Free Speech

Pouring Water on Speaker's Head During Press Conference Doesn't "Constitute[] Protected Speech"

A trial court said this pouring (without the target's consent) was indeed constitutionally protected; it took a 2-1 Texas Court of Appeals decision to reverse that.

|The Volokh Conspiracy |

The Texas Citizens Participation Act—Texas's anti-SLAPP statute—provides a special procedure for dealing with certain lawsuits: Defendants can move for prompt dismissal (and get their attorney fees paid if they win),

  1. if a lawsuit "is based on or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association or arises from any act of that party in furtherance of the party's communication,"
  2. though the case can still go forward if the plaintiff "establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question."

How does this play out if plaintiff accuses defendant of assaulting him during the defendant's public protest? Sanchez v. Striever, decided today by the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals, deals with that. First, the facts:

Steve Striever poured water on [Orlando] Sanchez's head while Sanchez [then Harris County Treasurer] addressed the media and others during a press conference.

Sanchez sued Striever for assault, and Striever moved to dismiss the claim using a normal motion to dismiss available for all cases (under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a), and also using the TCPA—and the trial court held in Striever's favor, dismissing the case and awarding him attorney fees:

[T]he Court … concludes that the act of pouring water over Mr. Sanchez constitutes protected speech, and that the suit by Mr. Sanchez also otherwise implicates protected First Amendment rights of the Defendant…. Once the burden shifted, Plaintiff failed to adduce clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case of his claims. Specifically, Plaintiff did not adduce any evidence of any injury whatsoever, even if he could allegedly recover mental anguish damages under the circumstances.

The Court of Appeals majority reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kevin Jewell, joined by Justice Tracy Christopher. As to the 91a motion, it concluded that Striever's conduct could indeed be assault:

[A] person commits … assault … if the person intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative…. Sanchez pleaded each element of a claim … by alleging that Striever intentionally and/or knowingly caused physical contact with Sanchez by pouring water on his head, and that Striever knew or reasonably should have believed that Sanchez would regard the contact as offensive or provocative….

A civil assault claim … does not require personal injury. As offensive physical contact is the gravamen of the claim, the defendant is liable for contacts that are offensive and provocative regardless whether they cause physical harm. Such a claim addresses the personal indignity that often flows from an offensive or provocative invasion of personal space or interests. Emotional distress is not merely incidental to a claim for certain forms of assault; it is "the essence" of it….

In the landmark Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. (Tex. 1967) …, for example, Emmit Fisher was standing in line at a luncheon hosted by business associates when the manager of the club approached and "snatched the plate" from Fisher's hand, shouting that Fisher, a black man, could not be served. The Supreme Court of Texas upheld a jury award in Fisher's favor, stating that recovery was permitted for "humiliation and indignity" even though no actual contact occurred so long as there was contact with clothing or an object closely identified with the body.

The court held that the "forceful dispossession of plaintiff Fisher's plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to constitute a battery." Accordingly, Fisher "was entitled to actual damages for mental suffering due to the willful battery, even in the absence of any physical injury." The offensive conduct in Fisher would qualify as assault ….

Striever does not dispute that mental anguish damages can be recoverable for a claim under section 22.01(a)(3); he contends rather that Sanchez presented no evidence of mental anguish. But evidence is irrelevant to a court's rule 91a dismissal, which must be based solely on the pleadings. Sanchez pleaded for all damages recoverable by law, including specifically mental anguish, and he was not required to present (nor could the court consider) evidence of mental anguish damages….

And the majority concluded that the TCPA doesn't apply to such behavior:

The TCPA's stated purpose is "to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury." The act protects citizens from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them from exercising their rights in connection with matters of public concern. To accomplish its purpose, the TCPA establishes a mechanism to identify and summarily dispose of actions designed only to chill First Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits….

To … invoke the TCPA, a moving party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a legal action "is based on, relates to, or is in response to" the moving party's "exercise of the right of free speech, … or right of association."

