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No Pseudonymity for Woman Alleging She Was Falsely Accused of Sexual Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, Doxed

|The Volokh Conspiracy |


From Doe v. Doe (E.D. Pa.), decided today by Judge Gerald Pappert:

Jane Doe alleges four X (formerly Twitter) users falsely accused her of having a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and doxxed her by posting on the social networking site her full name, employment and education history, phone numbers and addresses. Doe asserts claims for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts and aiding and abetting. She seeks to proceed under a pseudonym because she fears for her safety, along with additional reputational and professional harm. The Court denies the motion because Doe's fear of harm does not outweigh the public's interest in open litigation.

[A.] Parties to a lawsuit typically must identify themselves. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). In "exceptional cases," however, parties may proceed anonymously. To do so, "a plaintiff must show both (1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable." Courts balance multiple factors in considering whether to let someone proceed anonymously, including (1) the extent the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided; (3) the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant's identity; (4) whether the issue is purely legal in nature; (5) whether the party seeking to sue anonymously has illegitimate motives; and (6) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of the litigants. The purpose of this balancing test "is to allow a district court to determine whether a litigant has a reasonable fear of severe harm that outweighs the public's interest in open litigation." …

The first factor "does not support anonymity where the litigant's identity has never been confidential." Doe has not kept her identity confidential. After Defendants doxxed her, by posting her picture, phone numbers and prior addresses, she publicly responded by "den[ying] the connection to Epstein in the thread of Defendants' posts."

To establish fear of severe harm, Doe argues that "survivors and other named individuals have reported receiving death threats." Yet she does not allege how she will be threatened if forced to proceed under her real name, and courts reject "claims of harm or generalized fear that are found to be speculative and unsupported by evidence." As she notes, the Defendants have already shared her personal information with the public, so there is no greater risk if she proceeds under her own name.

Doe also alleges a "risk of reputational and professional devastation." But "[c]ourts in this Circuit do not recognize purely social and reputational harms, without more, as valid bases to prevail on this factor." Embarrassment or economic harm is not enough to justify proceeding anonymously either. And because her identity was made public, "litigating publicly will afford Doe the opportunity to clear [her] name" and "will not contribute further to the harm that [she] alleges has already occurred."

In assessing the public's interest, courts consider whether "other similarly situated litigants [would] be deterred from litigating claims." Doe provides no reason to believe similarly situated litigants would be deterred from bringing defamation claims due to fear of disclosing their identities. The Epstein-related cases she relies upon involve plaintiffs who Epstein sexually assaulted, not individuals falsely accused of having a relationship with him.

If a plaintiff's claims are purely legal in nature, there is an "atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's identity." Doe's claims that Defendants falsely identified her as someone who had a sexual relationship with Epstein are inherently fact sensitive. For example, a key issue is whether Defendants "knew or were reckless about this falsity and had no good faith basis to claim that Plaintiff was the woman" identified in the Epstein files, and resolving that depends on the nature of the facts known to Defendants.

There is no evidence that Doe has illegitimate motives to proceed anonymously, which favors anonymity. The universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants, however, always weighs in favor of disclosing a plaintiff's identity.

The Court does not diminish the harm Doe claims to have suffered, but she has not established how using her real name would subject her to "severe harm," separate from what she has already allegedly endured from Defendants' past actions. Any harm she may suffer from using her own name is not outweighed by the "thumb on the scale that is the universal interest in favor of open judicial proceedings." …

This is consistent, I think, with the cases generally holding that libel plaintiffs can't sue pseudonymously; see Roe v. Smith and the federal cases that it cites.