Ronald Bailey | November 20, 2007
University of Pennsylvania bioethicist Arthur Caplan weighs in with a good column on the new scientific report of producing human stem cells from somatic cells. Caplan notes that the therapeutic promise of the research for increasing human longevity brings forward
"one of the key bioethical debates of the 21st century: Is it right to repair ourselves if it means that we live much longer than any human being has ever lived?"
The answer is easy: Yes. A long healthy life is a moral good. More life is better.
Whole Caplan column here.
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one of the key bioethical debates of the 21st century: Is it
right to repair ourselves if it means that we live much longer than
any human being has ever lived?
Anyone on the anti-long life side of the debate who doesn't jump on
an errant ice floe at the age of 70 is a damned hypocrite.
Sorry for reposting, but:
Does anyone really think the religious right will be able to mount
a successful campaign to seriously set back scientific research in
this field? Methinks the ageing baby boomers will "choose (their
own) life" over "choose (some microbial) life"....
Well, if the "your body is a temple" thing applies, I'd assume keeping it healthy / living longer would be a good thing. Then again, there will always be opposition to modifying "God's creations"
I agree with you on this one Ron. I suspect The State will not which is why I reject that stuff about controlling the secondary market in gene-splicers and other bio lab equipment you posted about a while ago.
I see no moral issue with trying to live forever. After all, we were created in god's image, and she's not about to die anytime soon.
Anyone on the anti-long life side of the debate who doesn't
jump on an errant ice floe at the age of 70 is a damned
hypocrite.
Won't the red gem in your hand start blinking well before then?
If living longer isn't moral, at what age is it most moral to die? 100 years ago the average life span was lower. Were those people more moral than us?
Seeing that overpopulation of the planet is the root cause of a whole host of problems, I do see longer lifespans as a problem as it will just exacerbate that problem.
If by living longer you mean, having another go at your 20's, 30's, and 40's, then yes it is inherently good. If by living longer you mean, spending decades in your deathbed, then not so much.
"Were those people more moral than us?"
yes, because their carbon footprint was smaller.
Someone thinking seriously about the issue would not conclude
that the moral question raised is "Is it better for people to live
or die?"
If you think that the only way to arrive at a position contrary to
your own, one that a considerable number of people hold, is to be a
moral monster without the soul necessary to understand that the
loss of human life is a bad thing, then you probably don't
understand the issue or your opponents' position very well.
The question isn't about increased lifespans all by themselves, but
about the consequences of those increased lifespans.
Seeing that overpopulation of the planet is the root cause
of a whole host of problems, I do see longer lifespans as a problem
as it will just exacerbate that problem.
I agree; there are way too many brown people on Earth.
Um, at the risk of being called a "fundie" for actually knowing
something from the Christian Bible*, we are a long way off from
living longer than 900+ years. I really see no moral problem with
living longer than that either.
*And for capitalizing that.
After thinking about it, the only way I want to live longer is if I can put my head onto a shiny robot body, RoboNixon-style. Just think of all the smashing I could do...
I think you should live as long as you want to/can afford
to.
Of course, once you start adjusting nature and societal balance,
who knows what could happen.....
Also, there can be only one Highlander...
Warren,
If I choose to spend decades on my deathbed, then I obviously think
it is a good thing for me.
There is only one way to see how pr0n will evolve in the future,
one must be there!
The simple way is to live a long time. The other way is difficult
and is why I stopped doing it 35 years from now.
Yes. A long healthy life is a moral good. More life is
better.
I don't see how quantity, a single parameter, is of much
consequence in the moral calculus.
Wouldn't want any nuance brought to a discussion of a complex
topic.
the consequences of those increased lifespans.
Let's see, life expectancy in 1500 was about 32 years. And life
expectancy today is pushing 80.
The consequences appear to be progress, the rise of civilized
societies, free online porn and "Halo 3."
I'm totally all for this increased life-expectacy stuff.
Jamie:
downside of this life expectancy stuff:
Hugh Jackman
Dane Cook
DUNDEROOOO.
The answer is easy
Ah. The abundant easy answer... a favorite species of many a
Reason writer.
I predict that any significant lengthening of human life will
bring on a nanny state that will make today's bullshit look like
caveman times.
If the only way to die is through unnatural means, such as
accidents or murder, people are going to get ultra paranoid about
dying that way. No longer will it be "nobody lives forever", it
will be "I can live forever unless one of the 50 airbags in my car
fails."
Deathbed, wheelchair, whatever - that's up to you to decide the quality of life you'll tolerate. But you have to pay for it yourself, not expect the taxpayers to keep you alive indefinitely.
Neu: May I modestly suggest that you read Liberation Biology for a more nuanced discussion of the moral good of longer human life? I just provided the bottom line answer in my blog post.
A nice fictional treatment of the issue. . .
Old 20th by Joe Haldeman.
Those that can afford immortality treatments end up in the ultimate
class warfare with those who can't. I believe the William
Burroughs' line from the now immortal president sums it up...
"Fuck you, I got mine."
I think extending life is great as long as you are not a burden
on anyone.
Better be as nice as you can right now while you are young and able
to take care of yourself.
When you get old and need to have someone clean shit off your ass
they will remember what kind of a person you are and will act
accordingly.
Does this stem cell research have a promise of bringing Joan Collins back to her 1970s hottieness?
Ron,
I just provided the bottom line answer in my blog
post.
With the tag: "easy answer."
Makes me skeptical about the nuance in your book length treatment,
I must admit.
