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



social change

"Cheshire-Puss," said Alice . . . "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.

"I don't much care where ---" said Alice.

"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.

"--- so long as I get *somewhere,"* Alice added as an explanation.

"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."

--- from *ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND* by Lewis Carroll, first published in 1865.

INTRODUCTION TO THIS ISSUE

Why "social change"? It may not be immediately obvious why the editors of *REASON* have decided to devote an entire issue to this subject. Some readers, in fact, may be bothered by the notion of social change, preferring to fall back on remembrances of how nice things were before the "liberals" took over, or before Roosevelt, or before the Federal Reserve System, or before antitrust laws . . . Yet as we have endeavored to point out in these pages, there *never was* a golden age of laissez-faire and no amount of wishful thinking is going to carry us to one.

Often accompanying the good-old-days concept is the feeling that things aren't really so bad, that all we need do is elect a few honest men to office and the good old American free enterprise system will save the day. Again, we disagree. The libertarian perspective is a truly radical one which has never approached being fully realized in a social context. It rests on the the premise that each individual is absolutely sovereign - the sole owner of his life, property, and the products of his efforts. This view stands in fundamental opposition to both conservatives who would force their moral values (sexual restraint, opposition to drugs, duty to country) on others and to liberals who would take certain people's income and property for the use of certain others. A fully laissez-faire society, in other words, would represent a radical change in human institutions and behavior.

To get from where we are now to a society of laissez-faire calls for the utmost in careful thinking, planning, and working to achieve the necessary kinds and degrees of social change. This issue of *REASON* explores some aspects of the problem of moving from NOW to THEN. Lynn Kinsky leads off with a broad look at what society is all about, and she suggests that specific intellectual disciplines have much to tell us about how to change society. Robert Poole proposes a specific means for libertarians to multiply their effectiveness by finding society's points of leverage. Turning to the future, Dick Pierce explores the implications of Alvin Toffler's book *FUTURE SHOCK* for social change; and Stan Abraham points up the work being done by futurists in coming to grips with questions of values, a development of potentially major significance for libertarians.

Will we achieve freedom in our time? There is no consensus among our authors, but, in general and for various reasons, their outlooks are optimistic. Reader feedback on this issue is especially solicited.

reason

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

an anthropological perspective on social change

lynn kinsky

There is a growing ideology in the United States and western Europe which is very much opposed to the status quo in politics and economics - it goes by the general name of libertarianism [1]. Dimly realized by friend and foe alike is the fact that libertarianism is also at odds with most of the rest of Western culture, i.e., attitudes, social forms and norms, ethics, etc.

It is quite true that libertarianism has certain roots in the political values of the American Revolution and the frontier ethics of individual responsibility and self-reliance; but does invoking America's heritage tell us much about libertarianism's reception in America today? (Obviously such invocation gives libertarians a more "respectable" image - "left wing" radicals have always been suspect as European or Russian influenced.) Does this past convey any information, such as the American public's being more susceptible to libertarian ideas than, perhaps, the Canadians or Dutch or Japanese?

I would say no: libertarianism will not be more readily accepted in America than anywhere else. For one thing, it must be realized that there is no *one* America and Daughters of the American Revolution types are the minority. Who among you readers had ancestors who were in North America in 1776 *and* were rooting for the colonies to win? This country isn't called the melting pot for nothing. People came from many countries and many cultures and they came much too fast to be absorbed into the "American Way of Life" without permanently altering it.

In addition, many antilibertarian facets have been present in America's heritage right from the beginning [2]. Eminent domain, regulation of commerce, government monopolies - all these were present, not to mention slavery, sumptuary laws, and invasion of Indian lands [3].

Where does that leave libertarians? It leaves them with 200 million people who, by and large, *accept* government regulation and taxation, who are bound and determined to be their brother's keepers with regards to personal habits and morals, who consider welfare in some form a right, who rely on religion and astrology rather than themselves, and who hold patriotism and loyalty to the government in very high regard. The social change job ahead will not be easy!

Much more is involved in social change of the profound type that libertarianism represents than merely changing a few laws or electing a few sympathetic officials. Nor is revolution the answer [see "Revolution Repeats the Problem," this issue - Editor]. A whole culture (or, more accurately, many subcultures) has to be changed, right down to its basic premises and values; and this cannot be accomplished overnight.

Also, this change must be accomplished very carefully, with much thought as to the consequences of any action taken. Anyone who meddles in other people's lives, which is what promoting social change involves, should be responsible enough to do a good job, since many innocent people are involved. People who advocate bringing the system down, either through revolution or through promoting policies designed to overburden an already unstable system, should be aware that not only will the baddies catch it, but so will the good and the uninvolved (e.g., children). Hurting someone for his own ultimate good is

never justified, unless he's requested it.

In short, a disciplined, professional approach to social change is needed. One must know what one is doing, what society is all about, how different parts of it interconnect. One should have some basis for determining the probable consequences of actions, some notion of where a particular change can be made for maximum effect. A complex modern society is in many ways like a human body, and in neither case does one just hack away and expect any good to come of it!

Disciplines for studying problems of social change exist. Called anthropology and sociology in liberal arts colleges, and systems analysis [4] and modeling [5] in the engineering schools, these fields are still in their infancy, but their potential is great. Anthropology, in particular, has, for approximately a century, addressed itself to the structure of cultures [6], how people interact, and what is involved when new elements are introduced into a culture.

For instance, a theory of anthropology, called functionalism [7, 8], has much to offer the student of social change. Functionalism views any culture as an integrated whole, as an interconnected system. Individual institutions and customs aren't isolated phenomena and can't be fully appreciated except in the context of the whole culture: they have a function in the whole, meeting certain needs of the people participating in them. Functionalism in anthropology is in many ways equivalent to antireductionism in biology.

Determining the actual working of a social system is not always easy, of course. The people participating in a particular institution generally have a rationale for it, which may or may not correspond to what is actually taking place. This could, perhaps, be one reason why anthropologists have only recently begun studying the industrialized cultures that they themselves live in - it is very difficult to get outside of 30 or so years of socialization and view the whole process objectively! (Indeed, many people have trouble accepting the fact that most of the rest of the world lives differently from them. Such people are culture-bound, much the same way that a plant whose roots are all turned in on themselves is pot-bound.)

A functional analysis of the churches and religious institutions of the United States, for example, would reveal that these social units serve many purposes beyond their ostensible ethical and soul-saving function. A church is also a place to commemorate important life events such as birth, marriage, and death. Puberty rites of primitive peoples are analogous to confirmation, bar mitzvah, and holy communion ceremonies. (For the irreligious, school graduation appears to have a similar function.) Christmas and Chanukah have roots in old winter solstice ceremonies and Easter and Passover nicely mark the start of spring.

Then, of course, there is the purely social function of church-going. One meets friends and neighbors for choir practice, pot-luck suppers, and chatting after the service. It is no coincidence that many churches emphasize the fellowship hall, youth groups, and church schools. Christians often look askance at the Jews because many of the latter wish to have a Jewish nation - Israel: the Christians neglect the fact that they themselves already claim the United States and many other countries as *their* own!

What this analysis should show to anyone interested in supplanting the power of the churches over people's lives is that much more is involved than simply presenting a rational ethic and metaphysics. Religion offers a whole lifestyle that satisfies many needs - the need for morality, the need for companionship, the need for some structure in life, etc.

Libertarians have invented institutions which parallel those of religion, but these are not in any long term form and were not done with any apparent attempt to *compete* with religion. The most successful of these parallel institutions was, of course, Nathaniel Branden Institute (NBI) which sponsored lecture courses as well as socials and balls. In many ways NBI courses were similar to services of Ethical Culture- and Unitarian-type churches: people came to hear a lecture rather than a sermon, and they had a chance to meet others of similar persuasion.

Another parallel institution is the libertarian conference - a rational revival meeting, so to speak. As conferences have been organized in the past, libertarians and some curious outsiders get together, listen to some inspiring talks, meet all their friends, and in general get reenergized. (An outsider might even consider that they are all speaking in tongues!)

Finally, as the ultimate parallel institution to the mystically-oriented churches, some libertarians in Milwaukee have formed the Rationalist Church of America (RCA) [9]. As its name implies, this church rejects mysticism and dogma and, further, asserts that "the intrinsic worth and liberty of each individual is the highest possible value in human society." Whether the RCA gets tax-exempt status as a recognized church remains to be seen. It will also be seen if it can do more for its members than provide them with something to fill in on forms after "religious affiliation." Will it provide meaningful life ceremonies, celebrations, etc.? In any event, it has interesting possibilities.

Another area in which the functional anthropology approach can be useful is semantics and language. Here the idea is to concentrate on *what* people are saying (meaning), not the words they use. Ayn Rand, in particular, has documented the fuzzy thinking, faulty concept formation, and poor epistemology endemic in Western culture and has presented a rational epistemology [10] as an alternative. Given such documentation, why then do intellectuals, including Objectivists, still persist in taking people at their word?!

When an engineering professor talks about engineers' "responsibility to society" in producing safe cars, why assume he is an evil altruist bent on enslaving the engineering profession (unless, of course, one has some reason for expecting the worst of people)? Could he not simply be sloppy with words and be using a common buzz-phrase "responsibility to society" to denote the concept of an engineer's striving to turn out the best car possible, based on his personal and professional integrity?

A more striking example is that of Eastern European experiments with capitalism. When Ota Sik and his colleagues in Czechoslovakia started introducing marketplace mechanisms into the socialized economy, they did *not* refer to it as "capitalism"; they called it "human socialism." The political situation they were in simply didn't permit the use of the word capitalism in any sort of favorable sense, so they resorted to circumlocution, much the same way that peoples whose languages don't contain a past tense (e.g., some American Indian languages) are still able to refer to events in the past. Unfortunately for the Czechs, the Soviets are experts in doubletalk: they looked at what was happening rather than what people said was happening and called a quick halt to the whole experiment.

A more recent example of words obscuring meaning is a paper that appeared in *SCIENCE*, entitled "Altruism is Rewarding" [11]. Rather than being a paean to

REVOLUTION REPEATS THE PROBLEM

self-sacrifice, however, the paper is really saying that human beings don't like to see other human beings suffer and will learn a conditioned response (in this case pushing a button) where the only reward is seeing the cessation of another's pain. The paper could have been more aptly titled "Benevolence is Rewarding," but one had to look beyond the words the authors used (this sloppy use of the term "altruism" seems very common in experimental psychology) to see what they *meant* [12]. Examples like this are relatively frequent - it should be a warning to read beyond the headlines.

The above examples are on a *micro*scale, relative to what can be done. There is an even greater need for *macro*analyses - studies of whole industrialized cultures. Work of this type has already been done in anthropology, but on a superficial level. Ruth Benedict's *THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD* [13] is the classic in the field as a study of pre-War Japan (Anthropologists were in great demand during World War II since Japanese customs, motives, values, etc. were utterly alien to the West. The anthropologists had to interpret Japan to the Allies.) Margaret Mead's book *AND KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY* [14] is an interesting look at the United States during the same period.

On a more advanced level there was "Project Camelot" [15], a mid-1960s attempt at a multidisciplinary study of a major Latin American society. One of the purposes of "Camelot" was to gather data for later use in social change decisions. The clandestineness of the whole operation did not go over at all well with the target country, Chile: nor did the fact that the United States was sponsoring the study. In fact, the United States' relations with all of Latin America suffered a sharp decline and "Camelot" was hastily cancelled - no country wanted to be host to what seemed to them like a super-CIA.

Perhaps the most sophisticated work being done now is the World Dynamics study led by Jay W. Forrester and sponsored by the Club of Rome [16]. This is a computer model of the world's economy which takes into account various elements of technology, institutional and governmental decisions, etc. and permits forecasts of the effects of various technological and policy changes. The implications for social change are obvious: one can test ideas of the computer model before interfering in human lives. Of course, a model is only as accurate as the studies that go into it. Forrester and his people are primarily engineers and hence possibly not so attuned to the human cultural elements as anthropologists might be. Anthropologists, on the other hand, seem barely aware of the organizational capabilities of computers. As the two groups discover each other, models can be expected to correspond more and more closely to reality.

What implications does all of this have for libertarians wishing to develop effective social change strategies? Needed first are analyses of our current culture by competent professionals. In particular, the social forms that libertarians are now living implicitly should be made explicit and examined (for example, with marriage, is the standard Judeo-Christian concept valid for those living a libertarian ethic? What form should a libertarian or Objectivist marriage take? Can any sort of long-term commitment be made in a rapidly changing world?). Diffusion or imitation is a powerful force in modifying cultures, and if libertarians expect to change Western culture it is not unreasonable to ask them to start with themselves. Social change begins at home, as it were.

These analyses can presumably lead to one or more functional models of possible freedom-oriented societies. Some analyses have already been done (e.g., *THE MARKET FOR LIBERTY* [17]), but these only deal with some institutions and there is no indication that larger social forms have been considered. Institutions, values, laws, lifestyles, technology - all of these are interrelated (imagine what the world would be like if the automobile had never been invented!).

In addition to setting goals, these studies will give some idea (with, of course, inputs from other social science and systems analysis sources) of just how our present culture functions. After all, all the goal setting in the world is to no avail if you don't know where you are and how to get from here to there. Time is running out. Where are the lever points [18]? Where are the places that badly need shoring-up if libertarians are to have enough time to change this society? The stakes are very high. This is the only world around - study it or lose the chance to change it.

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IN COMING ISSUES OF REASON

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leverage points for social change

robert poole, jr.

Give me a place to stand
and I will move the earth -
Archimedes

Those who espouse a libertarian philosophy of social organization appear to be faced with an insurmountable task when it comes to implementing a society consistent with their values. The number of people in the United States who can be considered libertarians may be approximated in terms of, say, a few thousand serious students and academicians, ten to 20 thousand current subscribers to more-or-less libertarian publications, and perhaps 100,000 people who have had enough contact with libertarian ideas to have gotten their names on a mailing list somewhere. Whichever of these figures is most meaningful, it is clear that persons of the libertarian persuasion constitute, at best, on the order of 0.05% of the population or roughly one in 2000.

Given such numerical weakness, the chances of convincing a majority of the people to vote to end all forms of coercion seem vanishingly small, at least in the foreseeable future. This prognosis, of course, assumes that the major problems with which libertarians must deal are political and governmental. It can be argued that there are more fundamental problems of a psychological and epistemological nature, i.e., that most people do not know how to function as rationally self-sufficient persons and *therefore* create or sanction coercive institutions, rights violations, etc. This may well be the case, but it does not follow that *only* when *everyone's* psychoepistemology is straightened out can we have a laissez-faire society. (To my knowledge, no one has shown this to be the case.) I would argue, rather, that the existing coercive political and governmental structure, with its control over lives, is itself the primary problem which must be dealt with and that, if coercive restraints began to be removed, the superiority of laissez-faire would become increasingly obvious. If this is the case, then the primary task is to begin making the right kinds of changes in *our institutions*, leaving the changes in values and attitudes in follow as a result.

