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Did Human Genetic Changes Produce the Industrial Revolution?
Abject poverty is humanity's natural state. But during the last two centuries, a portion of humanity (those of you reading this for example) managed to escape into a world of previously unimaginable affluence. How did this happen?
University of California, Davis, economic historian Gregory Clark thinks that genetic changes to human nature are responsible. According to the New York Times, Clark
...believes that the Industrial Revolution — the surge in economic growth that occurred first in England around 1800 — occurred because of a change in the nature of the human population. The change was one in which people gradually developed the strange new behaviors required to make a modern economy work. The middle-class values of nonviolence, literacy, long working hours and a willingness to save emerged only recently in human history, Dr. Clark argues.
Clark appears to be arguing that the rich (with good habits) simply outbred the poor (mired in vice). The result is that those whose genes incline them to thrift have inherited the earth.
Generation after generation, the rich had more surviving children than the poor, his research showed. That meant there must have been constant downward social mobility as the poor failed to reproduce themselves and the progeny of the rich took over their occupations. “The modern population of the English is largely descended from the economic upper classes of the Middle Ages,” he concluded.
As the progeny of the rich pervaded all levels of society, Dr. Clark considered, the behaviors that made for wealth could have spread with them. He has documented that several aspects of what might now be called middle-class values changed significantly from the days of hunter gatherer societies to 1800. Work hours increased, literacy and numeracy rose, and the level of interpersonal violence dropped.
Another significant change in behavior, Dr. Clark argues, was an increase in people’s preference for saving over instant consumption, which he sees reflected in the steady decline in interest rates from 1200 to 1800.
“Thrift, prudence, negotiation and hard work were becoming values for communities that previously had been spendthrift, impulsive, violent and leisure loving,” Dr. Clark writes.
Clark lays out his arguments and evidence in his new book, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World.
Frankly, I think that genetics can't be the explanation for such a rapid shift in human fortunes. On the other hand, once the cycle of immiseration is broken, people who are no longer on the edge of subsistence can begin to think about the longer term. Thus a virtuous cycle of enhanced productivity got established. For another view take a look at Northwestern University economic historian Joel Mokyr's interpretation of the economic history of the Industrial Revolution in his magisterial, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy.
Whole New York Times article on Clark is here.
|8.7.07 @ 3:28PM|#
I've never seen the conservative inclination to baselessly
impart virtue to the holders of wealth more clearly expressed than
in the assumption that medieval nobility had greater thrift and
diligence than the peasantry, merely because they were rich.
Some of us have read about how the medieval nobility came to their
station. Eschewing violence and being thrifty don't rank very
highly.
SIV|8.7.07 @ 3:33PM|#
Ron,
Are you denying the SCIENCE again?
Now if we only had some science based mechanism of using State
power to prevent those undesirables from reproducing think how much
better, how much more progressive we could be.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:33PM|#
Abject poverty is humanity's natural state.
That is a debateable assertion.
But during the last two centuries, a portion of humanity (those
of you reading this for example) managed to escape into a world of
previously unimaginable affluence.
So, in the 18th century man existed in his natural state
everywhere? I don't think so.
...believes that the Industrial Revolution - the surge in
economic growth that occurred first in England around
1800...
The problem with this thesis is that the surge was based upon
hundreds of years of technological, etc. development.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:36PM|#
Anyway, there is massive amount of literature on why the 18th century industrial revolution started when it did (as opposed to previous industrial revolutions), where it did, etc. Much of it is clearly simply due to "accidents" like geography (Britain's fairly unique access to coal and natural waterways for example).
|8.7.07 @ 3:38PM|#
I suppose one could test the converse theory by establishing a
society where the least affluent people bred at a far greater rate
than the most affluent and then examining the progress or decline
of that society.
Oh, wait, I guess that test is already underway.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:40PM|#
Bailey,
BTW, of Mokyr's books I tend to recommend The Lever Of
Riches.
|8.7.07 @ 3:42PM|#
"Thrift, prudence, negotiation and hard work were becoming values for communities that previously had been spendthrift, impulsive, violent and leisure loving," Dr. Clark writes.
How to tell the two kinds of people apart?
