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6/2/2025 9:30 AM

STATE OF MINNESOTA **DISTRICT COURT**

SCOTT COUNTY **FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT**

Case Type: Change of Name

In the Matter of the Application of
Nautica Alaja Argue
for a Change of Name

File No. 70-CV-24-15158

Order Denying Motion to Change Name Over Prosecuting Authority's Objection

We held a hearing on Nautica Alaja Argue's motion to change his name over the objection of a prosecuting authority [Docket No. 19] on January 29, 2025. At the hearing, I allowed Argue time to submit a written brief in support of the motion.

Memorandum

Nautica Alaja Argue wants to change his name to Navier Argue, explaining that he wants his name "to accurately align with his gender identity as a transgender individual."[1] But Argue is a convicted felon and therefore can change his name only as allowed by Minn. Stat. §259.13. That statute provides that when a prosecuting authority objects to a felon's name-change application

[1] Memorandum in Support of Applicant's Name Change, filed March 5, 2025 [Docket No. 27] ("Memo."), at 1.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

(as Ramsey County has done here), a court can grant the application only if the applicant either: (1) "proves by clear and convincing evidence that the request … will not compromise public safety" (among other things), or (2) establishes that failure to allow the name change "would infringe on a constitutional right of the [applicant]." Minn. Stat. §259.13, subds. 3 and 4. Argue maintains that both of those things are true.

Under existing Minnesota law, I cannot grant Argue's motion to change his name over the prosecuting authority's objection. Argue has not carried his burden of proving by "clear and convincing evidence" that changing his name "will not compromise public safety," and failure to grant his name-change request would not infringe on a recognized constitutional right. Therefore, I deny Argue's motion.

Facts

Nautica Alaja Argue is currently incarcerated in the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Shakopee. He has been there since July 6, 2022, after being convicted of numerous aggravated robberies and other robberies in Hennepin, Ramsey, and Washington Counties that involved more than a dozen separate victims.[2] In just one of those cases (No. 27-CR-22-1229), Argue was

[2] *See* Case Nos. 27-CR-22-5282, 27-CR-22-1229, 62-CR-22-5899, and 82-CR-22-1764.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

charged with 13 separate felony robberies involving approximately a dozen victims, all of which involved the use or threat of force of a dangerous weapon.[3] Argue eventually pleaded guilty to and was convicted of five counts of aggravated robbery and one count of simple robbery.[4] In a pre-sentence investigation, Argue "admit[ted] to all details in the complaint [and] acknowledged joining with [a] co-defendant and committing numerous offense[s] over the course of several days."[5] The investigator noted that Argue engaged in a "string of offenses which terrorized the Twin Cities area" and that "[t]he number of victims left behind in the defendant's wake is staggering."[6]

Argue's anticipated prison-release date is January 18, 2028.

Argue maintains (and I accept for purposes of his application) that he identifies as transgender and has spent the last two years transitioning from female to male.[7] Argue also submits (and again I accept for purposes of his application) that while in prison, "he has received gender-affirming care and is

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[3] *See* Complaint filed January 21, 2022, in Case No. 27-CR-22-1229, at 1-10.
[4] Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty in Felony Case Pursuant to Rule 15, filed May 25, 2022, in Case No. 27-CR-22-1229, at ¶ 20(a); Amended Sentencing Order, filed July 15, 2022, in Case No. 27-CR-22-1229.
[5] Felony Pre-Sentence Investigation, filed July 1, 2022, in Case No. 27-CR-22-1229, at 12.
[6] *Id.*
[7] Memo. at 2.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

scheduled to undergo surgery to further align his physical appearance with his male gender identity."[8]

Argue has applied to change his name from Nautica Alaja Argue to Navier Argue (with no middle name) "to align [his name] with his gender identity."[9] Within 30 days of Argue filing his application, the Ramsey County Attorney's Office, one of the authorities that prosecuted Argue, filed an objection to Argue's application.[10] *See* Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 2. Argue then filed a motion to change her name over Ramsey County's objection.[11] We held a hearing on the motion on January 29.

