The Virtue of Riches
For many Americans, riches are so disreputable that taking them away is
a goal in itself. The left used to offer the misery of the poor as
a reason for redistribution, but these days an increase in
inequality is just as likely to be the
rallying cry for higher taxation. In a savage New York
Times column this past March, the economist Paul Krugman
turned rising inequality—a trend that has persisted for decades
under both Republican and Democratic presidents—into a frontal
assault on the hated Bush tax cuts. More generally, the chief
plaint of Democrats about those cuts has been not that they are
economically inefficient, or even that they are leaving wonderful
programs starved for funds, but that they primarily went to “the
rich.”
That same suspicion is
often applied to the vast wealth we enjoy as a society. Spend time
at an anti-globalization rally, and you’ll inevitably hear someone
complain that Americans are less than 5 percent of the global
population yet consume 25 percent of its output, as if we were
somehow stealing the difference from the world’s poor. Such critics
also cite the social, economic, and environmental dislocations
caused by a vibrant free market. We’re too rich, the activists are
basically saying, and our wealth has too high a cost; it’s time to
stop thinking about making money and start thinking about all the
suffering in the world.
Even those who think
wealth is good (or at least harmless) often implicitly suggest that
the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of moral goals are separate
questions. They would do well to read Benjamin Friedman’s The
Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. The author, a professor
of political economy at Harvard, has written an economic tome that
is accessible to the average reader without failing to offer
something new to specialists as well: a compelling argument that
rising incomes make us not just richer people, but better
ones.
Friedman’s
definition of better will irritate libertarian-minded
readers, who will quarrel with his decision to count support for
generous government expenditures among the “moral consequences” of
economic growth—or, at least, with his implication that such
support is among the positive effects. But most of the
consequences he discusses would impress nearly everyone. When
earnings are growing, Friedman says, people are more tolerant of
minorities, more welcoming to immigrants, more solicitous of their
fellow citizens, more supportive of democratic institutions, and
just plain better specimens of humanity.
This result is not
surprising to anyone who has been around normally rapacious Wall
Street bankers at bonus time, but Friedman provides historical
evidence for the intuition. In painstaking detail, he outlines the
economic history of the United States, Britain, France, and Germany
since the industrial revolution. Over and over, he shows that
during periods of economic stagnation, societies become more
xenophobic, less tolerant of dissent, and more willing to embrace
anti-democratic government actions. It is no accident, he argues,
that communism and fascism were embraced by countries in economic
crisis—or that the Palmer raids and the PATRIOT Act arrived during periods of rising
financial insecurity for America’s vast
bourgeoisie.
Economists have long
known that what they call the “wealth effect” can stimulate
spending: If people feel richer because the value of their home or
stock portfolio has gone up, or because they think their income is
likely to rise in the future, they will loosen up and spend more.
Friedman suggests that people don’t merely become more willing to
treat themselves to home entertainment systems and $4 cups of
coffee as their wealth grows; they also become more generous to
others. “With rising incomes,” he says, “more people become willing
to donate time and money. And among those who do so, rising incomes
also allow people to feel able to do more.”
But direct charity is
only one of the ways we become more generous. Even more important
is the tolerance that growing wealth brings for competition from
others. There is a growing recognition that trade is a vastly more
effective way to reduce global poverty than foreign aid; even
Oxfam, a reliably left-wing nongovernmental organization, has
jumped on the free trade bandwagon with a campaign against
agricultural subsidies. Better still, trade benefits domestic
consumers. Yet progress on that front is nearly impossible unless
economic prosperity is rising fast enough to ease the fears of
those who are threatened by a more open
market.
The current global economic climate
—economic stagnation in much of Europe and an
economic recovery in America that has bypassed much of the middle
class—gives us one way to test Friedman’s hypothesis. If he’s
right, global trade should be much more threatened now than it was
in the 1990s. Sure enough, the Bush administration has struggled to
pass even a minor trade pact with Central America, while the
European Union seems perfectly willing to scuttle the Doha round of
World Trade Organization negotiations rather than expose its
farmers to competition. That doesn’t prove Friedman is correct, of
course, but it’s certainly suggestive.
Disturbingly, if
Friedman is right, unless median incomes start rising
soon, it won’t be long before Americans start taking a long,
skeptical look at our neighbors. (Given the current uproar over
immigration, it’s possible that we’ve already reached that point.)