Anthropometry and phrenology.
|8.7.07 @ 3:44PM|#
Another significant change in behavior, Dr. Clark argues,
was an increase in people's preference for saving over instant
consumption, which he sees reflected in the steady decline in
interest rates from 1200 to 1800.
Uh, when the vast majority of the populace is making barely enough
money to survive (and some are making even less), the fact that
they're spending all their money doesn't make them
spendthrifts.
What an idiotic analysis.
|8.7.07 @ 3:45PM|#
Now if we only had some science based mechanism of using State
power to prevent those undesirables from reproducing think how much
better, how much more progressive we could be.
Cue Lemur and/or Grand Chalupa.
|8.7.07 @ 3:46PM|#
S of S: Take a look at economic historian Angus Maddison's World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2003 AD here.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:48PM|#
crimethink,
One of the things that 18th century employers most complained about
in their workers was their inability to control their behavior.
They had a hard time forcing them to accept the rythm of what we
might call a "work week."
|8.7.07 @ 3:49PM|#
"The change was one in which people gradually developed the
strange new behaviors required to make a modern economy work. The
middle-class values of nonviolence, literacy, long working hours
and a willingness to save emerged only recently in human history,
Dr. Clark argues."
Some of the things he's talking about--literacy, long working
hours, a willingness to save--they sound like the "protestant work
ethic" to me. ...but that's what I was raised on. The period at the
end of the Middle Ages is like magic that way--everybody that looks
inside seems to find whatever it is they're looking for.
...not that I would discourage anyone from arguing with joe about
whether genetic determinism justifies trickle down theory.
|8.7.07 @ 3:52PM|#
To be fair to the underlying premise of the book...cultural transmission is also considered as the mechanism... it isn't restricted to genetic transmission.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:54PM|#
Ron Bailey,
The link your provided doesn't seem to address what I am getting
at.
The issue is why people would form civilizations to start with
(pre-civilization populations would probably more a kin to what is
"natural" for human beings)? Why would they leave a life of
relative ease and plenty for one of dramatic hierarchies which
could call upon them to build massive edifices via back breaking
work? So what is "natural" for human beings isn't a life of
poverty; what was "natural" for us was probably a life which had
pretty decent resources and comparably low levels of work.
SIV|8.7.07 @ 3:54PM|#
How to tell the two kinds of people apart?
Anthropometry and phrenology.
Good to see not everyone around here is a SCIENCE
denier.Gregory Clark does have a "Dr." in front of his name, defer
to the experts.
I bet his "genetic" theory was peer reviewed!
That is the fucking Gold Standard of SCIENCE.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 3:57PM|#
JF,
It is probably the case that the terms we use for the rise in GDP,
etc. in the late 18th century overly dramatizes what really
happened. In other words, the label "industrial revolution" is
overblown, just as the labels "Enlightement" and "Renaissance" are
overblown.
Mike Laursen|8.7.07 @ 3:58PM|#
So, anywhere in this guy's 440-page hypothesis does he point to any actual genes that support his idea?
|8.7.07 @ 4:02PM|#
"So, anywhere in this guy's 440-page hypothesis does he
point to any actual genes that support his idea?"
Oh you crazy people, you always want your proof!
|8.7.07 @ 4:05PM|#
BTW, the Japanese government refused to believe Hiroshima was from a bomb, they at first said it was from a typhoon (!!) until Nagasaki.
|8.7.07 @ 4:08PM|#
Year GDP per capita/world
1 - $467
1000 - $450
1500 - $566
1700 - $615
1820 - $667
1870 - $873
1900 - $1,262
1913 - $1,526
1940 - $1,962
The above is a selection estimates of per capita income in real
dollars from Angus Maddison. My definition of abject poverty is
trying to live on less than $667 per year in 1820.
|8.7.07 @ 4:10PM|#
From my reading of the reviews of this book, it seems to echo
the argument put forth by Kirk Hamilton in his book.
http://go.worldbank.org/7M49XI1HT0
|8.7.07 @ 4:13PM|#
Just to be clear, people living in 1820 had average incomes equal to $667 in today's dollars. That's like trying to live on $2 per day in today's world. Unfortunately, about 2 billion people do live on less than now, and I'd say they suffer abject poverty.
|8.7.07 @ 4:13PM|#
Crimethink,
Steady saving, ie small amounts regularly, are all that is needed
to rise out of poverty. See
"The Wealthy Barber".
