A Classic Biden Gaffe Complicates U.S. Role in Taiwan
Will Xi Jinping just chalk up Biden's latest remarks as an accidental straying from "strategic ambiguity"?

On Monday, many journalists and pundits jumped to the conclusion that President Joe Biden was abandoning America's long-held "strategic ambiguity" concerning the defense of Taiwan. At a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida when asked, "Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?" Biden responded "yes" with confidence, following that up with, "that's the commitment we made." (The White House quickly walked his comments back.)
The commitment that Biden is referencing is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which he supported as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1979. The TRA basically guarantees that the U.S. will make sure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself. However, the TRA doesn't include a binding agreement the way agreements like NATO do. Legally, the U.S. has never promised to defend Taiwan as it has with NATO countries. Eric Gomez, the director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, tells Reason that the TRA was "the price of admission for U.S.-China relations."
How the U.S. will respond to an invasion of Taiwan is strategically gray for two reasons: to keep China on its toes and to ensure the pathways of communication between the U.S. and China stay open. "Biden's statement is not as far outside the bounds of 'strategic ambiguity' as people think," says Gomez—suggesting that Biden's recent remarks have been somewhat blown out of proportion. But he's adamant that if Biden were to go even slightly further to throw "strategic ambiguity" out the window then the U.S. will inevitably show more overt support for Taiwan. After that, all bets are off on how China will respond.
China sees self-ruled Taiwan as a "breakaway province" that will eventually be reunited with the rest of the mainland. But, Taiwan fervently identifies as an independent nation with its own democratically elected leaders. China and Taiwan have had separate governments since 1949. They were united under the same regime for just four of the last 127 years. And Taiwan is essentially united in wanting to be free of Beijing's rule. But the relationship between China and Taiwan has been delicate since the 17th century. As Liz Wolfe wrote for the February issue of Reason:
China's complicated relationship with Taiwan began in 1684, when the Qing dynasty seized the island … At the end of the 19th century, Chinese rulers, facing a humiliating war defeat, gave Taiwan to Japan; following Japan's loss in World War II, it was returned to the mainland. But just a few years later, civil war split the country apart. The Chinese Nationalist Party (or "Kuomintang") was exiled to Taiwan and would go on to exercise martial law there for nearly 40 years. … Despite this messy backstory, democracy and pluralism have flourished in Taiwan since the end of the Kuomintang's dictatorial reign in 1987. As in Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea, the rapid industrialization of the 1960s has produced lasting economic strength for Taiwan.
Biden is not the first president who has failed to thread the needle when describing the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, former President Bill Clinton sent two carrier battle groups to Taiwan's waters to intimidate China while Taiwan held free elections. In 2001, former President George W. Bush was asked by ABC about the U.S. commitment to the Taiwanese, and whether the United States would use "the full force of the American military," to which Bush responded, "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself." And former President Donald Trump was known for cozying up to Taiwan in order to be tough on China.
Gomez isn't the only one worried about what would happen if Biden's missteps were to become viewed as the U.S.'s new policy by Chinese President Xi Jinping. And some, like Bill Bishop, who writes the popular newsletter Sinocism, already fear that "strategic ambiguity" is a thing of the past.
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/1528732746251640832
Yet others, like Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, are praising the apparent end to "strategic ambiguity" because it will usher in an era of "strategic clarity" where both the U.S. and China will theoretically be better off knowing where the other stands when it comes to Taiwan.
"This confusion is dangerous to the extent that it could change China's assessment of the issue," says Gomez. It remains to be seen whether Xi chalks up Biden's latest remarks as an accidental straying from "strategic ambiguity" or if he interprets the comments as part of a larger trend worthy of concern.
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I think, if I was Xi, I'd assume Biden isn't in charge of the white house policy, if I saw his statements constantly walked back by his staff.
And then milk it for all it's worth in the way of further concessions.
After all, they have already paid for him.
Fuck Joe Biden
Lets go Brandon...
Not even with Bernie Sander's dick.
Not even with Michelle Obama's dick.
Good. Strategic Ambiguity has always been a terrible thing. And it is antithetical to many libertarian ideas. Whether we get involved or not, recognizing Taiwan as a separate country is obvious and right.
Strategic Ambiguity is how the US polices the world. When you consider that we change leadership and party of power at least once or twice every decade, for continued world leadership and influence, it is an absolute must.
The issue is, one president/congress may believe firmly that we should protect X country from Y aggressor; however, the next president/congress might very well not.
If leadership currently in power would state absolutely where they stand, it could give foreign countries a firm window that they could exploit.
Strategic Ambiguity forces other world leaders to have to wonder and guess just how serious the US is about coming to the aid of another country and what our response will be, regardless of the leaders currently in power. It also allows the next set of leaders to act in a way contrary to those right before them.
You can see how some of these issues played out/are playing out with Iran, where ambiguity was largely abandoned.
"Good. Strategic Ambiguity has always been a terrible thing."
Not necessarily. And not in today's America. Is this toilet for men, women or trannies? I dunno. It's strategically ambiguous.
"recognizing Taiwan as a separate country is obvious and right."
After all, the Vatican does, and they are not only obvious and right, they are infallible. Same with Haiti, Nicaragua, and most of the rest of central america.
From what view does our strategic ambiguity benefit us? Is it more of a deterrent to China than our unambiguous stance on South Korea and Japan? Or our unambiguous stance on Germany and Poland? Ambiguity rarely actually results in deterrence to invasion. Iraq interrupted our ambiguity towards Kuwait as permission to invade. Hussein was really taken aback when Bush didn't just accept it. Our ambiguity about support of South Vietnam, despite our promises of armaments and ammo, backed by treaties, led to North Vietnam breaking the peace treaty and invading South Vietnam. In this case, they correctly interpreted that ambiguity. North Korea always becomes far more aggressive whenever any ambiguity is allowed into our stance on South Korea. Being unpredictable is not the same thing as ambiguity. They may be near synonyms but aren't direct synonyms. When it comes to recognizing Taiwan, and supporting them, ambiguity is more likely to encourage aggression by China, especially after Afghanistan and Ukraine. Ambiguity is only a deterrence if the other side truly believes you will react with force. If they don't believe that, or it seems unlikely ambiguity is not a deterrence at all.
If we are willing to back Taiwan, Biden's remark would have been a far greater deterrence than the rush to walk it back. They rush to walk it back is more likely to emboldened China than to deter them. And the only reason we had to walk it back is that we have sold so much of our economy to China we can't afford further cooling of our relationship with them. Which China is well aware of.
I'm not advocating for war with China over Taiwan, nor am I supporting Biden's remarks, but I also don't believe our previous strategy was effective either. The largest deterrence has been the fact that China lacks enough amphibious assault crafts to effectively invade Taiwan, which they have worked hard to overcome in recent decades. I don't think they currently have enough either, but I'm not the military advisors to Xi, and it wouldn't be the first time military advisors told a tyrant what he wanted to hear, rather than what was militarily true.
Being unpredictable is only a deterrence if the other side actually believes force is a viable possibility. That's why Trump slamming a Iranian general was a deterrence rather than a wider provocation. If all your actions result in you looking less likely to choice force, trying to appear unpredictable or ambiguous is likely to result in the exact opposite of what you hope to achieve. Ask Chamberlain.
"That's why Trump slamming a Iranian general was a deterrence rather than a wider provocation. "
Deterring what? There are constant attacks on US military bases, for years now, sometimes resulting in casualties, sometimes not, by mortar, gun fire etc. Iraqi militants thought to be sponsored by Iran are generally held responsible. There was a drone attack today in fact:
https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2022/05/24/drone-attack-targets-us-base-in-iraq/
You have to read Yemen press reports to get the info, it seems.
They curtailed those attacks drastically until after Trump left office. So it did deter Iran until the threat was removed and replaced with Biden ambiguity.
Didn't those attacks start when Trump was in office? While Obama was president, the US was collaborating with Iraqi militias, Kurds, Hezbollah, and the very same Iranian outfit Soleimani was head of. They worked together to clear the city of Mosul of the ISIL occupation. It wasn't all that long ago in the scheme of things. Maybe check the Yemen press if you need details.
"From what view does our strategic ambiguity benefit us? "
I don't know about 'us,' but it benefits the empire. Just like the ambiguous position on the Palestinian question, up to recently in Ukraine, the war on terror, (al Qaeda, MEK, PPK et al) and Taiwan too. In the good book, it's referred to the left hand not knowing what the right hand is up to.
It doesn't actually benefit the empire though. As I've addressed at length. Multiple times now.
As for Palestine, we aren't ambiguous at all, we fully support Israeli independence which has deterred Syria and Egypt for over forty years from attacking Israel, something which occurred rather frequently when we had a much more ambiguous stance on Israel. Even Carter realized the importance of taking an unequivocal position on Israeli right to exist during the Camp David Accords. As to Palestine itself, it's not a vital question for our interests. And it certainly hasn't worked in Ukraine. Russia invaded, conquered a good portion of their coast line and Eastern Ukraine, killed tens of thousands of Ukrainians and costs us billions of tax payer dollars in aid, not to mention destroyed a good portion of Ukraine's economy, especially their largest export, agricultural goods, which they were unable to plant due to Russian military actions and the need to respond to them. It also has impacted our economy far more than it seems to have impacted Russia's economy, again due to short sighted policies from the current administration. And it yet appears to be possible to rule it as a success in Taiwan.
China can hurt us far more economically than we can hurt China as it currently stands. Even if Taiwan is successful in stopping Chinese aggression, the disruption to the semiconductor manufacturing that a war would result in will be catastrophic for the west, economically. Add in terms of rare earth, an embargo by China may make 1929 look like good times.
Anyone who doesn't understand the threat is either naive or willfully ignorant. There is not a single thing in modern life that would not be majorly impacted by either of the outcomes either of the outcomes I outlined, let alone both. China will most likely want to capture the semiconductor manufacturing intact, but if they appear to be losing than these are ripe targets that would punish the world and send it into a major economic depression.