The phrase "exercise of the right of free speech" means a "communication made in connection with a matter of public concern." "'Communication' includes the making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic." "Matter of public concern" includes an issue related to: (A) health or safety; (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being; (C) the government; (D) a public official or public figure; or (E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace. The phrase "exercise of the right of association" means "a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests." …

Though the TCPA's free speech definition is not fully coextensive with constitutional free speech rights—and thus the act may classify certain communications as protected even though our national and state constitutions do not—… [w]e cannot construe the act's terms liberally and faithfully to its fundamental purpose blind to the constitutional rights the act is designed to safeguard. Therefore, we look first to whether Striever's conduct, described by him as an act of protest, is protected speech under the First Amendment ….

[T]he First Amendment … protects symbolic speech and expressive conduct as well as actual speech. But not all modes of "communication" are protected by the First Amendment. Throughout our nation's history, for example, courts have long held that assaultive or other types of violent acts simply are not the sort of expressive conduct entitled to constitutional protection. "A physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993). "[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact … are entitled to no constitutional protection."

The conduct alleged by Sanchez and shown on the video constitutes an assault under Texas law. We therefore conclude that by pouring water on Sanchez, Striever was not exercising any free speech right ….

Because our constitutions do not protect Striever's conduct as free speech, his act can be an exercise of the right of free speech only if the TCPA deems it so…. Standing alone, the statute's facial definition of "free speech" might include "communicative" conduct made in connection with a matter of public concern. Striever asserts, and we assume, that his act of pouring water on Sanchez was meant to express opposition to Sanchez's message delivered at a press conference regarding Houston public schools.

Despite the TCPA's broad implications, however, the act "has its limits" and not every communication falls under the statute…. Reading the TCPA in its entirety, its broad definition of the "exercise of the right of free speech" is necessarily restricted by the expressly stated purpose "to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law."

The TCPA plainly contemplates and encourages government participation, but only law-abiding participation comes within its purview. The TCPA's statement of purpose requires us to balance recognized constitutional rights against the rights of all individuals to file lawsuits to redress harm. The TCPA exists to safeguard constitutional rights, not to protect assaultive or criminal conduct under the guise of protest. Striever has a right to participate in government to his heart's desire, but if his protestive conduct devolves into that not "permitted by law," he may not seek refuge in the TCPA when called to account for his actions in court….

Because we have reversed the dismissal order …, we sustain Sanchez's third issue, vacate the award of attorney's fees and costs ….

Justice Meagan Hassan dissented as to the TCPA issue, reasoning in part:

[T]he question presented in this case is not (as Sanchez has attempted to frame it) whether pouring water on Sanchez's head is constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment. Rather, the question is whether Sanchez's lawsuit is based on, related to, or in response to Striever's exercise of the right of free speech or the right of association as defined by the TCPA when he poured water on Sanchez's head. Sanchez has not cited (and I have not found) any legal authority that an assault by offensive contact is not an exercise of a right of free speech or right of association under the TCPA; based on the plain language of the TCPA, I would therefore reject this argument….

In a society increasingly marked by public protests, I am deeply concerned that the elimination of TCPA protections in protest cases will lead to a deterioration of the People's rights and remedies under the law. The legislature has instructed the courts to balance (1) the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and (2) the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.

If Striever had accidentally coughed on Sanchez during a pandemic while holding a protest sign, Sanchez might still have brought a claim for assault by offensive physical contact alleging that the coughing was deliberate, and—if we agreed that Striever was expressing his right of free speech and association while holding the sign—we would move to the second prong, under which Sanchez would be required to prove the deliberate nature of Striever's action as a prima facie element of the cause of action. Under the majority's opinion, however, Sanchez's pleading that the cough was deliberate (i.e., assault) would be taken as true for purposes of proving an underlying unlawful act with no further requirement that he make a prima facie case of same, thereby entirely frustrating the purpose of the TCPA.