Analysis

People with felony convictions can change their legal names only if they satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. §259.13. They first must file an application and give notice to all prosecuting authorities that obtained felony convictions against them. Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 1(a). The Minnesota Attorney General and the prosecuting authority/ies have 30 days to file an objection to the name change on the basis that the request "aims to defraud or mislead, is not made in good faith, will cause injury to a person, or will compromise public safety." *Id.*,

[8] *Id.* at 4.
[9] *Id.* at 1.
[10] Docket Nos. 14 and 15.
[11] Docket No. 19.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

subd. 2. If an objection is filed, the applicant may file a motion asking for a name change over the Attorney General's or prosecuting authority's objection. *Id.*, subd. 3. "[N]o name change shall be granted unless the person requesting it proves by clear and convincing evidence that the request is not based upon an intent to defraud or mislead, is made in good faith, will not cause injury to a person, and will not compromise public safety." *Id.* But a court must always grant a name change "if failure to allow it would infringe on a constitutional right of the person." *Id.*, subd. 4.

The Ramsey County Attorney's Office, one of the prosecuting authorities that obtained a felony conviction against Argue, has objected to his petition. Thus, subdivisions 3 and 4 of §259.13 prescribe the rules I must follow in deciding whether to grant Argue's request.

I. Argue has not carried his burden of proving that changing his name will not compromise public safety.

Ramsey County objects to Argue's name-change request on the grounds that the name change "will defraud or mislead and compromise public safety."[12] Under §259.13, subd. 3, I can grant Argue's request if Argue "proves by clear and convincing evidence that the request is not based upon an intent to defraud or mislead . . . and will not compromise public safety.

[12] Docket No. 15.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

First, I reject the County's objection on the ground that Argue's request "will defraud or mislead."[13] The statute allows a prosecuting authority to object on the ground that a name-change request "*aims* to defraud or mislead," Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 2 (emphasis added), and prohibits a court from granting the request unless the applicant can prove that it "is not based upon an *intent* to defraud or mislead." *Id.*, subd. 3 (emphasis added). As the underscored language shows, the statute bars name-change requests that are driven by an applicant's *intent* to mislead or defraud. While it may seem odd that the statute does not bar requests that might *actually* mislead or defraud, the statute says what it says and I must honor the language that the Legislature chose. *See* Minn. Stat. §645.16 ("[w]hen the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit"). This does not produce an absurd or unreasonable result (*see* Minn. Stat. §645.17(1)) because a name change that would actually mislead or defraud people is almost certain to "compromise public safety" and therefore flunk that portion of §259.13, subds. 2 and 3.

That leaves (appropriately enough) the requirement that Argue establish that changing his name "will not compromise public safety." Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 3. Argue's position (as set out in his memorandum) runs into a

[13] *Id.*

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

fundamental problem from the start when he points out that "Ramsey County has offered no evidence as to why allowing Mr. Argue to change his name would compromise public safety."[14] Argue repeats this theme throughout his memorandum.[15] But this ignores the fundamental rule that "no name change shall be granted unless *the person requesting it proves by clear and convincing evidence* that the request . . . will not compromise public safety." Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 3 (emphasis added); *see also Matter of Hanlon*, 2025 WL 1367731, at *1 (Minn. App. May 12, 2025) ("If the prosecuting authority chooses to object, the burden falls on the name-change applicant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is no basis for objection."). Lack of evidence on the subject therefore cuts against Argue, not in favor of Argue.

By placing this burden on Argue, the statute essentially requires Argue to overcome a presumption that changing his name would compromise public safety. And there is a reason for such a presumption—especially when the

[14] Memorandum at 1.

[15] *Id.* at 2 (Ramsey County's objection "did not offer any explanation as to how [Argue's] legal name change would … compromise public safety."), 3 ("The Ramsey County Attorney's Office did not present any evidence in support of its objection."), 5 ("the Ramsey County Attorney's objection is conclusory and lacks any evidentiary support."), *id.* ("The County asserts, without any proof, that granting Mr. Argue's name change would … 'compromise public safety.'"), *id.* ("Ramsey County failed to introduce any evidence supporting [its] clai[m]."), 7 ("The prosecuting authority's objection [is] entirely without evidentiary support"), 14 ("Ramsey County … provided no evidence as to how allowing Mr. Argue to change his name would compromise public safety.").