Despite the fact that libertarians are a tiny minority, are there any indications that such a group could effect fundamental political changes? Answering this question requires an understanding of how our political system works in fact (as opposed to in theory). In theory, the role of government in America is determined by our elected representatives, who express the view of the majority in deciding upon governmental programs and policies. To effect substantial changes in the role of the State, therefore, requires that one convince a majority of the people of the validity of a certain viewpoint and then see to it that they elect candidates who support that view.

But what actually takes place in our political system? Can anyone really believe that a groundswell of popular opinion led to the government's ill-fated decision to finance the SST? Or what about its decision *not* to back the SST? Is the "public"



now clamoring for farm subsidies, import quotas, or government-supplied medical care (or are they just bitching about high costs)? Did the mass of the populace push Kennedy and Johnson into the Viet Nam War? In every case, I answer **No.** Despite the democratic rhetoric and window dressing, our political system is very basically *elitist* in nature. Virtually all of the basic discussion of problems, framing of alternatives, and choices of policy are accomplished not by the general public, nor even by Congress, but by small groups of people with specialized knowledge.

By the time an "issue" (volunteer military, government insurance, import quotas) reaches public awareness, most of the real battle has already been fought. The problem has been defined, often in a way which precludes any sort of nongovernmental solution, and a limited set of alternatives has been drafted. By the time the "representative" body gets around to the subject, all that's left to haggle over is the details of implementation, rather than the substance of the issue. In short, the really crucial questions - those which determine the role of the State in our lives - are decided by specialists, about whom the electorate has little knowledge and over whom they have no control.

Who are these people who pose the questions and frame the alternatives? One group consists of the people who get appointed to presidential task forces and commissions, such as those in recent years dealing with crime, civil disorders, violence, volunteer military, and pornography. Although these people are usually prominent members of the Establishment, it is not impossible for serious libertarians to get appointed (e.g., Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan on the volunteer military commission). Although the commission members get the bulk of the publicity, it is often the hired staff members who do much of the research and analysis on which the members base their conclusions. These staff members are generally younger people, who are apt to be more idealistic and more open to new ideas than the commission members themselves.

Although presidential commissions get most of the publicity, they are only a minority of the total number of such groups in Washington. Including Congressional advisory groups and interagency committees, there are about 1,500 such bodies at present, of which only 60 are presidential [1]. Among the more important commissions currently at work are the President's Commission on School Finance, the Commission on Financial Regulation, and the National Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. The conclusions reached by these commissions could have important consequences on such matters as the future of education vouchers and/or tax credits, the current quagmire of controls and privileges in banking and finance, and the government's restraints on sexual/marital customs - all issues of far-reaching significance as far as the role of the State is concerned.

The short-term impact of such commission reports can be debated; the volunteer military commission's recommendations were favorably received and are (slowly) being implemented, whereas the pornography commission's findings are being (officially) ignored. Still, the publicity and prestige of such reports transforms them into an integral part of the political/intellectual scene and guarantees wide dissemination of their conclusions.

A second group with significant leverage consists of the members of Congressional staffs. These are the people who read the mail and answer the letters, do the research, prepare the position papers, and draft the speeches for the Senator or Representative who is out making speeches or improving international relations on the Riviera. Again, many of the staffers are young, dedicated people, more amenable to rational ideas and fresh thinking than the politician himself might be. One of the salient features of life as a Congressional staffer is overwork. With the complexity of today's socio-economic-technical issues (ecology, ABM, SST, etc.) and the vast amount of information produced on every subject, the staffs routinely suffer from information overload. Yet, somehow, they must filter out pertinent parts of this information and prepare definitive position papers. Lobbyists for every major "interest" have long been aware of the staffers' dilemma and are only too happy to save the day by giving them carefully-prepared papers supporting the "right" conclusions. Not all staffers fall for this, but many are themselves only too happy to be saved from the trouble of researching some complex subject. Thus do lobbyists utilized the principle of leverage in supporting their particular causes.

The third group of specialists is less well-known and probably more effective than presidential commissions and Congressional staffs. This group consists of companies and institutes doing research and systems analysis into government functions and operations - in short, the "think tanks" like RAND Corporation, GE TEMPO, Arthur D. Little, etc. Think tanks may be profit-making corporations, nonprofit corporations, or subsidiaries of universities. Whatever their structure, they derive the bulk of their income in the same way: by carrying out research projects under contract, primarily from governments. Many of the think tanks got their start doing exclusively military operations research; today nearly all have greatly expanded the scope of their interests and expertise, employing economists, political scientists, behavioral scientists, etc., as well as engineers, systems analysts, physicists, etc.

Think tanks are being called upon to examine virtually every area of the economy and of government functions, in order to analyze the nature of the status quo and recommend desirable improvements. For example, in the field of aviation, the Department of Transportation and NASA last year let contracts to a number of think tanks for a far-reaching study of the government's involvement in air transportation. Booz, Allen and Hamilton (a consulting firm) studied the historical benefits derived from air transportation, the Office of Policy Studies of George Washington University studied the social impacts of transportation system patterns, Planning Research Corporation evaluated the likely technical and economic characteristics of future transportation systems, and Arthur D. Little, Inc., examined who should finance and manage various aspects of the projected systems. Basic to the entire study was the evaluation of the impact - in terms of specific costs and benefits - of the present federal regulatory structure. After 18 months of study, the project's summary report stressed the following recommendations:

> Removal of regulatory and anti-trust legal restraints should be considered as a means of permitting transportation to expand into a door-to-door service rather than gate-to-gate . . .

and

> Marketing experiments should be considered to determine if there are any regions in the U.S. where market characteristics might justify competing carriers to set rates freely and establish routes [2].

Small, hesitant steps toward laissez-faire? Certainly, but they are positive, forward steps, being proposed at the highest levels and being listened to.

The preceding example illustrates the more conventional type of think tank study. In the last few years, however, think tanks have been delving deeply into the more basic and emotion-laden areas of government function. A recent listing of RAND Corporation studies in urban problems [3] includes some provocative abstracts of projects such as a thorough study of bureaus and bureaucrats analyzing "the peculiarities, the conflicting and complex motives of real bureaucrats" and classifying them into five categories based on their motivations and behavior patterns; a study of teacher shortages recommending salary schedules with subject-matter pay differentials as opposed to the status/seniority pay scale used in most public schools; a study of 297 urban renewal projects, documenting the fact that the projects sharply reduced the land area devoted to residential use to make room for industry and government buildings; an analysis of hospitalization insurance, recommending a more market-oriented relationship between premiums and benefits ("variable-cost insurance"); a study of a proposed government-owned rapid transit system for Los Angeles, pointing out the exaggerated claims made for it, documenting that the costs would exceed the benefits, and recommending alternatives such as "substitution of 'free-entry' taxi service for the present franchise type"; and a study of alternative methods of dispensing social services, such as the individualized marketplace approach made possible by such devices as education vouchers.

One of the most important RAND studies is a comprehensive analysis of the rental housing market in New York City. One RAND paper (P-4256) demonstrates that "public construction and rehabilitation have no effect on the long-run equilibrium quantity of housing," i.e., that the subsidizing effect of government construction activities causes a short-run increase in the demand for housing but has no net effect on the total long-run supply, due to the behavior of buyers and sellers in response to the program. Another paper (P-4257) describes the effects of rent control, as follows:

> . . . a simple rent control program results in a decrease in the quantity of housing service consumed in the long run. In the short run, rent control hastens the deterioration of rent-controlled housing, and hence, worsens the housing occupied by the tenants of these dwellings. It is further deduced that rent control subsidizes the consumption of non-housing goods by tenants of rent-controlled units at the expense of the owners of these units.

RAND's studies of rent control weren't simply put on the shelf and forgotten. The housing situation in New York City has gotten so bad that even politicians who had championed rent control for years began to realize that perhaps there was something to the free market after all. The RAND report was presented to the Lindsay administration in the fall of 1969 and the rationality of its arguments and its comprehensive factual data convinced Lindsay's people that rent control would have to go if the housing problem were ever to be solved. The solution was developed early in 1970 and adopted by the City Council at a little-known meeting on 26 June 1970 (reportedly at 4 a.m.). Instead of announcing an end to rent control, the government would continue to back it verbally, while quietly increasing the price ceiling by 7½% every year until the controlled price reached the free-market level, at which point rent control would be irrelevant. This solution saves face for the politicians at the same time that it comes to grips with economic reality. What 25 years of conservative and libertarian rhetoric failed to accomplish, RAND Corporation achieved with a one-year study, stressing facts and logic, not ideology.

RAND is not the only think tank entering into politically sensitive areas. General Research Corporation is among the leaders in applying systems analysis methods to the operations of law-enforcement agencies, the court system, and the corrections system. One of its subsidiaries, Public Safety Systems Inc., is developing a systems analysis of the processing of persons through the criminal justice system, which will make it possible, for the first time, to determine how costly (and how ineffective) it really is to process certain types of cases and which may lead to a reexamination of the aims and methods of operation of the various components of the system. Up to now, no one, certainly not the government, has thought quantitatively about such questions as police effectiveness, the costs involved in processing morals and sumptuary law cases ("crimes without victims"), the effectiveness of prisons, etc.

GE's TEMPO Center for Advanced Studies has applied systems and economic analysis to a variety of governmental activities. In one study (68TMP-64) the concept of property rights as a market mechanism for allocating the electromagnetic frequency spectrum was introduced and explored. Another pioneering study (68TMP-21) considered ways in which airports could be run on a free-market basic, utilizing landing fees both as a means of revenue and to reduce congestion by adjusting the price in accordance with hourly demand. RAND has also analyzed this problem and has proposed essentially the same solution, proportional marginal cost pricing of landing rights (RM-5817–PA).

There is an extremely important lesson for libertarians to learn in the above activities. For years libertarians have been reading economists such as Mises, Rothbard, and Hayek and learning how an unhampered market structure can work, how true economic calculation is impossible in the absence of a price system, that the concept of property can be applied successfully to matters commonly thought of as public goods or free goods, etc. Libertarians have claimed that these concepts are *rational* and that social and economic structures consistent with them are characterized by maximum efficiency in the use of resources. Yet despite all of these claims, many libertarians (especially among those under 30) treat this knowledge as if it were an occult secret, capable of being understood only by a select few; they consider themselves an underground movement, essentially at odds with every part of the Establishment. Yet as the above think tank examples illustrate, since the ideas *are* rational and the hypothetical libertarian solutions *are* the most effective, these ideas *can* be communicated to persons outside the confines of the "movement." (And many such persons are discovering market ideas without benefit of the movement, thanks to the ideas' inherent validity.) The point is simply this: a libertarian who really thinks Mises is right has no need to skulk about in the underground, writing off the Establishment as lost cause.

Additional light can be thrown on this "underground syndrome" by examining the rhetoric used by its spokesmen. Underground libertarians tend to view the world rather naively in terms of a rigid two-valued logic: people are either "statists" or "libertarians," i.e., bad guys or good, them or us. This is a grossly oversimplified picture, even of federal and state governmental bureaucracies. These two terms are useful as concepts, for delineating fundamental, opposite approaches to social problems, but to apply them haphazardly as black-or-white labels to individual people has the effect of erroneously defining away everyone but a small in-group. This may be emotionally satisfying, but it does not correspond to reality, as the experiences of the think tanks demonstrate. Despite libertarian rhetoric about the "predominent irrationality" of our times (which may be true of limited areas such as ethics and

education), logical thinking and rationality are very much in vogue in the fields of engineering, systems analysis, and applied (real-world) social sciences. What is *not* in vogue in these fields is *ideology*.

An important difference needs to be drawn between the values (or ideology) *underlying* one's work and the method of presentation and expression chosen. It is quite acceptable (and unavoidable) for a think tank systems analyst to have a value system which motivates his efforts and affects his choice of problems, emphasis, etc. It is *not* acceptable to present results in an ideological manner. It is unfortunately true that there is as yet, in the intellectual and scientific community, no recognition of the existence of a rational value structure. (It is interesting to note that while some technical people refuse to consider such a possibility, others are beginning to see a definite *need* for such a value structure.) For the most part, this is a constraint within which one must work, if one is to be listened to. Thus, analyses and conclusions, although they may have been motivated by what one considers to be a rational (i.e., Objectivist, libertarian) value structure, cannot be justified on that basis alone; they must be justifiable on their own merits as most efficient, cost-effective, etc. As pointed out above, if libertarian economic theory is in fact as rational as its proponents claim, there should be few problems doing this, assuming one is willing to work hard enough formulating problems, gathering and analyzing data, etc. The important point is that people *will* listen to rationally-presented arguments based on demonstrable economic efficiency.

The need for data gathering and analysis mentioned above should be emphasized. Many social programs promoted by government, in addition to being coercive and otherwise anathema to libertarians, could be demonstrated to be harmful to the persons supposedly being helped, if only the appropriate data were gathered and analyzed (much as Martin Anderson did in *THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER).* Lyndon Johnson's chief adviser for domestic affairs, Joseph A. Califano, admitted that the government in many cases hasn't the foggiest idea what a vast program is actually doing or whom it is reaching. (It took the Johnson administration nearly two years to find out who the seven million people were who were receiving $4 billion a year in welfare payments.) Mr. Califano candidly told the Senate Labor Committee:

> The disturbing truth is that the basis of recommendations by the American Cabinet officer on whether to *begin, eliminate,* or *expand* vast social programs more nearly resembles the intuitive judgement of a benevolent tribal chief in remote Africa than the elaborate, sophisticated data with which the Secretary of Defense supports a major new weapons system [4].

Many people in government are *not* basically malevolent. True, they want to stay in power and often do so at the expense of others. But once a particular program has been convincingly demonstrated to be worthless or counterproductive, it is difficult for men of (supposedly) good will to continue to support it.

We see, therefore, that there are at least three groups in our society with influence vastly out of proportion to their numbers which are called upon to chart the course of the role of government in America: advisory commissions, Congressional staffs, and think tanks. These groups, in a very real sense, may be termed *leverage points* in the way that Archimedes meant. As such, they offer libertarians a means of vastly increasing their influence in shaping the future of society. Two questions arise at this point. First, can a small group of people sharing a common value system effectively place themselves in such positions of influence and utilize them in concert? Second, what are the most promising organizations for U.S. libertarians to enter?

The first question can be answered affirmatively by reference to several historical examples. The British Fabian Society, which at its height had only 4,000 members, and for most of its history had under a thousand, between 1884 and 1945 accomplished the complete transformation of England from a liberal, quasi-capitalist nation to a complete welfare state. The Fabians made no secret of their very pragmatic approach to *action,* based nonetheless on a consistent, non-pragmatic ideology. Their basic method was not political, but it utilized the principle of leverage described above. Historian Max Beer described the Fabian intention to operate not as a political group but as "a group of men and women who are endeavoring to spread practical views on the immediate and pressing social problems and to indicate the way for their embodiment in legislation or administrative measures" [5]. In their methods of operation, the Fabians were technocrats, working within the scientific and intellectual community. Shaw's *FABIAN ESSAYS*

> based socialism not on philosophical speculations, but on the self-evident evolution of society. It accepted accredited economic science . . . it constructed the edifice of socialism on the firm foundations of existing political and social institutions [6].

