UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 23-CR-146(DG)

-against-

: United States Courthouse

: Brooklyn, New York

Thursday, April 4, 2024 11:00 a.m.

RACHEL CHERWITZ and NICOLE DAEDONE,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DIANE GUJARATI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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Eastern District of New York

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APPEARANCES: (Continued.)

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(In open court.)
COURTROOM DEPUTY: United States against Rachel
Cherwitz and Nicole Daedone.
Government ready?
MS. ELBERT: Yes.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: Appearances.
MS. ELBERT: Lauren Elbert, Jon Siegel, and
Gillian Kassner.
Mr. Siegel has another court appearance at noon so
he may have to step out at some point.
THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. Good morning
to everyone.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: Defendants ready?
MS. KRAMER: Good morning, your Honor. Jenny
Kramer from the firm of Alston & Bird. I am joined by my
colleague Rachel Finkel and my client Rachel Cherwitz.
THE COURT: Good morning to all of you.
MS. GATTO: Julia Gatto from Steptoe for Nicole
Daedone.
THE COURT: And good morning to both of you.
MR. PELLETIER: Paul Pelletier, Counsel for the
non-party One Taste, Inc.
THE COURT: Good morning to you as well.
You're going to be comfortable, Mr. Siegel?
MR. SIEGEL: I'll make do.

THE COURT: We're convened today for a conference and I'm going to begin today by taking up the pending motion to compel brought by the Government. I'll then take up the pending motion to dismiss and for a Bill of Particulars that's been brought by defendants Cherwitz and Daedone.

But turning to the motion to compel: On February 8, 2024, the Government moved to compel One Taste, Inc., a non-party to this criminal case, to comply with a grand jury subpoena dated January 2, 2024. The Government's motion is ECF No. 73. The subpoena is Exhibit E to that motion which is ECF No. 73-5. One Taste has opposed the motion. Its opposition is at ECF No. 78. The Government's reply is at ECF No. 79. And the Government's ex parte letter of March 14, 2024, which was submitted at the Court's direction is ECF No. 81.

As everyone is aware, or as everyone, all the relevant parties, are aware, there was prior litigation regarding subpoenas issued to One Taste. And I will assume everyone's familiarity with the details of that prior litigation, both the litigation before me and the litigation before Judge Chen.

Currently, the only pending subpoena-related motion is the motion to compel that I mentioned. And, again, that is ECF No. 73.

In connection with the motion to compel, the

Government argues that the January 2, 2024, subpoena was properly issued as part of an ongoing grand jury investigation and the Government seeks an order compelling One Taste to comply with the subpoena within 30 days.

The Government asserts that it is not the case that the sole or dominant purpose of the subpoena is to obtain additional evidence to prepare an already pending indictment for trial. Rather, the Government asserts that the challenged subpoena was properly issued as part of an ongoing grand jury investigation.

The Government has provided some information about that investigation in its motion and reply briefing and has provided additional information about that investigation in its ex parte letter. The Government points in part to the history of its issuance of grand jury subpoenas to One Taste, and the Government's communications with counsel for One Taste over the last few years, to support the Government's position that it did not issue the January 2, 2024, subpoena for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining additional evidence for the already charged case. The Government also points to the content of the subpoena itself.

Is it going to be Ms. Elbert?

MS. ELBERT: Yes.

THE COURT: Have I accurately stated your position

and arguments in general terms, of course?

MS. ELBERT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In opposing the motion to compel,
One Taste argues that the January 2, 2024, subpoena's
primary purpose is an improper one. Specifically, that the
primary purpose is not investigative, but rather, is to
obtain additional evidence to support an already indicted
case. One Taste argues that it has overcome the presumption
of regularity that normally attaches to grand jury
proceedings, that the burden has been shifted to the
Government to demonstrate a proper purpose for the subpoena,
and that the Government falls short of meeting its burden.

Like the Government, One Taste points to the content of the subpoena itself and to the history of the grand jury subpoenas issued to One Taste and the communications that counsel for One Taste has had with the Government over the last few years to support its position. One Taste, of course, asks the Court to draw different conclusions than the Government asks the Court to draw.

One Taste argues that what the Court must determine is not whether the Government was entitled to subpoena materials previously but whether the Government is entitled to do so now.

And Mr. Pelletier, have I accurately stated your position and arguments in general terms?

MR. PELLETIER: In general terms you have. I would just also note for the Court. When the Court referenced our pleading, attached to that pleading is an extensive declaration.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PELLETIER: That is absolutely our position.

THE COURT: Yes, I was using that docket that number to encompass everything under docket number but thank you for raising that.

It doesn't appear that the parties dispute the applicable legal standards governing the issue before the Court. And, in any event, the applicable law is well settled.

As a general rule, the grand jury process is afforded a presumption of regularity. See <u>United States</u>

<u>v. Calk</u>, 87 F.4th 164 at 186. Second Circuit 2023.

However, courts may not ignore possible abuse of the grand jury process. Again see <u>United States v. Calk</u>, 87 F.4th at 186.

And it is improper for the Government to use the grand jury "for the sole or dominant purpose of preparing for trial under a pending indictment." See <u>United States</u>

<u>v. Calk</u>, 87 F.4th at 186, quoting <u>United States v. Leung</u>, 40

F.3d, 577 at 581. Second Circuit 1994. See also

<u>United States v. Punn</u>, 737 F.3d 1 at 6. Second Circuit

2013. And <u>In Re: Grand jury Subpoena Duces Tecum</u> dated

January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26 at 29. Second Circuit

1985.

To determine whether trial preparation is the sole or dominant purpose for a grand jury subpoena, the Second Circuit has set forth that a burden shifting framework applies. See <u>United States v. Calk</u>, 87 F.4th at 186 describing the burden shifting framework.

And, again, I think the parties are in agreement about what the applicable law itself is here.

As I noted earlier, the parties rely in part on the content of the subpoena itself. The Court has considered the subpoena itself and the parties' respective arguments about what the subpoena demonstrates. As I also noted earlier, the parties also rely on the history of the issuance of subpoenas to One Taste and the Government's communications with counsel for One Taste over the last few years to support their respective positions. The Court agrees with the parties that the history has relevance to the instant motion. The Court has considered that history and has considered the parties' respective arguments about what that history demonstrates.

The Court also agrees with the separate point made by One Taste that the issue that the Court must determine is whether the Government is entitled to subpoena the materials now, not whether it was entitled to do so in the past.

Based on the record before the Court, the Court finds that One Taste has not met its burden to overcome the presumption of regularity with respect to the subpoena here.

One Taste has not identified a sufficient basis for the Court to question the Government's purpose for issuing the grand jury subpoena. But in any event, the Government has made a sufficient showing that the subpoena was not motivated by an improper purpose.