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

person has committed felonies that involved violence, as Argue has. Committing a "string of offenses which terrorized the Twin Cities area" and involved a "staggering" number of victims[16] is obviously extremely serious. And having an accurate record of who committed those serious offenses is extremely important. "[T]he public ha[s] a 'compelling interest in maintaining [a felon's] record of violence.'" *State v. Ambaye*, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000) (citation omitted). That compelling interest "is implicated if [a felon] is permitted to change his legal name … because the name change will make it more difficult to access records of his criminal history." *Application of Gutierrez*, 2022 WL 17751469, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2022); *see also Matter of Wagoner*, 2021 WL 2201502, at *2 (Minn. App. June 1, 2021) ("The state has a fundamental interest in protecting public safety and a compelling interest in maintaining records of violent crimes."). Changing a convicted felon's name requires additional efforts to ensure that the new name is linked with the person's records of past offenses. And any time that additional variables are introduced and additional records must be kept, some risk of error results. That risk carries especially bad consequences for public safety when it comes to people with violent felonies in their past.

[16] Felony Pre-Sentence Investigation, filed July 1, 2022, in Case No. 27-CR-22-1229, at 12.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

Thus, Argue is incorrect when he submits that there is no basis whatsoever to think that changing his name would affect public safety. A prosecuting authority objecting to a felon's name change comes in with a statutory thumb on the scales in its favor, based on the reasons I have just discussed. It is up to the applicant to prove—by "clear and convincing evidence"—that those reasons do not carry the day in his particular case.

And Argue has not done so. It is Argue who asserts in conclusory fashion that "[a]llowing [him] to change his name to align with his gender identity will not compromise public safety,"[17] and as the party bearing the burden of proof on the matter, he cannot rely on mere conclusions. He points out that neither Hennepin County nor Washington County objected to his name-change request, contending that "[i]f there was a genuine safety concern, it would not be limited to a single county's assertion."[18] But there is no evidence of *why* Hennepin and Washington Counties chose not to object. Perhaps they have resource limitations that preclude them from responding to every name-change request they receive. Perhaps they knew or trusted that one of the other counties would lodge an objection. Or perhaps they considered the matter and agreed with Argue's position that a name change would not implicate public safety. We are left to

[17] Memo. at 1.
[18] *Id.* at 5.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

speculate—and that is the point. I cannot assume that Hennepin and Washington Counties refrained from objecting because they agreed with Argue on the public-safety point any more than I can assume that they refrained from objecting because they knew that Ramsey County would take the laboring oar. And as I explained earlier, with Argue bearing the burden of proof—by "clear and convincing evidence," no less—this lack of evidence cuts against Argue.

Argue also points out that "[t]he State has actively facilitated and affirmed Mr. Argue's gender transition by providing medically necessary gender-affirming care wile incarcerated, demonstrating the State's recognition that the transition is a legitimate and essential process."[19] He also points out that the County "explicitly voiced support for [his] transition" at the January 29 hearing.[20] If Ramsey County were here claiming that Argue's petition should be denied because he is going through gender transition, Argue would have a valid point that the State was acting inconsistently. But the State is saying nothing of the sort. The State is expressing support for Argue's ability to transition, but drawing the line of that support at Argue's request to change his name, citing a compromise to public safety. There is nothing inconsistent in that; one can support a person's gender transition without agreeing to every single thing that

[19] *Id.* at 7.
[20] *Id.*

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

the person requests in connection with that transition. Supporting certain aspects of Argue's transition (*e.g.*, gender-affirming care, medical procedures) does not commit one to supporting *all* respects in which Argue wants support.