Fabian historian Anne Freemantle describes as the greatest Fabian achievement

> training the personnel who, through their knowledge of the new disciplines of the social sciences, could achieve the reforms all parties wanted [7].

The Fabians' primary tactical method was "permeation" - the placement of Fabians in leverage points - on commissions, in the Civil Service, in newspapers, and in universities. Their detailed research reports on conditions in various segments of the English economy won them widespread recognition. Their concrete proposals, as members of official advisory groups and commissions, were not presented as socialist tracts but were written as reasonable, practical proposals for solving specific problems. Despite their low-keyed, soft-sell approach, the Fabians never forgot their ultimate goal - the construction of socialism. Their opponents, whether Liberals or Tories, were almost never so dedicated, consistent, or well-organized. In the end, the Fabian slogan - "the inevitability of gradualness" - proved correct.

A more recent, but analogous, group is Opus Dei in Spain. Founded in 1928, ostensibly as a lay Catholic religious order, Opus Dei is "a cohesive and successful movement whose members have come to occupy, over the last 12 years, more and more key political, economic, and educational positions in Spanish life" [8]. Although avowedly nonpolitical, Opus Dei's leadership has recognized the value of leverage points as being an extra-political way of exerting a great deal of influence on the sourse of a nation's development. This is especially important in Spain, where the only legal political group is the fascist Falange. Opus Dei, therefore, provides a legal alternative to the Falange, for those with more liberal and libertarian views. As the *NEW YORK TIMES* noted:

> In the mid-fifties Opus Dei members entered the Government where, clustered around Mr. Lopez Rodo, they and their associates became known as—as the technocrats. They successfully opened the country to free enterprise and to foreign investment, trade, and tourism . . . At the same time Opus Dei members rose to control or influence a large part of the country's banking, insurance, construction, and communications industries [9].

In October 1969 Generalissimo Franco decreed a Cabinet reshuffle which ousted many Falangists and gave Opus Dei members virtually complete control of the top government positions. Lopez Rodo is now the Minister of Planning. Although Franco is still in control, and the Falange is still very powerful, the long-term effects of the "nonpolitical" takeover may be dramatic.

A third example is found in Brazil today. There is a group of pragmatic technocrats within the military government having a large measure of success in "encouraging private enterprise and eliminating some of the distortions in the economy resulting from years of wild inflation and haphazard government intervention" [10]. Under the leadership first of Minister of Planning Roberto Campos and now under Finance Minister Antonio Delfim, a "crawling peg" system of flexible exchange rates has been introduced, the federal budget has been nearly balanced, coffee subsidies nearly eliminated, taxes simplified, and public works deficits pared. Inflation has been reduced from an annual rate of 144% in the early 60s to 19% last year, the economy's *real* growth has averaged 9% for the last two years, and many Brazilians are now investing in Brazil rather than Switzerland for the first time in a decade.

None of this in any way justifies the repressive policies of the Brazilian generals toward dissent. It merely illustrates that a group of dedicated individuals can accomplish much good even under an appalling political system. A government, like a society, is made up of individuals. The technocrats' position in the Brazilian government is much like that of the Opus Dei members in Spain (or of Liberman in the U.S.S.R. or Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia): there is no way they can directly change many of the regime's repressive political policies, but by making non-ideological arguments for the efficiency and effectiveness of steps toward laissez-faire they can accomplish economic changes whose long-run effects will have major significance.

All the above examples illustrate the successful use of the leverage point concept. In each case, the textbook political process has been bypassed by an elitist approach to the political system's points of maximum leverage. In each case, a numerically small group has had a major influence on a country's institutions. Acknowledging that such an effect is possible does not say anything about *how* it can be done. It is necessary, therefore, to define the existing American leverage points in more detail and to suggest some approaches for libertarians to take in permeating various institutions.

There are several major paths that libertarians can take, in some cases simultaneously. In terms of careers, libertarians should seriously consider working for think tanks (see p. 15). These organizations employ engineers, physical scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, etc. A good academic background is an asset, but the primary attributes desired are the ability to think - logically, clearly, and creatively - and to express oneself capably in writing. Think tanks tend to pay better than either industry or academia and offer better working conditions (private offices, extensive libraries, large support staffs, etc.). They tend to treat staff members as professional *individuals*, rather than as employees, and are tolerant of unusual hours, dress, office decor, ideas, etc. so long as one does competent work.

A second avenue of influence is to produce research material and studies for use in influencing Congressional committees and staff. To a considerable extent, material produced in think tanks could be used in this manner, if a concerted effort were made to get it to the right people (e.g., to the staff members of Congressmen on key committees, etc.). In addition there may well be a role for an independent libertarian-oriented research organization, probably set up as a nonprofit foundation, to make grants and support economists, social scientists, etc. in gathering and analyzing the vital data needed to make clear what situations really exist in critical areas of society and what the unintended and counterintuitive effects of various social policies may be. It would then be up to individuals or libertarian political groups to make such studies available to Congressional staffs, professional journals, etc. The Fabian Society performed both roles, doing research and disseminating and publicizing the results at key political leverage points. With today's tax laws it might be more advisable, as suggested above, to keep the two functions separate; this would also help insulate the research from charges of bias and special pleading.

A third avenue of influence can be entered by joining organizations which are likely to influence advisory commissions, either by providing members and staffs with data or by generating ideas and information for them to use. Such organizations fall into several categories. First there are professional societies, such as the Association for Computing Machinery, the American Chemical Society, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, the Society of Automotive Engineers, etc. Increasingly these societies are becoming involved in socio-technical issues in which the role of government is often central. A relative handful of people in each society is generally given the task of exploring policy alternatives and suggesting to the society's governing body (or, rarely, to the entire membership) what position to take on various issues. It is not exceedingly difficult to get involved in such work (few people volunteer for such activities and society officials are eager for people, especially younger people, to "get involved"). How much can be accomplished varies with the circumstances, but it is certainly worth a try.

A particularly important professional society is the American Association for the Advancement of Science (1515 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005) which is open to professionals in virtually every field, including all the physical, biological, and social sciences, economics, education, and medicine. AAAS leaders are continually being sought out to serve in advisory capacities at all levels of the federal government, and AAAS study groups are formed for the same purpose. Another significant group is the World Future Society (P O Box 19285, 20th Street Station, Washington, D.C. 20036), a professional society whose membership is drawn primarily from think tanks but which is open to anyone interested in discussing and exploring the shape of the future [see "Publisher's Notes," in this issue - Editor]. The WFS has been in existence only since 1966, but it has already attracted a distinguished group of members, supporters, and advisers. As books like Alvin Toffler's *FUTURE SHOCK* (New York: Random House, 1970) come to be more widely acknowledged, the role of futurism is likely to become increasingly significant in the years ahead. Libertarians should be in the forefront of such organizations, agressively (but dispassionately) presenting economic and socio-political analyses in whatever pragmatic manner is acceptable, while working in the background to develop the basis for acceptance of a rational value system. (It is futurists, in particular, who see the need for a rational system of values.)

In short, the intelligent search for and use of points of leverage in the political system - as demonstrated in other countries and particularly by the British Fabians - offers libertarians a significant chance for increasing their effectiveness in promoting desirable political and governmental change. Far from going underground, libertarians should become ex-

perts as permeators, developing their particular professional competence and applying it at points of maximum leverage. Given a sufficient place to stand, perhaps we shall move the earth.

POSTSCRIPT

The objection may be raised that the analogy between libertarians and the Fabians is misleading. The Fabians were attempting to *pass* laws and *establish* government programs, while libertarians are trying to *repeal* laws and *abolish* government programs. The nature of one's *ends* invariably affects the *means* one can consistently use. Accordingly, although the Fabians could work within a coercive system to promote additional coercion, libertarians should not work within a coercive system even though their goal is to end coercion - or so some critics may say.

I consider this to be a simplistic argument. To get from where we are now to a laissez-faire society is not going to happen by magic. To get from "now" to "then," there are only three fundamental paths: 1) violent overthrow of the the government, followed by the construction from scratch of a free society; 2) nonviolent noncooperation and withdrawal of support, leading to collapse of the government, followed by construction from scratch of a free society; or 3) evolutionary change from our present government to a progressively more limited government, culminating in full laissez-faire.

The first path is clearly unacceptable by any sort of criterion of justice toward innocent bystanders (who typically bear the brunt of revolutionary violence). Furthermore, the chances of libertarians being listened to in the chaos following revolution are slim. The second alternative is nearly as bad as the first, in terms of both harming innocent people and providing little likelihood of libertarian ideas holding sway "after." That leaves only the third alternative - working for evolutionary change within the present context.

How, though, do we get from now to then, working within the system, when now consists of a fantastically complex array of interlocking controls, programs, pressure groups, vested interests, etc.? Clearly, only the most careful planning will suffice. Planning methodologies have been and are being developed in universities and think tanks for dealing with complex, many-variable situations characterized by uncertainty. Some of these methods are being applied in government (not necessarily by libertarians) to analyze problems and evaluate alternatives. Some are being applied to the workings of government itself, such as the attempt via "Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Systems" (PBBS) to make some sense, functionally, out of government budgets and to correct instances of government programs working at cross-purposes.

All of these are only minor steps, but they illustrate that in an economy so riddled with controls as ours, it is possible to play many of the usual political games by *removing* rather than adding controls. Careful, politically-sensitive strategic planning could help define a way of approaching laissez-faire over a period of years by such methods. This is truly a challenging task for those who would permeate in the manner of the (successful) Fabians.

One of the places such planning is being applied is the federal government's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the direction of Chicago-school economist George Shultz. Shultz is less of a libertarian than Milton Friedman (which may be how he was selected and how he can take the job), but a number of recent OMB actions illustrate some of the ways libertarians in government *could* use to make substantive changes in the direction of laissez-faire, while ostensibly playing the usual political games:

> When Nixon wanted to put pressure on the steel industry to roll back their recent price increase, Shultz suggested that instead of imposing new controls, the Administration should *remove* an existing control - namely reducing the government's barriers to steel imports. The plan was adopted.
>
> When Nixon wanted to hold down construction costs, instead of slapping on new controls, Shultz proposed suspending the Davis-Bacon Act instead. This law requires that union wage scales be paid on all federal construction projects, regardless of whether the men are unionized. This solution was adopted, but it has since been rescinded due to heavy union pressure.
>
> To help control oil price increases, the Administration has threatened to repeal the Connally "Hot Oil" Act which permits oil companies to collaborate with state regulators to fix prices and limit production.

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6) *Ibid,* p. 83.

7) *Ibid,* p. 125.

8) "Rise in Opus Dei's Power Stirs Spanish Controversy," *NEW YORK TIMES;* 27 November 1969.

9) *Ibid.*

10) "Booming Prazil Finds a Key to Growth," *BUSINESS WEEK,* 13 March 1971, p. 91.

BRIEF LISTING OF THINK TANKS

ABT Associates, 55 Wheeler Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Battelle Memorial Institute, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201.

Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., 135 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60603.

GE TEMPO Center for Advanced Studies, Box QQ, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93102.

General Research Corporation, Box 3587, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93105.

The Hudson Institute, Quaker Ridge Road, Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10520.

IIT Research Institute, 10 West 35th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60616.

International Research and Technology Corporation, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, Washingotn, D.C. 20036.

Institute for the Future, Riverview Center, Middletown, Conn. 06457.

Arthur D. Little, Inc., 25 Acorn Park, Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

New York City RAND Institute, 545 Madison Avenue, New York City, N.Y. 10022.

Operations Research, Inc., 1400 Spring Street, Silver Spring, Md. 20910.

Planning Research Corporation, 1100 Glendon Avenue, Los Angeles, Calif. 90024.

RAND Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, Calif. 90406.

Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Va. 22101.

Stanford Research Institute, 333 Ravenswood, Menlo Park, Calif. 94025.

System Development Corporation, 2500 Colorado, Santa Monica, Calif. 90406.

TRW Systems, 1 Space Park, Redondo Beach, Calif. 90278.

NONTECHNOLOGICAL THINK TANKS

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103.

Center for the Study of Public Policy, 56 Boylston Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Center for Study of Responsive Law, 1908 Q Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif. 94305.

Institute for Humane Studies, 1134 Crane Street, Menlo Park, Calif. 94025.

Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C.

(For additional listing see RESEARCH CENTERS DIRECTORY and NEW RESEARCH CENTERS, Archie M. Parsons, editor, Gale Research Company, Book Tower, Detroit, Michigan.)

futurology:

the coming thing

dick pierce



It's a strange phenomenon that nearly all well-known "radical reformers" are, unintentionally, staunchly conservative in certain important respects. One thinks of Consciousness III types like Jerry Rubin promoting social revolution (while calling for higher welfare payments from the Establishment). On the radical right, the late 50s produced the Liberty Amendment people who promised a new millenium "if only" the personal income tax were repealed. A closer look at their radically transformed society revealed *higher* corporate income taxes and excise taxes, continued subsidies of air and water transportation, etc. Similarly, writer Jack Newfield in a biting *PLAYBOY* (April 1971) article, "The Death of Liberalism," promotes such radical reforms as government regulation of industry and a $2.50 per hour minimum wage!

The fallacy in all three examples is a very common one; it consists in the implicit assumption that the future will be virtually identical to the present, except for one's own pet reform. Instances of this fallacy abound, particularly in low-grade science fiction movies wherein a few technological gadgets and space ships manage to coexist with a social structure whose lifestyles and institutions are carbon copies of those of the recent past or present. Libertarians, too, are guilty of this fallacy, of thinking that "if only X occurred," then we would have a free society, implicitly assuming everything else would remain the same.

There are two basic facts which make this assumption fallacious; first is the fact that everything in the social structure is related to everything else, i.e., the social structure of a country is an integrated whole in which a change in one aspect has a multitude of large and small effects on other parts, which in turn affect other parts, etc. [see "An Anthropological Perspective on Social Change," in this issue - Editor] ; the other point is that *regardless* of some particular pet reform, the future is *not* going to be much like the present. In point of fact, our society is undergoing extremely rapid technological and social change, the pace of which seems to be continually accelerating.

One of the best descriptions of the full magnitude and implications of this rapid change is Alvin Toffler's best-selling book *FUTURE SHOCK* (New York: Random House, 1970). Toffler argues that the age in which we live is fundamentally different from all that have gone before, primarily because capitalism and technology have radically changed man's relationship to nature and natural resources. Echoing a number of other writers, Toffler thinks we have passed beyond industrialism to an age of "super-industrialism" in which not only is a small minority all that's required to grow our food (less than 2% of Americans, but 26% of the Russian population: *TIME,* 26 March 1971, p. 30), but also to do our manufacturing. The displacement of blue collars by white and of manufacturing jobs by service industry jobs is an accelerating trend. Furthermore, today's plentiful, high-speed transportation and communication systems, which make everybody aware of and affected by everyone else's business, are also unique in man's long history. But most important, according to Toffler, is the fact that the *pace of change* in our society is far more rapid than ever in history and continues to accelerate all the time.

