

Sept-12-1864

To the Honorable  
Edwin M. Stanton,  
Secretary of War.

Sir:

Assembled from the different portions  
of Indiana, and practically familiar  
with the influences now at work in  
each Congressional District of the  
State, we express our profound conviction  
that upon the issue of the election that  
occurs within a month from this  
date, may depend whether the  
Secession element now rampant in  
the State shall be effectually crushed,  
or whether it shall acquire strength

enough, we do not say to take the State out of the Union, but practically to sever her from the General Government so far as future Military aid is concerned.

We further express the gravest doubts whether it will be possible for us to secure success at the polls on the 11<sup>th</sup> of October, unless we can receive aid

1. By the delay of the draft until the election has passed.
2. By the return, before election day, of fifteen thousand Indiana soldiers.

As to the draft, we propose an

inferred delay only, of which no public notice  
need be given: reason sufficient will suggest  
itself in the time necessary to adjust the  
local quotas of townships, towns and  
cities; without the careful settlement  
of which, great dissatisfaction, even  
among the loyal, cannot be avoided.

Volunteering is going on rapidly at this  
moment, and we have no hesitation in  
expressing the confident opinion that  
if the Draft be delayed, and 16,000  
Indiana troops be ordered home  
before the election, with suitable  
arrangements for recruiting,  
Indiana's entire quota can and  
will be filled by volunteering

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within two weeks after election day. She  
is, at this time ahead, after filling  
former quotas, fully 15,000 three-  
years' men.

Thus, the Government will obtain  
the recruits it has demanded almost  
as soon as by pressing compulsory  
measures at once; and it will  
secure itself against the possible  
loss of the power and influence of  
the State for years to come.

If the Draft is enforced before  
the election, there may be required  
half as many men to enforce it  
as we ask to secure the election.



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Difficulty may reasonably be anticipated  
in from 20 to 25 Counties. If the  
Draft goes on immediately after  
the election, the soldiers will be on  
the spot to secure it, being carried  
into effect, should that be necessary.  
But we are confident that, if our  
propositions are adopted, no Draft  
will be needed at all.

The case of Indiana is peculiar.  
She has, probably, a larger proportion  
of inhabitant, of Southern birth or  
parentage, - many of them, of course,  
with Southern proclivities - than any  
other free State; and she is, one of the  
few States in which soldiers are

disfranchised.

It is not on the score of Indians' past desert, that we ask this assistance. All such consideration, must give way before the public good. We ask it, because the burden of this political contest is heavier than we can bear. Nor have we asked it until we had exhausted every effort which loyal men can make for their country. We ask it for that country's sake. We ask it, because we feel absolutely assured that in this way more readily and more speedily than in

any other can the General Government  
accomplish the object it proposes.

If it were possible that you could  
see and hear what we, in the last  
month, saw in his own section of  
country, have seen and heard, no  
word from us would be needed.  
You would need no argument in  
proof that a crisis, full of danger  
to the entire North West, is at hand.

We do not expect any General  
Commanding, engaged with vast  
military operations, to realize this.  
And therefore, while of course we  
do not urge any withdrawal of

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troops that would imperil the situa-  
tion in Georgia or elsewhere, we  
suggest, that a mere request to  
General Sherman, or other Commandr,  
to send home, or not send home, the  
troops in question as he might think  
best, unaccompanied with an ex-  
pression of the urgent desire of the  
Government in the premises, and  
a view of the vast interests at  
stake, would be of no avail.

No Commander willingly diminishes  
his command. To what extent it  
may be prudent or proper to make  
the order imperative, we, not having  
the entire situation before us,



cannot judge. The hope you will  
see, in our most precarious con-  
dition, cause sufficient to  
do so.

The result of the State election,  
whether favorable or unfavorable  
to the Government, will carry  
with it, beyond a doubt, that  
of the Presidential vote of  
Indiana.

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All which is respectfully submitted.

O. P. Morton

E. Summit

Godlove 8<sup>th</sup> Dist

C. M. Allen 1<sup>st</sup> Dist

Thos. N. Stillwell 11<sup>th</sup> Dist

Ralph Hill 3<sup>rd</sup> Dist

Geo. A. Farguhar 4<sup>th</sup> Dist

John Jones Act & Pro Mar Court

W. W. Lury 2<sup>nd</sup> Dist

G. H. Decker 10<sup>th</sup> Dist

Hervey 9<sup>th</sup> Dist

John L. Mansfield, M. Gen. Sec. Leg.

James B. Kirkpatrick, Sec. Treas. Ind. State

Charles A. Ray, Dep. Sec.

A. H. Comer, Post Master

Indianapolis, Ind.

J. S. Wright, Ch. St. Court

Indianapolis September 12. 1861.

RECORD & PENSION OFFICE  
640723  
WAR DEPARTMENT

See 2

Sept. 12<sup>th</sup> 1864.

Gov. G. P. Morton  
Others

File that draft in Ind.  
be delayed until after State  
Election (Oct. 12, 1864) and  
that 15,000 Ind. Soldiers be  
allowed to return home before  
said Election.

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