Florida "Addictive Features" Social Media Restrictions on Minors Likely Constitutional, Eleventh Circuit Holds
Some short excerpts from the long opinion in Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. Uthmeier, decided today by Judge Kevin Newsom, joined by Judges Robert Luck and Gerald Bard Tjoflat:
One of the most pressing is how and in what ways social-media use affects minors. According to the State of Florida, social-media companies seed their platforms with "addictive features"—push notifications, auto-play, infinite scrolling, etc.—in order to make them, well, addictive. These features, the state says, are "psychological hooks" that "overstimulate the reward center in the brain" and "foster compulsive overuse." Florida insists that children are particularly susceptible to these "addictive features" because their brains are still developing. In particular, the state contends, the features contribute to "[c]ompulsive or uncontrollable" social-media use among children and threaten a "youth mental health crisis." Children face "'sleep problems, attention problems, and feelings of exclusion,' all of which put [them] at risk of 'depression, anxiety, and neuroticism.'"
In an effort to protect children from social-media addiction and its ensuing effects, Florida passed HB3, which imposes age-restriction requirements on platforms that use "addictive features." In particular, HB3 requires platforms within its ambit to prohibit anyone under the age of 14 from creating an account, and to prohibit anyone else under 16 from doing so without parental consent….
[W]e hold that HB3 likely passes First Amendment muster because it is a content-neutral speech regulation that satisfies intermediate scrutiny….
The court held that HB3 was a speech restriction and thus implicated the First Amendment:
Florida contends that HB3 "regulates product design, not children's speech," and, accordingly, doesn't even implicate the First Amendment. In particular, the state says, HB3 restricts only the creation of accounts, not social-media access writ large, and thus regulates only "commercial transaction[s]"—namely, a platform's ability to "enter[ ] into a contract" with children of a certain age.
Even accepting the state's characterization, it seems clear enough to us that HB3 "disproportionate[ly] burden[s]" CCIA's member platforms' "protected First Amendment activities"—namely, "compiling and curating others' speech" for their users. In particular, HB3 burdens platforms' ability to communicate with their users by requiring them (1) to prohibit minors under 14 years of age from creating or maintaining accounts and (2) to secure parental consent before communicating with 14- and 15-year-olds.
But it concluded that HB3 was content-neutral:
HB3 is facially content neutral: It regulates social-media platforms based on their functional capabilities and features, not the content they communicate. The law neither references the substance of the speech on any platform nor draws distinctions based on it. Put differently, HB3 applies to platforms wholly without regard to the topics discussed or the ideas or messages conveyed on them. Truth Social is just as likely as Instagram to be affected by HB3 so long as (1) a proportion of minors under 16 spend an average of at least two hours a day on it; (2) it uses infinite scrolling, push notifications, auto-play, or livestreaming, or displays user-engagement metrics; and (3) it selects content algorithmically for users. And tellingly, neither a platform nor a user can "avoid or mitigate" the effects of HB3 by "altering" the substance of any posted expression.
HB3's justification is also content neutral: to "protect[ ] children from [social-media] addiction and associated mental-health harms." That purpose is "unrelated to the content of expression" on any given platform, and it doesn't "reflect[ ] disagreement with the message such speech conveys." …
CCIA contends that HB3 is content based because it applies only to so-called "social" speech: The law, CCIA asserts, targets websites "based on the 'social' subject matter 'of the material they disseminate.'" … [But t]he "social"-ness of speech is a function of its form, not its substance. Put simply, "social" speech, as CCIA seems to be using the term, is simply speech that occurs between users on social-media platforms, wholly without regard to "the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Users can engage in so-called "social" speech about any topic, from the sublime (religion, philosophy, etc.) to the ridiculous (celebrity gossip, cat videos, etc.)….
And it held that HB3 likely passed the "intermediate scrutiny" applicable to content-neutral speech restrictions, because the law "advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests":
CCIA doesn't dispute that HB3 advances an important state interest; it acknowledges that "protecting minors is certainly a laudable goal." Even so, it says, HB3 fails intermediate scrutiny's first element because Florida's interest "is plainly related to the suppression of expression." In particular, CCIA emphasizes that HB3 prohibits addictive features only on websites, not on other "services that disseminate speech"—like, for instance, "books that end in cliffhangers." Florida singles out social-media platforms, CCIA insists, because they host speech that Florida "distrusts."
CCIA's argument doesn't necessarily follow. It would hold up only if websites have an inherent expressive value that differs from the expressive value inherent in all books. But both books and websites communicate content that spans the full range of expressive values; they just do so in different formats. Absent a restriction on the substance of the topics, ideas, or messages communicated by websites as compared to those communicated by books, HB3's "singling out" of websites is not, as CCIA argues, "plainly related to the suppression of expression." …
HB3 [is] also likely … appropriately tailored to advancing Florida's interest in protecting minors. In particular, HB3 doesn't "burden substantially more speech than necessary" because it (1) calibrates its restrictions by age, (2) regulates minors' creation of social-media accounts, not necessarily their access to the platforms themselves, (3) covers only those platforms that have been determined to induce heavy use by children, and (4) applies only to platforms that use both algorithms and one of several addictive features.
First, HB3 is age delimited. It prohibits minors under 14 from creating accounts, and it requires 14- and 15-year-olds to obtain parental consent before doing so. Notably, it imposes no limitations for those 16 years of age and older. The law thus applies only to younger minors and recognizes the fine-grained distinctions even among those to whom it applies—namely, that 13-year-olds (in general, middleschoolers) are different from 14- and 15-year-olds (those starting high school), who, in turn, are different from those 16 and up (budding adults).
Second, even among those to whom HB3 does apply, the law restricts only their ability to create their own accounts, not their ability to access social-media platforms per se. The creation of a social-media account is a commercial act—a business transaction. Even a minor—indeed, even a young child—may continue to use the platforms provided he either (1) uses his parents' (or someone else's) account or (2) gains access without an account.
Third, HB3 targets only the platforms to which many minors are already addicted. As a reminder, a platform comes within HB3's purview only if at least 10% of daily active users under 16 years old spend an average of two hours or more per day on it. Together with its other limitations, HB3's tailoring efforts fall within the broad range of potential legislative solutions that intermediate scrutiny permits.
And fourth, HB3 operates not as an outright prohibition of platform usage but rather as a "conditional ban" of sorts—namely, on platforms' use of addictive features and algorithms. The law applies only to platforms that use a combination of algorithms and addictive features and that succeed in keeping many minors on them for an average of at least two hours a day. Refraining from using either algorithms or addictive features, or remaining below the temporal threshold, exempts a platform from the law's application.
Now, none of that is necessarily to say that HB3 embodies the best policy choice. Maybe, maybe not. But intermediate scrutiny affords governments "latitude … to design regulatory solutions to address content-neutral interests." Accordingly, it is within Florida's discretion to draw the lines it has—many of which, of course, narrow the law's scope. So, for instance, Florida may validly opt to prohibit minors under 14, rather than 16, from creating social-media accounts, and to require 16-year-olds, rather than all those under 18, to obtain their parents' consent before creating accounts. So too, it may validly train its attention on platforms that a segment of children use more than two hours per day, rather than one. And finally, it is free to focus on sites that use both algorithms and "addictive features," rather than one or the other of those….
Judge Newsom also added a very interesting separate opinion, focused on as-applied challenges and intermediate scrutiny; interested readers may want to look at it, as well as at the panel's discussion of overbreadth challenges and other matters.