To back up this contention, Toffler documents the rapid increase in all our technological capabilities (maximum speeds, loads, energy usage, etc. versus time) and in the production of knowledge. (Scientific and technical literature, as an example, is being produced at the rate of 60 million pages a year.) An amazing variety of parameters (population, number of

computers in service, passenger miles traveled, etc.) is increasing with *no* limit in sight. Moreover, the pace of life for many of us is far more rapid than that of our parents and certainly than that of our grandparents. We routinely expect to live in many different cities or states (or countries) and hold any number of jobs throughout our life span. At present, the proportion of the world living like this, the "people of the future," is relatively low. The vast majority is still "people of the past," tied to a preindustrial, traditional, agricultural way of life; but the number transitioning from "past" to "present" to "future" continues to grow.

Toffler devotes major sections of his book to filling in this picture of a society in flux. The growth of disposables, modular construction, planned obsolescence, the exploding growth of renting - all signify a major trend toward *transcience,* as far as property and goods are concerned. The same tendency is found in people's increased propensity to move and to travel. Overall, people's attachment to particular places and objects seems to be getting less and less, even as their capacity to afford them increases. Transcience even seems to be affecting organizations, both business and governmental, as bureaucracy begins to be whittled away by "ad-hocracy," Toffler's term for the project team type of organization.

In addition to transcience, our change-oriented society seems to be experiencing a continuing growth in *novelty* and *diversity.* By novelty, Toffler means that the future is unfolding as "an unending succession of bizarre incidents, sensational discoveries, implausible conflicts, and wildly novel dilemmas," such that people tend to feel like "strangers in a strange land" in their own society. Radically new technological developments - undersea cities, weather modification, artificial organs, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence - appear to be on the threshhold of successful implementation. Service industries continue to create new ways to entertain, amuse, relax, and other otherwise provide experiences for customers. Social structures are toppled as voluntary childlessness, easy divorce, group marriage, child care centers, and homosexual marriages make the traditional nuclear family increasingly less common.

In this increasingly novel and changing environment, what choices will be open to the individual? Toffler is quick to debunk the widespread fears of increasing standardization and lack of choice; indeed, one of the basic aspects of super-industrialism is the vast explosion of choice, made possible in part by the computer revolution and partly by the increased sophistication of marketing, in defining and reaching more and more specialized market segments. Thus, *diversity,* even to the point of "over-choice," is the third major element in Toffler's future world-view. Along with diversity in products, we are increasingly seeing diversity in lifestyles and subcults, some primarily on a leisure-time basis (surfing, sky-diving, etc.) and others as much more of a total way of life (rural communes, ghetto youth cultures, etc.).

EFFECTS OF CHANGE

What are the implications of this sort of social change and ferment? Toffler, of course, thinks people are having and will increasingly have difficulty in coping with such an unstructured, rapidly-changing environment. He thinks people will experience, within their own society, a phenomenon analogous to the "culture shock" experienced by travelers in foreign lands, i.e., an inability to deal rationally with the social environment manifested in psychological (and sometimes physical) symptoms. For Toffler, this "future shock" is the most important implication of rapid change, and he suggests various possible means of preventing or ameliorating it. For those who have a stake in a particular vision of the future, such as libertarians, the existence of a reaction such as future shock is an important consideration to include in strategic planning. Yet of far more importance is the fact of change itself.

As Toffler takes pains to demonstrate, the implications of rapid, massive change have profound effects on all our institutions. Who would have guessed in 1961, for example, that a mere ten years after John Kennedy's inauguration (and despite the brief, emotional veneration that followed his death) he would be denounced, by many of the same liberal elements who supported him, as a chauvinistic interventionist in foreign policy and a tool of state-capitalist lobbies and federal bureaucracies at home? Five years ago, who would have expected a nationwide postal strike and the conversion of the Post Office into a quasi-private entity? Two years ago, who could have believed that the Council of Economic Advisers and the Justice Department would propose doing away with the ICC in favor of competition [see this issue's "Trends"]. Or that abortions would be available on demand in New York and divorces in California? Institutions that once appeared eternal and unshakeable *all at once* appear much less so. Several times in the last few years proposals to abolish the property tax have been debated in the California legislature, and the suggestion that the state sell the entire University of California system *has* been raised, not entirely in jest.

Examples such as these abound, the point of which is the same. *It is no longer reasonable to take the existence of today's institutions for granted in thinking about and planning for the future.* With this point in mind, it is worthwhile to reexamine the most common libertarian social change strategy - "educationism." Briefly, this strategy asserts that, because the existing governmental establishment is so complex and its controls and influence are so intertwined into all aspects of society, and because people's thought-processes accept it so unquestioningly, it is necessary to begin a long slow process of reeducation. This process would begin with young professors whose influence would gradually diffuse throughout society's key people - company managers, newsmen, enlightened political leaders, etc. Drawing on the history of past intellectual movements, proponents of this strategy expect that it would take on the order of 30 to 50 years to achieve meaningful results (such as the emergence of a laissez-faire society).

Implicit in this strategy is a model of the future that strongly resembles the past and present, with education supplied only by schools, news and entertainment supplied by the press and a radio/TV broadcast industry, people living in nuclear families, etc. The primary implication of the accelerating rate of social and technological change, however, is that *every* aspect of such a model is open to serious question, and therefore so is the educationist's estimate of the length of time needed to achieve success. If people begin to view education as a service industry (which may happen within a a very few years) and, therefore, as something which one buys in appropriate amounts whenever needed, then it might *not* be necessary to wait a generation for the effects of new knowledge and methodologies to be diffused to society's decision-makers. When the nation is wired for cable TV and when electronic video recording (EVR) comes of age, "broadcasting" as we now know it, with a few centralized sources of news and information, will be replaced by a fantastic diversity of sources, again altering a fundamental link in the way ideas are transmitted among people. If people begin living in group marriages and communes, or if children are partially or primarily raised in child-care centers, hatch-

eries, or kibbutzim, there *will* be fundamental differences in the way ideas and values are transmitted among people.

Not only are the communications links proliferating and the volume and rate of communications increasing, but also the basic institutional structures of our society can no longer be taken for granted. If a zero rate of population growth is achieved, it will wreak havoc with the Social Security con-game (which depends for its viability on a continually *increasing* work force supplying taxes to support the elderly population). As mentioned above, the property tax is increasingly under fire as an institution (see *TIME,* "Trying to Change an Unfair Tax," 3 May 1971, pp. 81-82). State-supported university systems may not survive, once the cost and benefit implications of the system are more widely realized [see *REASON,* "Trends," April/May 1971]. Common carrier regulation appears destined for an early death ["Trends," this issue], and once exclusively government functions, such as postal service and police and fire protection, are in some case being supplied by private companies [*REASON,* "Trends," January 1971].

In light of the above, it may well be the case that the education model is far too pessimistic. The institutions which constitute the major impediment to laissez-faire are nowhere near so unshakeable as past history might seem to indicate, and the methods for spreading knowledge are becoming greater in quantity and quality than at any time in history. To a significant extent, therefore, the future may be what we are willing to make of it.

A NEW PROFESSION

Is it possible to predict the future? Can we indeed shape (or at least influence) the future? In response to the needs of companies and government for answers to these questions, a new profession is developing - *futurology* (or futurism or futures research). In both think tanks and and in long-range planning departments of major corporations, a new breed of large-scale-systems analysts is developing; they are not narrow operations research specialists (whose detailed mathematical models are useful in steady-state and short-term cases) but professional generalists, usually building on a background in physical science with broadly-based knowledge of economics, sociology, political theory, philosophy, etc. Within the last decade, a number of futures journals have started, along with an organization known as the World Future Society [see "Publisher's Notes," this issue].

Obviously, futurists cannot "foresee" the future, since people have volition and since "the future" consists of an immensely complex set of interactions. The purpose of futurology is not *prediction* so much as it is the *examination of possible alternative futures* and the attempt, through education and discourse, to influence the course of events that will lead to a desired future. (Of course, this is precisely what the libertarian movement, in its own value context, seeks to do.) Insight into the thinking of futurists can be gained by looking at some of the main goals listed for the World Future Society's First General Assembly, held last month in Washington, D.C.:

1) a wider recognition of the need for systematic evaluation of alternative futures in the major fields of human endeavor;
2) an assessment of priorities to determine which areas most urgently require such evaluation;
3) an introduction to the approaches and techniques for considering alternative futures at all levels of policy-making and the different lead-times for implementation;
4) an outline of the ways in which national and worldwide developments in the principal fields of human effort may affect our values, our society, and our institutions;
etc.

The major insights of futures researchers are that a vast number of *alternative* futures are possible, that any particular set of corporate and government decisions represents at least an *implicit* policy regarding the shape of the future, that it is possible by using specialized techniques and models to gain an insight into at least some of the consequences of various alternatives, and that future courses of of action should be chosen consciously (rather than by default) in line with achieving the most desirable future.

One of the most important developments in futurism is the recognition of the role of *values* in decision-making. The physical sciences have long been "value-free," values being (properly) considered a source of bias and non-objectivity. The social sciences, attempting to develop along analogous lines, also adopted the posture of *wertfreiheit,* not realizing that the nature of the subject matter (human beings with volitional consciousness and, therefore, the possibility of choice) *requires* the consideration of values as an integral part of its deliberations. To my knowledge, futurology is the first discipline to include values explicitly [see the review of *VALUES AND THE FUTURE* in this issue]. Once alternative future possibilities have been elucidated, by no means an easy task, they must be evaluated against a hierarchical value structure in order that optimal choices can be made.

The question which then arises - *which* value system to use - is of course extremely important. When the importance of values first became evident to futurists, the standard "values are arbitrary conventions" position was all that was available. Although modern philosophy's default on this question was unfortunate, it has not left futurists empty-handed. On the one hand, empirical studies and methods are being developed to measure values people hold and to point up value conflicts. One example is the Echo Method *(THE ECHO METHOD - TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION,* Report MST-1, General Research Corporation, Santa Barbara, Calif.93105), a free-response survey and analysis methodology developed by General Research Corporation. On the other hand, theoretically-minded futurists recognize the need for a *rational* value system and are investigating the literature and attempting to derive such values on their own. A major breakthrough may occur when the Objectivist ethical system is presented to the profession in a suitably operational form.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERTARIANS

The emergence of futurology as a profession and its impact on the intellectual community (e.g., through books such as *FUTURE SHOCK*) carry a number of implications for those intent on achieving a laissez-faire society in our lifetimes. The first group of implications concerns the impact of futurology on people's ways of thinking about social institutions and the future. As change becomes more and more all-encompassing and disquieting, people will look to futurologists for guidance. If the profession is successful in its intentions, it will be able to educate people to accept the idea of change as a normal aspect of life in a super-industrial society. People will be much more willing to question our "hallowed" institutions - the draft, Social Security, the IRS, public schools, etc. - and the whole vast federal bureaucracy - along with the institutions' conceptual underpinnings, majority rule, eminent domain, the "public interest," taxation, etc. To be sure, as our conservative friends will hasten to remind us, there are dangers in such readiness to question

and discard, but there is little that can be done to slow down or stop the fact of rapid, massive change. The only hope is to be prepared to meet the challenge with carefully thought-out, innovative, noncoercive replacements for the toppling institutions.

There are growing indications that futurology is actively looking for new models of the future - entirely new conceptual frameworks for social organization, such as that offered by libertarians. Toffler writes:

> Today as never before we need a multiplicity of visions, dreams, and prophecies - images of potential tomorrows. Before we can rationally decide which alternative pathways to choose, which cultural styles to pursue, we must first ascertain which are possible. Conjecture, speculation, and visionary view thus become as coldly practical a necessity as feet-on-the-floor "realism" was in an earlier time.

Thus, libertarian visions of societies without coercion, with radically decentralized limited governments or competing governments or no government at all need to be drawn out in detail and examined for pros and cons. Completely free markets in drugs, new concepts in sexual behavior and customs, new forms of corporations without benefit of limited liability, etc. should be defined and explored in depth. As Toffler points out, to cope with the challenge of the future, we need to develop *new* sorts of utopian visions about the whole of society, perhaps in "utopia factories" composed of interdisciplinary teams. Such teams could conceptualize, first in nonfiction description forms, and then in fictionalized, multimedia form, what such visionary societies could be like. And once reasonable future models are defined, Toffler suggests that groups of people be allowed to set up *enclaves* (intentional communities and/or companies) where the ideas could be tried out, independent of existing laws, customs, etc. Thus, with support from, perhaps, the Ford Foundation, and cooperation from enlightened government officials, it may well be possible to establish libertarian proprietary communities in the near future, to demonstrate the practicality of libertarian theory.

Before such opportunities come to pass, libertarians would do well to take cognizance of the other major implication of futurology, to wit: the fact that specific tools and methodologies now exist by means of which to analyze, predict, and influence the future. Libertarians should be learning these methodologies and putting them to use, both as long-range planning tools and as communications devices. As pointed out above, Toffler and other futurists are *looking* for large-scale comprehensive visions of alternative futures, not mere reforms but radically new *weltanschauungs.* Thus, to communicate effectively, libertarians need to master the futurists' language and techniques. A method such as *morphological analysis,* for example, provides a comprehensive, efficient way of making clear the alternative aspects of a particular field, in a nonemotionally-colored fashion which is well-suited for clear communicating. The use of such techniques could substantially increase the effectiveness of spreading libertarian ideas, not only among futurists but in the intellectual community in general.

For long-range planning purposes, libertarians should become familiar with such techniques as the *Delphi* method, developed originally at RAND Corporation and now used extensively in industry and government for compiling expert opinion on the likelihood of future events. At TRW Systems, several Delphi exercises have been used to generate both short- and long-term research and development goals (by working backwards from a desired future development to determine what prior research accomplishments are necessary). Interactive computer exercises using Delphi along with *cross-impact* techniques are being used to explore the dependencies between possible future events at the University of Illinois and the Institute for the Future. Such tools could be extremely valuable in planning strategy for social change and for involving others with libertarian ideas in a nonideological manner.

Finally, there is one simple technique which is not at all esoteric but which is quite useful in both planning and communicating. It is called *scenario writing* and first came to public attention through Herman Kahn's early writings. A futures scenario is nothing more than a logically consistent description of a possible course of events, much the same as a movie or television scenario is a description of the action to take place in a particular scene. Scenarios force one to consider all the implications of a particular development and integrate it with other events, environmental and psychological factors, etc. This can be very instructive, both for the scenario writers and for those who later read and react to the scenario. Thus, libertarians would do well to begin crystalizing their ideas in the form of scenarios, both to strengthen their case by identifying and removing inconsistencies and errors, and to begin exposing their ideas to public view. Science fiction, both short stories and novels, provides excellent thought-provoking scenario-building ideas (see box).

