The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent

Guns

Second Amendment as a Right to Sell Guns as Well as to Have and Buy Them?

|The Volokh Conspiracy |


From Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham in an unsigned opinion filed yesterday in U.S. v. Deare:

Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements with respect to records of licensed firearms dealers. Deare then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, broadly challenging the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements.

The district court denied his motion to dismiss, holding that federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are not implicated by the Second Amendment because such requirements do not affect an individual's right to keep or bear arms. The court further held that, even if federal licensing requirements are implicated by the Second Amendment, such requirements are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation….

Deare primarily challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he argues that the Second Amendment's plain text covers firearm sales, and that § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements are inconsistent with our Nation's history of firearm regulation.

The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the sale of firearms. As we noted in Reese v. BATFE (5th Cir. 2025), "the right to 'keep and bear arms' surely implies the right to purchase them." During oral argument, the government conceded that the Second Amendment applies to the commercial sale of firearms.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order denying Deare's motion to dismiss the indictment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

(As I read the opinion, it doesn't affect the false statements charge.)

Judge Ho concurred:

It's gratifying that our court today reaffirms what we should have long understood—that the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms" plainly encompasses the sale of arms as well. It seems obvious that constitutional rights are meaningless if the Government can simply prohibit the means by which citizens are able to exercise those rights.

Our dissenting colleague theorizes that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) is not about constitutional rights, but about commercial regulation. It's the same view expressed by the district court below: "§ 922(a)(1) is a modest regulation of the commercial activity of selling/transferring firearms to others…. [F]ederal licensure and record keeping requirements do not affect an individual's rights to possess firearms…. [T]hese requirements affect only the seller. As such, Defendants have failed to persuade this Court that these commercial licensure and recordkeeping requirements implicate the Second Amendment."

Or as the dissent puts it simply, "the Second Amendment … doesn't mention sellers," so "I do not think that the sellers of guns are covered."

By that logic, the First Amendment doesn't mention sellers, so presumably booksellers aren't covered by the First Amendment, either. But that can't be right.

Constitutional rights are constitutional rights, regardless of whether they're compensated—as I've noted on a number of occasions. And if that's true under the First Amendment, then it should be equally true in Second Amendment challenges to § 922(a) as well….

Our dissenting colleague responds by offering a textual distinction between the First and Second Amendments. At bottom, the dissent theorizes that the "freedom of speech" contemplates sales, whereas "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" does not. But with respect, I don't see the textual distinction that she sees. The theory is also hard to square with what we saw in Villarreal.…

Judge Oldham, joined by Judge Ho, concurred in the judgment (though presumably they also joined their own unsigned opinion):

The first question presented is whether restrictions on the sale of firearms burden the Second Amendment rights of American citizens. They do—in at least two ways. First, such restrictions directly burden the seller's right to keep and bear arms. And second, they burden the prospective buyer's right to keep and bear arms, because the right to keep an item always includes the right to acquire it.

Start with the constitutional text. The Second Amendment does not just prohibit the government from denying the right to keep and bear arms. Instead, it says that the right cannot be "infringed." And at the Founding, "infringe" meant "violate," "destroy," or "hinder." Thus, the government cannot hinder the people's rights to keep and bear arms.

Restrictions on sale hinder both the seller's and buyer's right to keep and bear arms. Start with the seller's right to possess firearms. The Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep guns for personal use, and the seller is an individual who can lawfully possess guns. And it's hornbook property law that the right to possess an article "includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it." So the right to keep a gun must include the right to dispose of that gun as the owner sees fit. This is not an independent "right to sell." Rather, my point is that governmental interference with the right to sell a firearm is itself a burden on the seller's existing property right in that firearm. It hinders and hence infringes the seller's rights.

The same logic applies to the buyer. The buyer's ability to keep and bear arms is certainly "infringed" by regulations that hinder the purchase of arms. After all, the Supreme Court has explained that inherent in "property" is the "right to acquire, use, and dispose of it." In other words, a restriction on the sale of weapons obviously impacts the buyer's constitutional rights to acquire weapons. As one scholar has explained it:

Because one cannot 'keep' or 'bear' something without acquiring it, the act of acquiring arms must be included in the Second Amendment's 'right to keep and bear arms.' This is true for the same reason that the right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise. For there comes a point at which the regulation of action intimately and unavoidably connected with a right is a regulation of the right itself.

Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The American Tradition of Self-Made Arms, 54 St. Mary's L.J. 35 (2023).

