Fourth Circuit Publicly Admonishes Lawyer for "Citations to Nonexistent Judicial Opinions"
From yesterday's decision in In re Nwaubani, from the Fourth Circuit (Judges Marvin Quattlebaum, Allison Rushing, and DeAndrea Gist Benjamin):
This attorney discipline matter stems from attorney Eric Chibueze Nwaubani's briefing submitted in Bolden v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., No. 23-2195, 2025 WL 1355304 (4th Cir. May 9, 2025), an employment discrimination appeal argued before this court. Concerned that Nwaubani's briefing contained citations to nonexistent judicial opinions potentially derived from generative artificial intelligence (AI), the court's Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline initiated disciplinary proceedings against Nwaubani to determine whether his conduct violated any of the court's Local Rules of Appellate Procedure. After reviewing the show cause notices, responses and briefing in this case, we determine that Nwaubani's conduct violated Local Rule 46(g)(1)(c). As a result, and as further explained below, we issue a public admonishment….
We begin with how Nwaubani's conduct came to the attention of the court. During his representation of the plaintiff on appeal in Bolden, the Bolden panel discovered that a case cited in Nwaubani's brief, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 548 U.S. 629 (2006), did not exist. So, it issued an order directing Nwaubani to file a revised brief and show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned.
His response to the initial notice denied using generative AI in preparing his briefs and instead stated that he mistakenly cited Jackson when he meant to cite a different case, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). He also provided a tenuous explanation for why Darden, a case concerning the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, was relevant to his appeal. That said, when Nwaubani filed his revised opening brief, he omitted his earlier argument and did not cite Darden at all.
Unfortunately, Nwaubani's reply brief contained other errors, including citations to two more nonexistent cases, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Glencore Ltd., 611 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and In re Acres Properties, Inc., 100 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996). When asked at the Bolden oral argument about his sources for the three nonexistent cases, Nwaubani responded that he used LexisNexis, Westlaw and Google.
Later, the Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline issued a supplemental notice to show cause, directing Nwaubani to show cause why he shouldn't be disciplined by the court. It also encouraged Nwaubani to explain his research process and reasoning behind the citations at issue. Nwaubani explained in his response that, similar to his earlier Jackson explanation, his citation to Glencore was a genuine error because he meant to cite a different case involving a party named Glencore. And while he didn't provide a citation to that decision in his response, he did append a copy of an administrative sanctions proceeding before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission involving a party named Glencore.
The proceeding he identified—In the Matter of: Glencore International AG, CFTC No. 22-16, 2022 WL 1963727 (May 24, 2022)—appears to have little or no relevance to his Title VII appeal. His explanation for the citation to the nonexistent In re Acres case was similar, with Nwaubani stating he meant to cite to Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc., No. 16-CV-91, 2017 WL 2371295, at (W.D. Wis. May 31, 2017), a negligence case arising from an injury at a horse farm, and Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 58 (7th Cir. 1974), a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, instead. Both Dilley and Roberts appear to have minimal relevance to the facts or law of Bolden. In fact, the Dilley decision Nwaubani appended to his response—Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc., 905 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2018)—was different from the Dilley decision he said he meant to cite. And Nwaubani doubled down that he did not use generative AI.
After consideration of Nwaubani's second response, the Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline ordered formal briefing[ and] appointed prosecuting counsel ….
Courts across the country are grappling with how to address the use of generative AI in materials submitted to the court—and nonexistent cases (otherwise known as hallucinations) are the frequent posterchild for problems. One thing is clear—it is difficult to overlook the increasing prevalence of generative AI. Even traditional legal research services like LexisNexis and Westlaw now offer generative AI features as part of their software. The result—while the use of generative AI is currently perceived by some in the legal field as an exception, it may soon become the norm.
But today we need not delve too deeply into generative AI. In fact, we don't even need to determine whether Nwaubani did or did not use that technology. That's because Rule 8.4(d)'s prohibition of "conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice" applies to submitting a brief with nonexistent cases no matter how it is done, whether through generative AI or not.
Attorneys have ethical obligations as to the materials and arguments they advance in federal court. Of course, making a mistaken citation in a brief does not automatically rise to the level of a Rule 8.4(d) violation. But here, Nwaubani's citation of three nonexistent cases, each with materially different citations than those of the cases he says he meant to cite, does. And while Nwaubani attempts simply to replace the nonexistent cases with existing cases with correct citations, the legal relevance of those existing cases to his arguments in Bolden is tenuous at best. A reasonable attorney, in preparing or reviewing his brief, should have discovered the errors. In sum, our system of justice depends on advocates' candor in submissions to the court. Failures like those in this case impede the administration of justice.
For these reasons, we find by clear and convincing evidence that Nwaubani's conduct was not only improper but also bore negatively on the judicial process in a more than de minimis way. As a result, we find that Nwaubani's conduct violated Rule 8.4(d) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, and thus our Local Rule 46(g)(1)(c)….
[O]ur Local Rule provides that "[d]iscipline may consist of disbarment, suspension from practice before this Court, monetary sanction, removal from the roster of attorneys eligible for appointment as Court-appointed counsel, reprimand, or any other sanction that the Court may deem appropriate." "[I]n formulating the appropriate discipline[,] … [we] consider both aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the 'potential or actual injury' resulting from the misconduct."
Nwaubani's self-admitted citation oversights, justified by attenuated explanations for purported correct citations, do little to mitigate our view of his conduct. The facts here should remind all members of the Fourth Circuit Bar that there is no shortcut around the rules. Whether done in modern, innovative ways or old-fashioned ways, citing nonexistent decisions is not permitted…. As a result, Nwaubani is hereby,
PUBLICLY ADMONISHED.