Care to give me some of the potential downsides that you
consider?
(fwiw, I agree that it is probably good in the long run, but it is
certainly not a morally simple question).
"downside of this life expectancy stuff:
Hugh Jackman
Dane Cook
DUNDEROOOO."
Scientologists
Fundies of any stripe
Lou Dobbs
Rush Limbaugh
Christopher Rowley's The War for Eternity has an interesting take on immortality drugs.
Neu: Surely you are not suggesting that "nuanced" necessarily means that the "downsides" trump the "upsides"? In any case, I discuss the "downsides" you would normally expect people to bring up, e.g., the nursing home planet, overpopulation, social sclerosis, and so forth.
More Burroughs
http://www.interpc.fr/mapage/westernlands/immortality.html
And here is Mr. Rich Parts. He is three hundred years old. He
is still subject to accidental death, and the mere thought of it
throws him into paroxysms of idiot terror. For days he cowers in
his bunker, two hundred feet down in solid rock, food for fifty
years. A trip from one city to another requires months of sifting
and checking computerized plans and alternate routes to avoid the
possibility of an accident. His idiotic cowardice knows no bounds.
There he sits, looking like a Chimu vase with a thick layer of
smooth purple scar tissue.
I don't see how quantity, a single parameter, is of much
consequence in the moral calculus.
In my book Quantity IS Ouality!
Ron,
Neu: Surely you are not suggesting that "nuanced" necessarily
means that the "downsides" trump the "upsides"? In any case, I
discuss the "downsides" you would normally expect people to bring
up, e.g., the nursing home planet, overpopulation, social
sclerosis, and so forth.
Don't forget the upside of, um . . . , let me get back to you when
I remember what it was.
Care to give me some of the potential downsides that you
consider?
Looking for few easy downsides?
Jamie Kelly,
Life expectancy (how long a person can expect to live at birth) is
a very different subject from lifespan (how many years a person can
expect to live absent death of injury).
Lifespan has remained remarkably constant for the past couple of
thousand years (people who survived childhood frequently lived to
about 70-90 in the Roman Empire, just like us today), but life
expectancy has increased as you say (death from childhood disease
is a tiny fraction now compared to what it was two hundred years
ago).
We've certainly seen tremendous improvements in our lives from
people being less likely to get sick and die young. That's not
quite the same thing as whether we'll see improvements from
people's "golden years" being extended from about 20 years to,
what, 100 years? 1000 years?
Ron,
Surely you are not suggesting that "nuanced" necessarily means
that the "downsides" trump the "upsides"?
No, I am not.
Nuanced would require that they are considered, however.
Face it Ron, it is not an "easy answer."
If you hasd gone with "short answer" I might have been more willing
to buy into the idea that you have carefully considered the
subtleties.
Although I wouldn't call the entirety of the subject "what are the downsides of greatly lengthended lifepans" a nit.
Ron,
I discuss the "downsides" you would normally
expect people to bring up
And this indicates that your book is a nuanced discussion
how?
Think I'll skip it, sorry.
Does this stem cell research have a promise of bringing Joan
Collins back to her 1970s hottieness?
I'd prefer Joan from the
her late 1950s hottiness.
For those of you citing the upsides and the downsides, what is the effect of those things on whether or not living longer is moral?
Reinmoose,
I, actually, am trying to make the point that length of life, taken
in isolation, is essentially amoral. Without considering how that
life is manifest, you have nothing to hang a moral argument on.
What are the upsides of euthanizing every person at age
50?
Easier to schedule funeral services?
SIV,
She was a little too young for my taste in the 1950s. But I would
not be disappointed with the 1960s Ms. Collins from
Batman, no not a bit. However, my favorite Collins era was
the late 1970s.
Of course more healthy life is better. I don't see these idiots stopping using modern hygiene and medical technologies so they can live about 20-30 like humans did for most of our presence on this planet.
No, it's a drain on society, the planet, and the children of the old people. Let nature take it's course... or at least, don't claim medicare and social security if you're into prolonging life.
I thought Joan looked hottest as Edith Keeler in City on the
Edge of Forever.
I'd be happy if the stem cell research led to this
Joan Collins
Let nature take it's course...
Humans performing research and applying it is natural.
Neu: Oh well, your loss. I suppose I should just skip over the
normal objections that most people bring up about increasing
healthy human lifespans and get right to the obscure and irrelevant
ones.
For a shorter version, see my report of my debate with
Francis Fukuyama.
Neu: What an odd notion that longer life is amoral. You must wonder why people go on so about murder, war, lack of universal health care and the like.
I, actually, am trying to make the point that length of
life, taken in isolation, is essentially amoral.
Neu,
From "Societies" perspective you are right. From an individual
perspective one's own survival is inherently moral.
"This is a libertarian blog's comments........"
The question isn't about increased lifespans all by
themselves, but about the consequences of those increased
lifespans.
I fail to see how this doesn't ultimately all collapse back into
the question of whether it is better for people to live or die. joe
justs recasts the questions as "is it better for people to live or
die (all things considered)".
don't see how quantity, a single parameter, is of much
consequence in the moral calculus.
Its not merely quantity that is being promoted here, it is
existence, which is the fundamental basis of all moral calculus. No
existence, no moral good or potential for moral good.
The problem with increased life-spans is that it will produce
cultural changes that are difficult to predict.
Change is scary.
Personally, I don't worry; more healthy people => more wealth
creation => richer more pleasant societies.
