The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Appeals Court Decisions

Rolodexes, rabbit holes, and challenge coins.

|

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New cert petition: Does the Supreme Court want to overturn Kelo v. New London? We're asking them to overturn Kelo v. New London. Swear to heck. Click here to learn more.

New on Unpublished Opinions, IJ's roundtable podcast: Is a pun worth keeping if you have to explain it in a footnote? Plus, other weighty jurisprudential questions.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: UCLA's Joanna Schwartz and Kasia Wolfkot of the Brennan Center talk with IJ's Anya Bidwell about civil rights reforms at the state level.

Read More

Free Speech

Student Suspended for Saying Man Who Insulted Her "Needa Get Blasted" + Having Posted (a Year Before) a Shooting Range Video

|

From Monday's decision by Judge Joseph Dawson, III (D.S.C.) in Lemoine v. Horry Georgetown Technical College:

In September 2024, Leigha Lemoine … was enrolled in the cosmetology program at Defendant Horry Georgetown Technical College ("HGTC"). On September 5, 2024, while Lemoine was off-campus, Lemoine's boyfriend's roommate—who was not an HGTC student—insulted Lemoine. Later that day, Lemoine detailed the incident in a Snapchat group text that included other HGTC students. Therein, Lemoine posted the following:

But naw I was trying to be nice but f[***] that some random ugly a[**] in bread looking f[***] dude called me a b[****] he needa get blasted….

On September 11, 2024, some students at HGTC reported that they "fe[lt] uncomfortable and somewhat unsafe" due to Lemoine's use of "the term 'blasted'" in the Snapchat….

School officials met with Lemoine, who "denied [the Snapchat had] anything to do with physical harm" and said she "only intended that the roommate 'needed to be held accountable and called out for his behavior.'" The officials at first accepted that, but two days later they

discovered a one-year-old video of Lemoine posted on Instagram, in which Lemoine fired a handgun at a target. While firing the handgun, Lemoine was "wearing a western[-]style outfit …." … Lemoine explained [to school officials] that the gun in the video "did not belong" to her and she had never fired a gun before that time….

Apparently because of the combination of this Snapchat and the year-old video, Lemoine was suspended until Summer 2025, based on a student code provision forbidding "[e]ngaging in any activity that disrupts the educational process of the college, interferes with the rights of others, or adversely interferes with other normal functions and services."}

Specifically, [a school administrator] wrote that "[i]n today's climate," Lemoine's "failure to disclose the existence of the video" and "use of the term 'blasted'" created "a significant amount of apprehension related to the presence and use of guns" and that "both employees and students" at HGTC "feel unsafe due to these circumstances."  …

Lemoine sued, and the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering that she be readmitted. The court concluded that the speech likely didn't fall into the First Amendment exception for "true threats" of illegal conduct:

Read More

Free Speech

No Right to Discovery as to Possible Selective Prosecution in Prosecution for Burning Police Car at George Floyd Protest

|

From U.S. v. Wilson, decided yesterday by Ninth Circuit Judge Danielle Forrest, joined by Judge Patrick Bumatay and District Judge James Donato (N.D. Cal.) (for a similar result in a case alleging selective prosecution against alleged white supremacist rioters, see U.S. v. Rundo (9th Cir. 2024)):

On May 31, 2020, Defendants-Appellees Nathan Wilson and Christopher Beasley allegedly joined a protest in Santa Monica, California [following the killing of George Floyd] and set fire to a police car. They were both federally indicted on one count of arson. Defendants moved to dismiss their indictment, arguing that they were unconstitutionally singled out for prosecution based on the perception that they held anti-government views.

The panel held (disagreeing with the trial court) that defendants weren't entitled to "discovery on their selective-prosecution claim":

The Executive Branch has "'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." Thus, a "'presumption of regularity supports' … prosecutorial decisions and, 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties.'" Selective-prosecution claims—assertions that a prosecutor has brought charges for reasons forbidden by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—require courts "to exercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive." …

Given the separation-of-powers concerns at play, the standard for proving selective prosecution is "a demanding one." The Supreme Court has established a two-factor standard: the defendant must demonstrate "clear evidence," first that the decision to prosecute "had a discriminatory effect and[, second,] that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." "[T]he showing necessary to obtain discovery" on a selective-prosecution claim is "correspondingly rigorous," and is intended to be a "significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims." …