The Government has made a sufficient showing that there is an ongoing grand jury investigation and that the subpoena was issued for the purpose of furthering that investigation.

The Government has made that showing in the papers that One Taste has seen; for example, on Pages 7 and 14 of the Government's motion. And the Government has further strengthened that showing in the ex parte letter, in which the Government provides additional detail about the grand jury investigation.

The Government has set forth the nature of the crimes being investigated, and in the ex parte submission, has provided names of those under investigation, has provided information about particular conduct being investigated, and has provided a transcript of certain grand jury testimony relevant to crimes being investigated.

Here, the record before the Court does not reflect
that the sole or dominant purpose of the January 2, 2024,
subpoena is to obtain additional evidence to prepare for
trial on the pending indictment. The record before the
Court does not reflect an abuse of the grand jury process in
connection with the issuance of the January 2, 2024,
subpoena.

The Government's motion to compel is granted.

One Taste shall comply with the subpoena by May 6, 2024.

Before I turn to oral argument on the motion to dismiss and for a Bill of Particulars, I will address the pending sealing requests with respect to the documents filed in connection with the motion to compel; namely, ECF Nos. 73, 78, 79, and 81. And, again, I mean those to include the documents that were filed at those numbers. All of the documents filed at those numbers.

Although a presumption of public access ordinarily attaches to judicial documents, sealing or redacting such documents can be justified when necessary to protect countervailing interests. See <u>Lugosch v. Pyramid Company of Onondaga</u>, 435 F.3d 110 at 120. Second Circuit 2006.

In light of the content of the information contained in ECF Nos. 73, 78, 79, and 81; namely, information relating to an ongoing grand jury investigation, including information about those under investigation, and

in consideration of the relevant legal standards, the Court will permit those filings to remain under seal.

Turning now to the motion to dismiss and for a Bill of Particulars.

On January 16, 2024, defendants jointly moved to dismiss the indictment or in the alternative for a Bill of Particulars. Defendants' notice of motion is at ECF No. 68, and defendants' memorandum of law in support of the joint motion is at ECF No. 69. Defendants requested oral argument. The Government has opposed the motion and its opposition is at ECF No. 77. Defendants' reply is at ECF No. 80.

I have read all of the filings in connection with the defendants' motion, and I've given a lot of thought to those filings, but you did ask for oral argument and I want to hear you out today on anything that you'd like to raise with me. And, of course, hear the Government out as well.

There are certain, of course, themes that are running through the filings. The Government has taken the position that through the indictment and through discovery and other information including detention memoranda that they have provided what they refer to as a "roadmap" to the defense. The defense has argued that, notwithstanding all of the discovery that's been produced, and notwithstanding what the Government points to, the defendants believe that

they're still unable to prepare a defense.

I guess I would start with the defendants. And I don't know whether you are both going to be arguing. Why don't you tell me how you plan to do this.

MS. GATTO: So what we hope to do. Our motion to dismiss is grounded in both the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment. And so, I would ask that I would argue the Fifth Amendment issue and Ms. Kramer would argue the Sixth Amendment issue and also our alternative request for a Bill of Particulars.

THE COURT: That's fine. However you want to do it is fine. I will have some questions and you can decide who or both of you should be answering it.

I guess I'd just like you to start with what are the specific elements of the charged crime that you do not feel you have enough notice of, or information on, to be able to prepare your defense, your respective defenses.

MS. KRAMER: Thank you, your Honor. And we appreciate the time here today to be heard on this.

Your Honor's question appears to be directed to the Sixth Amendment component of our motion to dismiss. And to be really clear, we believe that the overwhelmingly vague indictment, opaque indictment, and the failure of the Government to particularize that indictment to date is in and of itself a sufficient basis for dismissal. In the

alternative, of course, we're asking for a Bill of Particulars.

So to respond to your Honor's question, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it guarantees, it is not a suggestion, it's not a hint, it guarantees an indicted defendant with the ability to be provided with notice, the nature and the cause of the accusation that they face.

And why they is that guarantee so sacrosanct? Why is it so important? It is so that our clients here,

Ms. Daedone and Ms. Cherwitz, can properly defend against this charge. The presumption of innocence should not be lost in any of this, I'm not saying it has been. But the very critical mandate, not suggestion, of the Sixth Amendment to properly put an indicted individual or entity on notice of exactly what it is that they have been charged with so that they can sufficiently prepare to defend against that allegation is critical.

So, to begin, and to give a little bit more around the atmospherics and the backdrop. By the Government's own admission, they have characterized the investigation and this alleged crime as a sweeping conspiracy that has spanned more than 12 years in time. More than that, your Honor, the Government spent more than half of a decade, and I know we've raised this in the status conferences along the way,

this is really our first opportunity to talk to the Court about what has, in fact, transpired along the way.

On top of the sweeping alleged 12-year-long conspiracy, the Government has spent five-plus years investigating the case and ultimately returning an indictment that was under seal a year ago. I think it was yesterday was the one-year date. It was unsealed in June of 2023.

And throughout the course of that five-plus-year-long investigation. The Government conducted its investigation. The Government interviewed witnesses. They obtained documents. And they did what the Government does in any investigation. And all of this culminated in a single-count conspiracy charge. A conspiracy, an alleged illicit agreement, that's the crime being charged here, an agreement. It's not a drug case, it's not a straightforward bank robbery, it's an illegal agreement to force people into labor. That is what is the culmination and resolution of a five-plus-year-long investigation alleging a 12-year-long conspiracy. And what we are left with is a 14-paragraph indictment, three to five of those paragraphs set forth this particular conspiracy charge.

And I have to say, and I mean this when I say it,
I spent lots of time as an AUSA myself. Ms. Gatto and I
have been sitting here for the better part of the last year

scratching our heads as to how we properly defend against this charge and here's why. Because the nature of the charge is criminalizing an agreement, we are entitled, constitutionally entitled, to know details about that agreement. And since the unsealing of the indictment, we've been asking the Government for help in that regard. We have requested a Bill of Particulars.

Your Honor rightly noted at the last status conference you had inquired whether there had been meet and confers. There have been. And those requests, those constitutional demands, have been met with silence or a refusal to particularize. And your Honor did something really, really wonderful at the last hearing when your Honor asked the Government. You said, have you directed the defense to, in all of the discovery that you've provided, those materials or information that would inform them, that would let them know what you deem to be so important, so that they can appropriately prepare their defense? And the Government said we will take that into consideration. That has never happened.

And, you know, put discovery aside, which we shouldn't have to, but putting everything aside, we are left with this. This is what we are dealing with after an alleged 12-year-long conspiracy.

THE COURT: I don't know what you are holding up,

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is it the indictment?