Additionally, I suspect women with longer life spans, if their
reproductive window is also lengthened, will choose to delay
child-bearing, and resulting in a significant reduction in the
birth rate, particularly if significant numbers decide that
child-rearing isn't worth the bother. Thus, I don't think we'll
find ourselves in some malthusian trap where the entire earth is a
squirming mass of humans packed cheek to jowl.
I think that this means that pedophiles are the most moral of all. They're just trying to get closer to stem cells.
Change is scary.
Change is only scary for people who are already scared. For the
rest of us, change is the stuff of life.
"Change is scary." But it can be exciting. And for many people change is scary because it means something is going to end. This means something is going to go on longer. That something? Life. Good.
Ron,
Neu: What an odd notion that longer life is amoral. You must
wonder why people go on so about murder, war, lack of universal
health care and the like.
Longer life without considering other factors is amoral.
Murder/war involve an overt act to shorten someone else's
life.
A much different question than overt acts to lengthen your own or
another's life.
If those acts come with costs (and which don't?), they need to be
considered in any moral calculus.
Is choosing not to smoke moral, while choosing to smoke is
immoral?
If longer life is inherently good, then can't I claim the moral
high ground by forcing you to increase your own lifespan? Am I
being moral in preventing your suicide? Keeping you on life
support? Am I immoral to follow through with your "DNR"
request?
For SIV, costs can be to you or to society. This isn't,
necessarily, a individual versus society question.
"I don't want to achieve immortality through my work... I want to achieve it through not dying." Woody had it right.
Neu:
You write:
A much different question than overt acts to lengthen your own
or another's life.
Just curious, but is it an "overt act" to shorten my life (and the
lives of countless millions of others) by preventing or slowing
various kinds of biomedical research in the service of one's own
peculiar morality?
joe,
Someone thinking seriously about the issue would not conclude that the moral question raised is "Is it better for people to live or die?"
Actually, this is the core question. It's just another Repugnant
Conclusion scenario.
This is the problem with population ethics in general - depending
on how you calculate population welfare, you will either conclude
that we should stop reproducing and start harvesting the unhappiest
people in society for their organs or you will conclude that we
need to keep churning out babies until we reach a bare subsistence
standard of living. This is just an example of the former line of
reasoning - it's even less ethically complex that most formulations
of the problem since we're dealing with eliminating extant lives
instead of potential ones. Granted most people arguing this
position won't have embraced the entirety of the implications of
the less-lives line of reasoning, but there is no reason to stop at
prohibiting people from recieving life-saving medical treatment as
opposed to any other milestone on that path and I don't see Bailey
implying anything other that that they're wrong. Should one refrain
from rejecting a bad line of ethical reasoning simply because Very
Serious People have held that it was worth entertaining?
Ron,
Just curious, but is it an "overt act" to shorten my life (and
the lives of countless millions of others) by preventing or slowing
various kinds of biomedical research in the service of one's own
peculiar morality?
Well "preventing" seems pretty overt
(although what is being prevented is pretty obscure since you are
assuming that the desired results will be achieved...is it immoral
to pursue immortality/longer lifespan fruitlessly? Could that
energy be more morally spent?).
Now "slowing" seems a bit less clear. Am I "slowing" the progress
of science by not supporting it actively?
If this research can keep skinny immigrant chicks skinny, then I am double-plus for it!
Ron,
You bring up an interesting juxtaposition of ideas in your last
couple of posts...
by preventing or slowing various kinds of biomedical research
in the service of one's own peculiar morality?
AND
Universal Health care
How does a libertarian world view justify the overt act of
"denying" someone medical services? Usually the concept of positive
and negative rights is invoked.
How do those ideas get tangled into your question about "overtly"
preventing or slowing an outcome that is only potential in
nature?
RC Dean,
I fail to see how this doesn't ultimately all collapse back
into the question of whether it is better for people to live or
die.
It does ultimately come back to that. However, "people" is a
different subjec from "I."
Will your extended lifespan causes other people to die sooner or
suffer more - THAT is the question. Thinking that only the life
span of the individual that can get the life-extending treatments
is a factor worthy of moral consideration is the problem NM and I
are trying to get at, and that Bailey seems so determined to bob
and weave around.
Matt XIV,
depending on how you calculate population welfare, you will
either conclude that we should stop reproducing and start
harvesting the unhappiest people in society for their organs or you
will conclude that we need to keep churning out babies until we
reach a bare subsistence standard of living. That's just not
true. There are numerous other conclusions one can come to.
If longer life is the moral choice.
It is immoral for me to deny someone what they need for longer
life.
That would include:
Food.
Shelter.
Medical care.
"A long healthy life is a moral good. More life is better. " =
justification for a positive right to that which is needed to
extend life?
Joe,
The question isn't about increased lifespans all by themselves,
but about the consequences of those increased lifespans.
The classic case of the performative contradiction: asking about
the consequences of longer lifespans would immediately call into
question the arguer's own lifespan by its logical extension. So, do
you REALLY want to set the example and fall over a cliff?
Mexicano Nuevo (or Neu Mejican, whatever)
If longer life is inherently good, then can't I claim the moral
high ground by forcing you to increase your own
lifespan?
No, you cannot. Forcing your will on someone else is an initiation
of force. Improving lifespans should be offered through the
marketplace and not by someone's fiat... you should know that by
now.
Frrancisco,
First of all, I haven't ventured an opinion on the subject, other
than to say that it should be discussed honestly.
Second, I daresay there is quite a bit of room in between leaping
off a cliff and utilizing biotech to pursue immortality.