I don't think you realize exactly how much every aspect of modern life is reliant on semiconductors, everything from agriculture, to finances, to manufacturing, to medicine, to communication and transportation. All of these things would quickly be compromised, and only last as long as they didn't need replacing. You want to convert to green energy and electric vehicles? Not going to happen if China cuts off rare earths and or massively impairs Taiwan's ability to manufacture and export semiconductors. Want 1% of the US working population to feed the other 99%? Not possible without a steady supply of semiconductors. Want Amazon to deliver your next order? Not going to happen without a steady supply of rare earths and semiconductors. Want the US military to resist Chinese aggressions? Guess what, smart weapons, advanced fighters, advanced tanks, artillery, naval ships all require an uninterrupted and steady supply of semiconductors (they get replaced pretty frequently in military equipment because military equipment is hard on these components and heavily reliant on them). Want to be able to access your bank account? You best hope your bank's computers don't require maintenance or replacing. Ditto if you need any sort of advanced medical imaging or testing, or surgery. In fact, most medical personal today aren't even trained how to perform more than the basics without the aid of computers, and almost none of our civilian logistics are capable of functioning without computers. Hell, even our elections now rely on computers. As to our communications, even our postal service isn't designed to operate without computers. Buying groceries, if you could find them, would be near impossible. Our electrical grid would start failing as soon as the first computers started failing.
Yeah, no. Our ambiguity has no benefit to the 'empire' unless it does detract Xi. And there is no historical situation where this has worked in the past, so the even money is it won't here either. The best way to avoid this is the one that Biden is least likely to take, deregulation of mining to produce more domestic rare earths and deregulation that promotes more domestic semiconductor manufacturing. But neither of these would have any immediate impact. You're looking at reversing decades of deindustrialization. We don't even have the skilled workers necessary to even start the process if we actually addressed the regulatory hurdles. To establish that alone would take two years minimum. And don't expect immigration to make much of a difference, as the majority of workers with the skills we would need are in Taiwan. Hell, we can't even address our massive CDL shortage, which takes far less training to achieve proficiency in and actually could be addressed by looser immigration rules.
"As for Palestine, we aren't ambiguous at all, "
Sure. We give them money, guns and ensure they have a seat at the table. We even give their elections a stamp of approval as long as our favored candidate wins.
"As to Palestine itself, it's not a vital question for our interests"
It was more of a thing in the 70s. Oil embargo, hijacking, Baader Meinhof. Good times!
"And it certainly hasn't worked in Ukraine."
Ukraine is irrelevant. The idea is to drive a wedge between Europe and the rest of Asia. I wrote about it below:
"The invasion has strengthened the US hold over Europe (even heretofore neutral Sweden and Finland), ensuring German imports good fossil fuels that the US approves of rather than the nasty stuff Russia was fixing to pipe in. Germany also registered a huge increase of military spending, something that Trump should welcome as it's been a complaint of his and American arms manufacturing stooges for decades. Biden finally made it a reality, and it only needed the threat of welcoming Ukraine into the arms of NATO to goad Russia into precipitate action."
About China, Taiwan and our desperate need not to antagonize China, I agree. The US empire is in the same position as Wiley Coyote when he runs of the cliff. He doesn't start to fall until he looks down, or makes China angry, just to dispel any of that nasty ambiguity that metaphors have a way of engendering.
In the short run, China can do more damage to the USA than the other way around, but longer-term that balance reverses. After the initial chaos of getting a new supply chain sorted out (which might take years if we tried to do it all domestically or decades if we tried in California), what would be left would be the absence of the trade imbalance between the USA and China, which is far more beneficial to China than to the US in economic terms (it does benefit us in political terms at the UN, where it protects us from ever being hit with trade sanctions though).
Sorry but I'm not sending my grandkids to die for Taiwan.
He said out loud what everyone already knows. Filters fall away as one gets older and more senile. Who doesn't know any elderly who say whatever comes to mind without any filtering?
Perpetual blunder about the edges of war you say? Of course not. Classical gaffe. Like when Jerry Lewis confuses the button to ring his secretary with the button that launches the nuclear missiles.
Pack up your troubles and just get happy!
Ya better chase all your cares away.
Sing Hallelujah, come on get happy!
Get ready for the judgment day...
I love how this is a gaffe and not LITERALLY WORLD WAR 3! like a certain Orange Hitler calling Kim Jung Un "rocket man".
That was much more violent, and he meant every word he said. I know morons that readily quote how many "lies" trump told in office. The problem being that when everything is a lie, the real lies get ignored.
Trump: "I'm meeting with the Joint Chiefs..."
ENB: "Duck and cover!"
Almost literally.
The tone contrast between Reason's (occasional) coverage and their (unhinged) coverage of Trump is quite striking
(occasional) coverage *of Biden
He’s now becoming a danger to humanity.
It's like Mr Bean became President.
Joe Friday will be along to tell us how "serious" and "adult" Brandon is, as soon as he gets his points from media matters.
This has all carefully considered and orchestrated 4D chess.
Since he can't count to 4, can we assume someone put him up to it?
Calling it a "classic" gaffe is minimizing the severity and normalizing it. In other words, you are covering for the regime. it's pathetic.
Yet completely predictable at this point.
Oh you know, Biden, he doesn't really mean it but his heart is in the right place!
He got there in Ukraine. The Big Guy will almost certainly do well off this last aid package.
Of course, the immediate solution is Kamala Harris...
As usual...
What? Why are people against this? Didn't we all love how Trump consistently shot his mouth off? How he kept everyone on their toes?
Or wait. You're not telling me people loved it just because he was on their "side" right? Oh c'mon...that can't be true.
Not a fan of Trump, but if ha something, he owned it. Not much "WH walking it back" bullshit.
Ugh..."but if he said something"
Edit button please.
"Didn't we all love how Trump consistently shot his mouth off?"
"We" didn't love it. You shit your pants with rage on a daily basis over it. Now all of a sudden it's okay because Team Blue.
Also, nobody walked back Trump like with Uncle Joe, and when they tried they got canned. See John Bolton.
"Covfefe" was a gaffe. "Yes, we will defend Taiwan militarily." is not a gaffe. And that doesn't even get into the dozens of willful and malicious misinterpretations presented as 'gaffes' like "You need an ID to buy groceries." and "good people on both sides".
Additionally, many of the 'worst' statements from Trump required you to read it out of context, in the worst light possible, while Biden's remarks on Taiwan wasn't even close to being ambiguous.
If you can’t tell the difference between what’s happening, you’re dumber than I thought, shitlunches.
Trump lives rent-free in your head. we're talking about the president of the united states right now not a resort mogul.
Shrike, is that you?
Joe's statement was pretty unambiguous, which is why it made the news, and it was a clear departure from strategic ambiguity, it requires major stretching to try and claim 'Biden's statement is not as far outside the bounds of 'strategic ambiguity' as people think'. That is why the Whitehouse has now walked it back three times in the past 24 hours. I don't support our current stance on Taiwan, however, to represent Biden's 'gaffe' as anything other than what it plainly states, is a direct misrepesentation of the facts, and requires massive torture of the English language. It's completely disingenuous.
Here is how CNN even covered it:
On his first trip to Asia as President, Biden was asked in Tokyo, in the light of his refusal to use military force to defend Ukraine, whether he would go further and get involved militarily to defend Taiwan. "Yes," Biden replied. "That's the commitment we made."
There is no ambiguity in these remarks nor is this not a major departure from previous official stances. His Asian trip has been a disaster (see his statements about gas prices, where he basically admitted he isn't worried about high gas prices because it will result in the death of the fossil fuel industry). I'm sure the Whitehouse is going to be working overtime to walk that statement back as well. I'm tired of the gaslighting and Reason reporting the gaslighting without any pushback on it, not even most the leftist media is misrepresenting what happened. It's undeniable.
S76....You know that we're going to war over Taiwan, right? They produce 60% of American semi-conductor supply, a vital US national interest. Unless and until we develop a domestic source for semi-conductors, our hand is forced. We are being prepared for that eventuality, either by happenstance or design. My fear is that we will be militarily defeated by the combination of China and Russia. The communists are less restrained in pursuing their objectives than we are.
I don't see a way out of this without preserving our semi-conductor supply. That is a national security issue.
That's impossible all of the Russian soldiers were killed by the zelensky mind ray
Which mind-ray caused the death of your brain?
It was a joke Sevo.
Oh I agree, strategically Taiwan is far more important than Ukraine, possibly, even likely, of vital national security importance, related to the semi-conductor issue alone. Not to mention the strategic value of Taiwan related to its proximity to Japan and the Phillippines. The former is far more important to us than the latter, but they both have more value than Ukraine, both economically and historically.
Strategic to who? The graft and, evidently bio labs, seem pretty important strategically to our ruling class.
To our nation as a whole. Ukraine offers very little, other than agricultural goods, which are vital to our economy (and even then, it is an indirect importance, as we are capable of feeding ourselves if we chose, but grains are an internationally traded commodity, so we won't have a major shortage, other than one induced by global shortages which will result in greater exports). Taiwan however, produces the majority of the world's semiconductors which are necessary for almost every aspect of daily living, including energy and food production. Tractors and harvesters have been mobile computing banks since the late 1980s. It's been a major contributor to making our agriculture industry capable of producing more food, on smaller acreage, with fewer producers. Reversing that would take massive effort and massive manpower we simply don't have anymore.
“To our nation as a whole.”
Understood and agreed. But the empire is in decline, and the people making the decisions are no longer making them with our interests in mind. And the people supposed to hold them to account (media) are so corrupt that they’re only mission is to run cover for them.
Our empire is in decline, mainly because we have always been ambivalent as a nation to empire building. Our government and ethos really isn't designed to establish or maintain an empire. Our most imperialistic action, the Spanish American war, we largely began to enact policies aimed at leading to self rule for our conquests.
You could argue manifest destiny and the Mexican American war (which was an outgrowth of manifest destiny) and the Monroe doctrine were imperialism, but those I believe were far more ambiguous than the Spanish American War. We paid for the land via the Louisiana purchase and the Treaty of Hidalgo-Garcia and we were never really strict or consistent about enforcing the Monroe doctrine. Even the Indian Wars, we usually paid for the land we acquired through treaty, despite our less than stellar record of fealty to those treaties.