2 MS. KRAMER: It is the indictment, I apologize.

For the record, it's the indictment.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KRAMER: We are left with three to four paragraphs that provide us absolutely nothing. Now, on that basis alone, we are, at the very least, entitled to a Bill of Particulars. But, again, our position is that dismissal is the appropriate remedy here.

This case is about far more than the allegations of an illicit agreement that spanned longer than 12 years. It's about the assault on a legitimate business that is still very much in effect where people, the cornerstone of the business, of which it's consent and volition. It's about a business where people come together communally and of their own volition and consensually engage in philosophical and meditative practices that maybe the Government's uncomfortable with.

And the reason we are asking for a Bill of Particulars is not because it's a run-of-the-mill request, we're not checking a box here. If ever there was a case where dismissal was present because of the unconstitutionally opaque indictment, this is that case. And the case law, your Honor, supports this. And this is really critical that I now talk about this other component

which is we're entitled to dismissal without getting into a discussion of the discovery. But we've had the benefit of receiving what we believe is almost complete discovery in this case.

And what that is, your Honor, is more than two terabytes of information, 90 percent of which is a regurgitation of the information provided to the Government by One Taste, Mr. Pelletier is counsel for One Taste. So we've received in this robust discovery process the company's own information that the company provided to the Government and pepper on top of that some raw footage from the NetFlix documentary and bank records.

THE COURT: And weren't there 20 witness statements or portions of witness statements?

MS. KRAMER: You are so ahead of me, your Honor, this is fantastic. I'm getting to that next. That was not provided --

THE COURT: But I do want to get the answer to the question I asked, actually, which was about the elements; right?

MS. KRAMER: Yes.

THE COURT: So keep going. It sounds a bit like you're trying to make an opening statement but I will let you go for a little bit longer but I do want the answer to my question.

MS. KRAMER: I appreciate that indulgence, your Honor. The backdrop and the opening statement part of this is absolutely necessary to explain why we believe that we're entitled to dismissal in the first instance and a Bill of Particulars in the second.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. KRAMER: So after reviewing the discovery which did not contain those statements, your Honor is thinking about the Brady letter and I'm getting to that just momentarily.

In all of that discovery, we've been still unable to better understand the particulars of the indictment.

Adding to that, the 30-page, 30-page tome that was provided to us the night before the October status conference in which the Government identified no less than 70 people, all of whom, each of whom I should say, were summarized to have said positive things, exculpatory information. So in all of this provision of information: Discovery, Brady, what we've seen is information that undermines the indictment and is exculpatory in nature.

So that begs the question --

THE COURT: Was the material provided to you as Brady material or not?

MS. KRAMER: So the 30-page letter was provided as potential Brady. The discovery was -- and there was a --

thank you four reminding me of that -- there was a 10-page letter that followed that initial 30-page letter. Both of those were letters were described and characterized as Brady.

And another note before I get to answering your very specific question is that this business has been in existence for years and years and there's an international footprint.

Now, I'm getting to the answer.

More than 30,000 people have crossed the threshold of the business. And, again, the cornerstone of the business is consent. The cornerstone is exercising sovereignty over the decisions that these consenting adults make about what they want to do with their lives, with their time, and the philosophies that they want to subscribe to.

How are we, when it comes to the who, what, where, when, why. How are we to prepare a defense to a one-count indictment after a five-plus-year-long investigation that simply characterizes the alleged criminal conduct as Ms. Daedone and Ms. Cherwitz at some point in time agreeing with a criminal purpose, mind you, agreeing among each other to force people into labor.

When we've asked for the Bill of Particulars, and we've asked for the information and the help from the Government in understanding this, the reason why we're

getting silence as a response, the reason why the Government isn't leading us in the right direction and isn't providing the particularization is because the Government can't do it because the information is not there and that is the answer to your Honor's excellent question.

We need to be able to prepare for trial, it's that simple. This is a one-count conspiracy case. We need to know who are the people the Government is claiming are the alleged victims here. The case law supports identifying victims. If ever there was a case where that's appropriate, it's here. Who is saying that they were forced into labor? What was the force? Where did this take place? Is it any number of the 30,000 people. Do we have to boil the ocean? That's not what is constitutionally required. We should not be required to have to do the Government's work for them.

THE COURT: So both the defense and the Government cite the Court to cases where a Bill of Particulars or motions to dismiss were requested where there were conspiracy charges. Now, some of the cases, I think, had substantive charges as well and some did not. I think I need to hear from the parties more on what you think those cases say where we're talking only about a conspiracy.

MS. KRAMER: That is a wonderful question. And if you will -- I can actually direct your Honor. Page 10 of our reply brief, and I'll walk through this just for the

- 1 purpose of the record. This is specifically addressing your
- 2 Honor's question. This case is no different ultimately than
- 3 | the cases I'm going to cite. <u>United States v. Wilson</u>,
- 4 F. Supp. 2d 364 at 373. Eastern District of New York, 2006.
- 5 In that case, the Government was ordered to turn over the
- 6 defendant identities of alleged victims in the charged
- 7 conspiracies.
- 8 <u>United States v. Urso</u> which is also a very
- 9 meaningful as is Tomasetta. That's at 369 F. Supp. 2d 254,
- 10 272. Eastern District of New York, 2005. In that case, I
- 11 | believe that was a racketeering case, the Court ordered a
- 12 | Bill of Particulars specifically including the identity of
- 13 | the victim or victims, individual or business, of the
- 14 alleged conspiracy.
- 15 United States v. Avellino, 129 F. Supp. 2d, 214 at
- 16 221, Eastern District of New York, 2001. In a conspiracy
- 17 | case, the Government must identify, among other particulars,
- 18 | the identity of the victim.
- 19 United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d, 1151 at 1154.
- 20 | Second Circuit, 1988. There, finding the district court
- 21 abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for a
- 22 | Bill of Particulars on a RICO conspiracy count because
- 23 disclosure of victims' identities during jury selection and
- 24 | file was not adequate, an adequate substitute for a
- 25 | straightforward identification in a Bill of Particulars of

the identity of victims of offenses that the prosecution intends to prove. See also, <u>United States v. Orena</u>, 32 F.3d, 704, 714 to 715. Second Circuit, 1994. In a conspiracy case noting, "An indictment should name the persons defrauded when they are known by the Government."

So those are just a few. But, more importantly.

Tomasetta is a case, I believe it's District of

Massachusetts, is squarely on all fours with a case such as
this. This is a unique case. It's is really a novel theory
what the Government is pursuing.

This is a case about communication. It's a case about alleged threats. Threats to any number of the 30,000 people who were part of One Taste and it's philosophical practices. It's a case about what those communications were? What was the labor? What was the force? Who are the people? And without knowing those very critical details, our clients are being constitutionally deprived of their ability to properly defend against this case.

THE COURT: But is it your position that in none of the -- what sounds like quite extensive discovery that is produced, are you given any information relevant to those issues that you're saying you don't have information about?