Argue maintains that *In re Giishig*, 2008 WL 5058537, *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2008), disapproved of a district court's denial of a name change that "g[ave] the impression that if a felon applies for a change of name, the prosecuting authority need merely object and the application will be summarily denied." This, Argue submits, means that a prosecuting authority must provide reasons that support an argument that public safety will be compromised.[21] But that is not the right lesson from *Giishig*. The problem in that case is that the district court completely failed to "address or otherwise analyze the parties' arguments." *Id.* That included a failure to engage in any analysis of the applicant's argument that failure to allow a name change would violate a constitutional right. *Id.* The court of appeals explained that the district court's complete failure to even address the parties' arguments made it "impossible to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's name change application." *Id.* I am not making that same mistake here. Far from "summarily den[ying]" Argue's petition, I am addressing and analyzing his arguments under applicable law. I fully acknowledge that §259.13 is not a per se bar on name changes for convicted

[21] *Id.* at 6.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

felons, but by placing the burden on the applicant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that public safety will *not* be compromised, the Legislature made such name changes the exception rather than the norm.

Ramsey County simply wants to ensure that public records accurately reflect that the person whose legal name is Nautica Alaja Argue committed violent felonies. Allowing Argue to change his name introduces a real risk that the publicly available links between him and those violent felonies will be compromised and in some instances lost. Section 259.13 requires Argue to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there will be no such compromise, and he has failed to do so. Therefore, §259.13, subd. 3, prohibits me from granting his name-change request.

II. Failure to change Argue's name will not infringe on an established constitutional right.

Even if a person seeking a name change is not able to satisfy the requirements of §259.13, subd. 3, a court must grant the request "if failure to allow it would infringe on a constitutional right of the person." Minn. Stat. §259.13, subd. 4. Argue maintains that denying his petition would infringe on two constitutional rights: his right to free speech and his right to privacy.[22]

[22] *Id.* at 8-13.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

A. Freedom of speech

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has twice rejected the argument that denial of a name-change request violates a person's free-speech rights, noting both times that there is no authority supporting a free-speech right to change one's name. *Matter of Larson*, 2019 WL 7286959, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2019); *In re Rickert*, 2014 WL 103426, at *3 (Minn. App. Jan. 13, 2014). Indeed, the court of appeals concluded that such a claim had "no merit." *Rickert*, 2014 WL 103426, at *3. Federal courts are in accord. *See United States v. Diamond*, 615 F. Supp. 3d 332, 334 & n.10 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (collecting cases).

Like the applicants in *Larson* and *Rickert*, Argue cites no authority holding that restricting a felon's right to change his or her name as Minnesota has in §259.13 violates the person's right to free speech. Quite the contrary: Argue acknowledges that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that a transgender person does *not* have a First Amendment right to a name change. *Interest of C.G.*, 976 N.W.2d 318, 335-46 (Wis. 2022). The court began by noting that "[f]ew courts have addressed this issue [and] [a]mong those that have, none have held that a prohibition on changing a person's legal name, standing alone, implicates the right to free speech." 976 N.W.2d at 337. A concurring justice stated it even more bluntly, stating that the plaintiff there was asking the court to hold "for what would appear to be the first time in American history that a

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

person's legal name contains expressive content subject to the First Amendment's free speech protections." *Id.* at 347 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). The court then canvassed the cases on the subject, which generally coalesce around the rationale that "[i]f a person is free to use a different name in day-to-day affairs, statutory restrictions on changing a person's legal name have not been understood to restrict speech or expression." *Id*.

Argue urges me to adopt the view of the dissenting justices in *G.C.* I decline to do so, for two reasons. First, recognizing the right that Argue seeks to establish would require an extension of existing Minnesota law, which currently does not support (and in fact stands against) his argument. And "[t]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court," not to lower courts. *Cruz-Guzman v. State*, 980 N.W.2d 816, 826 (Minn. App. 2022) (cleaned up). So if Minnesota law is to recognize a new form of free-speech right—especially one that is grounded in a *dissenting* opinion in a case from another state that recognized there is currently no authority supporting recognition of the right—that recognition must come from the supreme court, not me. And second, to the extent my view on the substantive legal question matters in light of what I have just said, I find the majority's opinion more persuasive, as it is in accord with what appears to be virtual unanimity on this question among the jurisdictions that have considered it. I agree with the majority's bottom-line conclusion that

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

the "First Amendment right to free speech does not encompass the power to compel the State to facilitate a change of [one's] legal name" and that "[p]roducing one's legal name is properly understood as conduct, subject to government regulation, not speech." *C.G.*, 976 N.W.2d at 346.

