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Self-Represented Ligitant Says He Was Mentally Incompetent to Represent Himself, Seeks to Void Results of Past Case

|The Volokh Conspiracy |


From Judge Jennifer Dorsey (D. Nev.) last week in Naessens v. Breslin:

Pro se plaintiff … contends … that he has an undisclosed mental-health condition that made him incompetent to represent himself during this lawsuit….

Naessens … argues that he was "diagnosed with a serious mental-health condition and lacked the capacity to proceed pro se without a judicial determination of competence or court-appointed representation." He asserts that the court should have sua sponte inquired into his competency and appointed a guardian ad litem to represent his interests. He contends that the failure to do so violated his constitutional rights.

Naessens cites no authority for the notion that this court should have, unprompted, questioned his competency to litigate a case that he brought before this court. The court's obligation to conduct a competency hearing under FRCP 17(c) arises only when a "substantial question exists regarding the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se …." No such question arose in this case; Naessens actively participated in motion practice, coherently articulated his arguments and allegations, and never informed the court of any condition that affected his competency.

The only issue he raised concerning his health was in a motion to extend deadlines, stating that he was suffering from seizures that made it "difficult to communicate in a timely manner with the court." That statement did not raise a substantial question concerning Naessens's competency, so the court was under no obligation to determine competency under FRCP 17, and I conclude that his arguments do not justify relief [from the prior judgment].

Naessens separately but relatedly argues that because he was incompetent to participate in the prosecution of this case, "all court actions taken while [he] proceeded pro se are constitutionally invalid and must be vacated." He cites United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) and Dusky v. United States (1960) to support his argument. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzalez-Lopez addresses criminal defendants' right to constitutionally effective counsel. And the High Court's opinion in Dusky concerns the requirement that a criminal defendant be competent to stand trial. Neither case provides any applicable principles for this civil context, so they are not persuasive here….