Additionally, we fully integrated those lands into the country as opposed to govern them as conquered territories or vassal states, which is more the M.O. of empires. Oregon and California are not vassal states, nor even Hawaii, or Alaska, they are fully integrated. Even most of the original indigenous peoples consider themselves citizens as opposed to vassals (outside the most extreme rhetoric of the certain activists).
In other words, it was inevitable our 'empire' would quickly fall, as unlike truly imperialistic cultures, we were never anything more than lukewarm to maintaining it. And it's hard to get the public, which was raised on the ideals of individuality and personal liberty, to be willing to sacrifice wealth, comfort and blood to maintaining the empire. That's why for the past century, the Wilsonian Progressives have worked so hard to supplant personal liberty with societal good. But to much of the country, even if it's not the overwhelming majority it once was, still rejects this premise. And it's not a new or even primarily Wilsonian Progressives who created this conflict. It was an the basis of the split between Jefferson on one side and Adams and Hamilton on the other. The best thing to come out of the Constitutional Convention was the addition of the Bill of Rights which created the means to continue this conflict, rather than allow the federalists an eventual victory. And it's for those of us who fall into the personal liberty camp, the Legislative branch is the most important branch, towards maintaining this conflict. As even Jefferson found, even the most devout classical liberal is willing to use the power of either the Legislative or executive branch, to curtail personal liberty for acquisition of power or to obtain their goals. We, in the personal liberty camp, can never achieve complete victory, but the best we can hope for is maintaining the conflict.
Well said soldier!
Plus 1000000000000
As for crop exports, we could easily feed our country and still have some surplus to export, but I expect that the world will expect us to export more than that surplus, because the world always does. And I expect Biden will go along with it, as he seems not to worry about American citizens as much as global citizens. So, I expect we'll have to do with less food in the next couple of months, to satisfy needs of other countries. It is a windfall for us farmers and ranchers, because we'll get a good pay day out of it (unless he pulls some stunt to buy our crops at reduced prices to use for humanitarian needs). But it sucks for everyone else in the country (and he'll turn around and blame it on 'greedy big AG' corporations).
Well you’re obviously greedy. Otherwise you’d be giving that grain away!
(Sarc for those whose meter might need adjusting)
"of vital national security importance, related to the semi-conductor issue alone."
10 points for naming the country of vital national security importance related to the baby formula issue.
10 more points for naming the country of vital national security importance related to the surgical mask issue.
There is no vital national security problem with securing baby formula supply.
The recipe is not a secret. Most mothers have two dispensaries.
Maybe it can be considered a national inconvenience problem. Idk. But ain't national security
"But ain't national security"
Truth be told, I think 'national security' is anything our leaders want it to be, and it's usually to justify something nasty, but I take your point.
National security generally means something that vital to national survival, including economic activity. Baby formula isn't really vital to our economy and it's more the result of short sighted policy rather than actual inability for us to produce it ourselves.
It's definitely been the biggest danger of globalization, one that the globalists have pooh-poohed for years. The loss of critical industries to offshoring has made it more not less likely we'll get involved in foreign wars, that a couple decades ago even, would not really have involved our strategic interests. It started with the decline of domestic petroleum industry, resulting in Desert Storm,band will continue until we address the underlying cause, our overly complex taxation and regulatory regime.
Militarily defeated by China and Russia? Methinks you've got a bad case of the vapors.
Russia has proven that, on the offense, it is a near-peer of - Ukraine.
China hasn't fought for forty years and didn't particularly succeed v Vietnam. Further, amphibious invasions are easily the most difficult military actions and tend to require lessons learned from previous failures. China has one go against Taiwan and I suspect it won't go as well as you believe.
Certainly in neither case will the foe of China/Russia be so overwhelmed that the US has to step in - and then also get spanked badly.
Not that this means the US is all that good either on offense. US China Russia all have the advantage of long distance murderdeathkill capability. That's it.
The US isn't that good on the offensive? The German Empire, Nazi Germany, Japan, North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and the Taliban would all disagree, we are far better on the offensive than on occupation. The latter is where we run into trouble. Name one US offensive action since 1863 that failed? Name one offensive war since 1815 that the US lost? I see another person who has bought the myth of lack of US offensive prowess. If anything the US military is the best military in existence for a century and a half on the offensive, based upon our success to failure ratio. Generally, we've faired worse when on the defensive or holding static lines, because those situations don't play to our tactical doctrine or strengths, and even in those situations, we've been more successful than not, on the battlefield. China and Russia combined couldn't beat us in a conventional war, but given the vastness of Russia, and the large population of China, we would have equal difficulty actually beating them conventionally. There's been some battles that we didn't achieve all that we wanted or didn't achieve quick victory on the offense, but very few that can be classified as a loss. The worst they majority of even this category could be classified as are a draw. I'm thinking of a few operations in Italy and Tunisia during WW2, possibly Market Garden, despite that mainly being a British operation. Possibly Chosin Reservoir, but the US had largely gone from the offensive into holding by the time the Chinese launched their attack (and Chinese success was largely because MacArthur ignored his field commanders who were reporting engaging Chinese troops). And while we did retreat after this, we drove the Chinese back across the 38th parallel fairly quickly and then mostly maintained those positions until China and North Korea agreed to a cease fire.
In 1864 Grant didn't win decisive victories at Spotsylvania or the Wilderness, and did lose Cold Harbor, but it didn't slow his offensive. The first two were tactically draws and all three costs Lee vital men and supplies he couldn't afford to lose. The same can be said of the Battle of the Crater during the Seize of Petersburg. Wellington labeled Scott's offensive during the Mexican American War the most brilliant military move he had ever seen (this from the victor of the Peninsula Campaign and the Battle of Waterloo against Napoleon). Japan tried unsuccessfully to turn the Pacific into a Battle of attrition, because they couldn't stop US offensive power. By 1943 Japan had already realized that their only hope was a negotiated peace. Germany realized this, even Hitler, by 1944. That was really the point of the Ardennes counteroffensive, to inflict enough casualties that Germany could negotiate a peace with the US and England on more favorable terms. No, the US does not suffer any difficulty with the offensive. If you think that's what Iraq and Afghanistan were about, you really weren't paying attention. The offensive portion were basically walkovers. It was the holding phase, the occupation phase, that we performed less well in (and even then, it was far more the result of schizophrenic and unrealistic political goals rather than military prowess).
Just copy-pasting this because I accidentally flagged it, and the flag is irretrievable.
Please, go about your business
Commenter_XY
May.24.2022 at 3:46 pm
Mute User
S76....You know that we're going to war over Taiwan, right? They produce 60% of American semi-conductor supply, a vital US national interest. Unless and until we develop a domestic source for semi-conductors, our hand is forced. We are being prepared for that eventuality, either by happenstance or design. My fear is that we will be militarily defeated by the combination of China and Russia. The communists are less restrained in pursuing their objectives than we are.
I don't see a way out of this without preserving our semi-conductor supply. That is a national security issue.
Wow...Nardz, what did I do to get flagged?
The Press now exists to be a translator for Biden. A "Bidenator" if you will.
"There is no ambiguity in these remarks"
The remarks actually serve strategic ambiguity. Will the US intercede on Taiwan's behalf? Ambiguity allows for different interpretations. On the one hand you have Biden's off the cuff remarks at a presser, and on the other, the White House comments. The Chinese are left wondering exactly what's going on - strategic ambiguity, that's what.
trueman, providing his best bullshit in support of Biden.
Eat shit and die, asshole.
The Whitehouse remarks were the result of having to walk back Biden's remarks, which left no ambiguity. Which is what I actually stated. The Whitehouse realized 'oh shit the remarks are a huge deal, we need to play damage control'. You are arguing there is ambiguity only because the Whitehouse had to run cover, again, for Biden on major foreign policy issue. Biden's remarks had no ambiguity. The ambiguity only comes from the rush to cover their asses.
"The Whitehouse remarks were the result of having to walk back Biden's remarks, which left no ambiguity. "
The ambiguity is what the US would do if China invaded Taiwan, intervene, or stand aside. Both answers are plausible, and both have their believers on the Chinese side, hence strategic ambiguity.
"The Whitehouse realized 'oh shit the remarks are a huge deal, we need to play damage control'."
This is only your interpretation. The white house may have realized we have to say the opposite to maintain strategic ambiguity. Had Biden disavowed intervention, the whitehouse may have found it necessary to stress its commitment to Taiwanese independence and 'sovereignty' for a lack of a better word.
No, it isn't. It's the majority interpretation even the from many on the left wing media. And ambiguity is not a maintainable strategic position. And it doesn't matter what the Chinese believe, it's what Xi believes. The ambiguity only exists if Xi accepts that Biden's statement was a misstatement. In fact, the walking back of the statement multiple times makes it far more likely that Xi will suspect that we aren't willing to use military force rather than suspect we will. Like most Americans, according to polling, most world leaders no longer believe Biden is actually in charge but is merely a puppet for others. This actually has a long history of occurring in Chinese culture, and in communists culture, and since everyone suffers from ethnocentrism to some degree, it makes it more likely rather than less likely that Xi is in the camp of Biden being a mere figurehead. As thus, it makes Xi more likely to conclude that Biden's remarks are the opposite of policy, especially evidenced by the rush to walk them back multiple times.
"It's the majority interpretation even the from many on the left wing media. "
It's not important. It's the interpretation of the Chinese government that counts.
"The ambiguity only exists if Xi accepts that Biden's statement was a misstatement."
The ambiguity exists if both interpretations are plausible. That's what ambiguity means.
"As thus, it makes Xi more likely to conclude that Biden's remarks are the opposite of policy, especially evidenced by the rush to walk them back multiple times."
I'm in no position to read Xi's mind, and neither are you. We can parrot things we've heard on TV, but it doesn't really get us anywhere.
