# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

#### FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Phoenix, Arizona
November 16, 2018
Michael Lacey,
James Larkin,
Scott Spear,
John Brunst,
Andrew Padilla,
Joye Vaught,

Defendants.

Defendants.

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, JUDGE

### REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

## MOTIONS HEARING

Official Court Reporter: Elva Cruz-Lauer, RMR, CRR Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 312 401 West Washington Street, Spc. 33 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2151 (602) 322-7249

Proceedings Reported by Stenographic Court Reporter Transcript Prepared by Computer-Aided Transcription

1		APPEARANCES
2	For the (	Government:
3		U.S. Attorney's Office By: PETER SHAWN KOZINETS, ESQ. KEVIN M. RAPP, ESQ.
5		40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200 Phoenix, AZ 85004
6 7		U.S. Attorney's Office By: JOHN JACOB KUCERA, ESQ. 312 North Spring Street, Suite 1200
8		Los Angeles, CA 90012
9	For the I	Defendant Lacey:
10 11		Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria By: PAUL JOHN CAMBRIA, JR., ESQ. 42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120
12		Buffalo, NY 14202
13	For the I	Defendants Lacey and Larkin:
14 15		Davis Wright Tremaine By: JAMES C. GRANT, ESQ. 1201 3rd Avenue, Suite 2200
16		Seattle, WA 98101
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

```
1
      For the Defendant Larkin:
2
                  Bienert Miller & Katzman
                  By: THOMAS HENRY BIENERT, JR., ESQ. (Telephonic)
                       WHITNEY Z. BERNSTEIN, ESQ.
3
                  903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350
 4
                  San Clemente, CA 92673
 5
                  Schulte Roth & Zabel
                  By: SEETHA RAMACHANDRAN
 6
                  919 Third Avenue
                  New York, NY
7
      For the Defendant Spear:
8
                  Feder Law Office
 9
                  By: BRUCE S. FEDER, ESQ.
                  2930 East Camelback Road, Suite 205
10
                  Phoenix, AZ
                               85016
11
      For the Defendant Brunst:
12
                  Kimerer & Derrick
                  By: MICHAEL D. KIMERER, ESQ.
13
                  1313 East Osborn Road, Suite 100
                  Phoenix, AZ
                               85014
14
                  Bird Marella Boxer Wolpert Nessim
15
                   Drooks Lincenberg & Rhow
                  By: ARIEL A. NEUMAN, ESQ.
16
                  1875 Century Park E, Suite 2300
                  Los Angeles, CA 90067
17
      For the Defendant Padilla:
18
                  Piccarreta Davis Keenan Fidel
19
                  By: MICHAEL L. PICCARRETA, ESQ.
                  2 East Congress Street, Suite 1000
20
                  Tucson, AZ 85701
21
      For the Defendant Vaught:
22
                  Karp & Weiss
                  By: STEPHEN M. WEISS, ESQ.
23
                  3060 North Swan Road
                  Tucson, AZ 85712
24
25
```

```
1
 2
      For Henze Cook Murphy, PLLC:
 3
                   Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman
                   By: ANNE MICHELLE CHAPMAN, ESQ.
                   2 North Central Avenue, Suite 1450
 4
                   Phoenix, AZ 85004
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

### 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 Criminal case 18-422, United States of THE CLERK: America versus Michael Lacey and others. 3 4 This is time set for hearing on pending motions. 5 MR. KUCERA: Good morning, Your Honor. John Kucera on 6 behalf of the United States. With me at counsel table is 7 Assistant United States Attorneys Kevin Rapp and Peter Kozinets. 8 9 THE COURT: Good morning to all of you. 10 MR. NEUMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ariel Neuman 11 and Mike Kimerer on behalf of Defendant Brunst, who is present 12 in court. 13 THE COURT: Good morning. 14 MR. FEDER: Bruce Feder for Scott Spear, who is also 15 present. 16 THE COURT: Good morning. 17 MR. CAMBRIA: Good morning, Your Honor. Paul Cambria on behalf of Michael Lacey, who is present as well. 18 19 THE COURT: Good morning. 20 MR. GRANT: Good morning, Your Honor. Jim Grant on 21 behalf of Michael Lacey and Jim Larkin. 22 THE COURT: Good morning to you. 23 MS. BERNSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. 24 Bernstein on behalf of Mr. Larkin, who is present in court. On

the phone is Mr. Bienert and Ms. Ramachandran.

25

1 THE COURT: And, ma'am, you are prepared to make 2 arguments on behalf of your client? 3 I am, Your Honor. MS. BERNSTEIN: 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 MR. WEISS: Your Honor, good morning. Steve Weiss on 6 behalf of Joye Vaught, and I will waive her presence. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. PICCARRETA: Good morning, Judge Logan. 8 9 Piccarreta on behalf of Andrew Padilla, who is not present. Ι 10 waive his presence. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. 12 MS. CHAPMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Anne Chapman on behalf of various movants identified in the docket. 13 14 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Chapman. 15 This is the time set for the motions hearing. I need 16 to hear from the government first. I'm just a little confused. 17 Please approach the lectern. Sir, in your Document Number 282, you argue that your 18 19 forfeiture matter should be addressed by this Court. 20 Do you recall that? 21 MR. KUCERA: I recall making that statement at various 22 points, Your Honor. I don't recall it in 282 specifically. 23 THE COURT: Well, what's your position now? 24 MR. KUCERA: The government still agrees with that. 25 To the extent Your Honor is getting into why it is

that we are asking that certain matters be brought before the CDCA court and certain matters be brought before this Court, I am happy to address that.

In going through defendants' motions, it's hard to suss out exactly what they are asking for and where and what relief they are asking for.

But in focusing on just their request for relief, they are asking to stay the execution of the seizure warrants that were obtained in CDCA.

Our position is that any attack on the warrants, the affidavits themselves, should be brought before the CDCA court. Those attacks are properly brought before that. Whether it is in a Franks hearing or whatever motions they feel appropriate. To attack those affidavits are appropriate there.

Any request for relief in the forfeiture matter by way of a Monsanto-type hearing, which is what the government believes is appropriate, given the type of relief the defense is requesting, that is more appropriate here. All of the type of relief that implicate the ultimate decisions this Court is going to have to make, those decisions should be made here in Arizona.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. KUCERA: Certainly.

THE COURT: I want to address Docket Number 360 right now, which is the Emergency Motion to Stay Seizures of

Attorneys' Fees and Request for Immediate Hearing. It's an eight-page document.

Which counsel would like to make an argument?

And for the record, since we have so many lawyers in the courtroom, please announce who you are before you start arguing.

Go ahead, sir.

MR. PICCARRETA: Mike Piccarreta representing Mr. Padilla.

Judge, in order to what we thought would be best to move it smoothly is we have divided the argument by areas and levels of expertise.

I will make the main argument, and with the Court's permission, Mr. Grant and Mr. Cambria will discuss the First Amendment implications and Ms. Bernstein will discuss particulars of forfeiture. I will provide the Court with background and discuss the Sixth Amendment issues with the Court.

THE COURT: You know, I am fine with that, but I just want to make sure it is done in an orderly way. This is the way we need to do it.

I am going to address Document Number 360, which I stated before, this emergency motion, and we'll also talk about the government's response, which is Document Number 371. The defendants' joint reply, which is Document Number 382. The

joinders and supplements to those joinders, which are Document Numbers 363, 365, 366, and 370, and then we will go on to the next matter.

Because the next matter will be Docket Number 365, which is the motion to stay the seizure, the different one, and then the last item we will take up is Document Number 376. So just to make sure we keep everything in order.

But, go ahead, sir.

MR. PICCARRETA: Okay. Judge, this issue here is unique for me. I have been practicing law 40-plus years and never been placed or had my client placed in this position, and I think it's unique to most if not all of the other counsel, and the Court can rest on its own experience to understand how often these things come up.