Argue also cites a law student's law-review article, Julia Shear Kushner, *The Right to Control One's Name*, 57 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 313 (2009) ("Kushner"). The easy answer to that is that a law student's law-review article is far from powerful authority for recognizing a constitutional right. Indeed, law-review articles commonly advocate for a *change* in the law or development of new law, and therefore are generally not solid ground upon which a district judge should base his or her effort to apply existing law. As a federal court noted with respect to the very article that Argue cites, "[it] is not legal precedent at all. It is a wholly insufficient legal basis for the Court to agree with Plaintiff's viewpoint." *Krebs v. Graveley*, 2020 WL 1479189, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2020), *aff'd* 861 Fed. Appx. 671 (7th Cir. 2021). And even if I were to accord the article persuasive value, I note that the author conceded that "denials of name-change petitions do not directly impose restrictions on the petitioners' speech," explaining:

> None of the difficulties faced by denied [name-change] petitioners restricts something to which they are entitled based on their free speech rights. None of these difficulties in fact place limits on speech at all. The only actions limited are petitioners' ability to request, and in some cases require, others to speak in a certain way. Denied petitioners may continue to say and write that their names are whatever they prefer in arenas to

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

> which they are entitled to free speech. For example, a denied petitioner is always free to say, "My legal name is Mary, but I prefer to be called Jane." Although denied petitioners will be required to continue to use their official names on government documents, these are not traditional fora for speech. Thus, denying permission to use a chosen name on government documents does not directly restrict speech.

Kushner, 57 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 337.

What the Wisconsin Supreme Court said in *C.G.* and the U.C.L.A. law student said in her law-review article are true in this case as well. Nothing about denial of Argue's request to change his name prohibits him from saying something or requires him to say something that he disagrees with. He is free to refer to himself as "Navier" going forward and to ask others to call him Navier. The only thing that Argue will not be able to do is use a different name when he is required to provide the name officially recognized on his birth certificate. But that is "not [a] traditional for[um] for speech" in the first place, so denying him that particular use of his preferred name "does not directly restrict speech." Kushner, 57 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 337.

In sum, current Minnesota case law rejects the notion that Argue has a free-speech right to change his name, all cases on the subject outside Minnesota that I have found reject the existence of such a right, no existing legal authority that I can find anywhere supports such a right, and I am not able to create new Minnesota law on the subject. Thus, Argue's First Amendment argument fails.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

B. Right to privacy

Argue's reliance on the right to privacy has even less support than his reliance on freedom of speech. He cites no authority whatsoever (in Minnesota or anywhere else) holding that denying a transgender person's name-change request invades the person's privacy. Argue instead appeals to general right-to-privacy principles and submits that they can be extended to cover this case.

The fact that Argue cites no authority for the proposition that a transgender person has a privacy right to a name change is reason enough for me to reject his argument for the reason that I mentioned earlier: the supreme court, not a lower court, is the one that must recognize a new constitutional right if it is to be recognized. Thus, I must reject Argue's claim that precluding him from changing his name would violate a constitutional right of his.

And I reach the same conclusion even if I were to take Argue's claim not as one to create a *new* constitutional right, but as one to apply an *existing* constitutional right to the specific circumstances of this case. Argue asserts (citing *Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co.*, 110 F.3d 174, 182-83 (1st Cir. 1997)) that courts have recognized two categories of personal privacy rights: (1) "'autonomy in making certain kinds of significant personal decisions'" and (2) "'ensuring confidentiality of personal matters.'"[23] The first category, Argue

[23] Memo. at 11 (quoting *Vega-Rodriguez*, 110 F.2d at 182-83).

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

submits, relates to "'decisions arising in the personal sphere—matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and the like.'"[24] The second category, he contends, "includes 'the individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.'"[25]

Argue asserts that Ramsey County's objection to his name-change request runs afoul of both categories of privacy interests,[26] but he does not explain how it violates the first category—*i.e.*, "'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and the like.'"[27] It is hard to see how it does. Nothing in §259.13 restricts Argue in the least from deciding whether and whom to marry, whether to procreate, whether to use contraception or what method to use, what family relationships to form and maintain, and whether to have children or how to rear any children he decides to have. Argue retains complete autonomy in all of those areas whether he is allowed to change his legal name or not. Thus, denying Argue's name-change request simply does not implicate that category of privacy rights.