I cannot agree with the majority's holding that some participation in government is less valid than others. Nothing in the TCPA itself limits the actions to those that are protected by the First Amendment or that are law-abiding under Texas law, and I reject the majority's attempts to write words into the statute….

Striever's evidence therefore establishes that Sanchez's assault claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to Striever's exercise of the right of free speech as defined by the TCPA because it involved a communication made in connection with an issue related to (1) economic well-being, (2) community well-being (i.e., the education provided to students in Houston's public schools), or (3) the government; as a result, Striever's conduct was a communication (via the medium of pouring water) that was "made in connection with a matter of public concern."

Under Justice Hassan's reasoning, then, the claim did fit within the TCPA first prong, as being related to the exercise of Striever's free speech; and then matters should have proceeded to the second prong, where Sanchez would have to prove that he had a good assault claim. As I read her opinion, she thinks Sanchez would have been able to prove that, and (if his lawyer had argued properly in trial court) Striever's TCPA defense would fail. But she concluded that in fact at the trial court Sanchez had "declined to even attempt to meet his burden imposed by the second prong of the statute," so because of that Striever should have prevailed in this particular situation.

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  1. These are the same people that think punching someone because they are a “nazi” is free speech or throwing a milk shake at a person with objectionable opinions, according to the thrower, is also fine. But then again what do you expect from savages?

    1. To be fair they didn’t go as far as exercising their constitutional right to reject one SC candidate in 2016 while accepting another in 2020. That would be crossing the line and is far worse than actually killing and maiming people in riots according to Dems.

      1. Because that’s actually okay, per the Constitution.

    2. These are the same people that think

      Who are the same people that think that?

    3. Care to link to someone arguing that punching nazis is free speech? Punching nazis is definitely cool and good, but I doubt anyone’s ever taken the position that it’s speech.

      1. Punching nazis and socialists and other anti-American types is definitely cool, but you are correct that it’s not free speech.

      2. Sorry Aunt Teefah, your own side has taken that position for nearly 30 years now. Start with _Words that Wound_, written by the four horsemen, and go from there.

    4. Jimmy, you need to realize they think along a different axis than us — they think “good” speech and “bad” speech, not “nonviolent” versus “violent” like we do. In fact, they define “bad” speech *as* violence.

    5. Who are “these” people? Steven Striever? The district court judges? I’m sure you’ve automatically assumed that these are people with opposite political opinions from you, but nothing in this article or the record that I can discern supports that point.

  2. If burning a flag is protected symbolic speech, so is a bucket of water without injury.

    1. You can’t burn a flag on someone’s head, even without injury.

    2. Whose flag? Whose property? If buy a flag and burn it on my property or public property, fine. If I steal a flag and burn it, that’s theft. If I trespass to burn my flag, that’s trespass and possibly more.

      (IANAL, but I sure know the difference between mine and yours)

      1. Ask the supreme court.

        1. The Supreme Court has already answered that. Burning your own flag is protected speech. Burning someone else’s flag is theft (or vandalism or some other property crime depending on the exact circumstances) and you never even get to the speech analysis.

          By analogy, pouring a bucket of water on your own head would be protected expression. Pouring it on someone else’s – not so much.

    3. How about unsnapping a woman’s bra? There’s no *physical* injury…

      1. Watch it honey! You could put someone’s eye out with one of those!

    4. If burning a flag is protected symbolic speech, so is a bucket of water without injury.

      Yes, because destroying your own property is analogous to assaulting another person.

    5. “a bucket of water without injury.”

      That’s not how the law works, BfO. Pouring a bucket of water on someone is an unlawful assault and battery under the common law even if the person isn’t “injured” physically.

      1. Those who like to pie pols in the face, take notice!

  3. The TCPA is a mess. It was intended as a normal anti-SLAPP statute but because the Texas legislature is weak, it’s overbroad. It specifically is not limited to the extent of 1A rights.