But I think it's important to recognize that this issue involves very serious constitutional issues relating to the Sixth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment and a quintello with the Fourth Amendment, and possibly later on including the Eighth Amendment. So these are issues that need to be raised before this Court for case management functions and for the orderly flow of the case.

Now, in terms of history, this investigation began in 2013 in Washington and eventually was subsumed here in Arizona. We began representing Mr. Padilla in January of 2017 and began to get up on the case.

Mr. Padilla's agreement, and as an employee of Backpage and related entities, he was essentially an editor, which is what we call a moderator. His job was to enforce third-party postings on their web platform to make sure they conform with the terms of use of the website.

He was not agreed and never agreed to be the monitor of unknown people's behavior at some unknown date at some unknown location, and never wanted or accepted that responsibility.

As part of his employment, the agreement is that legal fees, if civil or criminal matters arose, would be advanced to the employee. And in this case, legal fees were advanced to the employee in 2017.

The funds came from a Backpage-related entity and were placed in my trust account, and I always viewed those funds, although coming from the employer, were essentially my obligations were to Mr. Padilla and viewed those funds as part of his employment compensation.

Now, a case goes on, we meet with the government.

Mr. Padilla listens to the government's theory of prosecution.

We found it unpersuasive and declined to resolve the case.

We did offer to make a proffer if it was immunized and tell them everything we know and explain where we felt they were off on the wrong tangent. That did not -- and offered to voluntarily surrender ourselves because he has medical issues.

Instead there's early morning raids, arrest warrants, he's incarcerated for the weekend, and then essentially released to supervision to Pretrial Services.

The indictment comes in March of 2018. I was advised by two defense counsel that the government had represented to them that they would not be seizing trust accounts. I had no such conversations with the government.

The indictment, we have a status conference in April

THE COURT: Sir, just to make sure you are aware and everyone else, I am very, very familiar with the history of the case. So you can just cut through all of that, if you will.

I need to know positions as it relates to interfering with warrants issued by a different federal court, Article III court in California.

MR. PICCARRETA: Yes, Your Honor.

All right. Well, the point is, we are representing, and literally the first time the government mentions fees is in May. And we -- and we exchange letters and we handle the case. There's no mention after an exchange of letters of seizure of fees and we proceed accordingly.

You will note in the order of forfeiture for defendants who cooperated, their attorneys are permitted to keep the same fees from similar sources since they have apparently worked out an agreement.

We then learn for the first time in November, with a phone call saying that they had executed seizure warrants.

Then for the court's warrants, we were not parties to the Los Angeles civil forfeiture matters, however -- because it didn't impact our rights.

Mr. Padilla's home is threatened with seizure after conviction, so -- and we haven't really had to do much for that. But now we are in a position where the government literally seven months indictment, almost two years after my representation began, has now executed an exparte seizure warrant to seize the fees.

And we come to you because we are -- you are the judge in the criminal case. You are the case where it appears. You are the case that has equitable jurisdiction over this. You are the person who has control over case management. And as the government has indicated, they are agreeable, although they try and parse their words to having the forfeiture matters handled here.

And I think it is important in that, Judge, to look at the order in the United States District Court for the Central District when the Judge stayed all of those matters relating to the seizure warrant.

In that case, the matters were stayed and he did not want to rule on the motion to challenge the seizure of the warrant. So the government knows that if this goes back, this

matter will be stayed. We will file motions to withdraw, eventually other lawyers will all file motions to withdraw, and the whole shape of the case and tenor of raising all the issues that need to be raised will be over for myself, Mr. Weiss, and likely the other counsel.

Now, when you look at the Judge's order, and I urge the Court to look at that, the Court there indicated, A, that the District Court citing the Landis case, has the power to stay proceedings incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy and time and effort from counsel and litigants. So their order cites a Supreme Court case granting district courts have power.

Secondly, he says determinations made by that court there would ultimately have conclusion effect here. So they indicate there that the Court saw no reason why the pending motions relating to the seizure warrants could not be brought in the criminal action.

The Court stayed it, and by court order, suggested this is the place to deal with the seizure warrants. And now you are in that position because it's going to impact the case, the litigants, and Mr. Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.

THE COURT: Just one moment, sir. My apologies for interrupting you.

1 Mr. Rapp, is that the government's position on the 2 Central District's order? MR. KUCERA: No, Your Honor. That is -- John Kucera 3 4 on behalf of the United States. That is not the government's 5 position. I am happy to address that more fully, if you would like. 6 7 THE COURT: No, I will allow you to once the defense has finished, but I just wanted to clarify that issue. 8 9 I'm sorry, sir. Go ahead. 10 MR. PICCARRETA: Would the Court like a copy? 11 THE COURT: I have a copy. It is right in front of 12 me. 13 MR. PICCARRETA: Okay. So you are faced with a 14 situation where a defendant comes to you and says, unless this 15 seizure order is stayed, I can't have the lawyer of my choosing 16 who has been with me for two years, and for a moment, I try to 17 put myself in my client's shoes as to what that feels like. 18 And the Court, I think, has -- well, discretion to 19 handle matters that have been presented to it for decision that 20 affect the constitutional rights and potentially outcome of the 21 case that's pending before it. 22 And, Your Honor, I think the other issue is the Court 23 has the power also, under laches as to the government's delay 24 in doing this until all of us have spent considerable time and 25 energy, including this Court, trying to work through issues.

And you can't look at this in isolation, Your Honor.

And that's why we are suggesting to the Court that -- I thought we said that in our pleadings -- that the Court continue the stay order and set a briefing schedule. Because all of us did this as best we can under tight circumstances, including the government.

As to what type of hearing should the Court hold, as to what sanction, if any, is going to be appropriate, whether or not to resolve the legal issues relating to the First Amendment seizure of -- excuse me, the seizure of First Amendment proceeds and how the Court wishes to handle that as it does.

I think once the stay order is in effect and the funds unseized, then the Court can proceed with how to handle the situation.

Now, in terms of history. I know the Court is aware of it, but from our perspective, there has been overreaching in this case, from the execution of the search warrants, to the seizure of personal property, to the seizure of unrelated assets and other things related to Mr. Padilla, related to others, to -- after motions are filed in California, federal seizures of the trust account of our First Amendment counsel, there, attempts to conflict counsel, get them off the case, we held a whole hearing, we spent a lot of energy and the Court wisely permitted him to stay, and then lo and behold, within a

week or two of the Court's order, there's seizure warrants for IOLTA trust accounts of a variety of lawyers, some of those were held in trust to be used to defend these defendants in these cases.

So I think, Your Honor, this is not an isolated, what we view, as attack on our clients' Sixth Amendment rights. And I mentioned last time that there were issues that were occurring, occurring, occurring, occurring, but this now, has elevated it to a matter that impacts your case before your court for these defendants and particularly, my client.

And we view it, essentially as a motion to remove Mr. Padilla's counsel of choice and Ms. Vaught's counsel of choice, and if successful, eventually all of the counsel of choice.

Now -- and I think in terms of case law, we are getting close to the issue that was raised in *U.S. v. Stein*, where the Court -- where the government had interference with advancement of legal fees for a variety of defendants. And here, that is what is going on.

And the Stein court, in the Second Circuit, felt the remedy was dismissal of the prosecution.

Now, we haven't filed that motion, but *Stein* is very good authority for the Court to review and decide it.

So, Your Honor, I think what you have here is a presumed innocent defendant. A defendant who has asserted his

innocence. A defendant who has rejected plea bargains, who has litigated the case, I think fairly but vigorously with these seven months, and after raising issues with the government, some successful, some unsuccessful, trust accounts get seized, which would remove counsel.

And I think under those circumstances, we have -- we have alleged a prima facie case for the Sixth Amendment.

The Court clearly has jurisdiction over the forfeitures as indicated by the government. They want to bounce us back and forth like a ping pong ball going back to California so there they can get a stay and get the same result that they got for the other ones.

And interestingly, when they got a stay, it didn't stay them, they continued with more and more seizure warrants of lawyers' IOLTA accounts.