The question is not whether we should end our lives before their
"natural end" (scare quotes to acknowledge the problematic nature
of that concept), but whether we should extend them beyond them,
and how far beyond them, and how to go about answering that
question.
If longer life is the moral choice[,] [then] [i]t is immoral
for me to deny someone what they need for longer life.
False. It is immoral from you to hinder a person (through
initiation of force) to achieve a longer life (like stealing from
him, killing him, maiming him, kidnapping him, et cetera). However,
that does not mean that such a person has a right to RECEIVE such
an improvement from you (like food, shelter, medicine, et cetera),
because that would also constitute an initiation of force on his
part. You are arguing from positivism here, Mexicanito Nuevo. What
is being argued is that no third party has a right to hinder you or
me from obtaining such life-enhancement items through voluntary
exchange with a second party.
Excellent response Francisco Torres. Neu Mejican doesn't understand libertarian ethics
Frank Towers (Francisco Torres, whatever)
You sling around "should" pretty loosely in a discussion of
morals.
What is the justification for saying that the morality of "more
life is better" is inherently of a lower order than the morality of
"don't initiate force?"
There is a reason for the idiom: "forcing him to do it for his own
good."
Joe, I was not criticizing your opinion but your
question/argument.
... but whether we should extend [our lifespans] beyond them,
and how far beyond them, and how to go about answering that
question.
The question is answered by leaving that choice to each individual,
Joe, and not ask what "we" should be doing - it is not MY business
nor YOURS to think for others. It is a matter of principle, Joe. It
is like asking if torture should be allowed or not - the question
should not even be posited, since by principle, torture IS
immoral.
james,
I understand libertarian ethics fine.
(I also predicted the exact wording of Frank Tower's
response).
I disagree that they result in a system that can be consistently
applied to real world situations.
lil Frank Towers,
It is immoral from you to hinder a person (through initiation
of force) to achieve a longer life
So it is immoral for you to stop me from taking an apple from your
apple tree to ward off starvation. Got it.
Lil Franky,
What is being argued is that no third party has a right to
hinder you or me from obtaining such life-enhancement items through
voluntary exchange with a second party.
FWIW, you are the first one to bring this point into the
discussion. It is not "what is being argued."
What is being argued is whether or not extending life is in and of
itself a moral good.
What is the justification for saying that the morality of "more
life is better" is inherently of a lower order than the morality of
"don't initiate force?"
Mexicanito, or whatever ("Neu Mejicano" makes my blood boil, being
Mexican and all...), they are not one above the other: One is
prerequisite for the other, since initiation of violence against
another individual hinders that individual's life. This is why
stealing, killing, and taxing is immoral.
Francisco Torres,
If the consequences of an individual, or lots of individuals,
choosing to do this is to cause harm to others, then no, allowing
each individual to decide for himself is not the right
answer.
A libertarian should understand the point about swinging one's fist
and the ends of others noses.
What is being argued is whether or not extending life is in
and of itself a moral good.
N.M., again, you make a performative contradiction by implying that
it may NOT be (by asking if it is). You would have two responses:
either it is, or it is not. That is ludicrous, since if extending
our own life is NOT a moral good, then by extension your own
lifespan cannot be a good (where do you begin to call an extension
in life, "an extension")? That would imply ipso facto that you own
lifespan is not a moral good, if it happens that an increase in
your lifespan is not a good.
What should be the question is if a person will find that
desirable. That is for a person to decide. But the question cannot
be if an increase in lifespan is in itself a good: can you REALLY
conclude that it is NOT? Let me know this.
What is being argued is whether or not extending life is in
and of itself a moral good.
Yeah, what he said, Frankie.
Bailey didn't make a point about the morality of non-initiation of
force - he made a point about the inherent morality of living
longer.
Francisco,
"Neu Mejicano" makes my blood boil, being Mexican and
all...
Don't take it personally.
I am from New Mexico.
Germanic (Neu = new)
English ("an" being the ending to indicate "from" in
English")
My real name has a "j" in it
and "Mejico" was historically an acceptable spelling.
One is prerequisite for the other, since initiation of violence
against another individual hinders that individual's
life.
How do you equate "extend" with "hinder" in this particular
situation. I am forcing you to live longer...and that is hindering
your life?
Your liberty, maybe.
So, then, does liberty trump life in your moral calculus?
Neu Mejican you would be wrong though. Francisco Torres has it
exactly right and if you really understood libertarian ethics you
would understand why his viewpoint is the correct one. We have a
right to live our lives as we see fit as long as we don't infringe
on others' rights to do the same that is the bottom line of
libertarian ethics. And to say that they don't speak to "real world
situations" speaks loudly to your lack of understanding.
If you take an apple off of my tree you are stealing. Unless you
ask for permission I am within my rights to prevent you from eating
my fruit.
See your understanding of libertarian ethics is as faulty as that
analogy.
That is ludicrous, since if extending our own life is NOT a
moral good, then by extension your own lifespan cannot be a good
(where do you begin to call an extension in life, "an
extension")?
That beer was good. I think I'll have 50, because that will be even
better.
Putting the phrase "ipso facto" in there doesn't make B follow
A.
If the consequences of an individual, or lots of
individuals, choosing to do this is to cause harm to others,
then no, allowing each individual to decide for himself is
not the right answer.
Really? What kind of harm? What possible harm can come from
extending your life, Joe? Or Mine? Consider this: Are you
harming someone by taking care of yourself? The other
point (the one I highlighted) is really scary, Joe: Are you willing
to place your life in the hands of others? Because that is what is
being implied here.