MS. KRAMER: That is our position.

We do not believe we've been given -- there's been no identification, you know, in concrete way of this is the

alleged victim telling us as the Government has in their opposition brief: Categorically, we think the labor is cleaning toilets; we think the labor is putting coffee urns out. We think the labor is, you know, is this that and the other categorizing the types of labor that gets us no closer to the ability to properly defend as we are constitutionally entitled to do so.

THE COURT: Is there anything else the defense wants to raise before I turn to the Government? You want to turn to a different amendment?

MS. GATTO: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MS. GATTO: I think it dovetails nicely.

It's the same problem. It's this inscrutable indictment: 12 years, 30,000 people where, when, how? All of that is missing. The Sixth Amendment problem is we can't prep for trial.

It is impossible to prep for trial and I'll bring it to the most practical level. It actually is impossible to prep for trial. We don't know if the allegations are. These two women agreed to coerce someone using psychological abuse to clean a toilet in their own house, or whether it's economical threat to somebody to do A/V work in Colorado. We need to be able to confront that at trial.

THE COURT: And if the answer from the Government,

if they were to give you an answer, it's all of it.

Do you have an issue with that?

MS. GATTO: Yes, of course, I would have an issue with that because what're saying is they went into the grand jury, which goes right in the Sixth Amendment, so it's a perfect question for me.

If they went into the grand jury and they presented a case and what was in a the grand jury's mind is that these two women conspired against 30,000 people to do -- to compel all kinds of labor; in fact, their list of labor, which is their only attempt to particularize, is meaningless. What it is, is this is telling me I have a company, I have some people who work in the kitchen, I have some who work in the main area, and have some people who work in the attic. And they say, we'll particularize it for you by telling you, you coerced labor for some subset of 30,000 people who worked on all three floors. It's meaningless, we need more.

And the Sixth Amendment now to take -- the

Fifth Amendment is super important and I'm not checking a
box with the Sixth Amendment, with the Fifth Amendment.

That is not a fussy pleading rule, it is the -- I would
submit, one of the most important rules because it's what
separates ordinary citizens from untethered, overzealous,
overreaching prosecutions. The rule is, you don't get to

secure this inscrutable indictment that says nothing. So we have no idea what's in the jury's mind when they return it.

And then between now and the trial, spend time -- and that is what's going on, your Honor, this isn't a theoretical problem. First of all, even if it were theoretical, that's what the Fifth Amendment says, it can't be.

But what is happening here is there is this inscrutable indictment that means nothing. We have no idea what was presented to the grand jury. We can't even -- the Court can't even look at this indictment and determine whether it's legally sufficient. Because it's, again, it's meaningless. It's saying that two people agreed to do something somewhere against someone. And what is happening is between the indictment and the trial, the Government is now whether I understand your ruling on the grand jury, but what whether through subpoenas or, as we are learning doing our own work here, unscrupulous investigative techniques. They are filling trying desperately to fill in gaps.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. You just made quite an allegation. Why don't you flesh that out for me.

MS. GATTO: I will. I talked to the Government about it. They are, and I'm going to use this word, they are conjuring up victims, your Honor.

So what is happening post-indictment, and we have spoken to witnesses ourselves about this. Their agents are

re-interviewing people, who, in the initial stage of their 1 2 interview told them we are not victims of anything. 3 not victims of these two women. We were part of One Taste, 4 we were in the victims there. And they are reaching out to these women saying, me, federal agent, with all the 5 authority that means, you are a victim. Here is mental 6 7 health services for you. You are a victim, and if you're not a victim, then this is a sweeping conspiracy involving a 8 9 lot of people. The Government throws around the word 10 "co-conspirator" so often --11 THE COURT: Let me stop you for a moment. 12 MS. GATTO: Yes. 13 THE COURT: You talk about the Government. I need you to be more specific. 14 15 MS. GATTO: This prosecution, your Honor. Agents 16 of this prosecution. 17 THE COURT: That's what I'm asking you. Are you 18 accusing these prosecutors of something? 19 MS. GATTO: I am telling. 20 THE COURT: You used the word "unscrupulous." 21 MS. GATTO: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: And I want to know who you are 23 accusing of being unscrupulous. 24 MS. GATTO: The case agent in this case, we have

been told by witnesses, has done exactly what I said.

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1 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 2 Which is identify people who have told MS. GATTO: 3 this case agent: I am not a victim, I want to be left 4 alone. Reaching back out to them post-indictment and saying, you are a victim, here's victim services. And that 5 is coercive and that's not interviewing that's conjuring up 6 7 victims. 8 Additionally, and I alerted the Government to 9 this, we've asked for more discovery on it. They have 10 interviewed a prior counsel to One Taste knowing that that individual was prior counsel and elicited privileged 11 information from him. I reached out to the Government, I 12 13 asked for further discovery, we haven't heard back from them 14 on that. THE COURT: Go ahead. Let's get back to this 15 16 motion. 17 MS. GATTO: So, again, your Honor, it is not a 18 theoretical problem we're facing, it is very realistic 19 situation here.

I'll go back to the indictment I think your first question was just tell me what you need, what do you think is missing from it? From a Fifth Amendment --

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THE COURT: Let me just maybe clarify. It sounds
-- well, there's obviously a distinction -- but there's a
distinction between knowing what the nature of the crime

charged is and knowing all the evidentiary detail. So what I'm getting at is what is it about the crime charged that you think you don't know, you have not been put on notice of, such as to be able to defend yourself?

MS. GATTO: Yes, and that's the notice but I think it fits into what the grand jury knew.

It is the details of who were the targets, okay? Who were the targets of this forced conspiracy. And if I could take a step back, I know you want an answer so I'll give it to you. Who was the target? Where were they located? Where was the labor supposedly coerced to be performed? When in the 12-year period? So, for example, was it presented to the grand jury? It doesn't seem based on this indictment that the object of the conspiracy was to force people living in an owned house in Colorado to cook communal meals, right? That's the information we need to know. And the law on this, on the Sixth Amendment, is that you need as much -- not need -- the Government is required under the constitution to give as much factual particularity as necessary for the nature of the case and the peculiarities of the defense.

And I think it's helpful, your Honor, to address your question, and just kind of square us all in this. The nature of this case is as follows.

There are a huge number of people who walk through

One Taste's door because they, on their own volition, want to explore a meditative practice that involved stroking clitorises. And this huge group of people also engages with the surrounding philosophy of that meditative process. And that, and I don't want to kind of oversimplify what the philosophies are, but it includes exploring and experimenting with sexual boundaries. This is the group of people we're talking about.

