"Killing Helpless Men Is Murder"
Jack Goldsmith on "A Dishonorable Strike"
The Washington Post reported yesterday that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth did not merely order the initial strike on a boat off of believed to be transporting drugs, but gave the specific order to kill those on the boat. After the first strike hit the boat, a second strike was ordered to take out two survivors "clinging to the smoldering wreck" caused by the first.
Jack Goldsmith posted on this report yesterday at Executive Function. His essay, "A Dishonorable Strike," begins:
One can imagine stretching Article II of the Constitution to authorize the U.S. drug boat campaign. The wildly overbroad Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) precedents, as I have written before, provide "no meaningful legal check on the president." And there are dim historical precedents one could cite. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted in The Imperial Presidency that in the 19th century presidents unilaterally engaged in "[m]ilitary action against Indians—stateless and lawless by American definition—pirates, slave traders, smugglers, cattle rustlers, frontier ruffians [and] foreign brigands."
One might also, possibly, stretch the laws of war to say that attacks on the drug boats are part of a "non-international armed conflict," as OLC has reportedly concluded. This line of argument likely draws on a super-broad conception of the threat posed by the alleged drug runners as well as the expansive U.S. post-9/11 justification for treating as targetable (i) dangerous non-state actor terrorists off the battlefield; (ii) those who merely "substantially support" the groups with whom one is in an armed conflict; and (iii) activities that provide economic support to the war effort, such as Taliban drug labs or ISIS oil trucks. I don't think this argument comes close to working without deferential reliance on a bad faith finding by the president about the non-international armed conflict and much greater stretches of precedent than the United States previously indulged after 9/11. Still, the unconvincing argument is conceivable.
But there can be no conceivable legal justification for what the Washington Post reported earlier today: That U.S. Special Operations Forces killed the survivors of a first strike on a drug boat off the coast of Trinidad who, in the Post's words, "were clinging to the smoldering wreck."
Whether Hegseth was aware of this second strike, or his initial order was properly interpreted to direct it is unclear, but it does not change the bottom line. Goldsmith writes:
In short, if the Post's facts are correct, it appears that Special Operations Forces committed murder when the "two men were blown apart in the water," as the Post put it.
The post concludes:
Hegseth has emphasized that he wants to restore the "warrior ethos" in the U.S. military. In the hours after the story, he signaled generic support for the boat strike campaign and chest-thumped that "We have only just begun to kill narco-terrorists."
Yet the warrior ethos has always demanded honorable conduct in warfare. The Navy Seals, for example, describe themselves as "a special breed of warrior" but the Seal Ethos thrice emphasizes the importance of honor, including "on . . . the battlefield." And surely the warrior ethos, whatever else it means, doesn't require killing helpless men clinging to the burning wreckage of a blown-up boat. The DOD Manual is clear because the law here is clear: "Persons who have been incapacitated by . . . shipwreck are in a helpless state, and it would be dishonorable and inhumane to make them the object of attack."
Read the whole thing.