To show discriminatory effect sufficient to warrant discovery, a defendant must "produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants … could have been prosecuted, but were not." … Defendants argued to the district court that they were unconstitutionally prosecuted based on a policy of the Trump Administration to prosecute an arbitrary class: "'individuals associated with protests who the government thought held anti-government views, regardless of what actual views they held.'" And they asserted that to evaluate the discriminatory effect of their prosecution, the district court should look to "a control group consisting of 'all individuals whom the [U.S. Attorney's Office] could charge federally for arson.'" …

Focusing on its selected control group—arsonists in the Central District of California—the district court turned to statistics. It noted that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District brought four arson cases related to the George Floyd protests, two arson cases in the previous 10 years, and nine others in the decade before that. It also highlighted that the George Floyd protest cases were the first stand-alone arson charges brought since 2007. The district court further surveyed arson cases occurring in the area within the Central District overall, finding that between 2010 and 2019, an annual average of 3,500 arsons were reported and 559 were prosecuted. Based on these statistics, the district court found that the U.S. Attorney's Office was "obviously aware of and chose not to federally prosecute far more serious and damaging arsons" than the police-car burning for which Defendants were charged. As a result, it concluded that Defendants met their burden to show evidence of discriminatory effect.

This was an abuse of discretion because the district court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law." In defining the control group with only two shared facts—(1) arson (2) within the Central District—the district court did not account for many other facets of the crimes….

Read More

Law & Government

Book Recommendations from Me (and My Colleagues)

|

Every holiday season, the University of Chicago Law School collects and shares book recommendations from the faculty. Here are three from me:

Klara and the Sun, by Kazuo Ishiguro: A first-person novel told from the point of view of a solar-powered Artificial Friend. It is hard to say much more about the plot without spoiling it or failing to render it as beautifully as Ishiguro does. The book begins with Klara sitting in a shop window, and the reader discovers the world through Klara's eyes, as she manages to explore, understand, and misunderstand it, and develops her own deep relationships, quests, and failures. Written in 2021, but perhaps even more timely today.

The President's Lawyer, by Lawrence Robbins: A page-turner of a novel about the intersection of criminal defense and Washington scandal. The main character is a career litigator whose childhood best friend, the former President of the United States, has been accused of murdering his mistress. Plot twists, personal entanglements, and several entertaining trial scenes ensue. The author (recently deceased) was himself an experienced DC litigator, from criminal trials to Supreme Court arguments, and co-founded his own law firm, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner, where he was once my boss.

Law for Leviathan, by Daryl Levinson: How is constitutional law like international law? Both of them struggle with the fact that there are no international law police or constitutional law police who can directly apprehend and sanction law breakers. That is because they are law for states, and so they must figure out how to establish legal rules without simply relying on any one state to enforce them. This academic but readable book argues that this is possible, but requires a range of strategies outside of simply laying down the law and expecting it to be obeyed. One of the most refreshing books about constitutional law I have read in a while. [You can also hear a Divided Argument podcast discussion with Daryl about this book, Separation-of-Powers Police.]

Here's the whole list. I also recently read and enjoyed the Grover Cleveland biography, which is recommended by my colleague Todd Henderson.

Feel free to make your own nominations in the comments!

Free Speech

California Officials Agree to Preliminary Injunction Blocking Law That Limits Discussing Arrest Records

|

FIRE, which represents the First Amendment Coalition and me in challenging the law, reports:

A federal court, acting on a stipulation agreed to by the California attorney general and San Francisco city attorney, today halted enforcement of a California law that officials deployed to suppress journalism about a controversial tech CEO's sealed arrest records.

Under the law, any person — including journalists, advocates, witnesses, and victims of crimes — faced a civil penalty of up to $2,500 for sharing public information. The court order results from a First Amendment lawsuit filed by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression in November, which led the California attorney general and San Francisco city attorney to agree not to enforce the law while the lawsuit is pending….

In October 2023, journalist Jack Poulson published articles about a controversial tech CEO's arrest, sharing a copy of the arrest report sent to him by an unidentified source. The San Francisco Police Department had previously made that report public, even though the executive had successfully petitioned a state court to seal the record.