Xi has made no bones about his desire to conquer Taiwan. It's more likely that he will convince himself, short of a declared position, to accept the assessment that best suits his desire. That is human nature and is repeated time after time historically. German OHL in WW1 assuming resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare wouldn't lead to the US abandoning our stated neutrality (and the Zimmerman telegram only gave an excuse for Wilson to give into the growing pressure to declare war after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare). It lead Hitler to assume that Chamberlain and the French would back down again after he invaded Poland. It lead Tojo to believe that the US was unwilling to fight, that a quick victory at Pearl Harbor and the South Pacific would result in us suing for peace. It lead Stalin to believe that he could encourage and support Kim in invading South Korea without the US getting involved. It lead Hussein to misread the situation in regards to Kuwait. It lead bin Laden to assume that our previous responses to his actions in the Middle East would result in us not responding after 9/11. And that's just the 20th century and not even an exhaustive list at that. That's the thing about tyrants, when you leave them two options as to how to interpret your possible reactions, they will invariably choose the one that benefits their desires. Especially if your recent actions have been directed at avoiding confrontation at all costs, or abandoning allies rather than risking conflict.
"Xi has made no bones about his desire to conquer Taiwan. "
They talk but often enough, it's only talk. Mao used to talk about a world communist revolution, a lot, and when militant students in Hong Kong seized the colony for themselves and invited Mao to step in and take over, he not so politely declined their offer, and the Hong Kong police eventually got the upper hand and returned everything to normal. Including Mao's yammering about world communist revolution.
China's invasion of Taiwan would require an enormous national mobilization, and it's not clear that Xi or anyone else in Beijing is up to the task. It's a fractious country and every region is its own power base, and dictats from Beijing are often given the foot dragging treatment. I wrote a while ago how Beijing decided to go on daylight savings time. Disaster. Nobody followed and chaos ensued and the matter was shelved.
"It lead Stalin to believe that he could encourage and support Kim in invading South Korea without the US getting involved."
The invasion of South Korea was down to Kim Il Sung, and it surprised Stalin and was against his wishes. Your version was widely believed until the Soviet archives were opened up under Yeltsin and academics were given free reign. Quite a pleasant surprise for them, and they discovered a few things that overturned the conventional wisdom. It was not to last though, as the archives were once again sealed and kept from the eyes of curious academics.
Even if my interpretation of Kim's actions was incorrect, he correctly assumed the Soviets and Maoists China would support him. And neither Stalin or Mao had made it clear about their opposition, therefore that further supports my thesis that ambiguity isn't effective to achieve your desired foreign policy goals.
"And neither Stalin or Mao had made it clear about their opposition"
Korea was a deal put together by the UN general assembly after the war and Stalin signed off on it. Stalin supported a divided Korea and a divided Germany and other arrangements ironed out with the allies.
Stalin didn't actually support either, he did everything possible short of war to sabotage both. Additionally, Korea wasn't a UN creation, it was from the Potsdam and Yalta conferences, and agreements arrived shortly after Japanese surrender, before the UN was even established.
"Stalin didn't actually support either"
He signed off on the Korea arrangements with the allies and was dragged into the war by Kim Il Sung's actions. The Soviet archives opened during the Yeltsin years revealed this, though it was contrary to the conventional wisdom of western academics and pundits.
Ambiguity is not, historically speaking, ever a successful deterrence. I can't come up with a single example in history that demonstrates it as an effective deterrence. That's why Truman felt deeply that Korea was necessary, because we had been ambiguous with Stalin, and it resulted in Soviet aggression and territorial expansion and suppression across Eastern and Central Europe. He committed troops to Korea not to preserve South Korea but to convince Stalin that the US was devoted to protecting and supporting our allies.
Korea was all about removing any chance of ambiguity. As was our reaction to the placement of missiles in Cuba. As well as our formal commitment to protect Sweden, Finland and Austria despite none of them being formal allies, or part of NATO.
If you rely on ambiguity as a deterrence (which wasn't our official policy until Carter anyhow) you shouldn't be surprised when it doesn't work. Because it's never worked. If Xi is being honest about his desires to conquer Taiwan, than the best hope of avoiding that invasion would have been Biden's original statement without any walking back. However, it may not be the best to maintain less than hostile relations with China. If the latter is our primary concern, which seems likely based upon the rush to walk back Biden's remarks and reaffirm strategic ambiguity, than that argues strongly that we wouldn't be willing to protect Taiwanese independence. That we care more about Chinese relations than Taiwanese independence. Strategic ambiguity might have been enough before Biden's statement on Sunday, but since it, and the rush to walk it back, it just really reduced any deterrent impact that the policy may have had. Before Xi, it also wasn't as critical for it to be deterrent. China was thawing and working hard to reform it's image. The US had a large and vibrant semiconductor manufacturing base until the early 21st century. China was as devoted as the west was to maintaining fairly normal and friendly relationships, but as early as 2008, and Xi's rise to power, China has sprinted back into itself again. Which is a fairly typical pattern in Chinese dynasties.
Xi's shown that he is willing to sacrifice relations with the west to achieve his goals. He has worked hard to build up an economic alliance that will allow China to become independent of western economies. He's focused military acquisition on becoming a naval power capable of exerting power in the South Pacific. He has worked hard on improving and normalizing relations with former border adversaries, namely Russia, Mongolia, Vietnam and India. Mongolia primarily due to its long history of ties to Russia, which were originally formed during the time of Tsars to protect Mongolia from possible Chinese aggression (and later Japanese aggression and then back to Chinese aggression). He also has focused strongly on acquiring a monopoly on the primary rare resource that the west is most reliant on economically (not oil but rare earths), making the west reliant on China and less capable of acting adversarial in the case of Chinese aggression in the South Pacific.
Acquisition of 60% of the world semiconductor manufacturing would only add to these strategic aim. If he controlled both the majority of rare earth production and semiconductor manufacturing he would be in a position to dictate to the world. Even more so than control of petroleum. You can't build computers, solar panels or even basically run a modern society, without either of those things. And it would take lots of money and resources for the west to develop our own supply of either, independent from China and Taiwan.
Russia oil production has thrown the world into chaos, economically, mainly because the west has restricted our ability to produce our own, but the lag time needed to offset loss of Russian oil is far smaller than the lag time needed for us to develop our own rare earth mining and refining capabilities, as well as to re-establish our own semiconductor manufacturing ability (if we even could, given our regulatory state which has largely been the reason the former has never been done while the latter died). Before we could even begin Congress and the Whitehouse (and Canadian Parliament) in North America would have to undo multiple laws and regulations. In Europe, it would take the same from the EU bureaucracy. Then it would take massive investment from the private sector (which would take a major roll back of ESG, as both aren't the most environmentally friendly industries, which is why we regulated them basically out of existence). Then it would require a massive investment in workforce retraining, and a pivot from encouraging four year university degrees to promoting vocational training to produce the skill workers necessary to do the work (as those that did it a generation ago are rapidly aging out of the work force). None of these things would take anything less than years to develop. We've painted ourselves into a strategic losing position if we hoped to realistically confront and contain China.
"Ambiguity is not, historically speaking, ever a successful deterrence. "
Ambiguity isn't about deterrence. It's about eating your cake and having it too, to quote the good book, yet again. Maintaining a trading relation with China, all the while threatening retaliation if she misbehaves. China's happy, Taiwan's happy and our corporate masters are happy too. It's about condemning terrorism on the one hand, and supporting al Qaeda's battle against the Assad government in Syria on the other.
And as any reading of history demonstrates you can't maintain this duality for very long, which is the entire point of the quote eat your cake and having it too. It's a futile strategy and shortsighted, which has been my point from the start. And Biden's remarks made even that short term gains even shorter.
"And as any reading of history demonstrates you can't maintain this duality for very long"
Long enough to eat a cake? What more time do you need?
"Will Xi Jinping just chalk up Biden's latest remarks as an accidental straying from "strategic ambiguity"?"
Or, like the rest of us, he could chalk it up to an incompetent piece of shit occupying the WH.
Thanks be to all the TDS-addled assholes who provided this result; bevis and brandyshit both still trying to justify their stupidity.
Biden is a fucking international disaster. As much as it kills me to say this, he needs to read the NYT's open letter to his administration and take their advice.
Never underestimate Joe's ability to fuck things up.
let him Crazy Ivan a little. it's fun!
China need not worry, when was the last time America kept its commitments. they just have to ask South Vietnam or Libbia or most recently Afganistan
South Vietnam really takes the cake. The ARVN was holding its own against the NVA, until Congress decided to withhold the armaments and ammo we had already promised them and had contracts and treaties that bound us to those promises. It's hard to fight back when you run out of ammo.
" It's hard to fight back when you run out of ammo."
'Grab them by the belt' was the NVA strategy, get so close to the enemy that their overwhelming advantage in materiel was obviated and it was down to fighting man to man, as god intended, a strategy that clearly favored the NVA, what with the US GIs typically clueless as to what they were doing and why they were there in the first place.
Does trueman ever run out of bullshit? Never has here.
That's a myth, the NVA was heavily supplied by China and the Soviet Union and the captured ammunition strategy was inconsequential to their actual supply and logistics. First, their armaments weren't even compatible with US ammunition. Second, it's a stupid strategy from a logistical standpoint. You can't be guaranteed to keep yourself supplied, thus majorly hampering any military operation. Anyone who buys that myth is extremely naive. The VC did do that to a degree in 1965, and suffered majorly from it, and was never really a relevant threat. Many NVA operations were primarily aimed at trying to maintain the VC with arms and armaments necessary to keep them even as a nuisance force.
And basically by 1967, the VC had almost completely stopped existing as an armed formation, generally what was labeled after 1967 as VC were actually NVA wearing indigenous clothing instead of uniforms.
The NVA was a modern military, armed with state of the art Communist Bloc armaments, trained by Soviet advisors to the same level as Soviet soldiers. They were a conventional force, with a very sophisticated logistical arm, that we failed to cut, mainly because it largely was in Laos and Cambodia, and we never had a concerted effort to cut it. We would bomb it periodically, and launch special operations against it, but always in fits, rather than a concerted effort, due to public perception. When Nixon began dedicated strikes against it, they were largely unpopular in the public, but really did severely curtail NVA operations and contributed greatly to the ARVN gaining the upper hand enough that we could successfully implement Vietnamization of the war.