This principle is not limited to the Second Amendment context. For example, consider the neighboring First Amendment. The Free Speech Clause "afford[s] the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas"—and thus clearly protects the right to sell and distribute speech, including speech written or produced by others. And it protects the recipient's right to receive information and ideas. Willis v. Town of Marshall (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to hear and the right to speak are flip sides of the same coin."). Without a right to provide speech, there is no right to receive information and ideas.

Likewise, consider the Free Exercise Clause. "[T]he text of the Free Exercise Clause gives a specific group of people (those who wish to engage in the 'exercise of religion') the right to do so without hindrance." It is axiomatic that the right to free exercise of religion includes the right to practice it with others in, for example, houses of worship. Shutting down houses of worship is an obvious First Amendment violation for many reasons—not the least of which is that it prevents the faithful from communing with each other and with church leaders who provide teaching, holy sacraments, and other sacred traditions. Thus, the right to exercise religion includes a First Amendment freedom to participate in religious services with—and provide religious services to—others.

These examples demonstrate clear principles. A right to property, free speech, corporate worship, and firearms includes the right to provide these things. And to acquire them….

Judge Oldham also discussed the proper scope of a Fifth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Peterson (5th Cir. 2025) and concludes that it (1) "was wrong and should be overturned" and in any event (2) doesn't apply here; for more on that, read the full opinion.

Judge Catharina Haynes dissented:

I do not think that the sellers of guns are covered by the Second Amendment (which doesn't mention sellers) …. {Second Amendment is quite different from the First Amendment mentioned in the concurrence. The First Amendment states "freedom of speech" and lists people in general which is quite large whereas the Second Amendment says "the right of people to keep and bear Arms" not mentioning selling Arms or all situations.}

[But] I am respectful of the majority opinion on that given our prior cases and what the government said. So, even assuming arguendo the sellers are covered, I see nothing in this case that shows that the rules for the sellers in this context are inappropriate and, therefore, unconstitutional. Also, to me, since Deare did not properly challenge the relevant rules to show that they are abusive, I do not see a need to remand on that. To me, the relevant rules as to him are sufficient and proper, so I would simply affirm.

I appreciate Judge Ho's and Judge Oldham's arguments that the right to keep and bear arms must include the right to acquire them, which in turn means that restrictions on sales must be evaluated to make sure they don't improperly burden the rights of would-be buyers. By way of analogy, the Court continues to recognize a right to use contraceptives (see Griswold v. Connecticut). Surely that must mean that a ban on selling contraceptives would unconstitutionally burden the would-be buyers' rights, and even less comprehensive restrictions on selling them might likewise be seen as too burdensome.

But I'm skeptical of the argument that the Second Amendment secures a right of sellers independent of the right of buyers. A bookseller may be said to be engaged in "speech" in the sense that conveying ideas to readers is a form of speech (including when one conveys them in exchange for money). A gun seller, on the other hand, isn't actually "keeping" a gun or "bearing" it. And though property rights do generally include the right to convey, including by sale, I don't think the Second Amendment should be seen as constitutionalizing that

By way of analogy, the law bans transferring guns to felons. That, the Court has said, is presumptively constitutional, because felons don't have the right to possess guns (focusing on the rights of the would-be gun possessor). But I don't think it follows that the law even implicates the right of gun sellers. When the law bans me from selling a gun to a felon, it isn't affecting my own ability to keep or bear the gun at all.

And this distinction between (1) the Second Amendment protecting gun sales as facilitative of the buyer's ability to have a gun, and (2) the Second Amendment gun sales as protecting the seller's own Second Amendment rights, may be practically significant. Under theory 1, there would likely be more room for regulation of sellers, since restrictions that only very modestly affect the buyer's ability to buy guns might then be viewed as presumptively constitutional. (That's consistent with D.C. v. Heller's statement that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on … laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms"). Under theory 2, there would be less room for regulation of sellers, since the sellers' own rights would be at stake as well.

Again, that's also how the distinction might play out as to the right to use contraceptives, and how it played out as to abortion in the pre-Dobbs Roe/Casey era. And thus, for instance, just as the right to abortion was consistent with licensure requirements for people or organizations that perform abortions—so long as this didn't unduly interfere with people's ability to get abortions—so (it seems to me) the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is consistent with licensure requirements for gun sellers, so long as it doesn't unduly interfere with people's ability to get guns that they can then keep and bear.