THE COURT: And, sir, my apologies again for interrupting you, but it is my understanding that the arguments being advanced this morning have already been fully briefed in the Central District of California. Is that correct?

MR. PICCARRETA: Not the Sixth Amendment, I believe -- actually, I wasn't a party to that.

THE COURT: But you are very familiar with the litigation.

MR. PICCARRETA: Yes. But the Sixth Amendment issue that I am discussing relates to the criminal case. I don't

believe that there's Sixth Amendment issues in forfeiture cases, but I haven't studied them quite yet. But what I am raising has not been briefed and studied by the judge in California. But I do think that issues were raised and other people who are familiar with that will speak to that, that resulted in the order that we -- that I referred to earlier.

THE COURT: Do you know of any other districts where the proceedings on the same warrants have already been decided?

MR. PICCARRETA: The only -- I don't think it has been decided really anywhere. I think the Central District, which is the home to Mr. Kucera, which seems to be why that district was chosen for these as opposed to here, litigated that and there's the issue where essentially no result, we can't get a hearing which implicates all of the First Amendment issues, which I would like to have -- Mr. Grant will address on my behalf.

Finally, Judge, I urge you to continue the stay. The Court clearly has discretionary jurisdiction for the reasons that I've already indicated. Release the seizure warrant and set a briefing schedule where we can brief all of the issues that are subsumed by this and are presented to this Court.

Because if not here, where? If not now, when? And as of right now, we can't in the Central District, which is why they are suggesting let's take it to the Central District, I have no reason to believe that it won't be the same order where

the Central District writes what they wrote and indicates that it might be best heard over here, and then we'll come back here again. So we have spent a lot of time and drained a lot of money on collateral issues, conflicts, disclosure, document dumps, now seizure of attorneys' fees, and in the interim, we haven't even really gotten to the merits of the case. And if we start over with new counsel, this thing gets pushed further, further away.

It might -- you know, it may not be done for tactical advantage, but the result is identical from our point of view that these pleadings and these motions and these seizures of IOLTA counsel in the middle of our case, do give them great tactical advantage, disrupts the process, and implicate Mr. Padilla's Sixth Amendment right, and I will let -- Mr. Grant can fill you in on the First Amendment issues.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Grant.

MR. GRANT: Sir. Jim Grant on behalf of Mr. Larkin and Lacey.

Let me start with trying to address the question the Court had asked about why we are here in this court raising these issues, as we have raised similar issues in the Central District of California.

And, Your Honor, the answer is because the seizures

that occurred here related to the attorney trust accounts stem from a profound constitutional violation. That is true of other seizures as well that the government has effected.

But the question in the first instance is, can the government seize First Amendment protected assets, and by doing so, in this case, inhibit, restrict, or prohibit the defendant's right to defend the case?

So here we have a combination not only of the First Amendment issues, but also the Sixth Amendment issues, as well as the Fourth and the Fifth. And they are issues that directly affect this Court and its ability to proceed with this case, and directly affect the defendants' ability to defend this case. That's why we are here.

Constitutional issue and constitutional violation should be raised in any court in which it is affecting the proceedings of that court. That's why we are here.

We sort of have given the Court a preview of the First Amendment issues in this case, and yes, they have been briefed as well in the Central District of California. And I wanted to touch on that. Because the point of our motion today is to continue the stay to allow the Court to fully consider whether the government had any power to effect these seizures in the first place. And under the First Amendment, the government did not have the power to effect these seizures.

The premise of the First Amendment and the premise of

Fort Wayne Books, is that the government cannot seize First Amended related materials, First Amendment related assets, cannot do that absent an adversary proceeding that finds that the materials are illegal speech or that there is illegal conduct that derives from those materials as to specific materials and specific defendants. We don't have that in this case. All we have is a probable cause determination of a —based on a warrant that's been issued by the Central District of California.

Fort Wayne Books tells us that a probable cause determination is not sufficient for seizure of First Amendment related materials and assets.

And that makes abundant sense. Because the law is, that it is always the government's burden to prove the illegality of speech. It is never permissible for the government to presume that speech is unconstitutional or violates the First Amendment.

And so the presumption is that in all instances, the speech is constitutionally protected, first until the government proves otherwise, and the government must do so by a conclusive finding, not simply a determination of probable cause. That's what Fort Wayne Books holds.

We don't have any determination to that effect here. What we have merely is the government saying that we allege that the speech somehow led to some sort of illegal conduct.

The government's presumption is that every ad ever to have run on Backpage was illegal, that therefore, every dollar that was ever derived and revenues from Backpage is illegal and therefore the government can seize every dollar related in any way, directly or indirectly, to Backpage.

Your Honor, I suggest that that is such an overbroad interpretation of any version of seizure that it would be struck down and should be struck down in a heartbeat.

So the problem we face is, we need to present that constitutional issue. We need to present the violation of the First Amendment to this court here in order to protect not only the rights of the defendants under the Fifth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment, but to protect her abilities to defend this case at all. That's the reason that we are here in this case.

As I say, Your Honor, we have given you sort of a preview of the First Amendment issues here. In effect, the government's response to that has all been about, this should be heard in another court, it shouldn't be heard at all until after there's some sort of criminal conviction, that we have essentially no right to challenge the seizures in the first instance. And I suggest that's entirely wrong.

Because the constitutional flaw, which has occurred at the outset here of the seizures occurring in the first instance, the constitutional flaw trumps whatever statutory gamesmanship they want to play about, we should be in the

Central District of California, we should be in the District of Arizona. The statute should preclude us from bringing any kind of challenges until later. The constitutional flaw here is that they couldn't accomplish the seizures in the first instance.

The gist of what the government has effectively accomplished is to shut down a website, to pursue the defendants and every dollar the defendants have, to do that all based on a presumption of theirs that some speech, somewhere perhaps was illegal and that something maybe was directly related to that illegality. Your Honor, I suggest that that's not permissible. That's not a basis that they can pursue.

I think where we are in the process at this stage is the Court unfortunately has stayed the ongoing seizures of the government as to the attorney retainer accounts, I urge the Court should maintain that status quo for present purposes, that we should turn to a more complete briefing. It is effectively like the Court has entered a TRO for the time being. Now we should move for preliminary injunction to continue that stay and to fully address the First Amendment issues, the Fourth Amendment issues, Sixth Amendment issues as well. I can go further as to the constitutional flaws, or if the Court has questions, I can respond as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Grant, I don't have any questions.

MR. GRANT: All right.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Who is next?

MR. WEISS: Your Honor, Steve Weiss on behalf of Joye Vaught. I will be very brief. I concur with the remarks made by Mr. Piccarreta, particularly with respect to the Sixth Amendment issue here.

I differ in terms of my relationship with Ms. Vaught, in terms of the time, because I have only been representing her since the end of March of this year.

In fact, I was meeting with her in April, early April, when by happenstance we learned that there was arrest warrants out and I then voluntarily surrendered her and she was released to the custody and supervision of Pretrial Services. And I will come back to that in a moment as to why I think it is important.

If the money that I hold in trust for her for fees is seized, Ms. Vaught is, and I will state to the Court, unable to afford attorney of her choice, which is the essence of the Sixth Amendment.

And it seems to me, in the government's papers, there was some reference to the fact that we, when I say "we,"

Mr. Padilla and Ms. Vaught, had not made any showing that they would be unable to retain counsel.

So what I say to the Court is that I think it is apparent as to Joye Vaught, from her Pretrial Services Report,

that she would be unable to obtain, afford counsel, I think even just in a felony case, let alone a case, a monumental case of this nature. The government has a copy of that, and so they know that she is unable to retain counsel.

However, if the Court feels it appropriate or necessary, I am prepared under seal and ex parte with the Court's permission to file an affidavit with the court to establish that, and I believe that's the same as to Mr. Piccarreta's client, that he is prepared to submit an affidavit to substantiate their inability to retain counsel, which is the essence of the Sixth Amendment issue.