Almost a year after Poulson published the report, the city attorney of San Francisco — working with the tech executive — sent three letters to Poulson and his webhost, Substack, demanding they remove articles and the sealed report. Those letters threatened enforcement of California's anti-dissemination statute, Penal Code § 851.92(c). The law imposes a civil penalty of up to $2,500 on any person (except the government officials charged with maintaining the secrecy of sealed records) who shares a sealed arrest report or any information "relating to" the report — even if the information is already publicly available.

Concerned by the implications of the statute, FIRE sued the San Francisco city attorney and the California attorney general on behalf of the Bay Area-based First Amendment Coalition, its Director of Advocacy Ginny LaRoe, and legal commentator Eugene Volokh. Each regularly comments on censorship campaigns precisely like the one the tech CEO and city attorney launched against Paulson and Substack. But the anti-dissemination statute prohibited them from covering the CEO story, even though the information has been publicly available for over a year.

Today, the court entered a preliminary injunction agreed to by both California and the city attorney that prohibits them from enforcing the law with respect to publicly available information. The preliminary injunction protects not only FAC and Volokh, but anyone — including journalists like Poulson — who publishes information made available to the public.

The case is proceeding, and there will presumably be briefing as to whether the law should be permanently enjoined; but while that's happening, the law is being preliminarily blocked, as to reporting on publicly available information. Here's an excerpt from FIRE's memorandum arguing in support of the preliminary injunction, which I take it helped persuade the government defendants:

Read More

Law & Government

Calling for the Views of the President-Elect

|

[This post is co-authored by Will Baude and Richard Re and cross-posted at Re's Judicata.]

When a new presidential administration begins, the executive branch often changes position on some cases pending before the Supreme Court. But why wait till inauguration day to hear the views of the incoming administration?

The TikTok litigation casts this question in stark relief. The statute effectively banning TikTok goes into effect on January 19, the day before President-Elect Donald Trump is slated to begin his second presidential term. Recognizing that deadline, the justices have crafted an expedited briefing schedule with oral argument on January 10.

The Biden administration will of course litigate the case. But Trump has made public statements indicating that he may be more supportive of TikTok. In this situation, it might make sense for Trump to appear as an amicus. As the imminent president, he would hardly be a run-of-the mill friend of the court.

New administrations generally try not to change the executive's litigation position too much or too often, since doing so can undermine the Solicitor General's long-term credibility and draw attention to the political nature of the new position. Yet these changes do happen. And when they do, the new administration's views are often informative. The justices can be receptive to them.

For similar reasons, the justices might especially want to know the President-Elect's views on the TikTok case. For example, they might want to know how banning TikTok would interact with Trump's planned domestic and foreign policy plans. They might want to know whether and how the new administration will enforce the law starting January 20. Or they might simply be curious about what a different, new administration thinks about the question presented.

Of course, Amicus Trump would lack the formal trappings of office. For instance, he would not yet have taken his (second) oath of office or be fully in touch with the Nation's national security system. Yet even with those limitations there is significant room for judicial interest in the views of the future executive branch.

In the past, presidents-elect have generally avoided trying to openly disrupt the policies of their lame-duck predecessors before inauguration day. But that norm may already be fraying, as evidenced by Trump's stated views, and the logic behind it might be undermined in a time of sharp political polarization. If any incoming president would buck this norm, thereby creating a new one, it is Donald Trump.

It is even possible to imagine that the justices would invite Trump's views, essentially calling for the views of the president-elect (CVPE). Such a move would also have some appeal in cases like US v. Skrmetti, where the Biden administration's position is almost surely not the one that the Trump administration will or would adopt, and where the new administration's position might affect the viability of the case.

The appeal of a CVPE is at its apex in the Tiktok litigation, which involves a decision almost on the eve of a dramatic turnover in the Executive Branch.

Free Speech

First Amendment Censorship Claims Against Stanford Internet Observatory Can Go Forward to Discovery as to Jurisdiction and Standing

|

From Hines v. Stamos, decided today by Judge Terry Doughty (W.D. La.):

This case stems from Defendants' alleged participation in censoring Plaintiffs' speech on social media. Defendants are "nonprofits, academic institutions, and researchers alleged to have been involved in examining the issue of the viral spread of disinformation on social-media and the resulting harms to society." Plaintiffs are social media users, each with significant followings, who allege that the acts of Defendants caused Plaintiffs' disfavored viewpoints to be censored—namely their speech concerning COVID-19 and elections. As a result of this alleged past and ongoing censorship, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and "others similarly situated," against Defendants….