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:15PM|#
Ron Bailey,
It is pretty clear that much of manking was not in his "natural
state" in the year 1 CE. Many human societies were large,
hierarchal, used technology extesnively, had large trade networks,
etc. just like our society is.
|8.7.07 @ 4:17PM|#
Neu Mejican:
If the Times is accurate, you would be wrong.
Hamilton's work is an institutional analysis of wealth creation and
Clark's (again if the Times is right) is a genetic (social
darwinian?) analysis. See my interview with Hamilton here.
thoreau|8.7.07 @ 4:19PM|#
Like Ron said, whatever the causes of the industrial revolution,
genetic change seems the least likely explanation, given the time
scales involved.
Besides, as has been shown in numerous cases, the propensity to
have kids decreases with wealth. Now, I don't know the extent to
which increased child survival rates factor in, but when you have
two noticeable effects pointing in opposite directions it's very
unlikely that one of them will so utterly dominate that it will
effect a large genetic change in just a few generations.
Also, it's worth noting that immigrants to industrialized countries
frequently do at least as well as those born there. This further
argues against genetic effects.
|8.7.07 @ 4:20PM|#
S of S: I think I see where you're coming from. My view is that abject poverty is the natural state either in agrarian hierarchial societies or among pleistocene hunter gatherers. The average Roman lived on about $425 per year and that's abject poverty.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:22PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Yet most of them are not in anything resembling the "natural state"
of mankind. The basic dividing line in human history is not the
industrial revolutions it is the advent of, well, agriculture and
cities (and other state like structures).
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:26PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Does the historical record demonstrate that the lives of hunter
gatherers were ones of abject poverty? I don't believe so. In
general they lived longer and more healthy years than their
counterparts in agrarian agricultural societies and they had lots
of leisure time to create all manner of interesting cultural
institutions.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:29PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Why? Because they lacked gameboys? Their lifespan was similar to
ours as was their overall health during such. They had a ton of
leisure time.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:29PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Furthermore they generally weren't burdened by oppressive states,
taxes, etc.
|8.7.07 @ 4:32PM|#
He doesn't seem to address it directly, but isn't he arguing economic evolution ala the Baldwin Effect???
|8.7.07 @ 4:33PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Even the Times article makes it clear that Clark is talking about
cultural transmission of these traits.
Here is a concise statement of his main premise from an early
review.
Clark's bottom line? Economic growth and development are driven
much more by "demography, technology, and labor efficiency" than by
governmental and economic institutions and policies."
His work complements Hamilton's in trying to explain what is needed
for institutions to support growth.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:34PM|#
Ron Bailey,
In other words, it is fair to say that it has taken us ~6,000 to
~7,000 years to get back to much of the position we started
with.
|8.7.07 @ 4:35PM|#
From the time article
Because they grew more common in the centuries before 1800,
whether by cultural transmission or evolutionary
adaptation, the English population at last became productive enough
to escape from poverty, followed quickly by other countries with
the same long agrarian past.
|8.7.07 @ 4:35PM|#
S of S: With regard to pleistocene hunter gatherers, it is true that many had access to more calories on average and that their life expectancy was 5 to 7 years longer than agrarian types, but still... they dressed in bearskins, wielded stone axes, and with an average life expectancy of 30 or so.
|8.7.07 @ 4:38PM|#
Neu Mejican: No use us arguing now about whether a difference in emphasis amounts to a difference in kind between Hamilton (and other institutionalists) and Clark. I will get back to you after I read Clark's book. :-)
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 4:42PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Actually many hunter gatherer populations had average life spans
that averaged into the 60s.
|8.7.07 @ 4:48PM|#
Ron,
Fair enough.
I am just being pedantic.
But I think it is clear that your characterization of Clark's
premise in your post is off the mark. He is not making a genetic
argument. He is making a demographic argument. They are
distinct.
Notice how the comments here in this thread latched on to your
characterization of the book as being about genes?