The Government's allegations and, again, this is a guess because we really don't know. But what it sounds like is the Government's alleging that these two women somehow *Svengalied* some small portion of these people. And we know it's some portion, not all of them, to go to your original question because the Government has given us 70 witnesses who were not coerced.

So it's some portion who were *Svengalied* in some unidentified way to force this small portion that we don't know to perform labor we don't know in some place.

So when you kind of put it under the umbrella of this Sixth Amendment standard, it's hard to imagine a nature of a case and the peculiarities of a defense that scream more out for additional information that the Sixth Amendment requires.

So, with that backdrop, this is exactly we want to know. What was the agreement? The object of the agreement

was to coerce who, whom, to do what, where, and when? And we're not asking for the intimate details of all of it. It does feel a little bit like why are we have hiding the ball from the defense here? Is it some desire to move forward with trial by ambush? I don't think that's it. I think there actually is no meat to the bones of this case. And the Government should not be allowed, since the grand jury didn't return any of these factual details in the indictment, to scramble around. I don't think they'll find it but to scramble around and fill in the gaps.

That's whole point of the Sixth Amendment. It's the who, what, where, when, and why but not in the typical sense like where Ms. Kramer said, you're charged with a bank robbery and the conspiracy to rob 10,000 banks in 10,000 locations. The nature of this case, in that circumstance would scream out for more details, too. But here the nature of the case is so amorphous, unclear, not logical, and also against everything we're seeing. So we don't have any documents that are inculpatory in the discovery. All we have from the Government, other than the recycled subpoena returns from One Taste is 70 witnesses who say what the Government said happened didn't happen.

So if the Government presented to the grand jury that more of it happened, they should have put it in here, they haven't. This indictment fails to meet the standards

of the Sixth Amendment and it should be dismissed.

THE COURT: Let me turn to the Government.

MS. ELBERT: Yes, your Honor.

So the law is clear that in order for an indictment charging the offense of conspiracy to be sufficient, it need only identify the offense that was the object of the conspiracy. And we cited a number of cases in our papers to that effect.

The indictment in this case goes far further. It doesn't just identify the offense, it identifies the entity through which the defendants were accused of carrying out the crime. It identifies the places where that entity operated. It provides the dates. It provides specifics as to the various ways in which the conspiracy operated, the means and methods, the types of coercive conduct that were used in order to obtain the forced labor of the group of One Taste victims that are the object of the conspiracy. So it clearly passes constitutional Sixth Amendment muster.

There can't be a requirement that the indictment name specific offenses to a conspiracy count because the Government need not prove that anyone was, in fact, victimized by a conspiracy. They need only prove that an agreement existed to victimize somebody through forced labor which is what the indictment here says.

So in terms of the initial motion that the

defendants filed notably, and I think this is very telling, didn't specify any particulars at all that they needed in order to prepare for trial. It was just a blanket, we need a Bill of Particulars which is exactly what's prohibited, right? You can't use a Bill of Particulars as a general investigative tool to get a preview of the Government's case. Then, as we anticipated on reply, they seemed to have to some degree narrowed their request to fall into generally two categories: Identification of the type of the victims and more specific identification of the methods of force used.

And, in this case, your Honor, we submit that particulars requiring an identification of victims is premature. This is a case involving high profile allegations in which there has been extensive litigation pursued by the company and individuals affiliated with the company against parties that have spoken out about One Taste in the media. We believe that that could be potentially intimidating to victims. We think that the appropriate time for disclosure of the identities of victims would be closer in time to trial.

THE COURT: The defense in their papers are arguing that they need to know more about what the serious harm that was threatened was without -- that doesn't necessarily rely on naming any particular victim, right?

MS. ELBERT: Right.

I would submit, your Honor, that that's really laid out in the indictment in sufficient detail for them to prepare for trial. There's a paragraph with an itemized list of the types of abusive and coercive conduct in which the parties engaged starting at Paragraph 7 continuing through Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10. We submit that's sufficient to put them on notice of the type of serious harm and coercive tactics that were employed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: Give me one moment, please.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: You are talking about surveillance, collecting sensitive information, demanding absolute commitment.

Is that what you're referring to?

MS. ELBERT: Correct.

Specifically, Paragraph 10, it alleges that resistance to the directives of the defendant was not tolerated and that the defendant subjected One Taste members to public shame, humiliation, workplace retaliation if they failed to adhere to their directives as well as harassment and coercion to intimidate and attack One Taste members perceived to be enemies or critics of Daedone and One Taste.

So we would contend that that's been alleged with

sufficient particularity. We did, in our memorandum in opposition, and in an effort to resolve this dispute to include some categories specifying the types of labor that were the object of the conspiracy. I understand that the defense's argument is that this list is insufficiently particular. Your Honor asked a good question about what if the Government says, it's all of it, and I think the answer is it is all of it. Different people were directed to perform different types of labor in different ways. And so, it is an extensive list because the One Taste members who were the object of this conspiracy were directed to provide labor falling into a number of categories and that's the nature of the scheme.

THE COURT: Let me ask you: In your papers, you represent that you anticipate disclosing well in advance of trial, I think those were the words you used, the 3500 material and trial exhibits. Of course, the Court will be setting some schedules, but what do you envision -- what is your view of "well in advance of trial"? And I know that's a separate issue from the issue the defendants are raising about constitutional notice and Bill of Particulars, but I want to know what the Government is thinking because you did raise that as an argument.

MS. ELBERT: Yes, and I think this is a case where much of the evidence at trial is going to be victim

testimony which is why I think it is an appropriate case to 1 2 have a somewhat advanced disclosure for witness statements. If you give me one moment, your Honor, I can just confer. 3 4 THE COURT: That's fine. (A brief pause in the proceedings was held.) 5 MS. ELBERT: We were thinking somewhere in the 6 7 ballpark of 60 days in advance of trial, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And that's you're contemplating for 3500 material? 9 10 MS. ELBERT: Correct. THE COURT: And trial exhibits? 11 12 MS. ELBERT: Yes. 13 THE COURT: And I'm not setting any schedule right 14 now. 15 MS. ELBERT: Understood. THE COURT: I want to understand what your 16 17 argument is. 18 MS. ELBERT: I can hear the defense commenting to 19 one another next to me. I mean, as your Honor is aware, 20 what --21 THE COURT: I don't want to hear what they're 22 talking about with each other. 23 MS. ELBERT: Understood. That's guite an advanced 24 schedule compared to a typical case in this district. 25 THE COURT: You estimated at least a six-week

trial which, frankly to me, sounds a bit long.

MS. ELBERT: I think we submitted our case would be --

THE COURT: I mean the whole trial.

MS. ELBERT: Yes.

THE COURT: So it may or may not be a long lead time and it depends on the number of witnesses, the victim witnesses, that you are planning to call.

Okay. Go ahead.