The court didn't agree with plaintiffs that they had conclusively established that the federal court in Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over defendants—but it did conclude that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts that would justify further discovery as to personal jurisdiction:

To earn jurisdictional discovery, the movant must first make "a preliminary showing of jurisdiction." A preliminary showing does not require proof that personal jurisdiction exists, but "factual allegations that suggest with reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite contacts." In other words, Plaintiffs must state what facts discovery is expected to uncover and how those facts would support personal jurisdiction….

Plaintiffs have alleged—to the point of "possible existence"—that the Stanford Defendants effectuated censorship in Louisiana by "assigning analyst[s] specifically to Louisiana, determining whether speech originated in Louisiana, tracking the speech's spread from Louisiana, and communicating with state officials in Louisiana about supposed disinformation." And as such, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Stanford Defendants' online activities may support personal jurisdiction. Limited jurisdictional discovery is thus necessary to show to what extent Defendants' online activities were "directed" at the forum state.

And the court held that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that they had standing to sue (which in this case means that various platforms had restricted their speech because of the defendants' actions, rather than just because of the platforms' own independent decisions), and were thus entitled to further discovery on this as well:

Read More

Kelo

Institute for Justice Petitions Supreme Court to Take Case Seeking to Overrule Kelo v. City of New London

Kelo is the 2005 ruling in which the Supreme Court held that the government can take property for private "economic development.""

|

Susette Kelo's famous "little pink house," which became a nationally known symbol of the case that bears her name. (Institute for Justice.)

 

Today, the Institute for Justice filed a cert petition urging the Supreme Court to hear Bowers v. Oneida County Industrial Development Agency, a case in which IJ seeks to overrule Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo is the controversial case in which the Supreme Court held that the government could use eminent domain to take property in order to promote private "economic development." Although the Fifth Amendment states the the government may only take private property for "public use," a narrow 5-4 Supreme Court majority built on earlier precedents to rule that virtually any potential public benefit qualifies as such. The Court also ruled the government need not prove that the supposed public benefit will actually materialize. In the Kelo case itself, it never did, and the condemned property ended up being used mainly by feral cats.

The Institute for Justice is, of course, the public interest firm that represented the property owners in the Kelo case. I wrote about the case, its development, and why the Court got it wrong, in my book The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain.

Here is an excerpt from IJ's description of the Bowers case:

Bryan Bowers and his business partner Mike Licata build things. And they pride themselves on building things the people in their upstate New York community actually want and need. That is what led them to buy a plot of land across from a new hospital in Utica, New York: They had heard from doctors in the area that they would happily rent space from a Bowers building if one went up.

Unfortunately, they weren't the only ones with plans for a medical office building near the hospital—or with plans for their newly acquired land. A different group of doctors had formed a private company they called Central Utica, LLC, that had plans for a building next door. After Bryan and Mike signed a contract to buy their new land, Central Utica announced that it wanted Bryan and Mike's land, too—to use as a private parking lot for its building.

Two different people wanting the same thing is nothing new, whether it's toddlers with toys or private businesses with land. The difference is that this dispute happened in New York, where local and state officials sometimes behave like spoiled children.

Central Utica wrote a letter to a local government agency, the Oneida County Industrial Development Agency, asking it to take Bowers' land using eminent domain. Shockingly, the county agreed. In the county's telling, the new private office building would create jobs and economic growth, and that was reason enough to invoke the power of eminent domain. (Bryan, of course, proposed to build an office building that would also have created jobs, and the location was already surrounded by literally thousands of parking spots, including a brand-new multi-level garage, but the county didn't seem troubled by that.)

That may seem like a flimsy basis for taking away someone's private property, but in New York, it's standard procedure. New York is the nation's leading abuser of eminent domain, and it is a stark example of the excesses of one of the Supreme Court's most reviled decisions: Kelo v. City of New London….

Against this backdrop, the condemnation of Bryan's property is just more of the same. Sure, a private business went to the government and asked to be given someone else's private property—but that's not unusual in New York. While most states would have a problem with that, in New York, it took the court all of a paragraph to conclude that the taking was constitutional. If it weren't enough that the new private office building would create jobs, the court identified another secondary benefit that would justify the condemnation: The public, it said, could use the new parking lot at night, when its new private owner didn't need it.