Oh they used bikes and human to supply some of their supplies, but never enough. The majority was delivered by trucks and was a traditional military logistical column. The idea that the NVA either acquired their weapons from America, or transported it all by man and bicycle is a myth.
Just like the myth that the NVA was a group of underarmed, untrained, indigenous guerrilla group, or that our main enemy was the VC. The NVA was a conventional force that launched conventional operations. Meeting engagements, ambushes etc are not unconventional warfare. They made up the majority of action in both theaters of World War 2 and Korea, also. Tet, the Easter offensive, Ia Drang, Hamburger Hill, Khe Sahm, etc we all conventional operations on both sides. That was part of the problem. The public thought we were fighting a bunch of poorly armed farmers when in fact we were fighting a conventional army using conventional tactics. We didn't have a Frontline, as our strategy was never reliant on capturing territory so much as reducing the effectiveness of the NVA to launch operations in South Vietnam. And due to the ROE, we largely could only degrade those abilities in South Vietnam, while largely allowing resupply and reinforcement from North Vietnam to continue mostly unimpeded. It's the Police Action Mentality, which also persisted in Afghanistan.
And was largely the result of Vietnam being a proxy war with the USSR and ChiComs.
"The NVA was a modern military, armed with state of the art Communist Bloc armaments, trained by Soviet advisors to the same level as Soviet soldiers."
What surprised me was the NVA was issued with pornographic photos, presumably to improve their morale and give them something to help them masturbate, like the magazines given to sperm donors at fertility clinics.
"We would bomb it periodically, and launch special operations against it,"
The defoliants were also used to allow aircraft to spot activity on the ground. Agent Orange was the most notorious and was sprayed on tens of millions of hectares.
"The idea that the NVA either acquired their weapons from America, or transported it all by man and bicycle is a myth."
That was the Khmer Rouge. They were outfitted with American weapons.
It's a common myth touted often about the NVA as well. The rest of your remarks are complete non-sequitor. APO delivered lots of porn to our troops. MPs and CID did almost nothing to shut down prostitution and brothels, in fact, quite often medical units were utilized to treat brothel workers for STDs as a means of making them safer for our troops (we also did similar things in Paris in 1944 and Italy in 1943-45 after we realized that was more effective than trying to close brothels). We also spent major assets on transporting USO troops, largely populated by attractive women, to remote firebases since World War 1. That scene from Full Metal Jacket, where joker is directed to get a shot of the actresses 'dew on her bush' was based on actual experiences of troops in Vietnam.
As for defoliation, it was primarily aimed at exposing the NVA logistical routes, to hit them better, not as commonly believed to allow our infantry to spot them easier. Most defoliation took place in areas known as major logistical routes, especially the southern ends of the Ho Chi Minh trail. The utilization of it to aid our infantry is primarily a Hollywood creation. As is the effectiveness of the NVA to close with our troops to neutralize out artillery and air support. Additionally, even by what the Vietnamese are willing to admit as casualties, and the fact that the US Army never failed, nor did the Marines, to capture an objective or hold an abjective, is the idea that North Vietnam created a tactical situation our military wasn't capable of handling. The problem was in our strategy, which was to establish temporary firebases to control an area the NVA were operating in, degrade their ability to operate and then withdraw from the firebase, and relocate to another area, allowing the NVA to return. On the tactical level the US military was successful nearly 100% of the time against the NVA. And realistically we achieved our goals in 1973. It was our failure to live up to our agreement in 1975, which led to South Vietnam being defeated. The ARVN was holding their own, even pushing the NVA back until they ARVN ran out of ammunition. They mostly had peace between 1973 and 1975. We established an independent South Vietnam, and a functioning ARVN, but abandoned it when they needed it most. If we had delivered the ammunition and armaments we had promised them, the NVA offensive would likely have been a failure. The NVA own generals concluded this, based upon early combat when the ARVN was operating with adequate ammunition. Unlike the ANA, the ARVN really was an effective fighting force and didn't require direct US military intervention, but they had planned logistics based upon promises made by Nixon and his predecessors. It had nothing to do with NVA grab them by the belt strategy. It was entirely due to us abandoning South Vietnam.
"It was entirely due to us abandoning South Vietnam."
This of course was a long term strategy of the NVA, to sap American resolve to involve itself in Indochinese affairs. It worked. Nixon and the politicians were looking to get out, students protesting the war even brandished the flag of North Vietnam on their marches. Cultural icons visited Hanoi and posed for pictures sitting at Soviet anti-aircraft emplacements and sang songs with local peasants. The Vietnamese knew they could exploit American irresolution and that's a fair part of their victory. That and a willingness to make unbelievably great sacrifices for their cause.
They knew they couldn't beat America like they drove out the French. They knew that by 1967. Support of the war was actually pretty high until 1968. It only began to dwindle after the media largely misrepresented NVA success in Tet. It actually was a major military failure, and basically curtailed NVA offensive military operations for over two years other than small scale actions, and defensive actions.
During that time the US was largely able to successfully train up the ARVN and turn over combat operations.
Even the Easter offensive of 1972, the first major NVA military operation since Tet, was largely an ARVN operation, with the US primarily in a support and advising role. The outnumbered ARVN was initially driven back but able to hold strategic positions, and launch a successful counterattack that sent the NVA into retreat. It was the largest invasion since Chinese invasions over a century prior. And the NVA failed to make it decisive or achieve their goals. That is why they waited two more years after the Paris Peace Accords before being able to launch another attack. And at the start, they weren't sure if the US was would resupply South Vietnam or not. That wasn't a given until Congress voted to withhold supplies that South Vietnam had already paid for. North Vietnam and the Soviets only took advantage of growing unpopularity after Tet, but the unpopularity was largely the result of Cronkite and others misrepresenting what happened in Tet. It was a military debacle for North Vietnam and final proof that their grab them by the belt mentality was doomed to failure. The Easter offensive was a much more conventional style attack and was aimed at overwhelming the ARVN, which had become the primary combat force in Vietnam. No matter how you look at it, the evidence shows Nixon's Vietnamization policy was successful. It only failed because Congress withheld arms South Vietnam desperately needed after a few weeks of the 1975 offensive, and South Vietnam had already paid for.
Congressional actions were a complete stab in the back and not due to any brilliant strategy or long game North Vietnam played. It was entirely due to our politicians reneging on promises we made, and South Vietnam had already paid for. And that was primarily because the Democrats wanted to embarrass Ford and further embarrass Nixon. It had nothing to do with public perception, since we were never planning on sending troops back to Vietnam. And many in the American public were angered by North Vietnam's breaking of the Paris Peace Accords.
The main difference between the Paris Peace Accords and the Korean Cease Fire is that the US never left any ambiguity about our commitment to South Korea. The Kims have been playing the long game for decades now, convinced the US would eventually renege on our promises to the ROK, in fact North Korea became far more hostile following 1975, convinced the US was ready to abandon South Korea like we abandoned South Vietnam. Today, South Korea is strong enough to likely be able to resist North Korea by itself, if China doesn't get involved.
"It only failed because Congress withheld arms South Vietnam desperately needed after a few weeks of the 1975 offensive, and South Vietnam had already paid for. "
I understand it's important to blame congress. That doesn't change the fact that the NVA always had their eye on American public and political opinion, and that manipulating it was an essential key to their success. That and their resolve to continue fighting no matter what. More you can say for their opponents, whether the Americans or the dictators of the south.
"US never left any ambiguity about our commitment to South Korea."
Are you sure about that? Have you forgotten that Truman (no relation) fired General MacArthur for his views on the war? It was an enormous deal at the time and Truman was excoriated for it. Armistice negotiations commenced shortly after MacArthur was sent packing. Continuing to fight a stale-mated war, bombing the hell out of the north, while opening negotiations after firing the chief hawk is fairly high on the ambiguity scale.
Again that is historically inaccurate. Truman fired MacArthur for disobeying orders which lead to a major military blunder and inability to predict or respond effectively to Chinese aggression. MacArthur's response was to request nuclear weapons. Truman shot that down. MacArthur then publicly criticized Truman, which is a direct violation of the UCMJ and long standing military tradition. At no point did Truman ever consider, or broadcast any desire to withdraw from South Korea. There was never any ambiguity about our defense of South Korea, rather it was a disagreement about expanding the war into China and possibly Soviet territory or fighting in Korea alone. Truman fully supported the former, while MacArthur loudly, publicly, and illegally, under military law, pushed for the latter. Truman was forced to fire MacArthur, either that or abandon any pretense that the military was under civilian control.
As for Vietnam monitoring and using American public sentiment, that is at best apocryphal. And it wasn't the case by 1975 and had almost no bearing on what happened in 1975. And very little bearing on what Nixon had achieved in Vietnamization by 1973. Delivering weapons we had already agreed to sell to South Vietnam and they had already paid for was not derailed by North Vietnam playing some strategic long propaganda campaign. The fall of South Vietnam was not some masterstroke of North Vietnamese propaganda or taking advantage of public discourse. It was entirely a democratic lead action to deny us fulfilling contracts that Congress had already approved, and we had received payment for, prior to North Vietnam launching their offensive. This directly led to the ARVN crumbling once supplies starting running short, and North Vietnam overrunning South Vietnam. Something they hadn't been able to do in 1972, when they invaded and we had very little US forces involved by that point, and the fighting was almost exclusively conducted by South Vietnamese forces, with US provided supplies. Congress approved the weapons purchase in 1974, South Vietnam paid for them, then Congress, controlled by the Democrats withdrew that aid exactly when South Vietnam needed it the most (i.e. just when South Vietnamese forces were running low on supplies but successfully resisting North Vietnam's invasion).
