The New Generation of War

Defense expert Chet Richards on Lebanon, Iraq, and the future of the American military

Jesse Walker | July 20, 2006

For 17 years, a small tribe of military analysts has explored the rise of Fourth Generation warfare, or 4GW, a term coined in a 1989 article for the Marine Corps Gazette to describe conflicts that pit a state against a transnational, non-state opponent. Unlike traditional guerrillas, who try to overthrow their host government, these non-state groups take on other states. For an example, look no further than the war now unfolding in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel.

Chet Richards, 59, has spent more time than most pondering the implications of Fourth Generation warfare. A retired Air Force Reserve colonel, Richards is editor of the invaluable website Defense and the National Interest and author, most recently, of Neither Shall the Sword: Conflict in the Years Ahead. Written with far more wit and clarity than is usually found in military texts, his book argues that the modern Department of Defense, designed to wage the Cold War, is ill-suited to protect Americans against the threats we face today. It also examines a range of strategic and structural alternatives, including such radical notions as privatization.

Reason: In Neither Shall the Sword, you wrote that Hezbollah "may represent the wave of the 4GW future more than does al-Qaida." Why so?

Chet Richards: I was tossing out a possibility more than making a prediction. I think Al Qaeda has shot its wad. It can perhaps still act as a catalyst or an inspiration for people who are inclined to do that sort of thing. Osama is still a very riveting speaker to that particular audience. But when you look at what they can actually do, it barely rises above the level of the criminal.

Hezbollah, because it lives within a population—it "swims within the sea of the people," like Mao said—it can draw strength from those people. Al Qaeda can't, at least since it got kicked out of Afghanistan.

So if Israel's going to get back at Hezbollah, who does it strike? Well, it strikes Lebanon. But that also gets a lot of people who could care less about Hezbollah and may even be hostile to it.

Reason: Some people argue that, since it essentially has its own territory in Lebanon, Hezbollah is effectively a state in its own right. Does that pose problems for the Fourth Generation thesis?

CR: Not really. Because it's not a state. It's more like a tribe. It doesn't have a clearly defined territory. It exercises some of the functions of a typical government, but if it's attacked, it'll just pull back. They've done it before. They're not going to go head to head with Israeli armor.

They have some of a state's advantages, because there is a population. Even if they get driven out, that population will probably welcome them back in when the time comes. Al Qaeda doesn't really have a state structure at all. They're more of a philosophy than a group at this point.

Reason: The other argument people make is that Hezbollah isn't an independent actor but is a catspaw of an outside state, Iran or Syria.

CR: Well, you see the problem right there. Which outside state is it?

I think Hezbollah clearly draws support. It's in Syria or Iran's short-term interest, or at least they think it is, to support them. Though these extreme non-state sects make the Syrians nervous. Remember, Hafez el-Assad took down the city of Hama in 1982 to get rid of a non-state threat, killing—depending on who you believe—between 10,000 and 40,000 people. Iran's farther away, and they're more in the same ideological camp, so it may not be as big a deal to them.

Reason: What do you think Israel's game plan is?

CR: That's a really, really good question. I think a lot of it's driven by domestic politics. They've got to be seen as doing something. On the other hand, they're clearly hesitating about sending large numbers of ground forces into Lebanon. They did that before, and it didn't turn out too well. I don't think they want to get back into the business of occupying south Lebanon. That just makes them a better target, as they were before.

Maybe they'll go up to the Litani River. That would certainly push the Katyushas beyond the range of Haifa—they're a fairly short-range weapon anyway. But then what happens? Do you occupy it in perpetuity? It would be a hostile Lebanese population, just like it was before. Do you have an ethnic cleansing? Could Israel get away with that?