No Problem with Recognizing Islamic Talaq Divorce from Dubai, When Wife Didn't Want to Stay Married
From Schultz v. Stevenson, decided today by California Court of Appeal Judges Peter Krause, Shama Hakim Mesiwala, and Stacy Boulware Eurie:
In 2004, [the parties] purchased a residential property in Grass Valley, California, taking title as "husband and wife as joint tenants." In 2020, [husband] Schultz obtained a judgment of divorce from [wife] Stevenson in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Dubai divorce decree addressed marital status and child custody only; it made no findings related to division of property or spousal support.
Years later, Schultz commenced an action … to partition the Grass Valley property [by order it sold and the proceeds split -EV]. Stevenson opposed partition, arguing that the Dubai divorce decree is not enforceable in California and therefore the property is community property and not subject to partition [since California law does not allow partition of community property among married parties -EV]. The trial court ultimately … [decided] in favor of Schultz, finding that the parties are divorced and that the property is not community property….
Stevenson … argues that the trial court abused its discretion by extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree because it was based on Islamic (Sharia) laws that violate state public policy and constitutional principles of equal protection and due process…. [S]he argues that the Dubai divorce is not entitled to comity because it is based on a talaq pronouncement of divorce, which violates California's public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional protections against gender-based disparate treatment. [Generally, a talaq divorce can only be initiated by a husband. -EV] Stevenson contends therefore that she and Schultz are still married, and that the Nevada County property is community property, which is not subject to partition.
We conclude that Stevenson has failed to show that the trial court erred in extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree.
Under the doctrine of comity, courts of this nation generally will give effect to the judgment of a foreign nation if the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and enforcement of the judgment will not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy…. Even if we agree that parts of Sharia law—such as a talaq pronouncement of divorce—are contrary to domestic public policy favoring gender equality and constitutional protections against gender-based disparate treatment, the mere fact that some laws of the foreign nation are inconsistent with those of the sovereign does not preclude application of comity.
The basic principle of judicial comity is that "'a court should not assume to disturb another court's disposition of a controversy unless there are good reasons for doing so.'" The standard for refusing to enforce a foreign judgment on public policy grounds is high and infrequently met. The standard "'is not simply that the law is contrary to our public policy, but that it is so offensive to our public policy as to be "'prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the general interests of the citizens….'"' [E]ven when a foreign law offends public policy, 'it may still be applied in a limited context where the potential harm is minimal….'" (See In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate (Cal. App. 1948) [in context of intestate succession, foreign law permitting polygamy may be applied under principles of comity].)
Here, we are not persuaded that extending comity to the Dubai divorce decree impermissibly prejudiced Stevenson's rights or flouted state public policy favoring gender equality. It is important to remember that the Dubai judgment only adjudicated two issues—marital status and child custody—and that the trial court extended comity to the judgment as it related to the status of marriage only. {Stevenson contends that issues related to child custody and support have been rendered moot as the children have reached the age of majority.} Since Stevenson plainly did not wish to remain married to Schultz, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to recognize the Dubai judgment as dissolving marital status.
The premise underlying Stevenson's claim of prejudice appears to be that recognizing the foreign divorce precludes her from obtaining spousal support and an equitable division of the marital property. We disagree with this premise…. As noted, the Dubai judgment only adjudicated the issues of marital status and child custody. It did not address, and therefore has no effect upon, spousal support or the division of community property in California….
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court has ordered the partition and sale of property but has not yet determined how the proceeds will be disbursed, reserving jurisdiction "to order the manner in which the sale proceeds are to be disbursed, and to order equitable adjustments that the Court considers just and appropriate." It is therefore premature for us to consider whether the distribution of proceeds amounts to an abuse of discretion….
Robin D. Shofner (Scale LLP) represents Schultz.