Your interpretation is the biggest myth of the Vietnam War and one created almost exclusively by the media. And one wholly unsupported by any actual facts. Yeah the war was unpopular in 1968, and yes Nixon ran on withdrawing with dignity, but he won re-election despite combat forces still in Vietnam in 1972. The US achieved most of its goals at the Paris Peace Accords, despite Hollywood rewriting of events. The Easter offensive was a failure for North Vietnam in 1972, and almost exclusively the result of combat by the South Vietnamese military (US troops were down to less than 50,000, almost exclusively in support roles by that point). North Vietnam was so badly hurt by the failure of the Easter offensive that it took them three years to recover. Even after they violated the treaty, initially their offensive was stopped almost cold, with huge casualties, without any American intervention. All it would have taken was to honor the contracts Congress had already approved in 1974, for South Vietnam to continue to fight. The collapse of the South Vietnamese forces was never due to American public perception. American public perception did not prevent Congress from originally approving military aid, which was paid for as agreed by South Vietnam, in 1974. Some of it was already en route when Congress stabbed South Vietnam in the back by reneging on a signed and approved contract. Delivery of the paid for supplies would not have required US military intervention. It wouldn't have required US military forces to return to Vietnam. All that was required was for Congress to do absolutely nothing, as the shipments had already been approved, paid for, and many were already being transported and others being readied for transport. This isn't a lie I have to tell myself. These are facts. Facts that the media has largely ignored for decades.
The US Military was never driven from Vietnam. Yes, the communists governments, primarily the Soviets, not the North Vietnamese (again that is a myth, subversive actions with regards to supporting the protests were almost exclusively conducted by the KGB, not the North Vietnamese government) did try to use the protests to their advantage, but the protests actually turned off many Americans, especially after Chicago 1968. It directly led to Nixon winning the election on 1968 (and led far more to the division of Democratic party than LBJs civil rights actions in 1965) and re-election in 1972. These actions were not the desired outcome of either the Soviets and North Vietnam, who far more preferred the Democrats to win, as they viewed the Democrats as softer on military matters. By 1970, despite the war being unpopular, the peace movement was even more unpopular. And the actions of protestors, especially as they grew more militant, turned off many would be supporters. Yes, as in Afghanistan Americans wanted out, but they far preferred getting out with dignity as Nixon promised (and largely delivered in 1973) as opposed to cut and run. And the abandonment of South Vietnam completely in 1975 was overwhelmingly unpopular, and gave Ford a chance at winning in 1976, something the economy and Watergate should have made damn near close to impossible.
In fact, most political historians agree that the costliest moment in the campaign for Ford was his infamous response to the so called Polish Question in the 1976 debate. Even Carter stated this was the only thing that won him the election. Ford wanted to deliver the weapons and supplies as agreed. He pardoned Nixon for Watergate, his economy stunk. Carter barely won. Given the myth that Congress acted to withhold vital supplies when South Vietnam desperately needed them due to public pressure and desire to end all our ties to South Vietnam seems extremely dubious based on all these facts. Rather the costliest thing was that the Polish Question made Ford appear soft towards the Soviets, something the Carter campaign seized on immediately and ran on. Rather than running as the peace and hippie candidate, Carter ran the last couple of weeks as the foreign policy hardliner. He played up his Annapolis education and service in the Navy and uncompromising attitude towards Soviet aggression, as opposed to Ford who 'lost' Vietnam and didn't understand Eastern Europe. Far from running as a dove, Carter ran as a dedicated cold warrior, although he governed as a dove. This was largely because Congress didn't allow him to do anything else. Carter actually did want to expand and reform and rearm our military for the most part, and fought hard with his own party over it. He gets blamed for agreeing to the anti-military policies Congress enacted. Despite that, Carter really did help lay the foundation for the emergence of the US military as the dominant world power that Reagan achieved. Almost every single weapons program we now take for granted as the backbone of our military prowess was started or approved under Carter and Ford. Even those started under Ford, Carter managed to protect from a Congress bent on disarmament. Carter did a lot of things wrong, but he really doesn't deserve his reputation as a Cold War dove, at least not entirely. Nor does election outcomes in 1968, 1972, or 1976 suggest that public pressure regarding Vietnam was so great that it forced Nixon and Ford and Congress to abandon Vietnam. If anything, the results show exactly the opposite. Their is absolutely no other explanation for how close Ford came to winning in 1976, other than the public reaction to the Democratically controlled Congress abandonment of Vietnam. Not a single thing was going right for Ford, even before he took office. Carter should have waltzed into the Whitehouse. Much like Bush did in 1988. Or possibly even by as large a majority as Reagan did in 1984.
In fact, the Democratic party still hasn't fully been able to shake the stigma that started in 1968 at their Chicago convention, and was reinforced by Congress's actions in 1975. Prior to these two actions, Americans were almost evenly divided as to which party was better on national security and military strength, and slightly favored the Democrats. Since 1975, and starting in 1968, that trend has fully reversed, with the Republicans almost always comfortably leading in both catagories.
"At no point did Truman ever consider, or broadcast any desire to withdraw from South Korea. "
Truman did however enter into armistice negotiations very soon after MacArthur was fired. All the time dropping enormous amounts of bombs on the north. I think North Korea today has the distinction of being in the top 3 most heavily bombed nations on the planet. That's ambiguity. Firing the leading hawk, entering peace talks on the one hand, while on the other bombing the hell out of the place. Textbook ambiguity.
"That's a myth, the NVA was heavily supplied by China and the Soviet Union and the captured ammunition strategy was inconsequential to their actual supply and logistics. "
You have grabbed the wrong end of the stick and are beating about the bush with it. Grab them by the belt means getting extremely close to the enemy so that air strike, napalm, artillery can't be used against you, because the enemy dearly wishes to avoid killing their own. Grab them by the belt doesn't mean arming yourself by swiping the enemy's gear.
Even that is a myth, the get close strategy to offset our advantage in artillery and air power didn't actually aid the NVA. And it really wasn't practiced by them either. Our troops largely were confident enough in air power and artillery to call in close support even danger close. As the Germans found out in WW2 and the NoKo and ChiComs found out in Korea, when both tried the same tactics without success. A realistic reading of battles, even meeting engagements, showed that it didn't benefit the NVA to get in close. Mainly because our infantry tactics have always been to use infantry to make engagement and then call in artillery and air power to overcome the enemy. We've stressed since WW1 the close coordination between infantry, artillery and air power. Getting in close actually works right into our tactics. It's the entire purpose of firebases in Vietnam and FOB in Afghanistan and Iraq. We want you to get in close. Our artillery and air support are the best in the world. If you believe that the Vietnamese came up with these tactics, you actually haven't studied military history, specifically US military history. Both the Germans and Japanese tried the same thing in World War 2 and found out it didn't work. US Army (and Marine Corp) spends a large percentage of our training time on coordinating between infantry, artillery and air, including and especially danger close support. The part about Broken Arrow on the movie We Were Soldiers, actually happened, the book explained it much better than the movie ever could. Read letters from NVA troops, German troops, Japanese troops, they all remarked on how the US infantry was more than willing to call in fire much closer to their own position, than our opponents thought possible. In many cases, including calling fire in on our own position when necessary. They also remarked at how closing with US infantry didn't stop us from calling in fire, like it did with European militaries they had fought. And it amazed them how effective we utilized this ability and how it was nearly impossible to get close enough to US infantry to counteract these assets. Our entire combat arms doctrine relies on using infantry and cavalry to make contact and call in close support. We emphasize maneuver under fire, to fix them in position so we can eliminate them with close support. The North Vietnamese strategy worked with the French mainly because the French use artillery to soften enemy forces, and rely on infantry to eliminate them. It's the European method, infantry is the primary combat arm. Artillery is a supportive combat arm. It's the exact opposite in the US military, especially the Army. Artillery is the King of Battle. Infantry supports artillery, not the other way around. Infantry isn't expected to break the enemy, but to find the enemy, fix them in place, and then allow artillery and air support to destroy the enemy. Most European armies are hesitant to call in artillery closer than 100 meters. In the US Army we train heavily to do this. One of the main reasons Europe considers the US Army less professional, and always has, is that we don't stress infantry supremacy. Our military isn't entirely built to support the infantry as the primary arm. Instead, infantry is more trained to be an adjunct of artillery and air power. The NVA took huge casualties as a result of believing in the grab them by the belt strategy would be successful. And they abandoned it after Tet, because it hadn't ever worked. Not from Ia Dang, which was the first time they tried it in a major operation to Tet, while it costs them heavy casualties. It should also be noted that Soviet military doctrine also changed as Soviet advisors saw that closing quickly didn't reduce effectiveness of US artillery and air power. It also led the Soviets to abandon hope of a conventional victory against a NATO dominated by the US military. They began to invest much more heavily in close ADA and tactical nukes after 1968. Their ADA development had heavily geared towards defending strategic targets, while they believed that closing quickly in overwhelming numbers would negate our technological edge in artillery and air support. Vietnam demonstrated that this tactical doctrine was false. That's why anyone who believes Russia would stick to conventional weapons if war broke out between them and us is wrong. Their generals were educated by the post 1968 Soviets, who realized that our edge in artillery and close air support largely countered their edge in manpower, and rendered it neutral at best and made the possibility of a conventional victory extremely remote.
China on the other hand provided very little training, advising or observation to North Vietnam, and largely only supplied armaments and monetary support. Their last direct experience ended in 1954. Their current generation of generals are three generations removed, whereas Russia is one generation removed. China's most recent foes haven't relied on air power and artillery. They haven't trained to the level the US military has, for the needed level of close coordination that is necessary for our tactical doctrine to be successful (we've been developing it really since the Revolution, where even the British admitted our artillery was far more effective than theirs and made up for any shortages of infantry tactics). We perfected it during two world wars, and kept the edge in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Read the Last Outpost to get an idea of how we used it effectively in Afghanistan. Again, the Taliban learned that getting close didn't stop us from effectively using air and artillery against them, which is why after 2010, they largely resorted to IEDs as opposed to ambush or assaults. They only reverted to the latter as we drew down combat forces as turned over security to the Afghani Army, which was far less adapt at this doctrine, and the major nail in the coffin for the Afghani armed forces was the removal of US air and artillery support. We supplied all the necessary equipment to the Afghanis to conduct these missions on their own, but they spent little time or effort to master them, and their infantry wasn't trained like a European or even an Eastern Asian Army to be an independent arm, capable of conducting unsupported operations. That was a major contributing factor to the rapid advance of the Taliban.