As for the second category of privacy interests, which Argue describes as a "constitutional right to informational privacy,"[28] Argue submits that his

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[24] *Id.* (citation omitted).
[25] *Id.* (citation omitted).
[26] *Id.* at 12.
[27] *Id.* (citation omitted).
[28] *Id.*

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

transgender status is a personal matter and that he wants to decide to whom he will disclose that status. "By not permitting Mr. Argue to change his name to match his gender identity," he asserts, "the prosecuting authority is forcing him to disclose his transgender status in violation of his constitutional right to informational privacy."[29]

"[T]he law recognizes a right of informational privacy, which has two aspects: the right not to divulge private information to the government and the right to prevent the government from disclosing private information." *Matter of Agerter*, 353 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Minn. 1984) (citing *Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)). Neither of these rights is compromised by denying Argue's request to change his name. The private information at issue is (according to Argue) "his transgender status."[30] But denying his request to change his name does not require him to "divulge private information to the government" because the denial does not require him to divulge to the government that he is transgender. Indeed, denial of his motion will not require Argue to do or divulge *anything*. It will mean only that the information that the State already has regarding Argue will remain the same. And denying his request to change his name does not infringe on Argue's "right to prevent the government from disclosing private

[29] *Id.*
[30] *Id.*

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

information," *Agerter*, 353 N.W.2d at 913, because the government currently *has* no information regarding Argue's transgender status, except to the extent that Argue disclosed it to governmental agencies in this (public) proceeding, and Argue does not contend that the government has plans to disclose Argue's transgender status to others. Again, denying Argue's name-change request will simply maintain the status quo: it will not require Argue to do or divulge anything and it will not require the government to do or disclose anything.

Argue's circumstances do not fit within either of the two species of informational privacy that the supreme court recognized in *Agerter*, and those are the only two species of informational-privacy rights that I found in Minnesota (Argue does not identify any additional ones either). Thus, I am bound to reject Argue's claim that denying his name-change request would violate his constitutional right to informational privacy. Accepting Argue's claim in this regard would require a change in the parameters of the constitutional right that is beyond my power to grant; only the supreme court can define the parameters of a constitutional right.

And even if I could alter the parameters of the informational-privacy right, I would decline to do so. The supreme court has noted that "a protectable right of informational privacy depends on a balancing of the competing interests of the individual in keeping his or her intimate affairs private and the government's

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

interest in knowing what those affairs are when public concerns are involved." *Agerter*, 353 N.W.2d at 913. That means that Argue's claim that the government must allow him to change his legal name to avoid the possibility that some people would learn his legal name and deduce from it that he is transgender must be balanced against the State's competing interests. And I explained earlier that the supreme court has specifically recognized that "the public ha[s] a 'compelling interest in maintaining [a felon's] record of violence,'" *Ambaye*, 616 N.W.2d at 261 (citation omitted), and that that compelling interest "is implicated if [a felon] is permitted to change his legal name … because the name change will make it more difficult to access records of his criminal history." *Gutierrez*, 2022 WL 17751469, at *3. I conclude that the State's *actual* "compelling interest" in that regard outweighs Argue's right to avoid the *possibility* that someone would both learn of his legal name and deduce from it that Argue is transgender. The risk to Argue of disclosure of private information about him is quite speculative. The risk to the State of compromise to its record of a felon's past violent acts is much less so. When the State's interest is weighty, well-recognized, and more likely to be infringed than a countervailing interest that is weighty but not well-recognized and less likely to be infringed, the State's interest must prevail.

Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/2/2025 9:30 AM

Order

Nautica Alaja Argue's motion for a name change over the objection of a prosecuting authority [Docket No. 19] is **denied**.

Webber, Charles
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Dated: June 2, 2025

Charles F. Webber
Judge of District Court