If Toffler is right, and foundations (and perhaps even the government) recognize the need to support futures research and the creation of fictional and artistic utopias, the day may not be far off when libertarians may be able to apply for and win grants to do the kinds of things they are doing today on their own meager funds. Futurists will begin to discuss and debate the libertarian world-view and to examine the rationality of libertarian values. In short, these developments, along with the technological and social changes discussed earlier, will go a long way toward changing the ground rules for the spread of ideas and the speed and direction of social change. The future we want may arrive sooner than we think. ●

book review

REVIEWED BY STAN ABRAHAM

Values and the Future: the Impact of Technological Change on American Values



(This article reviews the book VALUES AND THE FUTURE: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON AMERICAN VALUES, edited by Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher - New York: The Free Press, 1969, 527 pp.)

Here is a book with the boldness and courage not only to dissect and analyze values and value changes almost to the level of specificity necessary for scientific measurement but which, also, in a way that cannot avoid being value-laden attempts to forecast the effects on values of a wide ranging set of technological innovations to the year 2000. Does it succeed? One might in good conscience further ask: Is the study of values even susceptible to scientific analysis? And why indeed should one be motivated to *want* to study values scientifically? After all, as Theodore Roszak writes:

> The values of men are not to be measured or predicted but to be honestly debated, affirmed, and deeply lived, so that we may educate one another by mutual example. It is *this* that we owe one another as fellow citizens [1].

Does this book help to resolve this dilemma?

In the preface to the book (I am an inveterate preface-reader - especially with technical books, for they give one a necessary perspective), the editors are at pains to point out the purpose, scope, and limitations of the work. Unlike most anthologies or readers, this book is the result of a planned collaborative project codirected by the two editors, centered and held in the University of Pittsburgh's Department of Philosophy in 1965/66, and funded through grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the International Business Machines Corporation. Eminent philosophers and social scientists - particularly economists and sociologists - both resident and invited, gathered to participate in this highpowered conference to analyze and exchange ideas. This book represents the formalized outpourings of this period of collaborative effort.

"The most ambitious ultimate aim of the investigation," the editors write, "was to contribute toward the ways of guiding social change in directions which are at least not incompatible with the realization of our deepest values, and perhaps even helpful to it." To this reviewer, it would seem that in order to succeed in this ambitious undertaking, it would be necessary, at a minimum, to:

> understand the nature of value and value change;
>
> standardize the terminology to avoid the possibility of misunderstandings (a look at quotes from the literature points out the need for this);
>
> define the role played by values in causing social change;
>
> define the effects on values of social and technological change;
>
> understand the causal mechanisms of value change;
>
> identify and develop techniques and methodologies useful not only for carrying out the above but for forecasting, to the year 2000, the concomitant values at that time based on value conflicts and stresses now in evidence and on technological innovations and developments likely to occur in the intervening period.

The book, in fact, does address most of these points and is remarkably successful in its treatment of some of them. Characteristically, though, it raises many more questions than it answers.

In a well-written 30-page Introduction, Alvin Toffler [see discussion of his book *FUTURE SHOCK* elsewhere in this issue - Editor] does more than just introduce the book as a master of ceremonies might introduce his next guest. He proceeds to survey its entire contents in some detail and, at the end, to offer his own review of the work accomplished. Toffler concludes that the book amply demonstrates the sheer enormity of such an undertaking and the complexity of the problem; that to make any real progress, a wide variety of intellectual disciplines must be drawn into the work; and that futher research in the field (such as determining value "profiles" of a community or country or testing hypotheses) will be severely hampered if there is a lack of concrete empirical data. However, it is clear that he is sympathetic to the view, shared by project participants (and this reviewer), that the study of values *ought* to be undertaken, made explicit, objective, and "scientific," and that the results of such efforts ought to become mandatory inputs into resource allocation and policy decisions at the highest (federal government) levels.

Toffler, in line with this implied view, therefore predicts the creation and rise to prominence in the future of a new profession called "Value-Impact Forecasting," the practitioners of which no future corporation or government agency is going to be able to do without. Citing "democratic control over the technological future" as an implied ultimate objective, he says that

> value-impact forecasting could help make clear the nature of the moral choice being made each time a line of research is opened, a project funded, or an innovation released from the laboratory.

Such a group of forecasters "armed with scientific tools to review in advance all important technological decisions . . . will soon find themselves located at the hot center of decision-making." [See "Leverage Points for Social Change" in this issue.]

The editors (project codirectors) have divided the volume into three parts: Analysis, Interaction, and Control (the table of contents is reproduced for the benefit of the reader as an appendix to this article). In the first and most important part, a definitional and methodological framework for the study of value and value change is presented. The second and third parts consist of an assortment of papers written by some of the project participants and concern the interplay between technology and values and the the mechanisms of control through which values are, or might be, translated into programs. The papers are of varying quality, though they collectively add to the richness of the volume, according to Toffler through "the interstices, the asides, the premises and second thoughts they compel us to consider."

One which will appeal especially to libertarians is an essay by David Braybrooke called "Private Production of Public Goods." Braybrooke foresees a "manifold enlargement of the market for what economists call 'public goods', . . . /where/ market incentives would join with notions of community (or group) improvement to stimulate the invention of new collective goods." Two interesting passages are valuable to whet one's appetite:

> In the envisaged market, myriad levels and units of government would bargain with competing private firms for goods and services that under present arrangements tend to be produced by governments themselves if they are produced at all. For *laissez-faire* extremists, having private firms produce them rather than governments would be a step forward. The genuine concern for variety and freedom present in *laissez-faire* beliefs would be substantially met by the variety allowed for in the goods and services bought by different governments. Local governments could aim at different ways of life, and people might shift between localities according to personal tastes.
>
> A crucial feature of the envisaged development is that it does not leave everything for the government to plan and organize in the public sector: it would make private corporations engines of progressive public policy.

The serious reader, however, is compelled to derive testable hypotheses for himself from the material presented. It would have added to the volume if such hypotheses had been made explicit, even summarized, as indeed forty were in another valuable piece of research, done after this conference but published before the book [2]. Filling in a gap of the Pittsburgh effort, reference [2] presents a viable technique (the Echo Method) for surveying the values of a community or a group which the Pittsburgh researchers lacked but recognized the need for. It seems to offer the promise of a powerful tool which may come to replace existing techniques of value measurement such as content analysis of the mass media, popular fiction, and legislative materials and court decisions [3].

Studies into the nature of value are not new, as evidenced by the extensive 23-page "bibliographic introduction" at the end of the book. What *is* new is the attempt to include value considerations *explicitly* in long-range planning and resource allocation rather than implicitly relying on a particular (social democratic statist, collectivist, etc.) value system without ever acknowledging doing so. *This* is the book's central message and underscores its importance for libertarians and others who do *not* share the Establishment's value system. Perhaps radicals will soon have the chance to see *their* values applied to national problems.

The book is noteworthy for a number of the points it makes, particularly the following considerations.

It is unique in its future-orientation to the study of values. An interesting experiment, combining some relatively advanced techniques of role-playing simulation, for example, and Delphi forecasting which are clearly explained in the book, seeks to predict the effects on values of certain important technological developments thought likely to occur between now and the year 2000. These are:

1) Fertility control
2) 100-year life span
3) Personality-control drugs
4) Incapacitating rather than lethal weapons
5) Sophisticated teaching machines
6) Ocean farming
7) Controlled thermonuclear reactions
8) Continued automation in commerce and industry
9) Artificial life
10) Weather control
11) General immunization
12) Genetic control
13) Man-machine symbiosis
14) Household robots
15) Preservation of privacy
16) Wide-band communications systems
17) Continued space exploration
18) Advanced techniques of opinion control, thought manipulation, propaganda
19) Continued trend toward urbanization
20) Ova/sperm banks established

The experiment, or game, is actually an important contribution to the art of decision-making and a good example of a new trend - dialectical planning. This concept is actually not new but is undergoing a revival, having been first propounded in the fifth century BC by Heraclitus, who taught that no change was possible without conflict, a theme later picked up by Hegel [4] in his notion of thesis/antithesis/synthesis and more recently by Churchman [5] and Mason [6]. In the game, two groups of planners are instructed to allocate resources to the development of each of these technological advances (in order to accelerate such development) according to different value systems assigned to them. One group had as its objective the maximization of GNP, the other, the enhancement of human freedom. That the results were surprisingly similar is due in large part to the common value system unavoidably held by the participants, who were drawn from IBM, RAND, NSF, the Harvard Program on Technology and Society, etc. - quite a homogeneous intellectual group from a values point of reference. Another conclusion which might have been easily predicted was that among the groups of futures evaluators (people playing certain roles as if they were living in the year 2000), the presently least privileged groups - teenagers, the poor, the aged - opted for the freer world more than did the others - housewives, middleclass employed, the cultural elite.

These results are traceable to a variety of causes, such as the biases of the role players, the one-shot decision process (unrealistic), and the larger number of changes, technological or otherwise, which would affect resource allocation decisions. However, the criticism should more justifiably be leveled at the performance of the game rather than the principles on which it rests. As embryonic as these methods must seem to "hard" scientists, they do seem to offer some of the very few approaches available for dealing with this "inexact" science of human behavior and show immense promise of further methodological development. The entire account makes for fascinating reading and Theodore Gordon's analysis of some of the social implications of each of the technological developments is remarkable for its perception.

As an aside, I could not help drawing parallels with the real world while reading about the game. National policies are in effect and national priorities reflected in the budget (ask Senator William Proxmire) in spite of claims made to the contrary by the Administration. When contrasted with the value system cherished by libertarians, for example, the discrepancies are glaring. If you, the reader, were to play a game in which it would be possible to obtain the appropriate power and authority, where would *you* apply the national resources? (A fictional account of a future in which people could specify how their income tax be spent is given in [7].) Could you state why you settled on each choice? Can you identify the values which would cause you to behave in this way? Can you predict how ensuing developments will in turn affect your inclinations to make further changes? If such questions fascinate you, this book will surely stimulate you. Rather than feeding answers, however, it asks more questions and suggests ways in which, by learning more about the feedback relationships that make technology and values sensitive to each other, these questions may eventually be answered.

An important contribution has been made to establish a definitional base upon which further study in this field can build. In the opening essay, "What is Value? An Analysis of the Concept," Baier concentrates on his quest to define "value" precisely enough for measurement purposes, in line with the general aim of the whole project to make the study of values amenable to scientific analysis. Rather ponderously, he develops his points: that it should always be clear *whose* values we are talking about, that is, which person, group, or institution subscribes to them; what amount of the value is held; and by what criteria we have appraised them. Baier writes about a basic idea of value (whether ascribed to a thing or a person) having the capacity to confer a benefit on someone or of making a favorable difference in his life. The prime difficulty in value measurement and definition is the objective appraisal of this benefit or favorable difference. This is clearly brought out in his definition of a thing which makes a favorable difference in a person's life as one which, "whenever it plays a helpful causal role in bringing about a certain change in a person's life, makes that life more worthwhile *than it would otherwise have been.*" This is not a before-and-after the change comparison, but it is one where the situation resulting from the actual change is compared to what might have been but for the causal impact of the thing. The commonest things playing such causal roles are, of course, people, who by their very actions affect what they and others subsequently do. To drive home more completely the difficulty of measurement, Baier introduces the notion of *"potential* favorable changes, the results of which increase *our ability* to make favorable changes and differences, thereby increasing our ability to cater to those of our tastes we most want catered to."

Rescher extends this analysis in the book's second essay to value change and suggests that the economic theoretical approach of cost-benefit analysis is eminently suited for measuring value change. More accurately, it may be a method to measure the *propensity* for value change in the future. Rescher reasons as follows: If "x" is a value held by N, then it can be inferred that N is prepared to devote some of his resources (time, money, effort, discomfort) to its implementation. N does so *in the belief* that the increased realization of "x" will benefit certain individuals - either N himself or others to whose interest he is attached. Because, as Rescher goes on to say, authentic adherence to a value implies some commitment to the pursuit of its realization in terms of resources ("advocacy and verbal support at the very minimum"), the force which causes change is less an attack upon the value at issue than upon the holding of it (the level of commitment applied) by someone under specifiable conditions. This causal change can take the form of alternatives:

> an oversubscription to a value, where its holder either has an exaggerated perception of the benefits involved, thus increasing his "investment" in it, or he simply overinvests *per se;*
>
> an undersubscription to a value, with a reverse conception of the benefits and costs (investments) involved, causing the opposite kind of behavior.

Societal and group norms are good examples where such pressure for change (usually by the group toward the individual) is directed toward the person's perceptions of the benefits and investments involved in subscribing to a value rather than on the value itself. The techniques for actually performing such measurement are strangely absent from the essay - a fault with Baier's contribution too - and are undoubtedly left for future researchers to discover and implement.

Rescher is equally as bent on definition and classification as Baier (to the reader's gain, I might add), classifying types of value change (value acquisition, abandonment, redistribution, emphasis, deemphasis, rescaling, redeployment, restandardization, and implementation retargetting) and causal change factors. In very useful appendixes, he presents in turn a glossary of terms, an outline of a "tentative register of American Values," a list of possible developments to the year 2000 having major implications for American values, and some possibilities for future value change in America. In his conclusion, he ventures a list of values which will change as a result of being subjected to severe stresses and strains, as follows:

Upgrading

mankind-oriented values (humanitarianism, internationalism);

the intellectual virtues;

reasonableness and rationality;

the civic virtues;

group acceptance;

social welfare;

social accountability;

order;

public service;

esthetic values;

Downgrading

nation-oriented values (patriotism, chauvinism);

the domestic virtues;

responsibility and accountability;

independence (in all its senses);

self-reliance and self-sufficiency;

individualism;

self-advancement;

economic security;

property rights (and personal liberty generally);

progressivism (faith in progress);

optimism (confidence in man's ability to solve man's problems).

Concerned libertarians will note with some dismay the prediction that social accountability might be upgraded and that individualism, property rights, and personal liberty generally might be downgraded. It is an interesting list and merits reflection. It was compiled from results of a questionnaire (reproduced in full in the book), another technique which, given time, will improve to yield more reliable results.

Finally, this book *emphasizes the need for a scientific study of values.* If it is acknowledged that our desire to subscribe to certain values is the causal factor in our behavior and a fundamental factor in our motivations, then an intensive examination of values is essential for effective planning (deciding *what* we do next, either individually or as a group, or institution, or nation, and *why).* The book does not tell us what our values are going to be or, for that matter, what they are now. It attempts to show what they might be as a result of using certain methods and by considering certain technological developments. As the Preface says:

> It is no exaggeration to say that we do not have available even a terminology in which to record an individual's or group's values, let alone precise instruments for ascertaining what they are or what changes they are undergoing. And we are in a worse position with regard to determining the soundness of values.

