As Congress and President Bush set to "hammering out the details" of a proposed $700 billion bailout for investment banks, reason asked free-market-friendly economists three pressing questions: How bad is the current market situation?; how bad are the current proposed bailout plans?; and what's the one thing we should be doing that we're not?
Their answers are below. Reactions should be sent to letters@reason.com.
Bryan Caplan
1. How bad is the current market situation?
To be honest, I'm not too sure. While we're blaming banks and
investors for their "herd behavior," we should remember that
politicians and the media often run with the herd, too. When the
dust settles, I suspect we'll realize that conditions weren't as
bad as people assumed—or at least they weren't until we tried to
fix them.
2. How bad are the current proposed bailout
plans?
Again, to be honest, I'm not too sure. The plans are creating a bad
precedent—perhaps the worst precedent since the New Deal. But it's
worth remembering that a "$700 billion bailout" doesn't literally
mean that the government gives $700 billion to investors. Instead,
it means that the government can buy $700 billion worth of assets;
the transfer to investors is only the difference between
$700 billion and the fair market value of the assets.
I should add, though, that I don't think the people spearheading the bailout have a clear idea about what they're doing either. They remind me of the old saying: "Something must be done. This is something. Therefore this must be done." I'm a former student of Chairman Ben Bernanke and his behavior during this mess has been a big disappointment.
3. What's the one thing we should be doing that we're
not?
Waiting a couple of years. Unemployment is only 6.1 percent; by
standard measures, we're still not in a recession. Even if you have
no libertarian sympathies, shouldn't you at least give familiar,
low-impact responses (especially standard monetary policy) before
you throw caution to the wind?
Bryan Caplan is an associate professor of economics at George Mason University and the author of The Myth of the Rational Voter.
(Responses continue below video box)
| Click above to watch economist Arnold Kling, founder of Homefair.com, Econlog blogger, and former Freddie Mac employee, talk about the bailout plan. |
Robert E. Wright
1. How bad is the current market situation?
The current situation is potentially dire. The comparison with
1932-33 is sobering: An unpopular Republican president is in
office, the financial system is a mess, and an important election
looms, yet many fear what the articulate Democratic candidate might
do if elected. We won't have to wait until March to find out this
time around. But given how fast the world moves these days, late
January will seem an eternity away. The payments system broke down
last time (March 1933), necessitating a bank "holiday," a moving
speech ("the only thing we have to fear is fear itself"), and
creation of the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
Breakdown of the payments system today would stagger the economy.
During the Depression we didn't have to worry about hackers and
terrorists but they must be salivating now. They will probably wait
until after the election, but they will almost certainly try to
kick us while we are down, just like they did during the last two
recessions (1990 invasion of Kuwait and 9/11).
2. How bad are the current proposed bailout
plans?
The current bailout plans are so bad it's impossible to tell just
how bad they are with any precision. The devil, as they say, is
hiding in details that are either undisclosed or will be concocted
on the fly. For example, it is clear that some sort of tax will
have to be placed on financial institutions that grow TBTF (too big
to fail). If the tax is too high, financial services firms will
stay small and the United States may lose, or be unable to regain,
its competitive advantage in some important financial areas. If the
tax is too low, financial services firms will merge and
conglomerate at a rapid pace just to avoid "Lehmanasia" (euthanasia
if they are not big enough to represent a systemic risk) during the
next crisis. If the tax is just right, only those companies that
need to be huge to compete internationally should be willing to pay
it. The probability that regulators will get this and similar
issues right appears small indeed given their track record.
3. What's the one thing we should be doing that we're
not?
There are many things that policymakers are not doing that they
should be. One is thinking long and hard about how to improve
regulation. Clearly, both regulators and financiers need to know
more about economics and financial history: Paying mortgage
originators their full commission upfront was an affront to both
theory (incentives matter big time) and history (the failure of six
previous mortgage securitization schemes in the U.S. between the
Civil War and World War II for the same reason). Equally clearly,
compensation structures within financial services firms need to put
much more weight on long-term or deferred compensation. Yearly
bonuses may be appropriate for some (e.g. traders) but are clearly
not appropriate for others (e.g. executives). Only then will
managers eschew short term profits for long term gains, as they
used to do when they were partners in private concerns.
Robert E. Wright is clinical associate professor of economics at
New York University's Stern School of Business and the author of
One Nation Under Debt.
Jeffrey A. Miron

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