If You Want To Cut Government Spending, You Can't Ignore the Pentagon
Since Congress began requiring annual audits in 2018, the Department of Defense has never passed.
Since the 1950s, every effort to reduce the size and scope of government has been bulldozed by a political establishment more concerned with furthering its own interests than those of the American people. Between sacred cows and special interest groups, we're always told why nothing can get cut.
With the exception of Social Security, there is no bigger scared cow than the Department of Defense (DOD).
Of course, defense policy is a legitimate function of government—a textbook example of a public good. It's hard, though not impossible, to imagine national security being provided privately. However, it doesn't follow that every dollar spent on defense is effective or even legitimate. It's often the reverse. Sacred-cow status grants relative immunity to the Pentagon's waste and poor strategic spending.
This is why, despite the chaos caused by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and its often questionable approach, I for one welcome the chance to have a national conversation about Pentagon spending.
In a February 22 post on X, DOGE announced that it held a preliminary meeting with the Defense Department and that it looks forward to "working together to safely save taxpayer dollars and eliminate waste, fraud and abuse." Heaven knows the DOD needs such supervision. Since Congress began requiring annual audits in 2018, it has never passed a single full audit.
As of late 2024, it had failed for the seventh year in a row, unable to fully account for an $824 billion annual budget. Pause and think about that: Much of the nation's single largest chunk of discretionary spending can't be completely tracked. Let's hope the DOD is better at protecting us from foreign enemies than tracking its own expenses.
One Pentagon official dryly noted that "things are showing progress, but it's not enough" and a "clean" audit is still years away. Imagine a taxpayer offering this answer to an IRS auditor.
In addition to not knowing where the money is going, a big problem with the department is the defense procurement system. Its issues go beyond simple waste or mismanagement. The system's core challenges stem from its painfully slow acquisition timeline, inefficient cost structures, and barriers to innovation. As a result, when major systems reach deployment, their technologies are often outdated and their costs prohibitive.
Nowhere is the dysfunction more visible than in the development of the F-35 fighter jet program. According to the Government Accountability Office, after nearly 25 years of development and $1.7 trillion in spending—the most expensive defense program ever—only 55 percent of F-35s are mission capable.
The jet's troubled history of cost overruns and unfulfilled promises reflects a broader pattern within the Pentagon: Shouts of "national security!" discourage necessary attention toward wasteful programs and less wasteful alternatives.
The DOD's acquisition timeline represents perhaps the most pressing challenge. Major weapons systems typically take eight to 10 years from concept to delivery. The Navy's Ford-class aircraft carrier program illustrates this perfectly. The lead ship's construction began in 2005, and it was originally scheduled to deploy in 2018. Yet it was deployed for a test in 2022 and finally ready for battle in 2023, with new technologies not yet integrated. The cost, $13.3 billion, was 30 percent higher than the original estimate.
During the extended development period, threats evolve, requirements change, and technology advances, yet the procurement system remains largely locked into initial specifications.
Cost structures create another fundamental problem. The prevalence of "cost-plus" contracts, under which contractors receive guaranteed profits regardless of performance, reduces incentives to do the work efficiently. The Army's Future Combat Systems program operated under such arrangements, with little incentive to control costs or meet schedules. It was canceled in 2009 only after spending $18 billion.
Mix in the many political pressures—such as pushes to include as much technology with each weapon as possible—and the many regulations that frustrate potential innovators who might offer something better or more affordable, and you've got quite a mess.
DOGE may succeed at shrinking the administrative leviathan that has long stifled innovation and burdened taxpayers. The Pentagon's practices demand a parallel reckoning. That can't realistically happen without Congress's help and buy-in from the Pentagon, but DOGE can use its enormous megaphone to jumpstart the conversation.
The road to genuine reform is rarely straightforward. It requires both innovative measures that challenge the status quo and the courage to question even the most deeply entrenched powers. It's time to illuminate the dark corridors of unchecked power at every government agency and department. Investigating the Pentagon is a critical step in this journey.
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