The book has the flavor throughout of advocating a *normative* mode of forecasting rather than a *deterministic* or *extrapolative* mode. Its power lies in the fact that its central message is that *if we want to* (this itself is expressing a value, proving how impossible it is to write or to think objectively about values, although by making them explicit, as this book encourages, constructive debate can follow), it is possible for us *to intervene and to change* the course of events in ways which, as well as we can determine at the present, improve the excellence or intrinsic worth of our own lives or the lives of others. Because the rate of social and especially technological change is accelerating [8], it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine the effects of such changes on the quality of life and on human values. (Another technique, to note in passing, which focuses on unraveling the mysteries of behavior of complex systems through time and showing how counterintuitively they function is Industrial Dynamics. A recent article relates values and quality of life to other major world problems, demonstrating how it is possible, by taking action now, to influence in positive ways our future [9].)

Many people don't realize it, but by *not* making certain decisions now (for example, by postponing them) the decision is nonetheless implicitly made to carry on as we are. Future values and technological advances will be molded and guided nevertheless as a result of the momentum of present trends which are allowed to continue unabated. Toffler's idea of "Value-Impact Forecasters," were it to cover forecasting the impacts on values for all manner of subgroups in society and not just for the intellectual elite, would be a viable mechanism to ensure that not only are values included explicitly in decision-making but that more of the right kinds of decisions are made.

This book, it seems to me, might appeal most to the thinking professional and decision-maker. In private industry, this might be an executive in Research and Development, newproduct planning, marketing, and at the highest level, in long-range planning, and in government, those responsible for national policy (if one could only pin down that responsibility), for resource allocation, and for spending a large portion of public monies on research and action programs. Mind you, the book does not tell one precisely *how* to arrive at one's own value "set," nor how to evaluate or appraise it, nor indeed how to incorporate this knowledge into a strategic decision to improve it. So there would be no way for these people to go out and *apply* what they got out of the book to their everyday concerns. If this is the expectation a reader brings with him when he comes to the book, he will be disappointed. Instead the reader will find himself more *aware* of the need to consider values explicitly *somehow* in what he does, whether the decision has national implications or is of concern to only one other person, and that values are susceptible to change by a wide variety of stimuli. For these reasons, the book will also appeal to the thinking layman. I use the adjective "thinking" purposely, because the book is useful only to the extent that the reader "makes something of it" and can appreciate the *potential* in the results more than the results themselves. To all those concerned with social change and its implication, I recommend it.

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8) Toffler, Alvin *FUTURE SHOCK* (New York: Random House, 1970).

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APPENDIX

Table of Contents

SCIENCE FICTION SCENARIOS

In addition to being entertaining, many science fiction novels and short stories provide thought-provoking examples of *future scenarios* - well thought-out, consistent explorations of social and/or technological developments and their effects on a society. Some representative examples are listed below:

A society in which defense and protection are exclusively provided by private companies (they are considered too important to trust to government bureaucracies) is a background feature of "The Moonrakers" by Poul Anderson, featured in the collection *BEYOND THE BEYOND* (New York: New American Library, Signet paperback, 1969).

A variety of antibureaucratic, laissez-faire societies are visited by a government mission in Eric Frank Russell's satirical classic *THE GREAT EXPLOSION* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1962).

The implications of various biomedical developments are explored in two Robert Heinlein novels. The radical effects of cryogenic hibernation on social institutions are explored in *THE DOOR INTO SUMMER* (New York: New American Library, Signet paperback, 1959), and the development of longevity among a small minority of humans is the theme of *METHUSELAH'S CHILDREN* (New York: New American Library, Signet paperback, 1960).

The ramifications of colonizing the seabed - political, economic, and social - are considered in *THE DEEP RANGE* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957) by Arthur C. Clarke (of *2001* fame).

A society in which children have legal rights, including the right to "divorce" their parents, is the backdrop of *THE STAR BEAST,* an early Heinlein novel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954).

Coexisting, competing social systems (selected for short periods in separate communities by vote) are examined in Chad Oliver's "The Mother of Necessity," included in his book *ANOTHER KIND* (New York: Ballantine Books, paperback, 1955).

A functioning anarchist society, a corporate form of group marriage, and a successful libertarian revolution on the Moon are featured in Heinlein's *THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Berkeley paperback, 1968).

An elite group of philosophers and scientists sets up a research project for a galaxy-spanning project to change the course of history in Isaac Asimov's classic trilogy *FOUNDATION, FOUNDATION AND EMPIRE,* and *SECOND FOUNDATION* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1967).

A galaxy-wide police force secretly forbidden to kill any intelligent creature is the subject of a series of Poul Anderson short stories, including "The Live Coward" in *ANOTHER PART OF THE GALAXY* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., paperback, 1966) and "Enough Rope" in *FOUR FOR THE FUTURE* (New York: Pyramid Books, paperback, 1959).

trends

This column reports significant events, publications, and analytical findings associated with the growing rejection of corporate liberalism and the concurrent rediscovery of laissez-faire principles. By reporting and publicizing such items, the REASON community can help ensure that they do indeed represent trends, not merely isolated instances. Readers are invited to submit material for this column.

PAY AS YOU EARN

In the special issue on education *(REASON,* April/May 1971) Christopher Jencks raised the question of how most students would ever afford college if the taxpayers did not provide the funds. Many critics charge that, despite free-market rhetoric, lending institutions would just not risk the funds to finance most students' educations: moreover, corporation grants in exchange for work commitments are generally considered unwieldy and inflexible, therefore unlikely. Now, however, a proposal is being tested that points the way toward a radical restructuring of higher education funding which could eliminate the conventional justification for taxpayer support.

The plan is called PAY AS YOU EARN (PAYE) and was first proposed ten years ago by Dr. Milton Friedman. It rests, essentially, on two principles: (1) that the fundamental responsibility for paying for college-level education should rest with the customer (the student) and (2) that education should be priced at a level that fully covers the cost of the service provided ("full-cost pricing"), rather than being subsidized by foundations, research grants, or taxpayers in general. Basically the plan calls for a college or group of colleges to raise tuition to the full-cost level and set up a massive loan plan available to (and needed by) most of the students. The unique feature of the the plan is that repayment of the loans would be during a very long time period (30 to 35 years), based on a small fraction (e.g., 0.4%) of the student's annual salary. Thus, those who benefited most monetarily from their education would pay back the most, often more than its original cost, while those who benefited less (monetarily, of course) would pay less.

The potential of higher than usual repayments for long periods of time would attract investors, while the relatively low annual repayment cost would attract students. Such a plan could put to rest the notion that "everybody" should pay for universities because "everybody" benefits. It would make explicit the benefits received and relate payments directly to the most readily available measure of those benefits - the student's income.

After Friedman proposed the concept it lay dormant for a number of years until it was picked up several years ago by Professor Jerrold Zacharias of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Ford Foundation. In 1967 a Zacharias-led study panel offered the plan to the Johnson Administration, only to run into extensive flak from state-supported schools, raising the old "everybody-benefits-from-education-so-everybody-should-pay" line. It has only been within the past year, as universities began experiencing their most severe financial crises, that the plan has begun to get a serious hearing. Planners at Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and other prestigious schools began discussing PAYE with the Ford Foundation last fall, and in February Yale became the first school to adopt the plan.

Under Yale's "Tuition Postponement Option" (accompanied by a $350 increase in tuition), students may receive a full loan for their tuition and expenses, with 35 years to repay, at 0.4% of their annual postgraduate income. In March, Duke University became the second U.S. university to adopt PAYE, with a plan based on repayment of 0.3% of students' incomes for 30 years.

The progress of Yale and Duke's experiments with PAYE will be closely watched by other colleges, since a Carnegie Commission study reports that over two-thirds of all colleges are on the brink of financial chaos (Yale's 1970 deficit was $2 million). Vernon Jordan, president of the United Negro College Fund endorses the plan, pointing out that "It's the student who gets the benefit of the education, so the burden should be on him and not on the family who doesn't have the money to begin with." Or, one might add, the taxpayers, who don't either.

PAY AS YOU EARN could well signal the death of tax-financed universities and thereby the beginning of the separation of Education and State that educational reformers Ivan Illich and John Holt have been calling for.

SOURCES:

"School Loan Plan Studied by Foundation," *LOS ANGELES TIMES/WASHINGTON POST* wire, 10 January 1971.

"Going to Yale on a 35-Year Loan," *BUSINESS WEEK,* 13 February 1971, p. 32.

"Learn Now, Pay Later," *TIME,* 1 February 1971, p. 57.

"Duke Defers Tuition," *CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS,* 22 March 1971, p. 45.

DEREGULATING TRANSPORTATION

> For generations the Interstate Commerce Commission has operated as a shield, protecting and preserving economic groups from the discipline of the marketplace . . . The ICC found itself surrounded by a special interest constituency that viewed the agency as an opportunity for protection from competition and for insulation from consumer demands . . . Long before it became a pattern of our political economy, the ICC and the transport industries forged a corporate state that utilized public power for private pursuits.

Thus did Ralph Nader characterize the ICC in the introduction to the 1970 "Nader Report" on the infamous agency. Since then it has become increasingly

difficult for officials in Washington to defend the ICC and to a lesser extent the CAB and similar regulatory bodies.

Early in 1970 the Council of Economic Advisors took the lead in raising the deregulation trial balloon. In its Annual Economic Report, the CEA stated flatly:

> The original justification for regulation - that railroads were monopolistic - has lost much of its validity since there is now considerable competition from other modes of transportation . . . A policy of permitting and encouraging competition of all kinds would, if general economic experience is any guide, make the industry more efficient as well as benefit the public.

Following CEA's lead, and spurred on by the Office of Management and Budget, the Transportation Department began "cranking CEA reports into [their] thinking." The ultimate goal is to end regulation of all air, land, and water transportation, but the first major step will be limited to land and water - the domain of the ICC. The odds appear good that the ICC will be abolished within the next several years.

Deregulating *part* of a thoroughly regulated mixed-economy is not particularly easy, although it *can* be done, as the Canadian example demonstrated *(REASON,* "Trends," March 1971). U.S. railroads are expected to favor abolition of the ICC because, despite the protection they receive from it, they are harmed more by the protection it gives to trucking and waterway companies. The latter industries are among the most thoroughly protected of all U.S. industries: trucks operating on federally-built superhighways, with strong ICC-imposed barriers to free entry; and barges operating on waterways maintained at taxpayer expense by the Army Corps of Engineers. Both are determined to see the ICC's current rules restricting rail operations continue in force and will fight any moves toward deregulation.

Because of the political realities associated with such interdependencies, deregulation will probably have to be gradual. Rate deregulation would probably come last in a series of steps starting with removal of legally-imposed entry barriers, especially in trucking. A good bet is that such phased deregulation could involve tradeoffs among different modes, removing a restriction on one, while compensating a competing mode by removing a restriction on it. (Given the number of restrictions, the number of such possibilities will be limited only by bureaucratic imagination.) One example, already proposed, would let railroads lower prices to compete with waterway competition, while simultaneously allowing barge operators to mix regulated and nonregulated cargoes in the same shipment.

SOURCES:

"White House Eyes Deregulation Route," *BUSINESS WEEK,* 21 November 1970.

"Washington Report," *PRODUCT ENGINEERING,* 7 December 1970.

on securing liberty

tibor machan

Those who have spent some time defending a free society against opponents and skeptics must not underestimate the difficulty of their task. Liberty is not a self-evident value to everyone. While we might want people to grasp the worth of political freedom, the absence of coercion, and the numerous implications of these *without* difficulty, in fact the understanding of political and economic theory takes effort.

Yet, as a number of libertarian theorists have observed, it is not always profitable and advisable to concentrate on gaining converts. Opponents of freedom are rarely if ever simply ignorant. To fail to realize this would be to believe that evil in the world is accidental. Very often those who oppose liberty are doing so because they *evade* their responsibility of thinking through the implications of what they know about human beings. It is no secret that free men work harder than slaves. It is not hidden from us that a climate of relative freedom in the United States produces, through the activities of relatively free people, a life for most citizens which, all things considered, is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the lives of most people outside our borders. Neither is it difficult to see that increasing intervention in the private economic, moral, and intellectual lives of the citizens of the U.S. by their government is leading toward overall worsening conditions throughout the culture. Thus, the failure to draw the implications in favor of freedom and in opposition to slavery cannot be due entirely to innocent ignorance.

Yet opposition to freedom will frequently be presented in the form of eloquent and sophisticated objections and questions. The minds of those who fear self-responsibility are not impaired; they are not naturally inferior creatures. Those who embark upon the control of their fellows' lives have every bit the intellectual capacity of those who recognize that human freedom is of the utmost worth. Underestimating the capacities of one's intellectual and political adversaries is, therefore, no less consequential than expecting to succeed in baseball or golf by believing that one's oppoent is (physically) inferior.

I have always preferred treating opponents to liberty as if their objections and questions were motivated by ignorance alone. This is often time consuming, admittedly; on those occasions one must be judicious and decide thoughtfully when the evidence shows that the opposition is not *really* for lack of full understanding, agreement, or knowledge. Having decided this, it is often advisable to depart. (Needless to say, as someone who who is both intellectually and, consequently, morally committed to political liberty, I can understand that the urge to "score points" against stubborn adversaries is powerful. To forego leaving the impression on an opponent of liberty that one has *won* is difficult but often necessary.)

For example, in defense of military conscription, zoning, or other coercive activities of government, some socialists have claimed that, since we are economically interdependent, we have obligations to "society" which we have not assumed voluntarily. Not long ago, the British government drew the logical conclusion from this and instituted measures against scientists who wanted to

POEMS BY WENDY MC ELROY

RUNNING

I must run through life,
Midnight to dawn,
For I've worlds to seize and conquer.
I've someplace to go
and someone to love,
With tears and touches and laughter.
I'm Young!
I don't want tastes of life,
I want to eat it raw.
I want to swim through flowing fields
down slopes and then to fall
breathless to grass,
breathless to laugh
Yet laughing 'til it pains.
And then to smile
to see your face and the laughter start again.
For I'm free and dizzy -
In love with myself,
A lifetime's love affair
Of meadows and music
And wind running wild,
Wild and lost through my hair.

UGLY WHEN SEEN

What does it matter
Truth or lies!
The world demands illusion,
demands a God with Xmas bells
So little people
In little hells
Can smile and pretend to live.

Dear sweet liar,
Dear innocent fraud,
Commiting suicide with every word . . .
Do you still watch the eagle soar,
Or do you turn your eyes away?
You
Whose life is twisting by
Like a snake through tall grass,
usually unnoticed,
ugly when seen.

---

participate in the "brain drain." The government and its defenders argued that these scientists had no right to leave the country since their skills and existence hinged on what their "society" had done for them. Apparently, few of these people considered that Communist Hungary and the other countries of the Soviet bloc use the same argument to justify the shooting down of people who attempt to leave without the explicit permission of the government.