Arguing about the non-initiation of force tells us nothing about
the inherent morality of pursuing immortality.
I keep seeing libertarians insisting "We don't reject morality, we
just don't want to see force used," but when faced with a question
of morality, the only moral reasoning many of them seem to bring to
the table is to note that force is bad.
OK, it would be bad to force people to shorten or lengthen their
lifespans. This tells us nothing about the morality of choosing to
extend one's lifespan.
Really? What kind of harm? What possible harm can come from
extending your life, Joe? Or Mine?
Finally, we get to the actual question - would the adoption of
these technologies and the creation of a world where some or all
will live centuries or millennia cause harms?
My answer to your question is, I don't know, Francisco.
Francisco,
if a person will find that desirable. That is for a person to
decide. But the question cannot be if an increase in lifespan is in
itself a good: can you REALLY conclude that it is NOT? Let me know
this.
Remember, my point is that length is not an inherently moral aspect
of your life.
I note that you have equated "desirable" with "good." Hedonism is
certainly a moral system, but I don't see it fitting nicely into
the libertarian system.
To take "whatever makes one happy" as a guide to action means:
to be guided by nothing but one's emotional whims. Emotions are not
tools of cognition. . . . This is the fallacy inherent in
hedonism--in any variant of ethical hedonism, personal or social,
individual or collective. "Happiness" can properly be the purpose
of ethics, but not the standard. The task of ethics is to define
man's proper code of values and thus to give him the means of
achieving happiness. To declare, as the ethical hedonists do, that
"the property value is whatever gives you pleasure" is to declare
that "the proper value is whatever you happen to value"--which is
an act of intellectual and philosophical abdication, an act which
merely proclaims the futility of ethics and invites all men to play
it deuces wild.
I am forcing you to live longer...and that
is hindering your life?
There is no need to argue this one, Neu. Any initiation of force is
a hindrance. If a person decides to live LESS by enjoying certain
pleasures (smoking, drinking, drugs, et cetera), then that person
has made a CHOICE for him or herself about how to enjoy his or her
life. Extending his/her life could be tantamount to impose a living
hell on that person.
I note that you have equated "desirable" with "good."
Well, we can play the "gotcha!" game all day long, Neu, but the
word "desire" here in this context means "choose". A person will
choose one thing over another, meaning: He or she will desire one
over the other.
james,
I notice that you cast your view of ethics as the "correct"
interpretation.
At its center sits a concept of property rights that says I have
done violence to you by eating an apple off of your apple
tree.
That, my friend, according to many other logically consistent
ethical systems is not an immoral act, it is not an act of
violence, and it is not an initiation of force against you. (there
are even "libertarian" ethical systems that hold a much different
view of property).
You are not your property.
Property rights are an important concept.
It is, arguably, immoral, however, to place them on the same level
as the right to life.
In ethics, stating that you have the "correct" view is not, really,
a very convincing argument.
Francisco,
I will note these two sentences without comment.
Extending his/her life could be tantamount to impose a living
hell on that person.
But the question cannot be if an increase in lifespan is in
itself a good: can you REALLY conclude that it is NOT?
Neu Mejican,
If longer life is the moral choice ... it is immoral for me to
deny someone what they need for longer life.
The thing I find consistently baffling about this subject is how
the way the dilemma is phrased produces completely different
outcomes.
Ask someone if murder is wrong and chances are, they'll say
yes.
Ask someone if allowing a murder to occur is wrong and they'll
likely say yes to that as well.
Ask someone if allowing another person to die of starvation or a
curable disease is wrong and many, perhaps most, people will say
yes to that.
Many people would even accept that it is only right and proper to
try to find cures for traditionally lethal illnesses ... as long as
they're things that have been recognized and pathologized
already.
However, ask somebody if it is right and proper to use SCIENCE! to
extend the human lifespan past the limitations previously imposed
by biology, and suddenly you're Dr. Frankenstein. Never mind that
in most cases, what that entails is ... finding cures for
traditionally lethal illnesses.
It's easy to accept the preservation of human life as a value when
it's your own and those of your family and friends. At some point,
however, the perception of a distant human life becomes too
abstract to care about, and fear of offending the gods (viz.
"nature") overwhelms what is usually at the center of moral
concern.
Expect a large number of people to change their positions on this
radically and immediately the moment it is relevant to themselves
or their loved ones.
Francisco,
Longer life does not equal better life.
It takes more than extending my lifespan to make my life more
"desirable" let alone "a moral good."
A longer life filled with immoral acts is not inherently morally
superior to the shorter version of that same life.
Ask someone if allowing another person to die of starvation
or a curable disease is wrong and many, perhaps most, people will
say yes to that.
I see you skirting that positivist morality here.
Finally, we get to the actual question - would the adoption
of these technologies and the creation of a world where some or all
will live centuries or millennia cause harms?
My answer to your question is, I don't know, Francisco.
I do not know either, Joe. But since I cannot prove a negative, nor
do I think anybody can, I cannot simply use a "precautionary
principle" (which is a logical fallacy) and call for a ban on life
extensions. This is why I find some of the questions posited here
bothersome. I do not know if you agree with this.
Never mind that in most cases, what that entails is ...
finding cures for traditionally lethal illnesses.
Actually, it doesn't. And that's the rub.
As we've found cures to lethal diseases, our lifespan - not our
life expectancy, our lifespan - has barely budged at all.