I mention the recency of my representation only to underscore the fact that the government could have taken this action months ago and did not, and it would have been, I believe, potentially less disruptive to this Court's functioning and overseeing of this case.

I don't know why they waited seven months to do this, and -- I don't know. Perhaps they will tell us.

In any event, I also will say to the Court that

Ms. Vaught has filed a claim for money of the fees in the

ancillary proceedings. She believes that as an employee -- and

she was a low-level employee. She was for a couple of years an

editor, essentially, called a moderator, and then she became a

liaison with the national association -- National Center for

Missing and Exploited Children.

She believes that she has a legal right to the fees that she has received. And that's obviously, though, a matter for another day.

So I join in the request made by Mr. Piccarreta to stay the seizure of the fees until there's a definitive ruling on the legality of the seizure. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CAMBRIA: Morning, Your Honor. If I may, Paul Cambria on behalf of Mr. Lacey.

Your Honor, we would urge you to continue the stay for several simple and clear reasons.

There's no doubt, number one, that this is a First

Amendment case. These are publishing activities. We have had

case after case of litigation, both state and federal,

indicating that these are First Amendment activities.

And the second thing is, since they are First

Amendment activities, any forfeiture of the proceeds of First

Amendment activities under the Supreme Court's decision in the

Simon & Schuster case, are protected and a special, if you

will, set of rules apply before there can be a lawful seizure

of those proceeds.

And the government has never denied, and I submit to you today that they cannot deny and if -- and I know Your Honor is familiar with the *Fort Wayne Books* case now, but that case makes it clear that when we are talking about First Amendment

proceeds, there are special rules.

You cannot have a lawful seizure unless there has been a adversary proceeding. There has been no adversary proceeding that has occurred as a result of any seizure of any of the funds. So the government clearly has violated the Fort Wayne Books rules with regard to First Amendment proceeds, because they have never engaged in an adversary proceeding.

They say in their papers repeatedly, well, there's probable cause. There was probable cause before the grand jury. They allege there was probable cause and that the District Court in California found probable cause.

When we read the Fort Wayne Books case, the case clearly says probable cause alone is not sufficient to seize First Amendment proceeds.

THE COURT: Sir, let me just stop you for a minute.

Mr. Kucera, is that your read on Fort Wayne Books?

MR. KUCERA: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: Tell me what your thoughts are.

MR. KUCERA: Your Honor, I will defer to AUSA Rapp, but in general the government's position is that all the cases that defense counsel have been citing relate to specifically books themselves or speech itself and the facilitating funds that are used to allow that very speech, not the profits that have been derived from any type of alleged First Amendment --

Since Mr. Rapp is the resident expert for

the government, I will let him speak.

MR. RAPP: Well, so, the Fort Wayne Books, Inc. versus Indiana, if it is the same Fort Wayne case that Mr. Cambria is referring to, that talks about the pretrial seizure of thousands of books and films. It doesn't apply to the seizure of the proceeds of a criminal enterprise after the CEO has pled guilty.

The case he is citing is inapposite. The case -
THE COURT: Mr. Rapp, when it's the government's turn,

I will let you finish up. That's all I needed.

Go ahead, sir.

MR. CAMBRIA: Yes, sir. What Mr. Rapp was leaving out is the Simon & Schuster case. That case makes it clear that proceeds generated from publishing activities, which is what we have here, are 100 percent protected by the First Amendment.

And what the government is failing to see is number one, they are not acknowledging, and I think it's quite interesting and telling that every single time we have alleged a First Amendment violation, they have never discussed it or met it or tried to convince a judge somewhere that that rule didn't apply.

But it's as follows, Simon & Schuster covers proceeds.

Here the monies that they have seized are proceeds of First

Amendment activity. The publishing, et cetera, by Backpage.

Fort Wayne makes it clear that anything that's related to the

First Amendment requires a prior adversary hearing.

So we have never had a prior adversary hearing. We clearly have proceeds under Simon & Schuster. They have not distinguished Simon & Schuster. It doesn't matter if

Mr. Ferrer or somebody else pleads guilty as part of a plea bargain, the Supreme Court made it clear, in order to take

First Amendment proceeds, you must have more than probable cause and it must be an adversary proceeding. That's what those two cases say.

And I would submit, Your Honor, that has not happened.

And so each seizure here is unlawful.

And, Your Honor, we are in front of you -- my client is here indicted in this courtroom. You stand between my client and the government. We come here for your assistance.

When we were in California, they said we should be here. When we are here, they say we should be there. They picked California. We didn't pick California. We are satisfied being here and asking you to apply Fort Wayne Books and Simon & Schuster. And we see that each of these seizures are unlawful.

As we sit here today, they are unlawful and they should be reversed, and we should be able to come to a court and have relief when there's a clear constitutional violation, which there is here under those two cases.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MS. BERNSTEIN: Whitney Bernstein, Your Honor.

I think the issues of the asset forfeiture are well addressed in all of the pleadings that the Court has mentioned it's taking under submission this morning as well as in the response.

The government's opposition, and in other filings the government has made, the government attempts to continue to shoehorn and mischaracterize defendants' motions as a 41(g) and request for the return of property. That's not what it is, and that's never what we have alleged.

The government has engineered this entire situation to relegate defendants to the realm of third-party claimants. The government went and forfeited, seized and is attempting to forfeit these attorney fees that were intended for the defense of Mr. Larkin, Mr. Lacey, Mr. Brunst, and Mr. Spears.

Even if 41(g) would be a remedy that might have been able to apply, it is certainly not the only one. And as a matter of constitutional rights, the government cannot seize all of the money and the attorneys' fees intended for the defense of these defendants that the government has seized without making the requisite showings as been laid out by my colleagues.

Whether there's another avenue under 41(g) is not the issue here, and the government continues to raise the strawman

argument to mischaracterize our pleadings because that's what they want to fight about instead of addressing the issues that have been raised.

No one has raised 41(g) other than the government. It is inapplicable as an equitable remedy. Because there are remedies at law available. The remedies at law available might be an ancillary hearing, and the government has taken the position in at least three pleadings, in their response in this case, as well as their response to our motion to stay the ancillary hearing and the related dockets of 18-CR-465 and 18-CR-464, the government has taken the position that the remedy at law is also indefinitely unavailable.

Like my colleagues that have come before me, Your Honor, we are here asking this Court to permit us to access money, both money that is clean, which I assume the Court wants to take up later, and that relates directly to Mr. Larkin's motion at 377, we are asking this Court to permit us to access money that is unrelated to Backpage and money that is in the attorney retainer accounts that is designated and intended for the use of these defendants.

I'm happy to respond to further questions or take up 377 now if the Court would like.

THE COURT: We will take up 377 later.

Thank you very much.

MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you.

MR. FEDER: Bruce Feder.

While I was listening to the arguments, and then I heard Mr. Rapp start talking about how the First Amendment doesn't apply to the proceeds that they claim, I was reading their response, which is 371, and nowhere in that response is there any discussion about the First Amendment and how Fort Wayne Books or Simon & Schuster does not apply to this situation.

And I would ask the Court, as has already been requested, that if the Court has any question at all about whether or not those two Supreme Court decisions apply to this situation, and require the government to prove in an adversarial hearing that they have lawfully seized these assets, we can have a briefing schedule that the Court would think — and we could at least have the benefit of hearing, other than Mr. Rapp's assertion, the benefit of the government's position in writing with case law cited.

And but for the interim, the Court should continue the stays of the fees.

MR. NEUMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ariel Neuman for Mr. Brunst.

And I just want to briefly address the perspective that the Court hasn't heard. And why we joined in Mr. Padilla and Vaught's motion is, essentially, we have an interest in this case proceeding a pace, and the Court controlling its

docket, controlling the case, and the orderly administration of justice.