When defenders of liberty object to increasing demands of government upon the lives, incomes, and properties of American citizens, the response based on social indebtedness seems, at first, innocent. Since not many people understand the difference between *economic* interdependence, based on the fact of a well developed division of labor, and *social* dependence, based on certain confused theories concerning what each man owes to "society," the presumption of innocence is justified. Yet, often it becomes evident that this argument, as many others, serves a desperate effort to concoct yet another rationalization for many people's tolerance of the absence of political and economic freedom. Clearly, interdependence means that each economically active member of society contributes a great deal to the well being and derives much benefit from the productive activities of others. The process may be summed up as the widespread trading of values. It is not accurately characterized when viewed as an instance of dependence analogous to the dependence of a child on its parent or a patient upon his nurse. The picture is captured better by employing the model of the choir where, in order to produce the desired result, a beautiful sound, each each member adds his or her effort. But, if one decides not to contribute, he is also willing to forego the benefits. No onesided dependence or duty enters the picture.

Yet, after theoretical discussions, many historical examples of the use of such arguments to excuse atrocities, and numerous helpful analogies, many defenders of coercion still insist on the claim that the individual owes his life to the collective under the direction of the mighty state. Under such circumstances the patience that we, as advocates, owe to people who desire honest communication is *not* warranted.

Each human being has, I believe, the responsibility to take certain steps to secure for himself optimal political and legal conditions and to the best of his capacity, therefore, to understand such matters. Thus learning about and discussing politics is not a mere parlorgame but a genuine human need. Hard times - when liberty is in danger - warrant, I think, extra attention to man's political needs. The considered and courteous advocacy of liberty is, under such circumstances, our moral responsibility (to the best of our ability and judgment).

But as with everything else, the free market should give us the guideline to how we can best profit in communication. The dogmatism of those who refuse to recognize the moral worth of political freedom may at times be so entrenched that one can fulfill his self-responsibility of promoting the free society by leaving certain people alone; even at the risk of being considered less than charitable by them. ●

FED UP WITH ROCK

jim wilson

Fifteen years ago rock was not taken very seriously. It was considered preadolescent music and when people talked about "serious music" it was understood that they were not talking about rock. Today all that has changed. Rock is omnipresent and is taken very, very seriously. Adults approach you shouting, "Have you heard the latest by the 'Mentally Retarded?' " whose latest generally is their first and last. Books are written on the history of rock and on its great significance for Our Time (always capitalized). Rock artists like Dylan and The Beatles are considered the great artists of our era. It is the purpose of this essay to put rock into a proper musical perspective.

First off I must emphasize that I am considering rock from a *musical* perspective. It is necessary to state this because I am often confused by rock aficianados who tell me they absolutely adore such and such a group and yet when pressed they admit they cannot remember any of the group's music. This split also shows up in many reviews of rock music I have read, where the reviewer will quote a passage from a song in order to show the reader how good or bad the song is. The reviewer has, however, said nothing about the song but has shown the reader the quality of the poetry that has been set to music.

This split between words and music in rock is not a trivial point. It does not, to my knowledge, occur in other musical genres. (For example, when Samuel Barber's opera "Cleopatra" was premiered a few years ago, I don't recall a single review pro or con divorcing the words from from the music.) I think this split points to an important deficiency in rock, that deficiency being the frequent inability of the rock artist to integrate the subject matter of the words with the emotional projections of the music.

An example will clarify what I mean. I once listened to the Tom Jones show. At the end of the program there is an approximately ten-minute segment when Jones does nothing but sing. On this night he sang one of his top hits called "Delilah." The song is about a man whose woman betrays him for another man. The first man ends the story of the song by stabbing and killing Delilah. Pretty sordid stuff; and, yet, the music has one of the gayest tunes I've heard from rock. Tom Jones while signing the song was dancing around the stage, just having a jolly old time. At the point in the song where the man stabs Delilah, Jones was smiling and dancing as if he was tip-toeing through the tulips. The effect was ludicrous.

Another reason it is important to point out this split between words and music in in rock is that it shows us the basic amateurishness of rock music. For instance, continental European rock stars have made no headway on the U.S. market as long as they sing only a foreign language. Why? Because if the listener cannot understand the words, he must then focus on the music and *in rock the music just isn't worth all that effort.* Yes, I know that English speaking rock groups make frequent tours of continental Europe, but one must remember that an awful lot of continental Europeans speak English. Also, ask yourself how many continental European rock groups you can name, groups who only sing non-English, have ever had tours in the U.S., and of those how many lasted any length of time? To emphasize my point I would ask rock fans if they would listen to Dylan if he sang only in Italian.

Now, in the serious music genre, the fact that an opera is in a foreign language is no hindrance to its distribution. The only exception to this is if the opera is written in an obscure language which the singers don't know how to pronounce. In that case a translation is usually effected (but not necessarily in the singer's native tongue). In fact, most opera lovers I've talked to prefer to listen to opera in a language they don't understand so that they can concentrate on the music.

There is another reason why some people like rock and once again it has nothing to do with rock as music. This reason can best be put under the term sentimentality or the "they're playing our song" syndrome. Adolescence is a turbulent age and it is during adolescence that most people start listening to popular music. Hopefully many pleasant memories are formed during adolescence. Frequently popular music is involved at important points in the young man or woman's social development (for example, at a dance or in a parked car with the radio turned on). Thus the popular music of one's adolescence tends to take on a special significance but the significance is *extra*-musical. This explains the curious phenomemon of most adults fixating on the music of their adolescence and never listening to contemporary pop music. It also explains the utter inability of adults to explain why they dislike present pop music. It isn't really the music they detest; it's the realization that their adolescence is past, that they are now considered old, and what they cherish is now considered passé.

It is pertinent at this point to note that serious music is not afflicted with this problem. People are still listening to Bach with avid interest; and father and son can and frequently do attend a concert of classical music with both generations enjoying it.

As far as the music of rock is concerned, it is totally unoriginal and secondhand. The bass lines and progressions show almost no variation between artists and consist almost entirely of I-II-IV-V-I. The form of rock music is deadeningly repetitious. I have heard songs by Dylan that last 12 minutes where the same passage is repeated from beginning to end, without the slightest variation, almost 15 times! There are songs by the Doors in which the bass line stays exactly the same for a full ten minutes.

The repetitiousness of rock's form demonstrates, once again, rock's inability to coordinate words and music. (This coordination is unnecessary in the case of artists like Dylan since the words of most of his songs are meaningless.) Because rock's form consists of repeating the same music with different words as the

song "progresses," rock music cannot express the subtle nuances of the words it is singing. The words are forced into a preexisting mold. The rock world has never heard that "form *follows* function."

This means that there is only one way left for rock music to indicate the climactic moment of the song - to get louder. (This assumes that there *is* a climactic moment; many rock songs don't even have that much.) Rock music can get very very very very loud. So loud, in fact, that it can permanently damage a person's ears. "Yes, it is true that rock music is loud and achieves its climaxes by getting louder," says the rock fan, "but isn't it true that at the climactic moments of the works of Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, and other romantic composers the music gets louder?" Yes, that is true; but the loud climaxes of Beethoven or Tchaikovsky are *integrated* climaxes, that is to say the climactic moment of a movement isn't *just* the loudest place (many times it isn't), it is the place where rhythmic, melodic, and other developmental considerations reach their culmination point. Because rock lacks any development its loudness is merely bombast.

There is a new argument being offered in favor of rock music which deserves special attention. [See comments on rock in *REASON,* "Editor's Notes," December 1969.] The argument is that rock music has grown out of its adolescence and that it is now "incorporating" various elements from the classical or serious stream in order to achieve a marvelous new "synthesis" of pop, jazz, and classical elements. Actually this constitutes the best argument I've heard *against* rock for it points to rock's fundamentally parasitic nature.

There is nothing new in this argument except the source of rock's "borrowings." Consider the names of the subclassifications of rock music. There is folk-rock, meaning rock that is based on old folk music; there is hard-rock, meaning rock that is based on blues; and there is raga-rock, meaning rock that bases its music on the classical music of India. Acid-rock is rock that borrows from the borrowers. I think the main reason rock groups have started "borrowing" from the serious stream is that there is no place else left for them to steal from. But, despite the hopes of many reviewers, rock's borrowings of classical elements does nothing to raise the level of rock, it merely debases the borrowed elements.

Peter Millward in a letter published in *REASON* (March/April 1970) points out that there are only three ways in which this borrowing can take place:

1) to take a melody from one source and harmonize and/or orchestrate it differently for another set of instruments;
2) borrow certain orchestration styles which belong uniquely to one composer and adapt them to a melody of one's own choosing;
3) imitate the dynamics of a composer's harmony - in other words, to fragment an artwork . . . and reassemble the parts into something of one's own whim . . . It is self-defeating to fragment complete works of music, because doing so distorts some element of the composer's idea by dropping its context.

Lanny Friedlander, writing for *REASON,* in substantial agreement with Mr. Millward, wrote:

> There is no particular reason why one should treat musical techniques any differently from any other kind of data. The fact that a scientist developed a certain lab technique to accomplish a certain goal doesn't mean that you can't use that technique in a totally different context.

Yes, of course, I agree. For example, Beethoven's modulatory techniques of his late string quartets were used by Wagner in opera, Bruckner in symphony, and Wolf in song.

But it is precisely techniques that rock music does not borrow. The difference between techniques and private ideas is crucial. For example, Elliott Carter's technique of modulation is a *discovery* of the way in which certain rhythms relate to each other. It is permissible to use someone else's *discovery.* A melody is not a discovery but a *creation,* a private idea expressed in musical form. It is *not* permissible to steal a melody. The relationship between the private ideas of a composer (e.g., melody) and techniques is the same as the relationship between a writer's discoveries and the characters in a fiction work he uses to express them.

At this point a rock fan is likely to note that serious composers borrow a lot of private ideas from each other. True. But, composers, at least since Beethoven, have been extremely careful to designate from whom they were borrowing. The composer usually states this in the title, e.g., "Variations on a Theme by Diabelli" or "Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini." The title renders onto one composer the melody and to the other composer everything else. Also note that Bartok once wrote to Henry Cowell asking Cowell for permission to use tone clusters, a unique device Cowell had developed, in a piano piece Bartok was writing. Composers are very aware of the difference between techniques and original private ideas.

Rock groups evidently are not aware of the difference. These rock groups steal a private idea of a serious composer and pervert it by putting it into a different, lower, context for which the idea was *not* designed. Examples:

> The rock version of Tchaikovsky's "Swan Lake," probably the most hideous piece of music I've heard.
>
> The Bosa Nova version of "Scarborough Fair," an old English ballad, by Brazil 66.
>
> The Swingle Singer's Bach.
>
> The pop song based on a variation from Rachmaninoff's "Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini."
>
> The Electric Prunes who, after finishing their "mass," were planning to do a rock version of "Madame Butterfly." This project was fortunately never completed.

The list could go on and on and on.

This is what is passed off as rock acquiring classical elements. What it is, in fact, is just plain old plagerism, that is to say - stealing.

But over and above rock's parasitism, beyond its stuntingly repetitious form and total lack of melodic invention, there is a basic flaw in rock. A flaw so central to rock as to be its defining characteristic, for if it were to get rid of this flaw it would no longer be rock. That flaw is the total lack in any kind of rock (soft, hard, folk, acid, raga, etc.) of development or variation. There is no

working out of melodic material (even on the rare occasions when the melodic material would be worth the trouble). There is no structural extrapolation. I have heard more development in the shortest piece of lute music of the Elizabethan Age than in the longest piece of of rock music I've listened to.

Is development necessary for a piece of music to be *good?* It is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Why? Because development or variation is a mind stimulating process. Too much repetition is mind deadening. In the good or better piece of music there is a careful balancing of repetition and variation. The object is to have just enough repetition to enable the listener to know where the variations come from without making the repetitions too obvious or boring.

Rock, because of its lack of variation and/or development, is mind deadening. With the vast majority of rock, you listen to the song once and you've got it. All of it. Rock's juvenile simplicity makes it impossible for the mind to flex its mental muscles while listening - so it atrophies. This explains why rock songs are so incredibly short-lived. Since a person can grasp the totality of a rock song in a single hearing, there is no incentive for the listener to hear the piece again. Too many more hearings make the song tedious.

The atrophying effect of rock also explains why the drug-dazed and the hippies find rock so appealing. Both of these groups are hysterically antimind and antiintellectual; and it is perfectly logical that they would listen to music that deadens the mind. And is it only accidental that those mass gatherings of irrationality at Woodstock (where people would have starved if food hadn't been *brought to them* and disease would have sickened them is doctors hadn't been flown there in emergency helicopters) and Altamont (where people drowned in puddles and were stabbed to death) were rock "festivals"?

Serious music is not afflicted with the problem of its music becoming a bore over time. Serious music *is* music that has the qualities of development and variation. That is what people mean when they say "serious music," although most have not identified it as such consciously. Because serious music has these qualities, it preserves its interest as long as there are men who care to think. People still listen to Machaut, Monteverdi, Schutz, J.S. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Bruckner, and Bartok. And not only do they still listen to these composers,but serious music lovers can and do listen to the same piece over and over without the slightest trace of boredom. I must have listened to Bartok's fourth string quartet at least fifty times and it is still as fresh and exciting as the day I first heard it.

It is necessary, here, to discuss a peculiar double standard that exists in the field of esthetic evaluation. The dichotomy is between music and every other art form. People usually realize that great literature requires immense concentration in order to understand what an author is saying. One does not read *CRIME AND PUNISHMENT* with the same (passive) attention as Dr. Seuss. Great paintings commonly contain that attribute which people often designate by saying "it grows on you." This means that as one looks at the painting many times, different aspects of the artist's intention fall into place, that the totality is not immediately perceivable.

For some reason people seem to think that the art of music shouldn't require the same concentration - that you are some kind of freak if you listen to a Bach organ fugue with the same undivided attention that one uses in reading a complicated novel, solving a complicated equation, or reading philosophy.

Many people seem to resent the fact that you may have to listen to a piece of music many times before it (finally, fully) makes sense; and yet the same resentment does not seem to intrude when dealing with literature. I, for one, am very disappointed if a piece of music has exhausted its content in a single hearing.

If the serious music lover tries to explain that serious music *really is better* than rock, he is met with a multitude of exclamations. The most frequent one I hear is, "You can't say that! The two genres are for different purposes. /They sure are . . ./ Rock is just as valid on its level as serious music." There is a grain of truth in the statement, although not the one intended. Rock *is* as valid on its level as serious music is on its; I hold, however, it's just that rock's level is at best the nursery school and at worst the gutter, while the level of serious music is the mountaintop, the moon, and the stars beyond.