People who are 90 don't have a higher death rate than people who
are 27 because their luck ran out and they caught a lethal disease
that they were equally likely to get at 27.
joe,
I was being a little flip about the exact conclusions, but once you
embrace the premise that population welfare is the basis for
ethical judgements, no matter what formula you use for population
welfare, there will always be a case where population welfare can
be increased either by killing off a single member or by bringing a
new but completely immiserated member into the population.
If I'm wrong, it should be a simple matter for you to produce a
counter example. You and Neu Meijican are producing a lot of noise
about how there must be some well-reasoned ethical objection to
deploying life-extending technology in and of itself, but you
haven't delivered a single example of one.
Francisco,
This is well said.
It's easy to accept the preservation of human life as a value
when it's your own and those of your family and friends. At some
point, however, the perception of a distant human life becomes too
abstract to care about, and fear of offending the gods (viz.
"nature") overwhelms what is usually at the center of moral
concern.
But within it lies a criticism of the libertarian ethical system
that will allow certain individuals to claim that my right to an
apple when I am starving is superseded by the property rights of
the owner of that tree.
Francesco,
No one is being asked to prove a negative, or to apply the
Precautionary Princple - which you misapply in your comment.
As people extend their lifespans a little here and there, we will
see if doing so has pernicious effects, and we can react to
them.
Neu Mejican it is the correct view as long as you are not
harming anyone else and I mean a physical harm (attacking my person
or my property is a physical harm) not an emotional harm. Then you
have the right to do what you want period provided again that you
don't infringe on anyone else's rights to do the same.
Again read about libertarian ethics and you will understand why
your taking something from me without my permission is a violation
of my rights and is an act of violence. Forcing me to do something
against my will can only be considered an act of violence. What
would you call it?
I am my own property if I don't own my self at least then the
concept of ownership is rendered meaningless. You are educated but
you lack understanding.
Neu Mejican,
I see you skirting that positivist morality here.
Oh, don't misunderstand me, I am not advancing a moral position
here. In fact, I haven't got one yet; this is an area in which my
opinion is truly of little or no consequence, so I am waiting for
more information.
I do see an inconsistency between a morality that values
the sanctity of life but regards preserving life as not just
immoral but morally ugly (that is, doesn't just from a
pragmatic, consequentialist position like the one joe is taking). I
am trying to understand the psychology of that inconsistency.
MattXIV,
You and Neu Meijican are producing a lot of noise about how
there must be some well-reasoned ethical objection to deploying
life-extending technology in and of itself, but you haven't
delivered a single example of one.
Nope. I have been saying that in and of itself life-extending is
amoral. The ethical question arise when the costs of deploying that
technology are considered. Those costs do not have to be societal
in nature. They can be costs that are born only by the individual
making the choice.
james,
I am my own property if I don't own my self at least then the
concept of ownership is rendered meaningless. You are educated but
you lack understanding.
Cute.
You have understanding but you lack wisdom grasshopper.
Matt XIV,
That's much better phrases. Two points:
1) "there will always be a case where" does not equal "all of the
cases will be." It is entirely possible to talk about population
welfare, and even act in its name, without getting into those
cases. Population welfare was advanced through the use of
vaccinations, for example.
2) Recognizing one moral imperitive does not mandate the exclusion
of other moral imperitives. Recognizing populatin welfare as a
moral good does not exclude the recognition of individual welfare
as a moral good. Sometimes they may conflict, and we'll have to
figure out what to do about that.
You and Neu Meijican are producing a lot of noise about how
there must be some well-reasoned ethical objection to deploying
life-extending technology in and of itself, but you haven't
delivered a single example of one. Actually, after much
arm-twisting by Neu Mejican, Bailey himself dropped in and named a
few, upthread.
joe,
3:30pm is just an appeal to nature. The same objection can be
raised to the technologies that prevent diseases decreasing the
traditional levels of disease-related mortality.
Longer life does not equal better life.
I agree with you that it does not mean the same for SOME. However,
again, that is subjective valuation, best left to each individual's
volition and not some potent overseer, as statists would
like.
However, I detect contradiction in your statements (or rather, a
lack of cohesion):
Neu: I am forcing you to live longer...and that is hindering
your life?
Let me put it this way: Extending life is a moral good. Extending a
person's life BY FORCE is unethical, because morality implies
CHOICE by the individual, so an extension of life made by someone
else's fiat CAN NOT be a moral good. At the same time, using
violence to hinder a person in his or her search for life extension
(that is, by force) is immoral, because it would imply initiation
of force. That means that life extension should only be a matter of
choice, by the individual, and not by imposition or fiat.
I hope this made matters clear.
james,
Share your understanding.
not an emotional harm
How is an act against your property, which are external to you, a
valid case of harm, when an act against your emotional state, which
is intrinsic and, perhaps, definitional of "you," is not a valid
case of harm?
Concerning the first part of your post at 3:24 PM. You can only make that determination for yourself not for others.
Neu Mejican,
Are you really saying that extending life, in and of itself and
without considering other effects, is not a moral good?
joe,
As we've found cures to lethal diseases, our lifespan - not our
life expectancy, our lifespan - has barely budged at all. People
who are 90 don't have a higher death rate than people who are 27
because their luck ran out and they caught a lethal disease that
they were equally likely to get at 27.
"Illness" and "disease" mean the same thing etymologically, but the
implication behind your statement is that the only curable killers
are illnesses caused by pathogens, so I'll allow "disease" to mean
those and by "illness" refer to others. A 27-year-old is flatly not
as likely to develop illnesses such as heart disease, cancer,
cystic fibrosis, immune deficiency, neurodegenerative disorders or
organ failure as an elderly person. When a person is said to have
died from "natural causes," it is typically one of these. Needless
to say, finding long-term treatments for these illnesses could
increase the average duration of human life considerably - is that
morally repugnant?