It will affect Mr. Brunst and the other defendants significantly if counsel is forced to withdraw. We are now however many months into this case, significantly down the road with complicated issues, as the Court is getting a small taste of today.

And we are going to start all over, or at least two counsel potentially are going to start all over, which is going to cause the rest of us to start all over.

And why does that matter? It matters more than in a typical case. This is not the typical case for a whole host of reasons.

The Court has again got a brief taste of why that is.

We have these First Amendment issues layered on top of many

complicated issues, the whole history of litigation, court

decisions behind us.

But beyond that, it's not typical in the way that the government has treated the defendants. It is not typical in the way that the government has essentially tried to financially strangle these defendants at every turn. And I will just give the Court one example.

Our client had an account seized where there was literally maybe 10, 20 dollars that could be traced back to Backpage-derived proceeds. We're talking millions of dollars

seized.

Our client is unable essentially to fund his life.

And, yeah, that's a bit more extreme, but that's where we are at this point, that if we are talking about a case that's going to proceed, at this point, into January of 2020, potentially longer given our conversation at the last hearing, our client needs to have some resolution here. And our client needs to see this thing resolved expeditiously.

Because what we expect is that at the end of the day, those funds are going to be returned, whether through this proceeding that we are asking for here, or whether at the end of this case when everything is resolved.

And so we need to see this forward, and that's our request, Your Honor, that the Court -- yeah, there's no reason, we haven't yet heard a single reason for this delay.

And one of my colleagues brought it up, this has been kind of — it would be a different situation if we were back in March and the government came in and seized. There's been no change in circumstances. They were well aware of these funds in the attorney accounts several months ago. We have no explanation for why this is suddenly occurring. There's theories that we have about what's happened in the interim, in terms of what's happened in this courtroom in the interim.

But putting that aside, there's no reason for this delay. No justification. Further delay, essentially starting

over say another eight months ago, putting us back there, will cause significant hardship to our client and quite frankly interferes with this Court's administration of justice in this case.

So we would ask the stay be extended and as well, that the Court hold the further hearing that has been discussed today.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. CHAPMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Anne Chapman.

Your Honor, I don't have much to add other than that the movants who are at issue in the pleading that I filed, which was 365, have Sixth Amendment implicated rights, which I think Your Honor has been provided with.

And the constitutional infirmities that affect the seizures by all the defendants apply with equal force to the movants. And so the Sixth Amendment issues I think are properly addressed at a later time. I can answer questions about those if you have them, but I do think you were provided that information with the pleading.

THE COURT: Ms. Chapman, I just need you to clarify your position that you are bringing the motion on behalf of the witnesses in this case. Why do these parties have standing to challenge the warrants in a different district?

MS. CHAPMAN: Well, Your Honor, the warrant is with

respect to funds that were -- are in our account in the District of Arizona, which would require service of the warrant in the District of Arizona, Your Honor. And I think the government acknowledges that in their response.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. CHAPMAN: So, Your Honor, we essentially are requesting the same relief, that Your Honor hold a hearing — continue the stay, hold hearing on the constitutionality of the seizure, and, again, we can address any related issues with respect to the Sixth Amendment or indigency at an appropriate time if it's appropriate, but it's premature at this point when the constitutionality of the seizure remains in question.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Is there anyone else from the defense?

Government?

MR. KUCERA: Thank you, Your Honor.

John Kucera on behalf of the United States. There has been a lot of questions about the government's intent and what has been called inexcusable delay, laches, sort of efforts to obstruct this Court's calendar and docket by bringing these seizure warrants at different dates.

THE COURT: What they're basically trying to say is that you're trying to choke out their clients, to take funds away from them representing their clients and starting the case over.

MR. KUCERA: Understood, and I will respond to that.

But I think it is important to first address their concerns

about and their allegations that we are doing this tactically

in stages in order to make them have to reset. That is not the

case.

When they are asking why it is that the government has done this several months later, the grand jury returned indictments alleging, among other things, concealment money, money laundering, and defendants were successful to varying degrees at concealing it.

We have been actively pursuing and tracing assets as they moved all around the world, sometimes overseas, frequently overseas --

THE COURT: But surely you are not making an argument that part of the concealment is through attorney-client funds?

MR. KUCERA: Part of the concealment resulted in funds being deposited into IOLTA accounts, and so we have had a hard time, because of the efforts to conceal, to trace these assets.

THE COURT: So by making that kind of argument, are you also saying that there's a potential that the United States Government might find these lawyers complicit and they might be part of the conspiracy if you can show direct knowledge of that?

MR. KUCERA: Your Honor, the government is not prepared to say that. Is there some theoretical possibility

that some attorneys somewhere could have been engineering this and part of the conspiracy? I supposed so, but no one from the government is saying that now. No one — there's nothing that anyone is saying that any of — the government is in no way alleging that there's any knowledge of wrongdoing now on the part of any of the attorneys before you today.

The only thing that I am saying is that, addressing defendants' argument that this has been some sort of tactic by the government to delay and to hold out, draw out the time that we were effecting these seizures, that is not the case.

This is a complicated case involving the movement of money across multiple countries, multiple jurisdictions and tracing these assets is a complicated and time-consuming endeavor that frequently requires MLATs to other countries and participation by other countries and being able to see where assets are moving.

As you have seen, part of the reason why we delayed executing these warrants immediately was because we had problems with another IOLTA account previously. Because while we concede the hopping of money from bank to bank, very often we can't see the internal transfer of money from one account at say Bank of America to another account at Bank of America. That's not information that is immediately apparent.

And so in a previous matter, previous seizure, the government inadvertently seized the wrong funds. And so in an

effort to avoid that type of confusion and avoid any type of hardship to these attorneys, the government got the seizure warrants, called up the attorneys and said, we are hoping to do this in the least disruptive way possible.

Our effort is to try and do what we are allowed to do by law but nothing further. We want to minimize any collateral damage, any collateral consequences. And in some ways, the government believes that no good deed goes unpunished and we are here now in what the government believes is the wrong venue for this fight.

That brings me to the next point. Had defendants initially framed their position in CDCA, not as a request for the return of funds but as a Franks motion, saying that there was something defective about the affidavit, that the affidavit included material misrepresentations or omissions and should have more fully fleshed out the First Amendment issues and neglected to inform the Court in California of these issues, we might not be here today. We might have had that issue resolved in CDCA. That is the proper venue for this motion now.

Before the Court is only a question about staying the execution of these warrants until such time as a decision can be made.

The government has agreed to stay it. My suggestion going forward is that we would continue to agree to stay to allow the defendants to bring whatever motions they feel

appropriate in CDCA to challenge this affidavit, if that's what they believe needs to be done. We would not object to such a request.

But any extension of a stay, the government believes needs to be analyzed under an injunctive theory.

I don't want to get too deep into the weeds on any of the issues regarding the First Amendment, because I don't believe that's properly before this Court. I don't think that's what these motions were set out to accomplish, and I think that they have been piggybacked into the court for today's purposes.

There's a proper proceeding for that. It is a 
Monsanto hearing, or if they want to attack it in a Franks-type 
proceeding in California on the affidavit, that's fine.

Defense has characterized those cases as being stayed. Very specific cases have been stayed. None of the affidavits that are seeking seizure of assets that are before the Court today have been stayed.

Defendants are free to go into California and challenge those affidavits by whatever proceeding they see fit.

The one point I would like to highlight for the Court is that defense counsel has got up again and again and said frequently, there is no money. There is no more money for defense if the government seizes this.

And that may or may not be true. There's a proceeding

to be able to find that out. There is a hearing that the government has been suggesting repeatedly could be brought before this Court if defense counsel chooses to do so. That is a tried and true path to do exactly what defense is trying to do.

They have mischaracterized the law in so many ways that I won't begin to try and disabuse the Court of it. The Court is capable of reading *Stein* on its own. *Stein* has almost literally nothing to do with the case that's before the Court today.

