Indiana Court Sets Aside $250K Default Judgment in Lawyer's Libel Case Related to "Scathing Google Review"
From Thursday's decision in Gillikin v. Mattingly, decided by Indiana Court of Appeals Chief Judge Robert Altice, joined by Judges Rudolph Pyle and Mary DeBoer:
Amy Gillikin appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside a $250,000 default judgment entered against her for defamation, which was based on a scathing Google review that she posted online about Janice Mandla Mattingly and Mattingly's law firm, Janice Mandla Mattingly, P.C., D/B/A Carmel Family Law (collectively, Mattingly)….
In June 2024, Mattingly and Gillikin did not personally know each other, but Mattingly represented the former spouse of Gillikin's fiancé in a pending legal matter involving child custody and parenting time. Around the middle of that month, Gillikin posted a review on Mattingly's Google review page.
In the post, Gillikin described Mattingly as a corrupt attorney and a monster, who exploits abused children for her own monetary gain, and who would soon be disbarred. Gillikin suggested that Mattingly colludes with the Hamilton County magistrates, among others, and that Mattingly knows that her clients continue to abuse their children. She concluded her post: "We pray that the Attorney General can stop this racket before anymore children are affected by her unethical conduct." …
Mattingly got a default judgment against Gillikin, because Gillikin didn't timely respond to the lawsuit. But the appellate court concluded that the trial court should have set aside the judgment:
We first address whether Gillikin alleged a meritorious defense to the defamation action. Her defense was that the statements she made in the post were true, and she testified as such and that she looked forward to proving it all true at a trial on the merits. When she attempted to provide the basis for her belief that the statements were true, she was cut off by Mattingly with an improper hearsay objection and then the court redirected the parties to Gillikin's procedural failure to respond to the complaint.
In any case, Gillikin asserted a meritorious defense, as "[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a claim of defamation." And her testimony, despite its self-serving nature, was sufficient to clear the low bar of making a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. Contrary to Mattingly's claim on appeal, Gillikin was not required at this stage to provide evidence that proved the truth of the defamatory statements.
We now turn to Gillikin's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default judgment based on T.R. [Rule of Trial Procedure] 60(B)(8)…. Our Supreme Court has cautioned:
[T]he important and even essential policies necessitating the use of default judgments—maintaining an orderly and efficient judicial system, facilitating the speedy determination of justice, and enforcing compliance with procedural rules—should not come at the expense of professionalism, civility, and common courtesy. An extreme remedy, a default judgment is not a trap to be set by counsel to catch unsuspecting litigants and should not be used as a gotcha devi[c]e when an email or even a phone call to the opposing party inquiring about the receipt of service would prevent a windfall recovery and enable fulfillment of our strong preference to resolve cases on their merits….
Here, just over a month after Gillikin posted the allegedly defamatory Google review and only twenty-five days after service of the complaint and summons, Mattingly sought a default judgment against Gillikin and damages of $250,000. This was the quintessential gotcha maneuver, which worked when the very next day the trial court granted Mattingly's motion and awarded $250,000 without holding a hearing.
Gillikin quickly sought to set aside the judgment, filing her motion twelve days after the default judgment was entered. At the hearing on Gillikin's motion, Gillikin testified that everything she stated in the review was a fact, thus asserting the meritorious defense of truth. Gillikin also challenged the amount of damages and the fact that a hearing was not held to determine the reasonableness of the $250,000 requested by Mattingly in the motion for default judgment. Gillikin argued that because the damages sought by Mattingly were not liquidated or for a sum certain, the trial court should have held a hearing on damages. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Love (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that because damages were unliquidated—not a sum certain or able to be reduced to fixed rules and mathematical precision—trial court erroneously entered the $225,000 damages award along with the default judgment without holding a damages hearing); Stewart v. Hicks (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming, on the basis of T.R. 60(B)(8), trial court's setting aside of $50,000 award entered in a default judgment without a hearing where damages were unliquidated).
Given the meritorious defense, the magnitude of the damages award issued without a hearing, the promptness in which Gillikin sought to set aside the default judgment, and the lack of any demonstrated prejudice to Mattingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default judgment on equitable grounds under T.R. 60(B)(8). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the default judgment, instruct the trial court to vacate the default judgment, and remand for further proceedings before a different judicial officer, as requested by Gillikin.
{While we do not agree with Gillikin that Magistrate [Erin] Weaver was constitutionally required to sua sponte recuse herself, we observe that some of Magistrate Weaver's actions during the very brief hearing were problematic. She abruptly stopped Gillikin from presenting evidence related to excusable neglect, prevented inquiry into the reasonableness of the damages award, and conducted a sua sponte Google search of the alleged defamatory statement during the hearing.}
Nathan Vining represents Gillikin.