Matt XIV,
My comment at 3:30 contains no moral argument whatsoever. It's just
a statement of objective fact about the difference between life
span and life expectancy, and the biological difference between
efforts to extend the one (cure diseases) and efforts to expand the
other (extend lifespan) differ.
I don't how you read any normative statement into that descriptive
comment.
Francisco,
Unless I misunderstand you, you are saying you agree with me that
the length of lifespan is not sufficient to determine the moral
value of that life. Correct.
I hope you recognize that many of the contradictions you are
attributing to me, are contradictions in RB's "easy answer" that
longer life is inherently a moral good. I have not, I think, taken
a position beyond saying that length of lifespan is essentially
amoral in nature.
joe,
I am saying that its length is not a moral characteristic of a
life.
I have been saying that in and of itself life-extending is
amoral.
It cannot be amoral, Neu. If a decision to extend your life is made
by you, it is a moral decision. If you decide NOT to extend your
life, yours is a moral decision.
Neu Mejican you really, really, don't get it. If you don't own yourself who does? It is thinking like yours that is the basis of the WOD and all the other infringements on our liberty by the state and those who run it.
hale,
but the implication behind your statement is that the only
curable killers are illnesses caused by pathogens That was not
my intent.
A 27-year-old is flatly not as likely to develop illnesses such
as heart disease, cancer, cystic fibrosis, immune deficiency,
neurodegenerative disorders or organ failure as an elderly
person. Yes, I know, I made this point myself.
Needless to say, finding long-term treatments for these
illnesses could increase the average duration of human life
considerably - is that morally repugnant?
In and of itself, no. I am concerned that greatly extending the
human lifespan could have negative consequences, but there is
nothing immoral about people living longer - if anything, that
would be a moral good.
NM,
You gave it the old college try, but I think you're going over
their heads.
I don't think your interlocutors are going to understand that you
are talking about an issue distinct from using force against
others.
Is it moral to screw sheep?
It is wrong to force people to screw sheep, and it is wrong to
force people not to screw sheep.
OK, but is it moral to screw sheep?
I just don't think you get the libertarian ethical argument about
the use of force.
Ad infinitum.
Neu Mejican regarding the idea of emotional harm I suggest you
read the works of Szasz. He has a website that has the listings of
his books as well as some essays that he has written.
If emotional harm is more real than harm of my property and person.
I should be able to sue every woman who has every broken my heart.
I should be able to go after my parents for thwarting my desires to
do what I want because it caused emotional harm. Maybe I feel harm
from your not understanding where I am coming from can I sue for
damages.
joe you don't get it either. Mises has an article concerning the
state of education written by Albert Jay Nock. It's titled "The
Theory of Education in the United States"
"Perhaps we are not fully aware of the extent to which instruction
and education are accepted as being essentially the same thing. I
think you would find, if you looked into it, for instance, that all
the formal qualifications for a teacher's position rest on this
understanding. A candidate is certificated - is he not? - merely as
having been exposed satisfactorily to a certain kind of instruction
for a certain length of time, and therefore he is assumed eligible
to a position which we all agree that only an educated person
should fill. Yet he may not be at all an educated person, but only
an instructed person. We have seen many such, and five minutes'
talk with one of them is quite enough to show that the
understanding of instruction as synonymous with education is
erroneous. They are by no means the same thing."
Neu Meijcan,
The extension of options is always at least ethically neutral and
almost always ethically positive. Think of an unspecified function
with any number of parameters that you're trying to maximize. You
can never increase the obtainable maximum by setting one of those
parameter to a constant. A choice is always at least as good as no
choice.
Note that this doesn't rely on any libertarian ethical premise -
the choice can be in the hands of any kind of welfare maximizer,
from the individual to a philospher king.
Given that there's good evidence that moral goods could come of
exercising the particular choice under consideration, it can be
said that the presence of the choice iself is a good.
james,
I haven't the foggiest idea what you are trying to accomplish, or
how it relates to anything anyone has said in this thread.
You certainly didn't put together a response to any of the points I
made.
Typing my name into the wrong field is the least of that comment's
problems.
joe,
Apologies regarding misinterpreting your 3:30 then. I assumed that
you intending to draw an ethical distinction, since I didn't see
any other reason to bring the point up.
james,
Szasz, despite making some interesting points regarding the
interface between mental illness and criminality, is essentially a
crank.
Or to keep in the spirit of his writings, I should say he is a
"metaphorical expert."
If emotional harm is more real than harm of my property and
person.
To be sure you are clear on my point...the harm of which you speak
when I harm your property is distinct from the harm to your body
primarily because it occurs only in the realm of your
emotions.
Unless I deprive you of property that will preserve your
life/prevent physical harm, the mechanism for harm in a case of
"property crime" is the emotional harm it creates. My taking that
apple off the tree (let us assume you have enough apples to
live/make a living) only harms you because it hurts your
feelings....
"Hey that's mine!!!!"
MattIV,
The extension of options is always at least ethically
neutral
If the extension of life is seen as an "extension of options," then
I am going with the position that it is "neutral."
"Given that there's good evidence that moral goods could come of
exercising the particular choice under consideration, it can be
said that the presence of the choice iself is a good."
The presence of the choice is good?
I can choose to kill or not, that is good?