    The 91a denial is unsurprising. Texas does not have a 12(b)(6) or general demurrer equivalent. TRCP 91a is relatively new rule (2013) enacted as part of tort reform to give Texas something sort of like a summary dismissal. It’s clunky.

  4. The difficulty here is that the Texas statue used the term “communication” rather than speech. As fans of crime shows like the Sopranos know, not to mention watchers of the news, murder can be a very effective means of sending a message. If any sending of a message is covered, than so is murder.

    My instinct would be to use the traditional speech/conduct distinction as the line. The problem with using lawful/unlawful as the line is that every lawsuit alleges unlawful conduct. One would have to know the merits of the lawsuit to decide whether TCPA applies. And this in turn defeats one of the purposes of the TCPA. By measures like expedited procedures and a heighted burden of proof on plaintiffs’ part, the TCPA moves the line between what is lawful and is not, somewhat further in the direction of defendants. This means one sometimes has to apply the TCPA to determine what is lawful. And this in turn means that by first determining what is lawful to determine whether the TCPA applies, one has rendered the TCPA somewhat of a nullity.

    1. Applying the soeech/conduct distinction, an assault is conduct, not speech.

      The hotel restaurant owner in Fisher doubtless knocked the plate out of Fisher’s hands in order to send a political message. So is every lynching. It is nonetheless conduct, not speech.

  5. I just wonder what kinds of damages the plaintiff is going to demand and ultimately get. I take it he sustained no physical injuries. Emotion distress can be worth a little money especially if say he endured a lot of mocking in the press because of the assault. But ultimately I would think this is a $10,000 or less case with potential attorney fees outpacing that. Could even see it going for nominal damages unless there is something more then the pleadings lead on to.

    1. But he almost drowned when a child, and unexpected water on his head causes an extreme emotional reaction and pain and suffering.

      Why not?

    2. The Boy Scouts are in bankruptcy because of sexual assaults where the victims sustained no physical injuries.

    3. I think it’s the principle of the matter. He gets the man who, by any normal understanding of the term, assaulted him on public television punished.

      1. If any part of his outfit was silk, there might be property damage.

  6. “Sorry, your honor, I went to the wrong place. I was supposed to perform an adult baptism but accidentally baptized the wrong guy. Could have happened to anyone.”

    1. I was probably the only one, but this scene immediately came to mind. He might have had more luck with that defense–I guess it’s a plea of mental delusion?

      https://youtu.be/S1KFfYCqAG0

      Talk about literally raining on someone’s parade. Or maybe he just wanted to do some guerilla live streaming.

  7. That dissent is loony: “If Striever had accidentally coughed on Sanchez …”

    Is he suggesting that pouring water on Sanchez’ head was an accident?

    1. She seems to be suggesting that you get a more favorable procedure if you are expressing yourself than if you are not. This strikes me as bizarre, given that the first amendment also protects your right not to speak.

      1. Or, conversely, “express” yourself with your .45 — this is Texas, after all.

        1. If you’re not packin’, you’re slackin’.

  8. I think politicians shouldn’t be filing lawsuits over getting wet. It’s a disproportionate response and they should be paying legal fees for the defense.

    It’s not “assault” in any meaningful sense.

    1. It’s not “assault” in any meaningful sense.

      Except a legal one.

      1. de minimis non curat lex

        1. People have been shot for less….

        2. An idiom that’s idiotically wrong in many situations, particularly here. Common law has essentially forever recognized that all kinds of actions that cause no measurable injury are nonetheless legally actionable for $1 nominal damages. Trespass to property. Assault. Battery. Basic, 1L stuff.

    2. So you think you should have no legal recourse if I walk up to you and pour water all over you at your place of work. Or while you’re out shopping at the mall. You’d really be okay with that? Just standing there and taking it?