MS. ELBERT: And just to be clear, too, your Honor, this is a case sometimes in our office we disclose 3500 material in excess of just the people we intend to call but to include all witness interviews gathered in connection with the case, and this is a case in which we would intend to deploy that practice and produce 3500 material beyond our actual witness list.

THE COURT: That's helpful to know. Thank you.

MS. ELBERT: There were obviously a number of allegations about unscrupulous conduct lodged at us as well. To the extent the defense wants to file a motion about that and put themselves on the record in writing, we'll be happy to respond.

And otherwise, you know, many of their arguments seem appropriate for summation at trial and we certainly look forward to trial and presenting our case and they can

make their arguments at the appropriate time. But at this stage --

THE COURT: Let me ask you. You used the word, the term, "roadmap." What's the roadmap that you think you've given, or what road are they going to follow to prepare their defense?

MS. ELBERT: Sure.

I think the indictment really sets out a roadmap.

I mean, the defense cited the case in -- the Ranieri case,
the NXIVM matter that was before Judge Garaufis a couple of
years ago where the indictment was not a speaking indictment
at all, so just by contrast of the.

Here, this case, we indicated to them what the company was that they engaged in the forced labor conspiracy through. We explained to them in the indictment the nature of the tactics. So there will be evidence detailing the various techniques described in Paragraph 7 as to how they perpetrated the forced labor conspiracy. There will be evidence as described in Paragraphs 8 through 10 about the types of harm that were threatened against the members who did not wish to participate in the forced labor conspiracy the way this they directed them to.

And so, in sum, the indictment itself gives a pretty clear roadmap. And I think we did do a very extensive pretrial disclosure of certain witness statements.

And while they're correct that the portions that we provided were generally intended to be what could arguably be useful to the defense, I think it gives a sense to them of the nature and scope of the conspiracy in terms of the types of people that were interviewed, the types of interactions that they were speaking about in terms of their past dealings with the company.

THE COURT: When you give over discovery, how detailed are your letters or indices?

MS. ELBERT: We have provided indices with the discovery. As they've noted themselves, much of the discovery that we have and have disclosed has been productions from the company with which it seems the defendants are already quite familiar.

But to the extent that they would like some additional indexing, if the problem is that they're not what's produced where, that's something that we can work out with them but I don't think that's the nature of the complaint.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question about the term "members" because the parties seem to dispute whether there were members. I think there's maybe, in the defense briefing somewhere, and maybe there's mention that, with certain exceptions, there were no members but there were a couple of people referred to as members, I don't know,

somebody needs to clarify that. And I'm not sure how much it matters but I want to make sure that I understand what the parties' positions are on this.

MS. ELBERT: Yes.

So the defendants' company obtained labor from a number of individuals, some of whom were full-time on-the-books employees. Some of whom were contract employees. Some of whom were simply people who were part of the One Taste community and adherents to the philosophy propounded by the defendants and other leadership of the organization.

And so, our use of the term "One Taste members" is intentionally broad because they obtained labor both from paid employees in excess of what those employees were being paid to do as well as contract employees, as well as people who weren't employees at all. So it spans a number of different categories. So to call them -- to limit it to "One Taste employees," for example, wouldn't be accurate, it's broader than that.

THE COURT: Can you speak to the cases that your adversaries have raised where Bills of Particular were ordered in conspiracy cases?

MS. ELBERT: So a number of those items --

THE COURT: You've addressed some of the case law in your papers.

MS. ELBERT: Yes.

I'm not prepared to address them in detail today, but I'd be happy to put in a supplementary surreply letter if you'd like. I know that a number of those cases involve both conspiracy and substantive counts. In particular, Ms. Kramer referred to a RICO conspiracy. Those typically include as predicate acts certain substantive offenses but I would have to look at that more closely to be prepared to give you a detailed response, your Honor, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That's okay.

Is there anything else you'd like to say?

MS. ELBERT: I don't think so, your Honor. I
think that's it unless you have further questions.

THE COURT: Let me turn back to the defendants if they want to briefly be heard in response.

MS. GATTO: Your Honor, I know Ms. Kramer has some replies to the presentation by the Government. I just want to address this question, which we're so thrilled that you asked about what does it mean to be a One Taste member. This is a word entirely made up by the government.

One Taste, and it's important, your Honor, to understand what this is. There is a business, it's One Taste. It's a legitimate business. It was a growing business, it was a successful business. It has an army of lawyers and accountants and it uses Sales Force Software.

It is a business.

The business is in teaching, training, and introducing people to this meditative practice, which is a scientifically backed practice, that lives in the space of yoga and meditation. And people who take the classes, do the training, many of them become practitioners. And then just like any other kind of successful wellness business, and I'm thinking of SoulCycle or CrossFit, they meet and they are like-minded people and they are elevating their practice together and they join together.

This isn't like membership in some secret society, this is community developing around like-minded people who are introduced. The word "member," and the Government use it is repeatedly for the purpose to make it sound like something to isn't, is wrong. There were opportunities to do training at a membership level, there's a very small number, that's not what they're using it as. They're using it to make it sound like this is some nefarious group with the puppeteers at the top pulling the strings. But none of that is factually correct, in fact, it's the opposite. And it actually goes to this whole idea of particularization again, your Honor, and the nature of the case and the uniqueness of it because it's not, I'm hearing it, and again, I don't know because the indictment doesn't say it and the discovery doesn't that the targets of the

conspiracy, I think the Government says, are people who worked for the company.

But now it sounds like this also includes people who don't work for the company but who practice the meditative practice. Practice the practice, adopt the lifestyle, which makes the need for particularization not only for us to prepare the defense and also to understand what the grand jury thought, but also to evaluate the legal sufficiency. Because if it is the case that they're -- the Government's case is there was an agreement to compel labor from people who were not even associated with the company which now they say they have particularized as the corporate vehicle through which the conspiracy happened.

So I'm happy to really try to put to bed this total misnomer of member which is made up from the Government. But I also think it really highlights how unparticularized this is and how flying in the dark we are, and it sounds like maybe even the Government, too.

THE COURT: Ms. Kramer.

MS. KRAMER: Thank you, your Honor. And very briefly, I promise.

So Ms. Gatto was just talking a bit about terminology and members. I also just, you know, atmospherically wanted to bring up part of this terminology, or the terminology that the Government has been the victims,

who are the victims? And what I understand, I was not prior counsel, but Ms. Cherwitz herself was previously identified as a victim and here she sits as an indicted defendant in a criminal matter.

The Government also raises as an argument why victims should not be identified, the idea of intimidation. Well, let's be clear. This process is a two-way street. The Government presented a case to a grand jury that returned an indictment and Ms. Daedone and Ms. Cherwitz sit here, presumed innocent, presumed innocent. And they have the constitutional protection and requirement that they be able to mount a defense in this matter and we are still in the dark.

