The U.S. Spends Half What France Does on Public Pensions. But Congress Is Making the Same Mistakes.
Social Security faces a 22 percent benefit cut in 2032, and unlike much of northern Europe, it has no automatic mechanism to prevent it.
For the past few weeks, news coverage around the world has been dominated by images of French cities burning, as mass protests turned into outright riots, clashes with police, and looting. The unrest is unfolding against the backdrop of a broader fiscal crisis: French public debt has reached 119 percent of GDP, and the government expects this year's deficit to hit 5.4 percent of GDP. The yield on France's 10-year bonds recently topped 5 percent for the first time since 2002.
Many of those in the streets are demanding more public spending, yet the French state has little room left to do so. As of 2024, government expenditure stands at a whopping 57 percent of GDP, and social spending at more than 30 percent, both among the highest in the developed world. Crucially, public pensions alone, at about 14 percent of GDP, account for nearly half of that social spending.
The whole problem has a sharp generational edge. On one side stands a large and politically powerful class of retirees; on the other, dissatisfied young people who want more of the money channeled their way. Caught in between are the squeezed working-age taxpayers who foot the bill.
By comparison, the U.S. rests on much sounder fiscal foundations. In 2023, American public social spending came to 18 percent of GDP, far below France. Social Security costs about 5 percent of GDP, and even counting pensions for government workers, America's public pension bill comes to around 7 percent, below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average.
The main reason is that the U.S. retirement system relies heavily on private savings through employer plans and vehicles such as the 401(k). Private pensions account for 44 percent of all pension payouts in the U.S., one of the highest shares in the OECD. In France, they account for just 2 percent. For public finances, the difference is enormous. After adjusting for population aging, countries with larger private pension systems spend roughly 80 cents less for every dollar paid out privately. Total pension spending is similar, but the cost sits outside the state budget, and retirees are, on average, no worse off.
Americans often—and rightly—point to Europe as a cautionary tale of runaway entitlements. But not all European countries are created equal. In fact, when it comes to pensions, some provide examples of systems the U.S. could emulate to avoid a fiscal disaster.
Denmark has tied its retirement age to life expectancy since 2006, a rule that will push it to 70 by 2040. The Netherlands raises its retirement age by two-thirds of every gain in life expectancy, and its large funded occupational pensions must trim benefits when the funds fall short. Sweden goes furthest. Each worker's pension is calculated from what they paid in, divided by how long their generation is expected to live, so longer lives automatically mean smaller monthly checks. If the system still runs short, a "break" holds back annual increases until the books balance, as it did in 2010, 2011, and 2014. As a result, Sweden and Denmark are projected to spend less on pensions in 2070 than they do today.
These mechanisms show that a younger population, one of America's biggest advantages over Europe, isn't everything. Several European countries have more people over 65 per 100 working-age adults than the U.S., yet spend a smaller share of GDP on public pensions. America has about 31 people over 65 per 100 working-age adults and spends 7.3 percent of GDP, or 6.8 percent once taxes paid on pensions are netted out. The Netherlands (35) and Switzerland (33) spend 6.4 and 6.6 percent before tax and 5.9 and 5.0 percent after. Denmark (36) and Sweden (37) spend more before tax, 7.5 and 8.0 percent, but tax pensions heavily, so their net cost falls to 5.4 and 6.3 percent, below America's. Germany, with as many over-65s per worker as France today, spends about four points of GDP less on public pensions, and is projected to keep doing so in 2050, when it will have considerably more.
America has none of the safeguards that Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden rely on. The full retirement age is fixed at 67 and doesn't move with life expectancy, and nothing automatically adjusts benefits or taxes when the money runs short. The only built-in fix is a cliff: If Congress does nothing, benefits will drop by 22 percent when the trust fund runs dry in 2032. Congress last repaired Social Security's finances in 1983. Its most recent changes, in 2025, raised benefits for some public-sector retirees and cut taxes on seniors' benefits, moving the depletion date closer.
This is where the dangerous parallel between the U.S. and France really lies: In both, politicians lack the courage for painful but necessary reforms that will hurt some voters, so the problem keeps getting kicked down the road. The electoral arithmetic is clear. Congress is unlikely to let benefits drop overnight in 2032. More likely, it will borrow to cover the gap, on top of a federal debt that already stands at about 121 percent of GDP.
In fact, that borrowing is already underway. When Social Security ran surpluses, "instead of saving those funds, the government immediately spent the money," the Cato Institute's Romina Boccia and Ivane Nachkebia write in their book Reimagining Social Security: Global Lessons for Retirement Policy Changes. Since the program began running cash shortfalls in 2010, the government has borrowed about $1.5 trillion to cover them. Counting interest, Social Security is projected to add $5.1 trillion to the debt by 2032, according to Boccia and Nachkebia.
Automatic mechanisms are no guarantee against irresponsible fiscal policy; politicians can repeal them like any other law. But they shift the burden of action: Keeping the system solvent requires no vote, while undoing it does.
America should make solvency the default, as much of northern Europe has done: a balancing mechanism that adjusts benefits automatically when the trust fund falls short, a retirement age that rises with life expectancy, and more room for funded private accounts. The reforms America needs are far less painful than those France now faces. But every year without them makes them more painful, and the U.S. could one day find itself where France is now: borrowing at ever-higher rates to keep promises it can no longer afford, until bond markets force the reckoning that politicians would not.