Seeing as how you wish people would stop mischaracterizing your
position on GW, I would think you would appreciate that.
|8.7.07 @ 4:52PM|#
Matthew,
I'm not talking about the poor in the modern US, who have color TVs
and cable. I'm talking about the medieval poor, who needed to spend
all their money just to avoid starvation. (In actuality, they
probably weren't spending money, just eating whatever was left over
from their harvest after their thrifty, morally upstanding lord
took what he wanted from it.)
|8.7.07 @ 4:58PM|#
Neu Mejican: Regarding my "genetic' characterization of Clark,
see the Times article:
Dr. Clark says the middle-class values needed for productivity
could have been transmitted either culturally or genetically. But
in some passages, he seems to lean toward evolution as the
explanation. "Through the long agrarian passage leading up to the
Industrial Revolution, man was becoming biologically more adapted
to the modern economic world," he writes. And, "The triumph of
capitalism in the modern world thus may lie as much in our genes as
in ideology or rationality."
SIV|8.7.07 @ 5:09PM|#
Sof S: Not disagreeing with you but are you relying on ethnographic analogy or the archaeological record (or a combination)in inferring the situation of past hunter gatherer societies ? Sahlins? Who or what else?
|8.7.07 @ 5:12PM|#
S of S:
Could you please point me in the direction of any data that
suggests that average life expectancy for pleistocene hunter
gatherers was 60 years?
|8.7.07 @ 5:15PM|#
Ron,
Again,
Fair enough.
To maintain my pedantic stance:
There seems to be a meaningful difference between Clark's qualified
statement and your summary...
To wit, Clark does not say: "that the rich (with good habits)
simply outbred the poor (mired in vice). The result is that those
whose genes incline them to thrift have inherited the earth."
SIV|8.7.07 @ 5:21PM|#
Ron,
Average life expectancy for pleistocene hunter gatherers is
unknowable.The archaeological record is not that complete.I'm not
sure it is knowable for a given population or group as it would be
difficult to determine whether the sample was representative of the
population as a whole.
|8.7.07 @ 5:35PM|#
Here is a nice recent piece of work estimating hunter gatherer
lifespans
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00171.x
A fundamental conclusion we draw from this analysis is that
extensive longevity appears to be a novel feature of Homo sapiens.
Our results contradict Vallois's (1961: 222) claim that among early
humans, "few individuals passed forty years, and it is only quite
exceptionally that any passed fifty," and the more traditional
Hobbesian view of a nasty, brutish, and short human life (see also
King and Jukes 1969; Weiss 1981). The data show that modal adult
life span is 68-78 years, and that it was not uncommon for
individuals to reach these ages, suggesting that inferences based
on paleodemographic reconstruction are unreliable. One recent study
that avoids several common problems of skeletal aging used
dental-wear seriation and relative macro-age categories (ratio of
old to young) to demonstrate an increase in the relative presence
of older adults from australopithecines to early Homo and, more
strikingly, among Upper Paleolithic humans (Caspari and Lee 2004;
but see Hawkes and O'Connell 2005). More compellingly, a recent
re-estimation of several common paleo-mortality curves based on
hazard analysis and maximum likelihood methods shows a life course
pattern similar to that of our ethnographic sample (Konigsberg and
Herrmann 2006).
|8.7.07 @ 5:45PM|#
Neu Mejican: As I'm sure you well know, longevity is not the
same as life expectancy. What I could turn up with a quick google
search is
here. See below:
Life expectancy - Timeline for humans
Homo sapiens live on average 37 years in Zambia and on average 81
years in Japan. The oldest confirmed recorded age for any human is
122 years, though some people in Asia are reported to have lived
over 150 years. The following information is derived from the
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1961:
Humans by Era, Average Lifespan (in years)
* Neanderthal, 20
* Neolithic, 20
* Classical Greece, 28
* Classical Rome, 28
* Medieval England, 33
* 1800's End of 19th Century, 37
* 1900's Early 20th Century, 50
* 1940's Circa 1940, 65
* Current (in the West), 77-81
Also see Jared Diamond's famous 1987 article "The
Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race."
|8.7.07 @ 6:17PM|#
Does the historical record demonstrate that the lives of hunter gatherers were ones of abject poverty? I don't believe so.
