No Pseudonymity in Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Lawsuit Against Phoenix Suns
The alleged harassment involved unwanted advances, offensive comments, and similar matters, rather than sexual assault (a situation where many, though not all, courts would be more open to pseudonymity). From Judge Murray Snow's decision today (Doe v. Suns Legacy Partners LLC):
Anonymity is disfavored and "runs afoul of the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings … and Rule 10(a)'s command that the title of every complaint 'include the names of all the parties.'" … [C]ourts may allow a party to proceed under an assumed name in unusual cases when the party "reasonably fear[s] retaliation and the public disclosure of their identities risks stigmatization or serious harm." …
[But w]hile a case in which Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment may always involve some embarrassment to the Plaintiff and those against whom she brings her allegations, Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint are not unusual or atypical for such claims, nor are allegations of sexual assault involved which by themselves are not sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.
While the Plaintiff speculates about possible harms from bringing these claims because she works in the public relations industry in a regional market, she offers no reason to think that any harm about which she speculates are reasonably anticipated. "[S]peculative claims of physical or mental harms are insufficient to bolster a request for anonymity." Nor for that matter, does she explain how the public relations industry differs from other regional occupations to the extent that Plaintiff might suffer additional reputational harm among potential future employees by bringing such charges.
And to the extent that the Defendants may be affiliated with a local sports team of some notoriety, it is not clear that her interest in anonymity outweighs the public's right to know. This Court is disinclined to shield Plaintiff's identity while she publishes the specific identity of the persons she accuses in her public pleadings and motion papers (which she has). She cannot use Court orders as both a sword and a shield.
Nor does Plaintiff offer any reason to believe she has a particular vulnerability or susceptibility to such harm. See Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that unnamed plaintiffs "face no greater threat of retaliation than the typical plaintiff alleging Title VII violations, including the other women who, under their real names and not anonymously, have filed sex discrimination suits."). In sum, Plaintiff's motion is not supported by sufficient facts to suggest that her right to anonymity overrides the inherently public nature of a lawsuit.
Eric Amdursky and Damali A. Taylor (O'Melveny & Myers) and Leah S. Freed (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart) represent defendants.