Stein is about assets that everyone agrees were not tainted, were not subject to forfeiture. No one at any point in Stein said that the assets that were being used to pay defense counsel in that case were in any way illicit. That case has absolutely nothing to do with the matter before the Court today.

I am happy to address any other questions, but the Court has all of the pleadings. I am confident the Court has read them.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions for you. Thank you.

MR. KUCERA: Thank you.

THE COURT: I will allow one defense counsel to address the government's argument.

You all can meet and confer and let me know.

```
1
          (Discussion between defense counsel held off the record.)
2
               THE COURT:
                           Lauren.
          (Discussion between the Court and law clerk held.)
3
 4
               MR. PICCARRETA:
                                Judge --
 5
               THE COURT: Can you speak into a microphone and tell
 6
      me who you are.
7
               MR. PICCARRETA: I'm sorry. Mike Piccarreta.
8
               Judge, would it be permissible if we had two people
 9
      just talk for no more than two minutes each?
10
               THE COURT: Yes.
11
               MR. PICCARRETA: Mr. Cambria will speak after me.
12
               Judge, the government tells you that all this --
               THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir. Can you speak into one of
13
14
      the microphones?
                        Just pick one.
                                        I have very poor hearing.
15
      want to make sure I hear everything.
16
               MR. PICCARRETA:
                                Me, too.
17
               Judge, the government talks about they needed this
18
      time to trace the funds.
19
               I met with them May 4th of this year where we had our
20
      initial discussion of my funds, and they told me about the
21
      funds.
              And there was no mystery, it went from account A, a
22
      Backpage subsidiary, to my trust account.
23
               And they have that in their seizure warrant. There's
24
                 This was no international entry. It just went boom,
25
      boom, just like every other transaction that comes into my
```

trust account. And they were well aware of that in May, and it's in their seizure warrant that shows that.

And, you know, Judge, Mr. Cambria will talk about Monsanto, but I have been told that the issues they want to send us back to L.A. to do again, when you read the judge's order, you saw his response to raising these issues, which I was told have been raised there.

And, yes, they have mountains of deficiencies in their seizure warrant, from Franks issues to omissions to withholding and noncompliance with the local rules.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, do you recall any Franks issues being brought to the attention of the Central District Court?

MR. PICCARRETA: They were -- in some of them, for that seizure warrant, were in the papers that the judge had and were stayed, and according to what he wrote, did not want to rule on because didn't want to prejudice the government and thought they would be best raised here. So here we are.

MR. GRANT: Your Honor, Jim Grant again.

I just wanted to briefly touch on I think what

Mr. Rapp was saying, because I think it's a profound

misunderstanding of how the First Amendment works and what Fort

Wayne Books holds and how it applies.

His position was that only has to do with actually seizing books or videos, it doesn't apply to seizing proceeds

from the activities of a publisher or distributor that are for First Amendment protected materials. That's flatly wrong.

The First Amendment protections apply to all sorts of different stages within the process. This is from Chief

Justice Roberts in Citizens United. "Suppressing speech may operate at different points in the speech process, including restrictions from requiring a permit from the outset, imposing a burden by impounding proceeds on receipts or royalties, seeking to exact a cost after the speech occurs, or subjecting the speaker to criminal penalties."

It's the equivalent here, Your Honor, of saying that, well, we didn't seize all of the ads on the website, although in fact the government did seize the website and that's the start of the whole process of their seizures, on the same probable cause assertions, but they are saying, well, we'll just take all the money from the publisher so the publisher can't act any longer, and that's okay. We can do that, but because we are not seeking the actual books or videos. Fundamentally, that's wrong.

If the government seizes the printing press, the government taxes the operation, if the government seizes all of the bank accounts of the publisher, all of those things infringe our First Amendment. All of those things are protected.

As Mr. Cambria points out, that's part of what Simon &

Schuster holds. But it's fundamentally a First Amendment proposition. That it's not simply the seizure of the suppressed materials by themselves, it applies as well in the seizure of the proceeds.

I also wanted to make one note about Mr. Kucera's comment about accidentally seizing an incorrect account. He's talking about the seizure that the government did of my firm's trust account. This was some months ago. Shortly after the disqualification motion.

But in the process of doing that, they served the seizure warrant on our bank. The bank actually then put a freeze on the entire trust account having to do with all of our various clients and obviously causing very severe problems for my firm.

We contacted the government immediately and said, what are you doing? And managed to work out an arrangement shortly thereafter, but it was a process that can be draconian, and that's exactly what the government did as to us.

THE COURT: Mr. Grant, how -- if you don't mind, how long did it take to resolve that mistake?

MR. GRANT: As to the -- well, I am not sure I can call it as mistake, Your Honor. But as to the initial change, we managed to do that in a couple of days.

As to the entire process from when the government first effected its seizure until most recently, when the

government finally indicated that -- they froze everything, including all of the amounts we earned for prior work and had yet not been paid. It took us two and a half months before the government actually released those funds for us to be able to use them.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. GRANT: You're welcome.

MR. KUCERA: If I may, Your Honor, just respond to that one last point? I think that mischaracterized what happened.

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. KUCERA: Thank you.

When the United States executed seizure warrants on the account that we were just discussing, the bank on its own decided to freeze all of the IOLTA accounts for that law firm.

THE COURT: Well, how is that possible when the government in its pleading, seizure pleading, specifically provides the bank with information with specific account numbers that will only be seized?

MR. KUCERA: My understanding of what happened is that the bank decided that the law firm was an anti-money laundering risk. That it was a risk under the Bank Secrecy Act. That's my understanding. They did not discuss it with me. That's the best of my knowledge.

THE COURT: Are you speculating that that's what the

bank thought?

MR. KUCERA: I am speculating, Your Honor, yes. Yes.

That's my guess. There's nothing that we did that indicated -
there's nothing in the government's seizure warrant that

indicated that all of the IOLTA accounts should be seized.

In discussing with opposing counsel, we came to a very quick agreement, I think this might have happened on a Thursday or a Friday, and we worked as quickly as we could. Our intent was not to do this, was not to shut them down, to make it as painless a process as possible.

THE COURT: Mr. Grant said it took two and a half months.

MR. KUCERA: And that's the part that I find a bit disingenuous. What took two and a half months was the government agreed to allow that money to -- the money the government was seeking, the undisputed portion that both parties agreed was subject to the seizure warrant, was handed over to the government.

There was another portion of funds that we -- the parties decided to analyze. The government explained that it had no interest in seizing earned funds.

We did not seek to seize any funds that counsel had said they already earned. And some portion of the funds that had been left in the account, counsel said were earned.

We asked counsel to provide documentation of how that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

was earned, what it was. Said redact whatever you feel needs to be redacted in order to protect attorney-client or any other privilege you feel you need to assert, and after that we will then go ahead, if we agree with your conclusions, we will agree that you can keep those funds. Those funds stayed in their IOLTA account, by agreement of the parties, pending this discussion. The way that it was just characterized was much more jack-booted thuggish than what actually happened. This was --Sorry, I'm not familiar. Maybe that's a THE COURT: Central District term. "Jack-booted thuggish," I don't understand that. What does that mean? MR. KUCERA: It's a term that I think came out of Ruby Ridge, where government employees were construed as jack-booted thugs for the way they handled various actions. I didn't mean to use a colloquialism. We were accused of being very heavy-handed by counsel. I don't think that that's what happened. I don't know that that's the proper construction of how the government treated this. THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Grant, if you will speak into the microphone, please.

MR. GRANT: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity.

Absolutely there was no suggestion by our bank that

there was any issue of money laundering or any concerns about that.

What actually happened was, when the government served the seizure warrant unannounced on our bank, the bank then puts a hold on all funds in the IOLTA account.

And we immediately went to the government and said, what is this? They said, oh, that often happens. That you will find out that the banks will freeze everything just because they received a warrant as to some piece of it.