So talking about intimidation, Ms. Cherwitz, when she was arrested, helicopters descended upon her home.

People came out with guns drawn. Guns drawn. And this isn't in a case where she was previously identified as a victim, that's intimidation.

But more to the point about the Government's arguments.

What I heard the Government saying in its argument was, I wrote it down, the indictment clearly passes constitutional muster. Well, your Honor, respectfully to the Government that's why we're here. That's why we're before the Court. That's your Honor's decision to make, not

the Government's unilateral statement to make.

The Government also said that giving this kind of necessary information is premature. How is it premature? This investigation lasted for more than half of a decade. We are a year out of indictment. What's premature about any of this? And to Ms. Gatto's earlier point, what is there to hide? What is the actual harm? And I want to leave the Court with this one/.

THE COURT: They've identified one concern they have, if I understood Ms. Elbert correctly, is witness intimidation.

Did I understand your argument?

MS. ELBERT: Correct, your Honor.

MS. KRAMER: Yes.

And the response to that, your Honor, again is:

It is a two-way street, and if the Government chooses to charge this case as a one-count conspiracy to commit forced labor, we must know the who and that is where I was going to bring your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. KRAMER: The Sixth Amendment guarantee, again, is not a suggestion, it's an absolute requirement and it's a protection that's afforded our clients. In <u>U.S. v.</u>

<u>Tomasetta</u>, that was a conviction for violating loansharking protections at Title 18 Section 894.

At bottom, the case was about threats, it was an extortionate threats case. That's what this case is alleging. That Ms. Daedone and Ms. Cherwitz, through threat of force, the "or else," which we still don't know what is the "or else," we have no idea what that is. But through threats of intimidation, coercion, manipulation, they were somehow able to have people engage in forced labor. I don't even know how to articulate it which is embarrassing at this stage of the case. That is what the Government's case is, it's a threats case.

And in <u>Tomasetta</u> there has already been a conviction, this was on appeal. The indictment there, your Honor, was more particularized than the indictment we are contending with. And, in that case, the indictment filed to name the victim and failed the name of the location of the offense with specificity. And most critically, which is what we're also asking for, failed to describe with particularity the extortionate means charged.

And what is the question? What's the analysis here? The question is whether the indictment as a whole, in its entirety, conveys sufficient information to properly identify the conduct relied upon by the grand jury in considering the charge. That is the analysis. That is what this court must ask itself and that is what we're asking ourselves. And the answer uniformly, overwhelmingly,

steadfastly, is it does not. And the reason the indictment does not contain those particularized facts to inform us and enable us to prepare a defense is because the facts are simply not there.

And with all of those reasons in mind, your Honor, we respectfully request --

THE COURT: Is it that you're arguing the facts are not there or there's too many facts; that you would have to defend against too many things and that's a different argument.

MS. KRAMER: So it's both, your Honor.

Because as the Government suggests, it's everything. Why is the Sixth Amendment in place? How do we go to a trial with everything? So we are to boil the motion? We are to guess who of the 30,000 individuals who have been part of the One Taste, you know, philosophy and who have been engaged with Ms. Daedone and Ms. Cherwitz. How do we possibly prepare for that? And I love the idea of early disclosure of Jencks and Giglio, and the Government's right, to the extent this even proceeds to trial which we do not believe it should. We think dismissal is warranted with on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds. But to the extent that this does happen, we would ask for much earlier disclosure than that.

THE COURT: When you say "much earlier," what

would you be asking for?

MS. KRAMER: W

MS. KRAMER: With a trial date in January, six months at least. At least.

It shouldn't be an argument for the federal government after a half-decade-long investigation to say, you know, "it's all of it." It's not too many facts. It's that we don't know what the fact are. We don't know what we're defending against. We are shadowboxing and that is unconstitutional.

And for that reason, your Honor, we ask that the indictment be dismissed. It's an easy call on both Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds. And we thank you very much for giving us the opportunity.

THE COURT: Does the Government wish to be heard further?

MS. ELBERT: I don't think so, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Give me a moment, please.

(A brief pause in the proceedings was held.)

THE COURT: Thank you for the arguments. I did find them to be helpful. I found the briefing to be helpful. I'll take the defendants' joint motion under advisement.

Let me turn to a few remaining matters.

There was a letter submitted by defendant Daedone

requesting a briefing schedule for an anticipated motion to vacate a warrant. That's at ECF No. 83.

Is that something the Government wants to comment on, there was no response to the letter, there didn't need to be, but why don't I hear you on that.

MS. ELBERT: Since that time, your Honor, we have engaged in some discussions with defense counsel with the possibility of being able to avoid the motion. They presented some additional information to us. We have presented some additional information to them. And so, I defer to Ms. Gatto, she feels prepared to set a briefing schedule at this stage, or if she would rather let the discussions play out a bit longer before we commit.

MS. GATTO: No, your Honor, I would like to set a motion schedule.

Since that letter, one, we've had confirmation in writing from the bank that it was due to government action in January that the account was restricted which is one -- it was there is two, kind of, parts. There's a lot going on with the seizure warrant, your Honor. I've laid it out in my letter and I'm happy to do it again.

THE COURT: I would like to hear it and then I would like to hear the Government's response.

MS. GATTO: I'd be happy to do that.

So, at the start of the case as you might recall,

the Government seized every penny that Ms. Daedone had. We engaged in negotiations and we reached an agreement where they returned some of the money so that Ms. Daedone could pay for counsel.

During that time, there was one account with Ms. Daedone's name on it as trustee. This is something the Government has known about since the beginning. It is a trust set up for Ms. Daedone's 81-year-old mother. And if you look at the bank account statements, which presumably the Government has, you see once a month, a check goes out, or a wire goes out, to Ms. Daedone's landlord. That happens every month.

Some of the accounts that Ms. Daedone had seized were at the same bank where the trust account was. And so, what happened, whether directly or indirectly because of the Government action, the bank kicked the trust out. They didn't want anything to do with it since they had this whole government intervention with other accounts with Ms. Daedone's name on it.

So the trust found a new bank, Schwab Bank, and moved there. Ms. Daedone was listed as the trustee. Then, lo and behold, having nothing to can with the trust request for anything, the trust gets a letter from the bank saying you're out, we're no longer interested in having this account. Either tell us where to wire the money or issue

a -- we're going to issue a certified check.

And it's very difficult for Ms. Daedone to find a bank, even though this is a trust. So the check was issued, and this is extremely important. It wasn't purchased, it wasn't t Ms. Daedone or trust's request, it was issued. A certified check is sent, not to Ms. Daedone in her individual capacity as the seizure warrant says, but to Ms. Daedone, logically, as the trustee. And, in fact, the Government must know that because the bank would never issue a certified check from a trust to someone in their individual capacity.

