepmother]," the Candiotti court found the challenged order to be "much more far-reaching, aimed at conduct that might cause others, outside the immediate family, to think ill of [the stepmother]." The court explained: "Such remarks by [the mother] may be rude or unkind. They may be motivated by hostility. To the extent they are libelous, they may be actionable. But they are too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on [the mother's] constitutional right to utter them."
The same reasoning applies to the part of the restraining order prohibiting Michael from posting information about the case to Facebook. The record shows Michael's Facebook posts were not specifically directed to the minor children, but in many cases invited comments from Michael's adult friends and extended family, some of whom urged him not to dwell on the divorce, while others suggested he seek legal representation. Moreover, although the trial court plainly had the power to prohibit Michael from disparaging Bertha in the children's presence (see In re Marriage of Hartmann (2010)), the order here, like the order in Candiotti, was "much more far-reaching," proscribing speech only peripherally related to the case and speech that might, at worst, "cause others, outside the immediate family, to think ill" of Bertha.
Indeed, most of Michael's earlier posts were of this variety?they expressed his apparent despair about the divorce and his separation from the children, but did not directly disparage Bertha or openly seek to alienate her from the children. Posts of this sort are "too attenuated from conduct directly affecting the children to support a prior restraint on [Michael's] constitutional right to utter them."
"It is certainly in the best interests of any children of divorce that the adults in their lives act in a mature and courteous manner"; however, where a restraint on the freedom of speech is concerned, the restriction must be necessary and narrowly tailored to promoting those interests. The part of the restraining order prohibiting Michael from posting about the case on Facebook does not meet this test. We conclude it is overbroad, constituting an invalid prior restraint, and must be stricken from the domestic violence restraining order.