Did they have Nintendo Wii and John Woo DVD's?
No?
Then I rest my case.
|8.7.07 @ 6:29PM|#
Pardon me for being dense, but what leap of faith do I have to
make in order to see how biological development and economic
participatory practices are related? Is someone claiming a causal
relationship, here?
Re: Poverty
It's all relative. Poverty is an artificial line in the sand
separating those who have from those who have not. When everyone is
making $627 per year, only those who are earning under "the poverty
line" can be described as "living in poverty" ... and I'll give a
fistful of clams to anyone who can divine where that line was in
the Pleistocene Era.
|8.7.07 @ 6:41PM|#
James,
Is someone claiming a causal relationship, here?
It doesn't seem like it to me, despite some speculation regarding
potential causes (biology or culture or a combination)...Clark
seems to be claiming that demographic trends in the context of
cultural institutions explain the economics better than a
simplistic explanation based on the existence of certain
institutions.
|8.7.07 @ 6:45PM|#
SIV,
Damn internet is to shallow.
That's okay. It is just one of those "Gold-Standard" peer review
journals that SCIENCE.
;)
SIV|8.7.07 @ 6:48PM|#
I'll give a fistful of clams to anyone who can divine where
that line was in the Pleistocene Era
Well for a Pleistocene-American you could start by
appraising his estate.
SIV|8.7.07 @ 6:57PM|#
neu mejican,
Nearly fried my computer spitting out my ice tea.Anthropologists
publishing in a Geography Journal ?...is...science?...OH you meant
SCIENCE...haha ...thats a good one ...have to
remember it.
|8.7.07 @ 6:58PM|#
This is so ridiculous.
Most scholarship on the causes of the industrial revolution is
ridiculous.
Almost nobody takes into account changes in economic freedom and
respect for/enforcement of property rights.
"Oh, it must have been human nature that changed, that's why people
suddenly got rich."
It's like listening to a biologist look at monkeys in zoos and
monkeys in the wild, and concluding that the different movement
patterns of the monkeys in the zoos are due to their differing
natures.
|8.7.07 @ 7:06PM|#
Now if we only had some science based mechanism of using
State power to prevent those undesirables from reproducing think
how much better, how much more progressive we could be.
Sounds great to me!
|8.7.07 @ 7:08PM|#
SIV,
For what it is worth, the article seems to use solid methodology
and keeps their discussion well within the realm of reasonable
based on their data.
But I am not a population anthropologist, so I would not be a
qualified peer to review the article on more than a cursory
level.
|8.7.07 @ 7:14PM|#
Here is a set of freely available materials from the publisher
of the journal which linked above
http://www.popcouncil.org/publications/pdr/LifeSpanTOC.html
|8.7.07 @ 7:21PM|#
Was a large portion of the labor in the U.S. during the
industrial revolution either slaves or indentured servants? Greed
being the primary fuel of the factory?
Was Thoreau living in abject poverty? Isn't abject poverty
determined more by the expected lifestyle of a given society?
SIV|8.7.07 @ 7:29PM|#
neu mejican,
I wanted a look at the paper's bibliography and footnotes. I'm
actually more curious about their data, methods, and weight given
to ethnographic analogy than to their conclusion.As I stated above
the answer is largely unknowable.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 10:36PM|#
Ron Bailey,
Given the high infant mortality rate in the paleolithic that
explains the difference. However, unlike hierarchal agragrian
societies or industrializing societies, post-infant mortality drops
dramatically in paleolithic societies and hunter gatherer societies
tend to have long-lived populations which do survive infancy.
Also note that pleistocene is not the proper term of use here. It
is more a geological term (since it largely concerns itself with
periods of glaciation) not an anthropological one.
Syloson of Samos|8.7.07 @ 10:54PM|#
Ron Bailey,
BTW, if I am not mistaken the article you link backs up my general
position - that agriculture, the creation of cities, etc. was in
general a bad deal for the majority of humans who came to belong to
societies with these trademarks.
An equally significant issue is why these societies came to adopt
such practices. At one time warfare was a favored explanation - but
with the discovery of such sites as Caral that seems less plausible
now (one wonders what Hobbesians think of that!).