The certified check sat there unnegotiated for some time because the trust couldn't find a bank account with Nicole Daedone's name on it. Ms. Daedone asked Charles Schwab in this period, can you send a portion of these funds to the landlord because, as you'll see from the bank accounts, as they sent from the bank accounts once a month it would go out. The bank could not do that.

What happened is, pursuant to the original trust document that set up the trust, I think it's 2023 all before this, Ms. Daedone stepped down as the trustee since she was having trouble finding a bank. The successor trustee accepted up as a trustee, called back Charles Schwab, and said we still are this check sitting here, would you open a bank account with me now as trustee? Here's all the

paperwork, this was the lawyers and accountants and all those sort of things, and Charles Schwab said okay. And then in the process of moving the funds to this new bank account that was set up, the trust was alerted no, no, this check has a stop payment on it since January, which the bank has notified was at the direction of the Government.

I called the Government, I learned about this, I called the Government, did you guys have a warrant? Took a couple of days for them to get back. They said, oh, we're looking into it. And finally, I got an e-mail from the Government saying, we didn't have a warrant in January but we have one now and they issued the seizure warrant.

As I outlined in my letter, in addition to this whole kind of long story which I think is troubling in many ways that this account that's clearly used for this 81-year-old mother's shelter, was seized knowing all the time where it was and how it was. But the most troubling thing is that the search warrant affidavit by the case agent includes, and I highlighted in my letter and I sent it to you, two representations that are used then to make a very serious representation. Those two representations is that the certified check was issued to Ms. Daedone in her individual capacity, and that the certified check was purchased. And based on those two, the agents says, based on his experience, it seems consistent with money

laundering.

That's the circumstances around this.

THE COURT: So what is the motion you want to make?

MS. GATTO: It's a Franks Motion, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me turn to the Government.

MS. ELBERT: Sure, your Honor.

So, first of all, I would dispute certain aspects of Ms. Gatto's factual recitation. The picture is not quite as clear as she presents. Ms. Daedone, at the closure of this trust account, directed that this cashier's check in the amount of \$200,000 be issued, sent to someone who is not a co-trustee on the account and who is a member of the leadership of the One Taste organization.

And so, based on that information, we became newly concerned about the possibility of these funds being used for reasons that were unrelated to the care of her mother which is what had been represented to us initially.

Setting aside my dispute with the factual representation, two points on the law which I can flesh out more fully to the extent that we do end up litigating.

First, the information that was contained in the affidavit was truthful based on what the bank had told the agent at the time. Ms. Gatto has since presented us with information we didn't have previously. So, to the extent

there were factual pieces that were incorrect such as the check being made out to Ms. Daedone versus Ms. Daedone as trustee, that's based on the information that they had at the time which is the first prong of the Franks analysis. It has to be a knowing misrepresentation.

Second, none of that information is material which is the second aspect of the Franks analysis. Even if this account were held in the name of Ms. Daedone's mother and there was no allegation of any laundering activity in it at all, if we can show that we can trace proceeds of the scheme to this account, we could seize it. And Ms. Gatto does not dispute our ability to trace the proceeds of Ms. Daedone's sale of One Taste to this account. We had just, in the past, exercised our discretion not to take it.

As a legal matter, these misrepresentations are also immaterial so there is really no basis for --

THE COURT: What's the Government's position now with respect to that account?

MS. ELBERT: I thought we were engaging in good faith. I haven't heard from Ms. Gatto since we last spoke, and so, I am now being accused of carrying on various misdeeds. So I don't know if I am in a position to take a position at this point.

MS. GATTO: Your Honor, that seems like a little dramatic. We spoke yesterday. I think it makes sense, if

the Government is, well, one, I hear them acknowledging that there's misrepresentations.

MS. ELBERT: That's not accurate.

MS. GATTO: Okay. Well, that was the word I thought I heard.

THE COURT: No, she said based on the information that the agent had at the time, it was truthful and that since there's been additional information; is that correct?

MS. ELBERT: That's correct, your Honor.

MS. GATTO: Okay.

I think what she's saying is it was a mistake, which, should we litigate this seems incredible to me that an agent would think or be told that a bank account for a trust, the bank issued a check in somebody's individual name, I think that that would violate many banking regulations. I also find it incredible that the agent didn't look at any of the back-up or have any kind of meaningful conversation before submitting the affidavit.

THE COURT: You're trying to get this money released; is that right? And the Government, she's not going to give me a position right now, because for whatever reason and I believe valid. But you don't know whether the Government is going to agree to this or not, right, I mean --

MS. GATTO: I agree, your Honor.

And should they release it and they withdraw the
warrant, then how could I possibly have a motion? But, at
the same time, this 81-year-old mother's rent isn't being
paid and there aren't the funds. So I'm happy to engage in
conversations. I'm worried that they're going nowhere based
on our conversation yesterday.

The Government keeps providing new facts that are wrong and then I have to provide the back-up to show them that they're wrong, the agents, the investigating parties, and I don't want to leave it hanging. We could set the motion for late next week or the Monday after and I obviously will continue to engage with the Government especially since this --

THE COURT: That's fine. I think we can set a motion schedule. I think it doesn't seem all that likely that there will need to be a motion but that's up to the parties. So I'll set a schedule as follows: And it's just defendant Daedone?

MS. GATTO: It is.

THE COURT: So defendant Daedone's motion will be due on April 12th, a week from tomorrow. Government's response will be due April 19th, and I don't think we need a reply on this. If the Court needs more, the Court will ask. But it is my hope that the parties will continue to talk to each other in good faith. This sounds like something that

1	may very well resolve on its own.	
2	MS. ELBERT: Thank you, your Honor.	
3	THE COURT: Is there anything else we need to take	
4	up before I set the next conference in this case?	
5	For the Government.	
6	MS. ELBERT: Not from the Government, your Honor.	
7	THE COURT: Defense?	
8	MS. KRAMER: No, your Honor thank you.	
9	MS. GATTO: No, your Honor thank you.	
10	THE COURT: Again, we have a tentative January	
11	trial date, I don't expect that will change but it is still	
12	tentative at this time but nobody should be making other	
13	plans.	
14	I am going to set the next status conference for	
15	May 3rd at 10:30 a.m. And time has already been excluded	
16	until the date that is the tentative January trial date and	
17	that remains appropriate here but it has already been	
18	excluded.	
19	Is there anything else we need to take up?	
20	MS. ELBERT: No, your Honor. Thank you.	
21	MS. KRAMER: No, your Honor. Thank you very much.	
22	MS. GATTO: No, your Honor. Thank you.	
23	THE COURT: Thank you. We are adjourned.	
24	COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.	

 $({\tt WHEREUPON}\,,\ {\tt this}\ {\tt matter}\ {\tt was}\ {\tt adjourned.})$

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