Of course, that isn't true. Once the new owners took over the land, they immediately put up signs making clear that the general public wasn't allowed….

But in New York, that doesn't matter. It doesn't matter whether the public can actually use the land that's being taken, and it doesn't matter that in reality the land is a private parking lot in a sea of public parking spaces—just like it didn't matter in Kelo whether the government would actually build anything at all. All that matters is whether the government can imagine a good reason for the taking.

A rule that says the government can take your property whenever it can imagine a benefit to doing so is just a rule that says the government can take your property whenever it wants to. It will be up to the Supreme Court to decide whether the Constitution demands more than that.

Four current Supreme Court justices have previously expressed interest in overruling or at at least revisiting Kelo. Unlike the recent "passive park" case, this case seems like a good vehicle for doing so. It features a dubious condemnation for private development, and one that also raises a number of issues that could help clarify Kelo's extremely vague standards for what qualifies as a forbidden "pretextual" taking. If the Court doesn't want to overrule Kelo outright, they should at least clarify and strengthen the pretextual taking rules.

As IJ notes, many states have passed eminent domain reform legislation since Kelo or repudiated it as a standard for the public use clauses of their state constitutions. But, as described in my book, many of the reform laws are weak, and still permit a wide range of abusive takings.

I will likely have more to say about this case in future posts.

NOTE: I have worked with the Institute for Justice on various other property rights issues over the years, but have no involvement in this case. However, I may file an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to hear it.

Free Speech

Odds Are Against TikTok at the Supreme Court

It seems unlikely that five Justices will buy TikTok's First Amendment arguments when neither Judge Douglas Ginsburg nor Judge Neomi Rao nor Chief Judge Sri Srinivasan did so.

|

The Supreme Court's decision to hear the TikTok divestment statute case is better for TikTok than the alternative: The D.C. Circuit had upheld the statute, and now TikTok has a chance to try to reverse that.

But it's not a high chance, I think, chiefly because the D.C. Circuit opinions on the First Amendment were detailed and careful, and were written by a highly respected and ideologically mixed group of judges: Douglas Ginsburg, a Reagan appointee; Sri Srinivasan, an Obama appointee; and Neomi Rao, a Trump appointee. Srinivasan took a different approach on the First Amendment issue than did Ginsburg and Rao, but he reached the same result: All three voted to uphold the law.

It seems to me a good bet that most of the Supreme Court Justices will take a view similar to either Ginsburg's and Rao's or Srinivasan's. It's hard to identify up front any Justices who, as a matter of their general jurisprudence or of their particular First Amendment views, are likely to be quite different than all three of the D.C. Circuit judges. There are certainly highly plausible arguments against the law, as well as in favor. It just seems unlikely to me that those arguments will persuade five Justices when they persuaded neither Ginsburg nor Srinivasan nor Rao.

Read More

Tick, Tock Goes the SCOTUS Clock

The timing of TikTok v. Garland.

|

Today, the Supreme Court acted on pending applications in the challenges to the "Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act." The Court did not grant an injunction pending review. Instead, the Court construed the applications as petitions for writs of certiorari, and granted them. The Court set a blazing fast briefing schedule, with opening briefs due two days after Christmas, reply briefs to be filed two days after New Years, with oral argument one week later.

The parties are directed to file electronically simultaneous opening briefs, limited to 13,000 words, and a joint appendix on or before 5 p.m. (EST), Friday, December 27, 2024. Reply briefs, limited to 6,000 words, are to be filed electronically on or before 5 p.m. (EST), Friday, January 3, 2025. Any amicus curiae briefs are to be filed electronically on or before 5 p.m. (EST), Friday, December 27, 2024. Booklet format briefs prepared in compliance with Rule 33.1 shall be submitted as soon as possible thereafter.

The case is set for oral argument on Friday, January 10, 2025.

Happy Holidays everyone!

The timing here is extremely tight, with good reason. The law goes into effect on January 19, 2025. The President can only extend this deadline once, assuming that certain conditions are satisfied.

Again, the Court did not grant some sort of temporary injunction. In the past, Justices Barrett and Kagan have been critical of granting injunctions on the shadow docket. That the Court agreed to promptly hear oral argument, and placed it on the rocket docket, seems consistent with past precedents.