SIV|8.7.07 @ 10:59PM|#
S of S:
Late Pleistocene is commonly used in NA archaeology to refer to the
Paleo Culture phase.
As is Early Holocene for the Archaic. Don't get me started about
the usage of "Late Holocene" however.
Late Pleistocene refers not just to the time but the environment,
with presumed widespread exploitation of megafauna by nomadic
hunters.
SIV|8.7.07 @ 11:06PM|#
S of S:
Construction of large earthworks,or mounds,widespread trade and
division of labor precedes clear evidence of agriculture in parts
of North America. See Poverty Point Culture and the Ouachita Valley
mounds in Louisiana for examples.As to whether this evidences
hierarchical society-who the fuck knows?
|8.7.07 @ 11:07PM|#
I suspect Ron and Thoreau are right. Dr. Clark has a related working paper on his website. It's also in The Journal of Economic History (log in required for full article).
SIV|8.7.07 @ 11:10PM|#
Damn everybody is linking pdfs.
My computer hates them and they are a pita regardless.
|8.7.07 @ 11:24PM|#
Fitzgerald: You know, Hem, the rich are really different
than you and me.
Hemmingway: Yes, they have more money.
Hemmingway later used this exchange in The Sun Also
Rises. After publication of the book, Fitzgerald got
a gun and ran around Paris for a week swearing he was going to kill
Hemmingway when he found him.
|8.8.07 @ 1:11AM|#
@thoreau
Like Ron said, whatever the causes of the industrial
revolution, genetic change seems the least likely explanation,
given the time scales involved.
Well, genetic change wasn't really necessary. Remember, the Black
Plague wiped out nearly half of Europe only a few centuries
earlier. There's the possibility the less hardy population was
killed off, and resulted in the concentration of beneficial genes
already present.
Of course, that's yanked-out-of-the-ass speculation, and I don't
know if there's any practical way to test whether the Plague was
actually Nature's exercise in eugenics. Still, if I was looking for
a biological explaination for the abrupt rise of Europe, the Plague
would certainly be high on my list of possible causes to
investigate.
Besides, as has been shown in numerous cases, the propensity to
have kids decreases with wealth. Now, I don't know the extent to
which increased child survival rates factor in, but when you have
two noticeable effects pointing in opposite directions it's very
unlikely that one of them will so utterly dominate that it will
effect a large genetic change in just a few generations.
That was addressed in the article. Apparently the opposite was true
in the time-frame being discussed. It might be worth considering
that easy access to birth control wasn't available in those days,
so the well-to-do wouldn't have had as much control over
reproduction. Also, consider there were other incentives to
reproduce that aren't necessarily operative now. Children were
largely a retirement plan, to be relied upon for support in old
age.
Coupled with higher survival rates due to better living conditions,
those factors may account for why the well-to-do were more prolific
in those days than they are now.
Clark has an interesting theory, but unfortunately no hard data to
back it up. I await further research before drawing any
conclusions.
|8.8.07 @ 1:37AM|#
Pig Mannix,
The plague was an extreme case of natural selection. It wiped out
between a third and half of Europe in one generation, which means
it could cause rapid changes in the gene pool. None of the
epidemics between 1820 and 1920 came close to that.
Syloson of Samos|8.8.07 @ 1:47AM|#
SIV,
For the Andean world the cotton and fish trade seems to have been a
major catalyst for the development of large, hierarchal societies
that built temples, etc. Cotton was grown in the interior and
shipped to fishermen to use for, well, fishing and fish were sent
in return to these new population centers.
As for Poverty Point, etc. I believe they have in common with Caral
and other early locales in what is today Latin America an absence
of pot sherds. Trade in some good seems to be the common factor in
all such sites, whether local population were agriculturalists or
not.