Seems to me that it is not until the choice is made that you have
anything to hang a moral argument on.
Matt XIV,
There may be a moral distinction. There may not be.
The reason I brought it up was to refute the argument that
lifespan-extension is the same thing as disease-fighting, and
therefore there are no further moral considerations.
They are not the same, so the possibility remains that there are
additional problems.
MattIV,
You can never increase the obtainable maximum by setting one of
those parameter to a constant. A choice is always at least as good
as no choice.
I would need to see a rigorous proof of this.
It may be that interaction between parameters will be maximized
when a particular parameter is held constant. Don't tell me you are
positing some linear combination of "moral" functions.
Read the article joe then you will understand.
Neu Mejican Szasz is not a crank. Read his work before you judge
him.
Both of you need to check out the sites of LRC and Mises if you
want to better understand libertarian thought because obviously you
are not comprehending it. Peace
MattIV,
By the way, your post at 4:15pm is a very impressive job of making
Ron Bailey's point ("more is better") with more complex language.
It doesn't however, make it any more valid.
james,
I could not have made the "metaphorical expert" dig at Szasz
without having first read his works.
The valuation of his work as that of a crank is based on reading
his stuff.
Since you are handing out reading suggestions...
Try reading the work of the original libertarian.
Proudhon.
Start with What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of
Right and of Government.
Pay particular attention to chapter 4.
=\;^) http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/ProProp.html
MattIV,
The central problem I have with your formulation of this is that
you are essentially saying, I think, is that the existence of the
conditions for moral choices to be made is somehow morally good. In
other words, the existence of conditions for judging moral valence
have moral valence.
This seems vacuous to me.
2) Recognizing one moral imperitive does not mandate the exclusion of other moral imperitives. Recognizing populatin welfare as a moral good does not exclude the recognition of individual welfare as a moral good. Sometimes they may conflict, and we'll have to figure out what to do about that.
We know they conflict - they do by definition and they do in the
question under consideration. What's important is how we actually
relate them to each other. If we reject population ethics for some
other standard (or visa versa) here, why not elsewhere? If we
establish some exchange rate between the two, we don't escape the
Repugnant Conclusion problems, we just change the level of
tradeoffs at which we're willing to travel down that path.
Is it moral to deny someone the right to extend their life
because you think more people living impose undesirable costs upon
you? If you think that is moral, can you posit a government or
society that forces people to not avail themselves of
life-extending treatments that is not an amoral authoritarian
monstrosity?
Take a marginal view of it -- would a moral person force their
neighbor to die by refusing them access to medical treatment, thus
giving that moral person imperceptibly less traffic congestion,
etc.? Of course not. Using government to prevent people from
choosing to live longer is unambiguously wrong.
NM,
What I'm going for is that as far as normative ethics are
concerned, removing a choice that is not a bad thing in and of
itself is never superior to some other ethical rule targetting
something that is a bad thing in and of itself. At best removing
the alternative is neutral - when the alternative is never
ethically superior to the status quo. In other cases, it is
inferior to the postulated other rule and its imposition in lieu of
that rule is a moral bad.
I think we talked past each other a bit earlier - I was trying
demonstrate that extended livespans cannot themselves be a bad
thing, while you were trying to demonstrating that they are not
obligately a good thing.
I predict that any significant lengthening of human life
will bring on a nanny state that will make today's bullshit look
like caveman times.
If the only way to die is through unnatural means, such as
accidents or murder, people are going to get ultra paranoid about
dying that way. No longer will it be "nobody lives forever", it
will be "I can live forever unless one of the 50 airbags in my car
fails."
Interesting theory, episiarch, but I don't think it pans out. If
you were to suddenly be given a medical that would allow you to
extend your lifespan by two hundred years more, while maintaining
the body and health of a 20 year old, would that cause you to turn
into a raving nanny-statist who wants to ensure everyone else also
avoided preventable deaths? If that lifespan extension happened to
me, I'd take fewer risks, but I wouldn't be the slightest bit more
inclined to foist that choice upon others who like to live more on
the edge.
I would need to see a rigorous proof of this.
It may be that interaction between parameters will be maximized when a particular parameter is held constant. Don't tell me you are positing some linear combination of "moral" functions.
The set of for f(x,y,z) should contain all values of where C is a
constant. Thus, you shouldn't have any maxima that are in the first
set but not the second. It should hold for contiguous and discrete
parameters and function results, including a physical model of a
brain.
MatIV
I think we talked past each other a bit earlier - I was trying
demonstrate that extended livespans cannot themselves be a bad
thing, while you were trying to demonstrating that they are not
obligately a good thing.
That sounds about right.
The set of for[sic?] f(x,y,z) should contain all values
of[sic?] where C is a constant. Thus, you shouldn't have any maxima
that are in the first set but not the second. It should hold for
contiguous and discrete parameters and function results, including
a physical model of a brain.
Maybe my brain is muddled today, but I don't follow your logic
here. Fluxuations in some parameters have the potential to reduce
the overall output of the system along some other parameter (let's
say the one we are using as a metric of "moral good"). Holding
those parameters constant should increase the "moral good" output
by the system...
Or am I missing something here?
Are you simply saying that the case with the best results will be a
member of the larger set of possible cases that result from varying
all parameter values?
MattIV,
To be clear.
It seems you were trying to demonstrate that extended lifespans
were not themselves a bad thing, while I was trying to say that
they were neither a good nor a bad thing in and of
themselves.
I think you were just supporting a sub-domain of the territory I
was trying to stake out.
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