What happens after oral argument? I see a few different possibilities.

First, a majority of the Court promptly affirms the D.C. Circuit. I think this can be done fairly quickly. Judge Ginsburg's decision is extremely thorough, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel. It is also possible that one or more Justices finds persuasive Judge Srinivasan's concurrence. But a simple majority affirm could be done in a summary fashion. There may be dissents filed right away, or the dissents could be issued at a later date.

Second, a majority of the Court promptly reverses the D.C. Circuit. That sort of opinion would have to be more-fully developed, and explain why Judge Ginsburg erred. I think that sort of outcome, especially on a prompt timeline, is unlikely. Then again, that opinion may already be drafted. Bush v. Gore was written on a tighter timeline. And the Justices have had months to think about the case. (Justice Barrett's NetChoice concurrence presaged some of these issues.)

Third, the Court could grant a temporary injunction immediately after oral argument, to provide enough time to develop a written opinion. This opinion could ultimately affirm, but more likely would reverse. Again, an affirmance can be done quickly without making any broad pronouncements about First Amendment law. Any injunction may have one or more dissents, which would provide a preview of the final vote count.

Fourth, on January 11, the Court denies an injunction, but does not rule on the petition for a writ of certiorari. That outcome would create an unusual game of chicken with the White House. President Biden would then have about eight days to decide whether an extension should be granted. SCOTUS could then wait until January 18 to decide whether to release its opinion. (I am not certain what time the law goes into effect on January 19.) Remember, if TikTok comes into compliance with the law, there is no need for the Court to resolve this issue. And who knows what happens when Trump comes into office. He has spoken in support of TikTok. If somehow TikTok comes into compliance with the law, then Judge Ginsburg's opinion will be vacated under Munsingwear and we can all forget this ever happened.

Fifth, if January 18 comes, and there is no extension granted, the Court will have to do something. Or it could do nothing at all. Indeed, if the President and the Court fail to act by January 19, TikTok would suffer the same fate as Heinrich Quirin. Remember, by the time the Court decided Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteurs had already been executed.

Tick Tock, goes the clock.

Free Speech

S. Ct. Will Hear First Amendment Challenge to TikTok Divestment on Jan. 10

|

The question presented is:

Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

The parties' briefs are due the same day, Dec. 27, as are friend-of-the-court briefs. Both parties appear to be entitled to file reply briefs by Jan. 3. Two hours are allotted for oral argument. For more on the D.C. Circuit panel majority opinion, see this post; for the concurring opinion's alternate path to reaching that result, see this post.

Free Speech

Trump v. Selzer Likely Going Nowhere

|

Monday's Complaint in this case essentially alleges that pollster Ann Selzer's Nov. 2 poll for the Des Moines Register, which showed Harris ahead in Iowa by 3 points, was deceptive to consumers and thus violated Iowa consumer fraud law:

62. President Trump, together with all Iowa and American voters, is a "consumer" within the meaning of the statute.

63. Defendants furnished "merchandise" to consumers within the broad meaning of the statute since they provided a service: physical newspapers, online newspapers, and other content that contained the Harris Poll.

64. Defendants engaged in "deception" because the Harris Poll was "likely to mislead a substantial number of consumers as to a material fact or facts," to wit: the actual position of the respective candidates in the Iowa Presidential race.

65. Defendants engaged in an "unfair act or practice" because the publication and release of the Harris Poll "cause[d] substantial, unavoidable injury to consumers that [was] not outweighed by any consumer or competitive benefits which the practice produced," to wit: consumers, including Plaintiff, were badly deceived and misled as to the actual position of the respective candidates in the Iowa Presidential race. Moreover, President Trump, the Trump 2024 Campaign, and other Republicans were forced to divert enormous campaign and financial resources to Iowa based on the deceptive Harris Poll. Consumers within Iowa who paid for subscriptions to the Des Moines Register or who otherwise purchased the publication were also badly deceived. Additionally, Iowans who contributed to the Trump 2024 Campaign were similarly deceived.

Read More

More

Do you care about free minds and free markets? Sign up to get the biggest stories from Reason in your inbox every afternoon.

This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

  • Full digital edition access
  • No ads
  • Commenting privileges