Syloson of Samos|8.8.07 @ 1:51AM|#
SIV,
BTW, I will note that it is often difficult to determine exactly
what an agricultural activity should look like and what evidence
one should be looking for. For example, for a long time it was
assumed that the "aborigines" of Australia were not
agriculturalists, but it has become apparent that they were, if not
agriculturalists in the sense that Europeans knew it, master
shapers of the Australian landscape, using fire and other
techniques to create yearly crop cycles and the like.
|8.8.07 @ 2:41AM|#
@jtuf
The plague was an extreme case of natural selection. It wiped
out between a third and half of Europe in one generation, which
means it could cause rapid changes in the gene pool. None of the
epidemics between 1820 and 1920 came close to that.
I understand that. I'm not crediting the epidemics between 1820 and
1920 with rapid changes in the gene pool. I'm saying those changes,
if indeed they occurred at all, were a possible effect of the
plague. There's no reason to believe the changes in society
occurred at precisely the same time as the alterations in the gene
pool. However, it wouldn't be unreasonable to guess that the
genetic alterations were a prerequisite to the changes to
society.
I assume the opposable thumb evolved somewhat before the stone
hammer was invented.
|8.8.07 @ 5:54AM|#
"Frankly, I think that genetics can't be the explanation for
such a rapid shift in human fortunes."
There is the theory of "punctuated equilibirium" in evolution that
would allow for a very rapid evolution in this manner.
|8.8.07 @ 6:59AM|#
Actually, wayne, I think you're making the common error of
confusing punctuated equilibrium with saltation.
At least some of the comments here still seem to support the idea
of a genetic factor in starting the Industrial Revolution. But I'm
pretty sure that geneticists can't point to any meaningful
difference between, say, the French and Chinese.
In any event, there's no reason to believe that the various
pandemics of Europe affected people along genetic lines, so it's
incredibly unlikely that a particular trait would have been favored
as a result. (Also, the use of "fit" in a Darwinian context does
not mean "hale," nor "strong." Any analysis relying on such a
meaning is flawed from the start.)
|8.8.07 @ 9:26AM|#
After skimming the article and doing some back of the envelope calculations, I'll grant that most of 1950's Brittain was descended from the upper middle class. However, I still don't buy the genetic explaination for the industrial revolution. After all, the US developed economically even though very little of the US gene pool comes from Brittish upper class. The gains made by many groups after removing educational barriors suggest that cultural transmission can swamp any genetic predispositions.
|8.8.07 @ 9:26AM|#
"In any event, there's no reason to believe that the various
pandemics of Europe affected people along genetic lines, so it's
incredibly unlikely that a particular trait would have been favored
as a result. (Also, the use of "fit" in a Darwinian context does
not mean "hale," nor "strong." Any analysis relying on such a
meaning is flawed from the start.)"
This is not true. Europeans are less susceptible to HIV infection.
It is thought this is a result of Europeans who survived exposure
to the black plague, i.e. modern day Europeans carry genes that
allowed them to survive the black plague and this gene also confers
some immunity to HIV.
|8.8.07 @ 9:33AM|#
If "saltation" occurs in one generation, i.e. Mom gives birth to
a more-or-less radically changed baby, then I stick by my
punctuated eqilibrium remark.
The sort of change postulated for this "industrial revolution
explanation" clearly occurred over more than one generation so it
seems to me that it fits PE better.
|8.8.07 @ 11:53AM|#
S of S, Ron Bailey, Neu Mejican,
Jean of Samsos asks Why would they leave a life of relative
ease and plenty for one of dramatic hierarchies which could call
upon them to build massive edifices via back breaking
work?
They wouldn't. Societal evolution, like biological evolution, comes
about under situations of extreme stress, when body counts are
high.
I agree with you, S of S, that many pre-agricultural
hunter-gatherer societies may have had high standards of living,
but that does not mean they all did.
Perhaps sustained, settled agricultural life came about as a
response to the problems a hunter-gatherer society encountered when
they grew large enough to surpass the natural carrying capacity (if
you'll forgive the archaic term) of the land they were on, and a
group that had been an idiosynchratic gang of plant-tenders
suddenly found themselves the most sought-after people in the
village during some bad times.
Syloson of Samos|8.8.07 @ 1:04PM|#
joe,
The problem is that the archaeological record does not reflect
that. At early sites like Caral there is no sign of warfare or
other catastrophic problems. So "extreme stress" as an explanation
is not reflected in what I have seen of the research on this
subject.
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