And so, yeah, that can happen on occasion. So it was something apparently that they were familiar with. We were able to work out an arrangement in the near turn. Then it took us two and a half months of back and forth with the government to actually free up funds that we had recently applied.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. Thank you.

Next, I want to move to the second issue I have here.

It's Document Number 365, which is the Emergency Motion to Stay

Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Joinder in defendants Padilla

and Vaught's emergency motion.

I have the government's response, which is Document

Number -- I'm sorry, Docket Number 371. Counsel's reply to the
response, which is Docket Number 379. And I am prepared to
hear arguments on that. If you have any at this point.

Defense?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, Anne Chapman. If I am

correct, this is the emergency motion to stay on behalf of the movants, which was essentially asking Your Honor to determine the same constitutionality of the seizure as has been previously been discussed this morning and addressed in my earlier comments.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. CHAPMAN: So I don't have anything to add, Your Honor. I can answer any questions. I think we also provided you with information about the Sixth Amendment interests of these movements. If Your Honor has questions about that, I can answer them, but essentially the issues are as discussed by other counsel this morning, that we are in a pre-seizure process.

The government, I understand, has suggested several times we had to move to a post-seizure process. But we are asking that Your Honor consider the constitutionality of the seizure and the issues that have been previously discussed this morning with respect to the First, Fourth, and the Sixth Amendments. It would have the same effect on the movements — or the movants, rather, as it would on the defendants.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I was just giving you another opportunity.

MS. CHAPMAN: I appreciate it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Government?

MR. KUCERA: Nothing further unless the Court wants to

1 inquire, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: I don't have any questions for the 3 government on that either. 4 This is actually a perfect time to take our morning 5 Court will be in recess until 10:35. recess. (Recess taken at 10:18 a.m.; resumed at 10:37 a.m.) 6 7 THE COURT: This Court will come to order. parties present when the court last closed are present again. 8 9 The last thing I want to take up is Document Number 10 I know we have the arguments that have already been 11 presented in the earlier 360; however, I will give the defense 12 an opportunity. 13 376 is the Defendants' Emergency Motion to Stay 14 Seizure of Attorneys' Fees, and that's Defendant Michael Lacey, 15 James Larkin, John Brunst, Scott Spears. Emergency Motion to 16 Stay Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Request for an Immediate 17 Hearing. The supplemental brief is Document Number 377. 18 And Mr. Kucera, I am treating the government's 19 response as Document Number 371, since 371 was filed in the 360 20 original emergency motion to stay the seizure. Is that what 21 you would like? 22 MR. KUCERA: Notwithstanding the fact that these other 23 documents were filed after the response --24 THE COURT: Correct. 25 MR. KUCERA: -- yes, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: I mean, would your response be pretty much 2 the same? It's the same issue. 3 MR. KUCERA: Certainly along those same lines, yes, 4 Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will allow you an 6 opportunity to present on the record any additional information 7 you would like to as it relates to Docket Number 376, after I hear from the defense. 8 9 MR. KUCERA: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: You're welcome. 11 Is there anyone from the defense that wishes to place 12 anything else on the record as it relates to Document Number 376? 13 14 Briefly, Your Honor. 376 is the motion as MR. GRANT: 15 to Mr. Larkin, Lacey, Brunst, and Spear. THE COURT: For the record, Mr. Grant. I just wanted 16 17 to make sure I had your name. 18 MR. GRANT: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I forgot. 19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 20 It raises very similar issues, the same MR. GRANT: 21 impropriety of the government's seizure in the first instance. 22 The basic proposition here that -- we are not here to talk 23 about Monsanto issues until we first establish whether the 24 government's seizures in the first instance were permissible. 25 You don't begin to talk about Monsanto until we find out if

they are legal in the first instance.

And I want to point out one other -- and that is not the case here because the government couldn't effect the seizures under the First Amendment.

I wanted to point out one other thing as well, that the nature of the request here, of course, is we are asking the Court to permit us to proceed with the stay and be able to brief further and argue further about the government's seizures.

And the issue is not so much looking at the exact warrants that have been issued by the Central District of California, it would simply be — tell the government at this stage, we are going to maintain the status quo, there will be no seizures of attorney trust accounts going forward, in order to be able to address that issue. Without having to, you know, parse through the warrants in the Central District of California.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Anyone else?

Mr. Kucera?

MR. KUCERA: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly.

Defense counsel cites to Monsanto and points out just essentially generally to several pages of Monsanto, that

Monsanto stands for the proposition that the government must first establish the legality of its seizure prior to having

Monsanto hearing.

This isn't really found anywhere specifically. There is certainly no holding to that. But the government takes the point that there has to be some sort of legal mechanism by which the government takes hold of this property. The government submits that that's exactly what it did by going out and obtaining the seizure warrants based on probable cause from a federal magistrate.

This isn't a function of like a PC arrest or a PC seizure by an agent just at the discretion of the agent and then having a decision made by a court after the fact.

The government went through the procedure that it always goes through when it obtains a seizure warrant and does have lawful possession of the asset pursuant to a seizure warrant, or would have but for the stay.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

This is an oral decision.

After consideration of Defendant Andrew Padilla, Joye Vaught's Emergency Motion to Stay Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Request for Immediate Hearing, which is Document Number 360, the government's response, which is Document Number 371, the Defendants' Joint Reply, which is Docket Number 382, the joinders and supplements, which are Docket Numbers 363, 365, 363, and 370, this Court's also taken into consideration the arguments presented by counsel, and I rule as follows:

As it relates to Docket Number 360, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the seizure warrants at issue in the emergency warrant -- I'm sorry, the emergency motion.

It is well settled that a court should rarely interfere with the order of another Court as any such interference usurps the power of the rendering court.

Although courts have held that justice may occasionally demand this type of interference, the identification of those rare situations is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court.

See Ord versus United States and also Treadway versus

Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice demand that the nonrendering court should decline jurisdiction of an action and remand the parties for their relief to the rendering court.

See Delson Group Incorporated versus GSM Association, which is also a Ninth Circuit case.

Through the emergency motion, the defendants are seeking an order from this Court to interfere with two criminal seizure warrants that were issued upon findings of probable cause by a magistrate judge in the Central District of California.

This Court finds that the defendants have not set forth any persuasive reasons as to why this Court should interfere with the Central District of California's issuance of the search warrants, and this Court finds that the defendants have a sufficient legal remedy for any challenges to the seizure warrants issued by the Central District of California in that district.

Accordingly, the relief requested in the Defendants'

Emergency Motion to Stay Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Request

for Immediate Hearing, which is Document Number 360, is denied.

The temporary stay imposed by this Court's order, which is Document Number 361, is lifted and the government may move forward with execution of the seizure warrants at issue if so ordered.

As it relates to Docket Number 365, again, I have carefully considered the pleadings, which are the Emergency Motion to Stay the Seizure of Attorneys' Fees, which is Document Number 365. The government's response, which is Document Number 371. Counsel's reply to the response, which is document — I'm sorry, Docket Number 379, and the arguments of counsel.

Again, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the seizure warrants at issue in this emergency warrant, as already stated before, but since this is a different order because there was a different filing under Document Number 365,

it's well settled that a court should rarely interfere with the order of another court, as any such interference usurps the power of the rendering court.

Although courts have held that justice may occasionally demand this type of interference, the identification of those rare situations is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court.

See Ord versus United States or Treadway versus the

The Academy of Motion Picture and Arts and Sciences, both Ninth

Circuit cases.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice demand that the nonrendering court should decline jurisdiction of an action and remand the parties for their relief to the rendering court.

See Delson Group Incorporated versus GSM, which is a Ninth Circuit 2014 case.

Through the emergency motion, counsel seeks an order from this court to interfere with one criminal seizure warrant that was issued upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate judge in the Central District of California.

The movant has not set forth any persuasive reasons as to why this Court should interfere with the Central District of California's issuance of the seizure warrant, and this Court finds that the movant has sufficient legal remedy for any

challenges to the seizure warrant issued by the Central District of California in that district.

