Treating Cars as a Commerce Clause Hook Would Vastly Expand Federal Power, a SCOTUS Petition Warns
The case involves a kidnapper who was federally prosecuted because she used a car that never crossed state lines.
As is often true of criminal defendants who ask the Supreme Court to review their cases, Derick Irisha Brown is, to put it mildly, not a sympathetic petitioner. But notwithstanding the horrifying details of her crimes, which involved the kidnapping of a 3-year-old girl who reportedly was sexually abused and "accidentally killed" by her boyfriend, her petition raises an issue that goes to the heart of the constitutional distinction between state and federal powers.
In a case that has not yet gone to trial, Brown is charged with capital murder under Alabama law, which means she would face the death penalty or a life sentence without the possibility of parole if convicted. But in September 2024, a jury convicted her of federal kidnapping charges, which resulted in two concurrent life sentences. The justification for that prosecution was that Brown used a car to kidnap the victim, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit said was enough, by itself, to establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.
Brown's Supreme Court petition emphasizes the sweeping implications of reading the power to "regulate commerce…among the several states" as a license for asserting federal authority over "any conduct involving an automobile." Does the Commerce Clause "give Congress the authority to prohibit double parking?" her lawyers ask. "Failure to signal a turn? Driving with an expired license? In the Eleventh Circuit, it does."
The Supreme Court has said the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce." The statute under which Brown was convicted, 18 USC 1201, relies on that holding: It applies to a kidnapper who "uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense."
Last December, when the 11th Circuit rejected Brown's constitutional challenge to her federal prosecution, the appeals court cited its decision the previous month in United States v. Bryan, which held that automobiles "are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce." That conclusion jibes with decisions by the 5th, 6th, and 7th circuits, but it contradicts the 10th Circuit's 2025 ruling in United States v. Chavarria.
"Allowing the government to bring charges based on the use of any ordinary motor vehicle (here, a Jeep) to commit a purely intrastate crime would transform any crime that uses a vehicle into a federal matter," the 10th Circuit noted. "That interpretation—unbound by a cognizable limiting principle—stretches Congress's authority beyond the Constitution's boundaries."
If the 11th Circuit's contrary conclusion were correct, "Congress would have the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate everything involving an automobile," the petition in Brown v. United States says. "Congress could enact nationwide parking and traffic regulations. Congress could create a federal law of contracts to govern purchases and leases of automobiles, and a federal law of torts to govern automobile accidents. Congress could turn any state crime into a federal crime if any of the participants drove to or from the scene. Congress would gain 'a "police power" over all aspects of American life' involving automobiles."
The Cato Institute amplifies that warning in a brief urging the Supreme Court to accept Brown's petition. The 11th Circuit's decision "brings the Commerce Clause one step closer to becoming the engine of a general federal police power—a power that the
Framers deliberately withheld from the national government," Cato lawyers Thomas Berry, Daniel Greenberg, and Kimberly Coleman say. "Such a power would erode the distinction between national and state authority on which our federal system depends. And it would offend the Constitution's structural guarantees of liberty by allowing Congress to regulate multiple new dimensions of American life."
Berry et al. note that the Commerce Clause already has been stretched far beyond its original meaning. "'Commerce' was originally understood as meaning trade and nothing else," they write, citing contemporaneous dictionary definitions, James Madison's notes from the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist Papers, speeches at state ratification conventions, and early court decisions. That understanding of commerce as the exchange of goods made it distinct from productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.
The Cato brief adds that the qualifying phrase "among the several states" originally meant "among people of different states." The Commerce Clause therefore does not encompass "commerce that takes place entirely within one state." Its "regulatory ambit is confined not only to trade, but also to trade among states," Berry et al. say. "Activity that takes place wholly within a single state, no matter how 'commercial,' lies beyond the federal government's reach."
Since Brown's conduct did not involve trade and was neither commercial nor interstate, that should settle the question of whether it can be covered by a federal statute based on the Commerce Clause. And even if the Commerce Clause extends to "instrumentalities of interstate commerce," Berry et al. argue, automatically placing cars in that category would be a serious mistake with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Unlike airplanes, shipping containers, railroads, and telegraphs, which the Supreme Court has viewed as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, cars are not predominantly used for that purpose. "Automobiles are regularly used for matters outside the scope of interstate commerce," Berry et al. note. "The average U.S. driving trip is twenty-five minutes long, and the average number of miles driven daily is 29.1. These distances are narrower than the width of our Nation's smallest state. It is not just a matter of common experience that many car trips are entirely unconnected to commerce; it is also an uncontroversial statement of fact."
This case illustrates that point. Brown's car "did not leave Alabama, it did not cross any state lines, and it was not used for commerce," Berry et al. write. "A car trip that was neither interstate nor commercial cannot qualify as interstate commerce. And because cars are not predominantly used for trips that are both commercial and interstate, they are not per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce."
Holding otherwise would empower Congress to "regulate countless examples of conduct that are devoid of any connection to interstate commerce," Berry et al. say. If the 11th Circuit's decision stands, they warn, it will "vastly broaden federal power" to include "regulation of such quintessentially state law matters as traffic rules and licensing drivers."
The Cato brief relies heavily on research by Georgetown University law professor Randy Barnett, who filed a separate brief making similar points. The 11th Circuit's logic "permits Congress to regulate the purely intrastate use of an automobile—untethered to any economic activity," he writes. "That reasoning has no logical stopping point. If an automobile is always an instrumentality, then Congress may regulate virtually any activity that involves the use of a car." That means Congress "could set speed limits on local (or even private) roads, establish licensing rules for local drivers, regulate the length and process of school drop-off lines, or dictate when and how residential streets must be plowed after a snowstorm."
The 11th Circuit's per se rule "converts one of the most common—and local—objects of everyday life into an all-purpose jurisdictional hook," Barnett warns. "That is not a faithful implementation of the Commerce power. It is an end-run around its limits."