Then why has rock become so popular, even among serious musicians? For example, Leonard Bernstein and Zubin Mehta both take rock seriously. The reason becomes quite clear when you look at what twentieth century composers are offering as music. If you place rock music next to the incomprehensible twitchings of the serialists or the irrelevant babblings of John Cage and his chance school, then, yes indeed rock is by far the better music. But that only indicates how low the art of composition has fallen in the twentieth century; it says nothing about the quality of rock. A third group of composers, e.g., Ned Rorem, William Schuman, Samuel Barber, David Diamond, etc., has resisted all these trends and still writes lyric mysic, some of which is quite beautiful. In discussions of twentieth century music, these composers are generally put down as "old fashioned," and they are the least played of the main schools of this century's music. If one compares rock to the music of these composers, then rock is put back into its proper perspective.

At this point someone is bound to ask whether I think one should *ever* listen to rock. Sure, it's fine as an occasional diversion. Just as an adult may enjoy a few quiet reminiscences over a nursery rhyme, one can also have a brief respite by listening to rock. But one would wonder about an adult who read nothing but nursery rhymes and I wonder similarly about people who listen to nothing but rock. Also, what one is listening to in a rock song is often the words and some, a few, rock songs do contain pro-life messages. But I respectuflly request that people who "dig" a rock group's poetry not cloud the issue by telling me how good rock *music* is. The issues are quite distinct and separate.

Let's stop this prattling about the Great Significance of Rock and take rock for what it is. Rock is a sociological, not a musical, phenomenon. It is the background noise for the various love-ins, group-ins, festivals, etc. where one goes to blow one's mind, not to use it or to expand its capabilities. At its best, rock provides elementary rhythmic accompaniment to poetry. Serious music is in enough trouble without people being sidetracked by the trivial escapades of nonentities. Let's start getting serious about music. ●

publisher's notes

REASON editor Tibor Machan attended the First General Assembly of the World Future Society, May 12 through 15 in Washington, D.C. Professor Machan presented a paper on the differences between utopian thinking and libertarianism at an evening session dealing with "Futures from Utopias," Other speakers taking part in the discussions were Issac Asimov, Richard Allen, Kenneth Cauthen, William Gay, and Craig Lundberg. Professor Machan distributed a number of copies of *REASON* to the assembled futurists. Speakers and participants included Herman Kahn, Arthur C. Clarke, John McHale, Robert Theobald, Harvey Cox, Robert Ayres, Carl Madden, Theodore Gordon, and Norman Dalkey.

Several recent items should be of interest to regular *REASON* readers. A subscriber has brought to our attention a 12 April front page article in the *WALL STREET JOURNAL* entitled "Natural Gas Shortage Is Likely to Continue Despite Rising Prices." The article covered many of the same points brought out in Robert Poole, Jr's "Power Crisis" article in the February issue of *REASON*. And, also, readers who were incensed by the federal government's ill-conceived plan to force the installation of air bags in all passenger cars, as reported in Brock Yates' "Is Inflation Good for You?" in the March issue of *REASON*, can breathe easier. *PRODUCT ENGINEERING* for 29 March reported that work on air bags will be shelved. Auto manufacturers will still be forced to install protective devices, but these will now be limited to improved padding (which at least can't discharge accidentally in your face).

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ERRATA

The following notes were inadvertently omitted from the April/May issue of *REASON*.

"Deschooling Society" by John Holt was originally presented in February 1971 as a talk at Harvard University.

"The Case Against Vouchers" is available in pamphlet form from the Center for Independent Education, Wichita, Kansas 67206, under the title "Another Look at Education Vouchers." The author, George Pearson, is Director of the Center.

FUTUROLOGY BIBLIOGRAPHY

A good introduction to the institutions, individuals, and methodologies involved in futures research can be found in the article "Inside the Future" by Stephen Rosen in *INNOVATION*, No. 18, February 1971. For more detail and depth, the following journals and books are recommended.

JOURNALS

THE FUTURIST, c/o World Future Society, PO Box 19285, 20th Street Station, Washington, D.C. 20036, $7.50 per year (monthly).

FUTURES, Iliffe-NTP Inc., 300 E. 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, $22.50 per year (quarterly). *FUTURES* is published in cooperation with the Institute for the Future, Middleton, Conn.

INNOVATION, Technology Communication, Inc., 265 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016, $35 per year (monthly).

TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE, American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017, $22 per year (quarterly).

BOOKS

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Baier, Kurt and Nicholas Rescher (editors) *VALUES AND THE FUTURE* (New York: The Free Press /Division of MacMillan, 1969).

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letters

BIG BUSINESS -- COMMENT

I enjoyed R.A. Childs, Jr's article (*REASON,* "Big Business and the Rise of American Statism," February and March 1971), particularly the preface. I was bothered, however, by the approach to the concept of the individual in history.

Childs appeared to regard it as being in a position analogous to that of the "fundamental particle" in physics - basic and indivisible; a "first cause," a "causal primary," an "ultimate stopping point," an entity whose properties are given as the basic premises of the system and are not subject to question. I think he would be better advised to regard it as the chemist regards the atom. In studying a wide variety of behavior in a broad range of systems, atoms can be effectively regarded as truly "atomic" - their various properties (chemical valence, ionization energy, mass, etc.) taken as given without further analysis. However, all chemists are aware, of course, that atoms are made up of electrons, protons, neutrons, and various other particles whose exact nature is still unclear, and that such questions as "*Why* is the valence of sodium plus one?" can be answered by reference to the fundamental laws of physics with a resultant simplification in the system of premises considered as primary.

Similarly, studies such as those by Lettvin, McCullock, and Pitts into neurophysiology and nerve networks, Ardrey and Lorenz into the evolutionary origins of instinctual behavior, and Minsky into computer simulations of the human mind enable one not merely to, as the article puts it, "speculate on some of the considerations which led a given man to adopt a certain end but ultimately . . . stop with the fact that he did," but rather to treat of such matters with the same sort of rigor that applies in any other area of the physical sciences.

Of course, the state of such analyses of human behavior is far more primitive than such areas as inorganic chemistry or Newtonian physics - which leads to my second point. Childs appears to regard the primariness of the human consciousness as a closed subject, reference to which conclusively settles any dispute to which it is relevant beyond reasonable debate. This corresponds to the attitude of most physicists toward Newtonian mechanics. Their time and resources are limited, and, while they would admit the principle that Newton is subject to any contradictory evidence that might arise, they don't consider such contradictions sufficiently likely to warrant spending any research money on performing checks on Newton, or to spend any time looking at any papers purporting to advance such contradictory data (such as are put out by the Flat Earth Society, John W. Campbell of *ANALOG* magazine, and others).

The attitude to Einstein's work is quite different. It is significant that most physicists refer to "Newton's *laws,*" but "Einstein's *theory* of relativity." Checks on Einstein are performed from time to time, and many papers appear and are widely read on the subject (just recently, there has been considerable stir over a paper presenting the thesis that the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury that were formerly accounted for by Einstein and, in fact, were cited as one of the primary pieces of evidence supporting relativity, can be accounted for by the bulging of the sun's equator due to its rotation). Considering the sketchy state of current knowledge about the workings of the human mind, and the fact that much work in this area is now going on, it would seem more appropriate to me to regard the primariness of the individual more like Einstein than like Newton, to refrain from smug assertions of its finality and of the (as Childs put it) "dead end/ed/" nature of further study, and to use it as a handy working rule-of-thumb while keeping one eye on continuing research in this area.

I realize, of course, that the individualist hypothesis is certainly on much firmer ground than the theories one usually hears in a university history department, and that the temptation to be cocksure is large; I just hope we can manage to keep things in perspective.

Erwin S. Strauss
Santa Barbara, Calif.

INDIAN RIGHTS -- RESPONSE

In response to Kris Kott (*REASON,* "Letters," March 1971) regarding return of stolen property, I would like to make the following comments. While Mr. Kott does not exactly say that a thief has the right to sell an owner's property, he does assert that a third party has the right to buy stolen property, as long as *he* gives "value for value" (to the thief, of course). What Mr. Kott does not explain is how ownership can become morally alienated from the owner *without* his consent. It is my view that this cannot be done. Further, I would regard someone who knowingly bought or retained stolen property as being of dubious character. If someone sold me Kris Kott's wristwatch, for instance, and I discovered that it was stolen, you can be sure I would return it. I am sorry that Mr. Kott would not do the same for me.

I wonder how those who take Mr. Kott's position would react to the following situations:

Situation One: Hank Rearden works ten years to develop a formula for Rearden Metal. The government confiscates it and sells it to Orren Boyle (who gives "value for value," of course, to the government). Now who owns it?

Situation Two: Suppose I were to steal *you,* dear reader, and sell you to the operator of a salt mine in Siberia. Would you be morally entitled to reclaim yourself as your own property? (Remember, the salt mine operator "has not initiated force to obtain" you, and his only crime has been to give value for value. Wouldn't your escape be "an act of coercion every bit as damnable as the injustice sought to be rectified"?).

Lest anyone think this latter is an extreme example, let me remind you that the Southern plantation owners *did not initiate force* against the slaves but merely "gave value for value" to the slavetraders who had; and the 13th Amendment "swept away a $2 billion investment belonging to almost half a million Americans" (Carl N. Degler, *OUT OF OUR PAST,* p. 205).

Kris Kott's attitude toward the American Indians reminds me of the Indian agent who, in 1862 when the Sioux were being starved through injustices committed against them, exclaimed, "Let them eat grass." This same guilty party later turned up dead, with prairie grass stuffed in his mouth (Ralph K. Andrist, *THE LONG DEATH,* pp. 31-36).

In the present case, the conclusion may come in a more roundabout way. Those who refuse to recognize property rights help to destroy the concept of property rights. This society is far along that road already, and it got there with the help of people who, like Kris Kott, said to the victims of injustice, "**Suffer!**" That is something the American Indians know how to do: they have done it for almost five hundred years. But once in a while, the foundation of suffering upon which this society is built trembles a little - a quake here, a shifting there - and cracks appear in the superstructure. One day, those who live secure in that superstruc-

ture are going to find a load of bricks on their heads!

Rosalie Nichols
Sacramento, Calif.

REPLY TO READER'S COMMENTS

Reader Adam Reed criticized my article on "Big Business" *(REASON,* "Letters," April/May 1971). I am pleased to reply.

As Ayn Rand states in her *INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY*: "A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its unit." Aristotle puts a similar point this way: "By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention . . . nothing is by nature a noun or a name - it is only so when it become a symbol." In my essay, I used the word "businessmen" to subsume those who are conventionally called businessmen. The meaning of the concept as used by me is made quite clear from the context. By Mr. Reed's definition, there can be no such thing as a *dishonest* businessman (one who accepts favors from the government). This use of the term would, I submit, rob it of what modern logicians call "existential import," i.e., it might very well have no referents.

I prefer to use the term as it is used by Rand and innumerable other thinkers and then to qualify the concept with adjectives like "honest," "dishonest," and so forth.

But I do not think that Mr. Reed has gotten my point in any case. When Ayn Rand refers to the *actual* accomplishments of American big businessmen, as a class, as she does in her essay on "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business," and refers favorably to James J. Hill, Vanderbilt, Carnegie, and Morgan as honest businessmen, then I must take issue - and it is *this* which is my point of departure from the Objectivist view of American history. My point has been that the Progressive Era, so-called, was in reality initiated and sustained by criminal big businessmen working with intellectuals whom *they* made possible (by direct and indirect financial and institutional support). The "Progressive Era" was in reality a *conservative* movement, in the original sense of that word: supporting and maintaining the political and economic status quo.

In the course of my historical investigation, I found that throughout American history, regulation and control of the economy has been pioneered by American big businessmen. Even the New Deal's economic policies were first championed by such businessmen as Gerald Swope of General Electric, and the same goes for Social Security and other so-called "protective labor" legislation.

What does this mean? That if the American right wing is to be realistic, it should at the very least undertake a massive overhaul of its historical outlook, and a revision of its picture of the American political spectrum might not be out of order either. Long ago the right wing gave up its reverence for intellectuals *as such,* realizing their massive role in forming the present statist American politico-economic system. Now it is time for them to do the same for big businessmen *as such* and to realize *their* critically important role in creating and maintaining statism. It also means that adopting this view of American history will at long last enable the American right winger to *communicate* with those who criticize big businessmen (as they do exist and have existed), accepting criticisms but explaining them via a different theoretical route. This, I believe, will make libertarians a far more potent force in American ideological life.

This, of course, is only important *if* they propose to *do* anything about changing the world, to *make* it what it "might and ought to be." I am, unfortunately, not at all convinced that many numbers of the right-wing have this end in mind - they are far too pessimistic. But part of this pessimism comes precisely from their mistaken view of history and from their inability to identify their natural friends and natural enemies. This in turn comes in part from their *a priori* approach to history, treating history as a deductive system. The point to my paper was to suggest that they and the New Left have accepted a false dichotomy between theories and facts - with the New Left thinking that only specific concrete "facts" are necessary for a world-view and the right wing thinking that all that is necessary is a broad general theory, sketched in outlines. The results are obvious: both are in a state of almost eerie spiritual disarray; the right is top-heavy with theory, knowing basically nothing about the inner nature of U.S. foreign policy, for example, and the left is frantically concerned with day-to-day events. In Randian terms, the right has the psychoepistemology of a mystic whose theories are irrelevant, while the left has the psychoepistemology of a savage unguided by the precepts of a rational ethic.

This, then, is what Mr. Reed needed my essay for. Only libertarianism can unite the best aspects of both left and right and cast out the bad. Only libertarianism can unite a rational ethic with an understanding of human history. Only libertarianism can deal with all issues from the guaranteed annual income to feudalism in the "Third World" and imperialism in U.S. foreign policy - by means of applying its theory of *justice* in property titles to the real world. Only libertarianism, then, as a political and philosophical movement can have a future, for only by understanding the past *it* is truly consistent with reality - but it can have a future only by understanding the past and the present context of the world. This takes a great deal of research and work, otherwise broad concepts of libertarianism and Objectivism are puny and without content, without the richness they should possess.

The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and other radical scholastics failed to survive because it failed to come to grips with the demands and nature of modern science as it was developing in the Renaissance. The philosophy of Objectivism will likewise fail if *it* neglects taking history seriously. True, some Objectivists have some historical knowledge, but I think that it is generally that which was uncritically absorbed from American conservatism - whose historical world-view is almost completely wrong. Objectivists have *not* come to grips with what is called "revisionist history," yet this history has immense importance if Objectivist principles are to be applied to reality. Thus the purpose of my essay was to explain some of this and to combat that *a priori* approach to history that often comes out of students of Objectivism. It is precisely this approach which an understanding of Ayn Rand's contributions to epistemology should help to combat - producing a *true* integration of theory and practice, of reason and experience, of philsophy and everyday life.

R. A. Childs, Jr.
Silver Spring, Md.

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PERSONALS

BRAINS? Neuroscientist, with B.S., M.S., and a professional degree in electrical engineering, plus an M.S. in biology (neurophysiology), currently doing graduate work in experimental psychology, would like to correspond on philosophical issues in the neurosciences. Adam Reed, 509 Willamette St., Eugene, Oregon 97401.

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