Nativist and racist movements are at least partly about the
economic insecurity of their members; as August Bebel said,
“anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools.”
Friedman musters an
array of empirical evidence to connect the rise of the Ku Klux Klan
in the 1920s to the growing economic anxieties of its members, who
were frequently “farmers, skilled craftsmen, small business
proprietors, blue collar workers…and low-end white collar workers
of all kinds.” Those Klansmen faced new competition from Catholics
and blacks at a time when economic advancement was already becoming
more difficult thanks to structural changes in the economy:
troubles in the farm sector, population shifts from the country to
the city, increasing industrial consolidation, and structural
shifts away from certain industries and regions. Friedman quotes
historian Nancy McLean’s observation that those economic changes
“cut short the climb of men on the make and defied their dreams of
being their own bosses.…Class standing and economic insecurity
created a potential among white men for openness to the Klan’s
message.” If we can all agree that forestalling movements like the
KKK is a worthy social goal, it
suddenly becomes terribly important to make people feel
wealthier.
This is not as simple as
it sounds. People judge how well they are doing in two ways:
against how well they think other people are doing and against
their own (and their family’s) recent earnings. That’s why an
American postal worker might not be particularly happy with his
income, even though in terms of transportation, health care, and
personal comfort he has a better standard of living than Cornelius
Vanderbilt and other past plutocrats. Ironically, globalization
therefore has made ordinary citizens in many countries unhappier
with their lot, even as it has made them objectively better off.
The more information people have about higher living standards
elsewhere, the less content they are with their own
lifestyles.
Unless we try to bring back
communism, something vanishingly few crusaders against inequality
would support, any social income distribution will always leave
some on the top and some on the bottom. But nations can and do
increase the size of the economic pie, allowing everyone to get a
bigger piece even if their proportions stay the same, or even
shrink. Friedman argues that governments everywhere should focus
policy on creating the broad prosperity that will allow their
societies to become more open, tolerant, and
generous.
Friedman’s argument for
what wealthy nations ought to be doing is the weakest part of the
book. Translating analysis into policy is where many otherwise
brilliant works on popular economics fall down: Economists know
lots of ways an economy can go wrong, but they’re not completely
clear on what makes one go right. The World Bank spends pretty much
all its time analyzing developing economies, and yet in a recent
Foreign Policy essay,
Moisés Naím quotes François Bourguignon, the bank’s chief
economist, as saying “We do not really know what causes economic
growth…[w]e do have a good sense of what are the main obstacles to
growth and what are the conditions without which an economy can’t
grow. But we are far less sure about what are the other ingredients
needed to create and sustain growth.” Even in those happy moments
when economists have a pretty good idea of what should be done,
they are generally at a loss to prescribe programs that can survive
a political process that is usually controlled by the same group of
people who are causing the problems.
So Friedman trots out
some tired old standbys: Increase investment! Boost education! He
might as well declare that we should all try harder to love one
another. Investment and education are fine things; sometimes they
even boost economic output. But those cases are limited, and
government policy has proven incredibly inept at targeting those
specific areas.
It
is an economic truism that incentives
matter, but people are often highly resistant to government
programs waving carrots and sticks. Witness America’s appalling
household savings—briefly: we don’t save—despite all the marvelous
opportunities the government has afforded us to sock away cash for
retirement. Compounding the problem, politicians are often
attracted by things that sound like they work, rather than those
that actually do, which is why we get job training programs instead
of radical education reform.
Even things that we
theoretically know how to do and are sure would improve economic
performance—say, boosting basic reading and math skills—have proved
devilishly hard to implement. Programs like Success for All, a
highly structured reading curriculum, are showing that it is
possible to teach disadvantaged children the skills they need. But
putting those programs in place in a world full of intransigent
teachers unions, inert administrations, and children whose homes
and neighborhoods are scenes of indescribable chaos is very
difficult.
But this book’s lackluster discussion of policy does not undermine its importance. The recovery from the 2001 recession has been disappointing in many ways; labor markets remain softer than we would expect at this point, and middle-class income growth has been stagnant. With all this economic anxiety, it seems likely that the 2008 election will feature more economic protectionism, more attacks on immigration, and probably more proposals for aggressive social programs that will have negative effects on economic growth. Whether or not he intended to do it, Friedman has provided powerful empirical evidence against any program aimed not at increasing the country’s wealth but at cutting wealth down to size.