      What about when 100 of my friends decide to coordinate our dunkings by pouring water on your head every time you change your clothes? Still not assault? You’d just take it repeatedly for as long as we felt like doing it?

      If pouring water is allowed, what else is allowed? Can I spraypaint nasty things about you on your jacket as long as I use water-soluble paint? Can I add mud to the water? If so, how much? What about urine or some other chemical that’s stinky but washes out? What is the limiting principle that tells a reasonable person what is “assault” under your definition?

      1. Let’s go the other direction. How small is acceptable?

        I think we can say that spitting at someone’s foot is speech, not assault.
        Spitting ON their foot, still probably wouldn’t count.
        Spitting in someone’s face, on the other hand, would probably be counted as assault anywhere on the planet.

        However, that is something that a judge would have to rule on, not dismiss out of hand before the trial even begins

        1. Spitting on anybody, on any part of their body, will be recognized as a common law battery (and probably assault, assuming they saw it coming).

      2. This happened in Texas. His legal recourse was, at the time of the incident, shooting the perpetrator. By not doing so, he relinquished his right of reprisal.

    3. Would you prefer they shoot the perp?

  9. Seems to be assault, not speech.

    If there is a solid argument the other way, I have not seen it.

    1. I’d say it’s more battery than assault; He actually got touched, but few people would be all that frighted by being doused with some water.

      Certainly not speech, though.

      1. Ohio did away with battery and refers to both crimes as assault.

      2. Add cleanup and dry cleaning and losing time to go home and change. Hell yes, it’s assault. He didn’t agree to it, it’s involuntary, it has measurable harm.

        1. Brett is trying to make a pedantic distinction: at common law, battery consisted of non-consensual physical contact with another person, while assault consisted of placing a person in fear of an imminent battery.

          Many (most?) American jurisdictions no longer observe a distinction between the two, and my 30 seconds of research suggests Texas is one of them, so the pedantry appears misplaced.

          1. It’s not like I haven’t been on the receiving end of that particular pedantry often enough.

            1. I and the public know
              What all schoolchildren learn,
              Those to whom pedantry is done
              Do pedantry in return.”

        2. Add also possible damage to any electronics he may be carrying (i.e. smartphone) and electrocution risk from the PA.

          Remember this? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-kohfPAzj8

      3. Frightened, no — mad, yes.

        And the reason why the state punishes crimes is so that victims *don’t*.

    2. I agree. I think the dissenting judge is overthinking things. But we lawyers are frequently guilty of that.

    3. Maybe Striever should have argued he was just trying to baptize Sanchez and turn him into a good Christian. Just as silly as arguing it was free speech.

      1. If the dunkee doesn’t want to be baptized, isn’t that a civil rights violation? Would that be actionable? Someone named Sanchez is often Catholic, and that church doesn’t believe in re-baptism, except for conditional baptism. Imagine “baptizing” someone who is Jewish or Muslim! That pig won’t fly.

        1. If the dunkee doesn’t want to be baptized, isn’t that a civil rights violation?

          Mormons say “no”.

          1. /L/S/D/ LDS at least wait until one is dead for that. I don’t think a corpse would have standing.

  10. Read the discussion of Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., in the amicus brief: “The court held that the ‘forceful dispossession of plaintiff Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to constitute a battery.’ Accordingly, Fisher ‘was entitled to actual damages for mental suffering due to the willful battery, even in the absence of any physical injury.'” Having water poured over your head is a much bigger deal than having a plate snatched out of your hands.

    1. Sorry, not the amicus brief, but the opinion of the court. I was getting mixed up with the previous post. Also I was trying to respond to Bob from Ohio’s comment that “de minimis non curat lex.”

  11. I don’t have much opinion on the legal argument.

    But that guy is an asshole for suing over getting wet.

    1. Any similarly enlightened thoughts about the asshole who thought it was his right to pour water over someone else’s head?

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