In summary, grabbing them by the belt actually plays right into the US Army's tactical doctrine. It allows us to use our best assets. It's what we train for. Because of Iraq and Afghanistan we have spent billions of dollars on improving this capability (mostly Iraq, where the insurgency quickly learned that was a no win situation and resorted to urban combat to try and utilize our aversion to civilian casualties to neutralize artillery and air). This is why in Iraq the USMC was more successful early in urban combat, because they emphasize more aggression over fixing, maneuvering and support, to overcome obstacles. But then we developed guided artillery munitions and JDAM and other similar weapons, which allowed the US Army to be as effective (more effective in the end) than the USMC. The USMC is primarily an assault force, or storm troopers in the old verbage, whereas the US Army is a maneuver and occupation force. When the two work together, it's a deadly combination. Throw in the Air Force and Navy, which has long worked on close support, and it's difficult to overcome using conventional warfare. IEDs somewhat negated this, but even then we learned how to counter those.
"The NVA took huge casualties as a result of believing in the grab them by the belt strategy would be successful. And they abandoned it after Tet, because it hadn't ever worked."
The NVA managed to tote up an enormous amount of casualties, without any of the materiel advantages enjoyed by the US. So great were they, American politicians and public grew disillusioned and lost their confidence, essentially washing their hands of the matter, with a policy called, I shit you not, 'Vietnamization.'
I'm not sure about the effects of Tet on the NVA leadership. It was a great success from a propaganda point of view, waltzing into the US embassy in Saigon, and taking over the place. But politically it was a disaster. Typically with communists, they assumed the working classes would take up arms, given the chance, and join the revolution. It didn't happen, and a general slaughter of 'class traitors' was the result. As I say, I don't know how this affected NVA strategy vis a vis the US.
We took 50,000 casualties in 16 years of combat. We took that many in one month of World War 2. The North Vietnamese by their accounts took 650,000 in the same period, by our account over a million. We didn't take large casualties. We took half as many casualties in just three years of Korea as we did in 16 years of combat in Vietnam.
Additionally, the NVA was not lacking in material supplies like you contend. I already addressed that myth at length above. The Soviets and ChiComs spent billions supplying them with the most advanced Soviet and Chinese armaments and ammo available. The Soviets also supplied tens of thousands of military advisors to train them and provide intelligence and logistical support. The NVA was a well equipped force, well trained by Soviet standards. You believe a lot of Hollywood myths.
In reality, our casualties were extremely light, compared to previous engagements. Our casulaties in Vietnam were equivalent to our casualties in the three months of the Battle of Normandy. The Battle of Attu island was actually bloodier, based on percentage of casualties compared to troops involved. As a percentage of troops who served our casualty rate was greater in Korea than Vietnam. Nothing you've stated so far is correct and is largely based upon common myths about Vietnam.
"In reality, our casualties were extremely light, compared to previous engagements"
Irrelevant. You could also say casualties were extremely heavy compared to later engagements.
And to claim that the NVA were not lacking in material resources is ludicrous. NVA lacked nuclear missiles, nuclear submarines, a functioning air force, battle ships, air craft carriers, a productive functioning economy encompassing most of the globe, the wealthiest citizens in the world as a tax base, pretty much everything you can think of except an iron will not to surrender and pay the ultimate price if necessary.
You said we took heavy casualties. So no previous, and closer in terms of time, conflict s are not irrelevant.
You are talking strategic capabilities, which played no role in the Vietnamese conflict. Our nuclear arms did not play any role in Vietnam, nor did our Nuclear missile force. North Vietnam did not lack an air force, they were equipped with some of the most advanced Soviet fighters of the time, and actually performed rather well. They also had an extremely advanced air defense, courtesy of the Soviets, capability that severely hindered our air power and forced the USAF and USN to spend vast resources developing countermeasures for. Which paid off dividends in our subsequent conflicts. Directly leading to the creation of wild weasel air craft, HARM missiles, electronic warfare dedicated aircraft, airborne radar and Stealth technology, as well as guided munitions and fire and forget technology. As for their economy, it was supported by the second wealthiest economy in the world at the time, and supported further by the most populous country. Your problem is every one of your assessments is based upon North Vietnam as acting in a vacuum. You completely ignore how much support they received from the Soviets and China. They didn't need Nuclear weapons, as both the Soviets and Chinese were already nuclear powers, and actually had a larger nuclear force then we did. They didn't need submarines, because the Soviets had those already to, and they played no part in Vietnam on either side. The Soviet Union and it's satellite countries supplied everything the North Vietnamese needed that you say gave us an advantage. As for battleships, battleships were obsolete as of 7 December, 1941 and didn't play any role in any military action after that date, except as floating artillery. If you had said aircraft carriers you would have been on more even ground, but we never had more than one flattop serving in Vietnam at a time. Almost all of our flattops were serving in deterrence rolls against the Soviets. None of our submarines patrolled routinely or ran interdiction patrols. We didn't sink a single ship by submarine. They were a complete non entity, especially as Vietnam was able to resupply largely by land routes from China and the US was never going to sink a Soviet flagged vessel. The Soviets and Eastern block countries provided almost all the aid free of charge, so economics was of very little importance. The Soviets cared more that they were Stalinist-Leninist Communists, and that was enough.
The whole David vs Goliath interpretation of the Vietnam War is complete and utter bullshit. It completely ignores the vast support of The Soviets, Eastern Block Countries and China. To them it was all about ideology. Communism failed to win in Korea, and the Soviets vowed never to allow that to happen again, so they went all in to aid Vietnam. It's also why they invaded Afghanistan, to support the failed Afghani Communist government. Expansion into Europe looked mainly to have been checked, which left Asia as the obvious next theater to expand Communism. And they were going to do it. And it wasn't just Vietnam, it was also Laos and Cambodia. All of which the Soviets were supporting before the US got involved. And which the Soviets continued to support after the US left (China and Soviets were almost always reluctant allies and often were adversarial, which was a large part of the cause behind the China Vietnam war and subsequent border clashes post Vietnam). Our biggest mistake was in rejecting Ho Chi Minh after Vietnam and supporting French assertion of control of Vietnam, this pushed him right into Soviets hands. He actually preferred to be allied with the US. The US had aided him in his fight against the Japanese and he rightly expected that Vietnam should have been independent after World War 2. By ignoring his outreach, in favor of France's dubious claim (France had done absolutely nothing, even after being liberated, to repulse Japanese control of Indochina), we created a vacuum that first Stalin and then Kruschev, not to mention Mao, were more than happy to fill.
"Our nuclear arms did not play any role in Vietnam, nor did our Nuclear missile force. "
I'm afraid they did. Nixon used the mad man theory, that he was crazy enough to use nuclear weapons to gain concessions from the north. The mad man theory wouldn't have worked if the US didn't have nuclear weapons ready to be used at Nixon's fingertips. Suffice it to say, the Vietnamese didn't have nuclear weapons, or the entire conflict wouldn't have taken place. The US were not about to invade a nuclear armed country.
As I say, the argument that the north and the US were equal or near equal in terms of materiel is ludicrous. Vietnam was a poor country brutalized and exploited by the French and Japanese. The US was the wealthiest nation on the planet.
You remind me of one of the posters here who seriously maintained that the Vietnam war was actually three wars, with the US winning two of them, and sitting out the third.
I don't have a big problem with President Biden statement. I think it may remind China's President Xi Jinping that there is a big difference between talking about war and actually committing to war. Putin is finding that out now in Ukraine. Even if the US commitment is no more than we are doing for Ukraine, taking Tawain would be costly. This might make the Chinese government thing that ambiguity is still valuable. I look for complaints from China but not much more.
Definitely hasn't studied history have you? It was the US commitment to protecting the South Pacific, particularly the Phillippines which convinced Japan to launch Pearl Harbor. If the same thread, if China is hell bent on invading Taiwan, and they perceive we will assist in defending Taiwan, it gives them reason to attempt an attack against us prior to give them breathing room to attack Taiwan.
If, as you say the US commitment to the South Pacific led to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chinese government might look at that and see that the Japanese attack did not end well for that country.
I also not that you mentioned the Chinese government being hell bend on invading Taiwan. I think the goal is longer term. The Chinese government waited almost 100 years for Hong Kong, I suspect they would wait as long for Taiwan.
Nice try. Rarely do tyrants believe that they will suffer the same consequences as previous actions have resulted in. Additionally, this again requires China and Xi in particular to believe that the US will actually use force. If they base their decision based upon Ukraine and Afghanistan, this doesn't seem to be a very likely assessment on their part. We would have been far better to ignore Ukraine than they half assed response we've launched. Stated Ukraine wasn't a vital interest so we weren't going to get involved at all, while reinforcing that we would intervene if we had a vital interest in the situation, such as we obviously do in Taiwan related to their production of semiconductors. We didn't need to specifically state Taiwan, because China is well aware of the strategic value of Taiwan.
As for the Hong Kong thing, there are three major self evident rebuttals. The Chinese already had an agreement to return Hong Kong, so they knew it was already a done thing. This predated the Chinese government. So, that's a totally different kettle of fish. The second rebuttal is that Chinese military spending and acquisition has been unambiguously geared for two decades geared towards strengthening naval strength, especially amphibious assault. This isn't even a question, it's basic facts. A third major rebuttal is China under the communist have a history of using military force against it's neighbors, far more often, than using the long game. They used it against Tibet, used it against Vietnam twice since 1975 and have used it in India in the past couple of years (although the latter resulted in a return to the status quo). So, basically, your analysis is grasping at straws, rather than based upon actual facts.
The National School Boards Association letter to the White House first draft included calling for the deployment of the Army National Guard and the military police to monitor school board meetings.
The draft of the NSBA letter said, "We ask that the Army National Guard and its Military Police be deployed to certain school districts and related events where students and school personnel have been subjected to acts and threats of violence."
An independent review also showed the collaboration between the NSBA, the White House and the Department of Justice as well as internal responses to the swift blow back.
https://www.foxnews.com/media/nsba-letter-called-national-guard-military-deployed
Yeah, saw that yesterday. Not only did they sic the DoJ on parents but wanted to sic the military on them too. But the parents are the extremists.
Jeff thinks you both are liars.