Accordingly, counsel's Emergency Motion to Stay
Seizure of Attorneys' Fees, which is Docket Number 365, is
denied.

The temporary stay imposed by this Court's order,

Docket Number 369, is lifted and the government may move

forward with executing the seizure warrants at issue if so

ordered.

And last, as it relates to Docket Number 376, this is the Court's oral decision, after consideration of defendant Michael Lacey, James Larkin, John Brunst, and Scott Spears' Emergency Motion to Stay Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Request for Immediate Hearing, which is Document Number 376, the supplemental brief, which is Document Number 377, and the government's response, which is nearly identical to the response 371, in the docket filing 360, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the seizure warrants at issue in the emergency motion.

It is well settled that the court should rarely interfere with the order of another court as any such interference usurps the power of the rendering court. Although courts have held that justice may occasionally demand this type of interference, the identification of those rare situations is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court.

See Ord versus United States, or Treadway versus The Academy of Motion Picture, Arts and Sciences, both Ninth Circuit cases.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice demand that the nonrendering court should decline jurisdiction of an action and remand parties for their relief to the rendering court.

See Delson Group Incorporated versus GSM, which is a Ninth Circuit 2014 case.

Through the emergency motion the defendants are seeking an order from this Court to interfere with nine criminal seizure warrants that were issued upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate judge in the Central District of California.

The defendants have not set forth any persuasive reasons as to why the Court should interfere with the Central District of California's issuance of the seizure warrants, and the Court finds that the defendants have sufficient legal remedy for any challenges to the seizure warrants issued by the Central District of California in that district.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Emergency Motion to Stay Seizure of Attorneys' Fees and Request for Immediate Hearing, which is Document Number 376, is denied. The temporary stay imposed by this Court's order, which was Document Number 384,

```
1
      is lifted and the government may move forward with the
2
      execution of the seizure warrants at issue, if so ordered.
3
               The hearing is adjourned.
 4
               MR. PICCARRETA: Judge, may I say one thing?
 5
               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry?
               MR. PICCARRETA: May I say one thing?
 6
 7
                           Sure.
                                  Go ahead.
               THE COURT:
               MR. PICCARRETA: I would ask the Court to continue
8
 9
      this stay --
10
               THE COURT: Can you speak into the microphone and tell
11
      me who you are?
12
               MR. PICCARRETA: Mike Piccarreta.
13
               Judge, we would ask the Court to stay these orders for
14
      seven days to allow us time to consider bringing motions in the
15
      Central District.
16
               THE COURT: Your request is denied.
17
               The hearing is adjourned.
18
               MS. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, may I address 377?
      didn't have an opportunity to do that. That was Mr. Larkin's
19
20
      supplemental brief.
21
               THE COURT:
                           I specifically asked you if there was any
22
      defense counsel that wished to address that issue.
23
                               I understood that to be about 376.
               MS. BERNSTEIN:
                                                                    Ι
24
      apologize.
25
               THE COURT:
                           Go ahead.
```

MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Especially in light of the Court's ruling just now,
we -- I do want to just highlight the issues that were raised
by Mr. Larkin in Document Number 377.

He is in an untenable position that the government has seized nearly all of his assets through Central District of California seizure warrants, which we did challenge. We raised and briefed the serious Franks issues that were present there. The government never responded to that on the merits. Instead said they could file a civil complaint. Filed a civil complaint. They sought the stay and obtained a stay. Now, the government has obtained the seizure of funds, of all other funds that were earmarked for Mr. Larkin's defense.

And additionally has put Mr. Larkin on notice that should he spend other money that he has from newspaper print proceeds, the government views that as somehow criminal, subjecting him to possible further charges, as well as further bond revocation.

Mr. Larkin owned a newspaper empire with the Phoenix New Times, SF Weekly, LA Weekly, Village Voice, Denver Westword, Dallas Observer, Miami New Times, many print newspapers. He had a history of running those. He -- they made millions of dollars.

They were sold and he continues to generate income from the sale of the newspaper. That is not Backpage money.

The government has — and has not seized that money, but the government has told Mr. Larkin that it will move to indict if he does spend that money. So he is in an untenable position that he can't use money that was earmarked for his defense as it was just restrained and seized, and he can't spend newspaper print proceeds without any repercussions.

And so we are seeking clarity as to what money

Mr. Larkin, if he is able to use those newspaper print proceeds

to fund his legal defense and his life.

THE COURT: Mr. Kucera, do you wish to respond to that -- or Mr. Rapp?

MR. RAPP: Well, first, this motion came in quite late, and our response to the previous dockets doesn't really address this. We haven't had a chance to respond. But in a word, I don't know what she is talking about.

THE COURT: I just asked co-counsel minutes ago if there was some additional information that the government wanted to place on the record and he had that opportunity. I don't know why -- what's your name again, ma'am?

MS. BERNSTEIN: Whitney Bernstein.

THE COURT: I don't know how you didn't understand when I asked the question about the emergency motion, Document Number 376, when I pointed to defense counsel if anyone had anything to place on the record. I don't know how you didn't understand my question.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

But Mr. Rapp, your co-counsel indicated that 371, the -- when I asked the question, should it serve as the response, he did say they had some additional information -- I don't recall what you said exactly, Mr. Kucera, but I provided the government with an opportunity to flush out the issue. So go ahead. MR. RAPP: Well, I think there's some confusion. were talking about 371. This is 377. This came in --THE COURT: No, there's no confusion. My question was, the issues raised in Docket Number 376 were similar to the issues raised in 360. I asked your co-counsel if he wanted to use 371 to serve as a response. Is that what I asked you, Mr. Kucera? MR. KUCERA: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So where's the confusion? This is 377, not 376. Maybe I could just cut to the chase. THE COURT: Did you hear what I just told you? I --MR. RAPP: THE COURT: We are here to address document number --Docket Number 376. I understand 377 -- is her supplemental brief, which is 377. That's why I asked Mr. Kucera that exact question, because I didn't receive a response from the government. Can we have a moment, Your Honor? MR. KUCERA:

1 THE COURT: Of course. 2 (Discussion between government counsel held off the 3 record.) 4 Judge, if the Court has any questions about 5 this motion, we are happy to respond to them. Is there anything from you? 6 THE COURT: Go ahead. 7 MS. BERNSTEIN: We are seeking the government's 8 position that if Mr. Larkin accesses, utilizes money that is 9 newspaper print proceeds for his legal defense or his life, we 10 have been put on notice from the government that they would 11 find that to be criminal. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Is this relief that you are requesting outside of what we were here for today? 13 14 No, Your Honor. I think it implicates MS. BERNSTEIN: 15 many of the same issues, it's just now, especially in light of the fact that the money earmarked for the defense has been 16 17 restrained, Mr. Larkin -- we need some clarity as to whether he 18 can spend money that is not restrained and not related to 19 Backpage without incurring additional criminal charges. 20 THE COURT: Is the government prepared to respond to 21 that? 22 The government is not prepared to respond MR. KUCERA: 23 to it and I cannot imagine any situation where the government ever would respond to the possibility of prospective action and 24

take a position on whether or not that action is subject to

25

indictment. THE COURT: Is there anything else you would like to place on the record? MS. BERNSTEIN: Would the Court entertain an evidentiary hearing upon further briefing at a later date as to this issue? THE COURT: No. This Court has ruled on the matters that were pending, which is Docket Number 360, Docket Number 365, and Docket Number 376. My ruling is on the record and the hearing is adjourned. MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings conclude at 10:58 a.m.) 

## CERTIFICATE I, ELVA CRUZ-LAUER, do hereby certify that I am duly appointed and qualified to act as Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of all of that portion of the proceedings contained herein, had in the above-entitled cause on the date specified therein, and that said transcript was prepared under my direction and control. DATED at Phoenix, Arizona, this 17th day of November, 2018. s/Elva Cruz-Lauer Elva Cruz-Lauer, RMR, CRR