It's amazing how awful, antihuman and antilibertarian his takes always are. He's a moral monster.
"Not only did they sic the DoJ on parents but wanted to sic the military on them too."
Yep.
And we'll just sit here with our thumbs up our asses until they do it too.
Of course, by then it will be too late.
It is an excellent example of Obama's comment that we should never underestimate Biden's ability to fuck things up.
https://nypost.com/2020/08/15/barack-obama-reportedly-undercuts-bidens-2020-white-house-run/
And on that score Obama was, and is, right.
I apologize for the multiple replies to myself, and comments, but I felt it was necessary to completely explain what are very complex subjects and I thought of further information and concepts that reinforced my original points after I had posted. Wasn't trying to flood the comment boards.
"Wasn't trying to flood the comment boards."
There's no need to apologize for submitting well considered comments, especially if they have correct spelling.
You do you, man
I’ve really appreciated them.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/
Well, looky looky looky looky.
Kissinger says Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to end war
It was always probably the best option once the special military operation began. I was disappointed by the invasion. I thought Putin, with his background in KGB, and grandson of Lenin's cook, would have had more brains and cunning to get what he wanted without a conflagration. Bribing the necessary politician, targeted assassination, nobbling the Ukraine parliament, symbolic gestures of friendship and trust building and so on. But now the troops are in Ukraine, Russia is going to keep Donbas and Crimea and annex it.
It has probably been brewing for a while as Minsk II agreement has gone mostly nowhere since it was signed. It is my humble opinion that Putin is merely attempting to enforce it-- or perhaps more accurately his perception of it. The unfortunate happenstance is that Biden was elected in 2020 thus emboldening Putin to invade as he undoubtedly sensed weakness in the West.
I have zero... perhaps less than zero faith in Kissinger's moral compass, but I do have confidence in his sense of pragmatism. Kissinger sees the writing on the wall, he sees through the hashtags, twitter and snapchat Ukraine flag biopics and is looking for a way out of this mess. He knows the sanctions have not only worked, but likely had literally the opposite effect: Strengthening Russia while weakening the West.
not only failed*
"The unfortunate happenstance is that Biden was elected in 2020 thus emboldening Putin to invade as he undoubtedly sensed weakness in the West. "
"The West" is a figment of your imagination. The invasion has strengthened the US hold over Europe (even heretofore neutral Sweden and Finland), ensuring German imports good fossil fuels that the US approves of rather than the nasty stuff Russia was fixing to pipe in. Germany also registered a huge increase of military spending, something that Trump should welcome as it's been a complaint of his and American arms manufacturing stooges for decades. Biden finally made it a reality, and it only needed the threat of welcoming Ukraine into the arms of NATO to goad Russia into precipitate action.
So Biden, in a game of 4D chess, tricked Russia into invading Ukraine as a way to get Germany to buy US natural gas and push Sweden and Finland to join a Cold War relic?
That's fucking awful. What a monster.
That's empire. And go easy on Biden. He's a career long corporate stooge, and he's only nominally in control.
Ukraine's response should be that they will cede territory so long as NATO membership is granted to what remains.
Otherwise there will be no long term peace from any such territorial exchange.
Liz Wolfe leaves out that Formosa was a coca and opium-producing powerhouse in competition with Dutch colonies of Java and Sumatra. Quing Dynasty's suicidal prohibition-by-beheading policies destroyed its economy and civilization and Japan made Formosa/Taiwan a non-British source of narcotics (and stimulants) with which to expand its power in Asia the way Germany did in Europe and Africa. But today Taiwan is not a Hong-Kong democracy, and apparently has enough nuclear weapons to repel potential invaders on its own.
“ strategic ambiguity”: that’s a strange way to say “Alzheimer’s.”
Not a gaffe. Biden was telling the truth. We would, and should, not let China attack Taiwan.
Today's NYTs:
"WASHINGTON — The Biden administration has accelerated its efforts to reshape Taiwan’s defense systems as it projects a more robust American military presence in the region to try to deter a potential attack by the Chinese military, current and former U.S. officials say.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has made American and Taiwanese officials acutely aware that an autocrat can order an invasion of a neighboring territory at any moment. But it has also shown how a small military can hold out against a seemingly powerful foe.
U.S. officials are taking lessons learned from arming Ukraine to work with Taiwan in molding a stronger force that could repel a seaborne invasion by China, which has one of the world’s largest militaries.
The aim is to turn Taiwan into what some officials call a “porcupine”— a territory bristling with armaments and other forms of U.S.-led support that appears too painful to attack.
Taiwan has long had missiles that can hit China. But the American-made weapons that it has recently bought — mobile rocket platforms, F-16 fighter jets and anti-ship projectiles — are better suited for repelling an invading force. Some military analysts say Taiwan might buy sea mines and armed drones later. And as it has in Ukraine, the U.S. government could also supply intelligence to enhance the lethality of the weapons, even if it refrains from sending troops.
American officials have been quietly pressing their Taiwanese counterparts to buy weapons suitable for asymmetric warfare, a conflict in which a smaller military uses mobile systems to conduct lethal strikes on a much bigger force, U.S. and Taiwanese officials say.
Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence. The Pentagon has begun divulging more details about the sailings of American warships through the Taiwan Strait — 30 since the start of 2020. And U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, Canada and France when their warships transit through the strait.
In ramping up its posture and language, the United States is trying to walk a fine line between deterrence and provocation. The actions risk pushing President Xi Jinping of China to order an attack on Taiwan, some analysts say. A Chinese offensive against Taiwan could take many forms, such as a full-scale sea and air assault on the main island with missile barrages, an invasion of small islands closest to China’s southeast coast, a naval blockade or a cyberattack.
“Are we clear about what deters China and what provokes China?” said Bonnie S. Glaser, director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “The answer to that is ‘no,’ and that’s dangerous territory.”
On Tuesday, Mr. Biden said in Tokyo that the decades-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” — leaving open whether the U.S. military would fight for Taiwan — still stands. “The policy has not changed at all,” he said.
Harry B. Harris Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and a retired admiral who led the U.S. Pacific Command, said the United States now needed to adopt “strategic clarity” rather than “strategic ambiguity” to serve as a deterrent. China, he said, “isn’t holding back its preparations for whatever it decides it wants to do simply because we’re ambiguous about our position.”
The United States has been urging allies to speak up on Taiwan in an effort to show Beijing that Washington can rally other nations against China if it attacks the self-governing democratic island. On Monday, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan said at a news conference with Mr. Biden that the two leaders had affirmed “the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”
In the three months of war in Ukraine, Washington has held together a coalition of European and Asian partners to impose sanctions against Russia. U.S. officials say they hope the measures send a message to China and other nations about the costs of carrying out the type of invasion overseen by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. U.S. officials are already discussing to what extent they could replicate the economic penalties and the military aid deployed in defense of Ukraine in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
“I want P.L.A. officers to wake up each day and believe they cannot isolate Taiwan in a conflict and must instead face the decision of initiating a costly, wider conflict where their objectives are beyond their reach,” said Eric Sayers, a former senior adviser to the U.S. Pacific Command who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, referring to China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, by its initials.
U.S. intelligence analysts have been studying the evolving relationship between China and Russia and the lessons Beijing might be drawing from Ukraine.
Chinese leaders face a complicated calculus in weighing whether their military can seize Taiwan without incurring an overwhelming cost.
A Pentagon report released last year said China’s military modernization effort continued to widen the capability gap between the country’s forces and those of Taiwan. But the Chinese military has not fought a war since 1979, when it attacked Vietnam in an offensive that ended in a strategic loss for China.
To take Taiwan, the Chinese Navy would need to cross more than 100 miles of water and make an amphibious assault, an operation that is much more complex than anything Mr. Putin has tried in Ukraine.
And in any case, perceived capabilities on paper might not translate to performance in the field.
“As we have learned in Ukraine, no one really knows how hard a military will fight until a war actually starts,” said James G. Stavridis, a retired four-star admiral and former dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “China is probably not ready to take a risk of an invasion with current force levels and capabilities in terms of attacking Taiwan.”
American officials are not making that assumption. They have pressed Taiwan to buy weapons systems that they deem suitable for asymmetric warfare against China. The Biden administration recently told the Taiwanese Defense Ministry not to order MH-60R Seahawk helicopters made by Lockheed Martin, and it has also discouraged orders for more M1A2 Abrams tanks.
Admiral Stavridis said the United States needed to get weapons into the hands of the Taiwanese quickly if an invasion looked imminent, with a focus on systems that would wear down Chinese offensive capabilities.
“That would include smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, cybersecurity capability and special forces who can neutralize Chinese advance teams, and air defense systems,” he said.
U.S. officials consider mobility to be critical and are encouraging Taiwan to buy mobile land-based Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Stinger antiaircraft missiles could also be valuable for staving off the Chinese air force.
The pace of Taiwan’s weapons purchases has increased. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, according to the Pentagon report from last year. In 2020 alone, authorizations totaled more than $5 billion. The sales included advanced unmanned aerial systems, long-range missiles and artillery, and anti-ship missiles.
Taiwan’s annual defense budget is more than 2 percent of its gross domestic product. President Tsai Ing-wen has increased the annual figure by modest amounts.
Both U.S. and Taiwanese officials say Taiwanese troops need better training, but each government wants the other to take more responsibility..
“The Taiwanese troops barely have opportunities to conduct exercises with the allies,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, which is funded by the government of Taiwan. “Military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States should be strengthened in the aspects of regional exercises and the deployment of weapons.”
Ms. Glaser said Taiwan needed to create a strong reserve force and territorial defense force that could wear down an invading military, as the Ukrainians did.
“The U.S. has encouraged Taiwan’s military for years to talk to countries with a robust defense force,” she said. “Taiwan has sent delegations to Israel, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, some of the Baltic States. Now the situation is far more serious and far more urgent. There’s a lot more pressure.”
John Ismay and Julian E. Barnes contributed reporting from Washington, and Amy Chang Chien from Taipei, Taiwan.
Wow from purturbed to an easy on-line provide from the consolation of home. Sign me up!
Wow the translation software of that bot was extremely bad.