<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
		<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
			<channel>
			<title>Reason Magazine - Staff</title>
			<link>http://www.reason.com/staff</link>
			<description></description>
			<managingEditor>info@reason.com (Reason Online)</managingEditor>
			<generator>http://www.pjdoland.com/chai/?v=0.1</generator>
			
<item>
<title>Divided We Stand</title>
<link>http://www.reason.com/news/show/30121.html</link>
<description> &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674197445/reasonmagazineA/&quot;&gt;Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy&lt;/a&gt;, by Michael J. Sandel, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 417 pages, $24.95

&lt;p&gt;In this well-written book, Michael J. Sandel offers a critical interpretation of the historical 
development and current state of the American social order--an interpretation that qualifies basically 
as &quot;anti-liberal,&quot; with varying communitarian, republican, and federalist sentiments. The narrative 
is straightforward. Until well into this century, argues Sandel, the United States was a civic 
republic, and criteria for political action were defined in terms of the traditional republican virtues. 
Important among these was active citizen participation in collective endeavor. Americans conceived 
themselves as &quot;belonging&quot; to the community or communities, as &quot;situated selves&quot; rather than 
&quot;unencumbered selves&quot; whose existence was of little import for others. Communality was almost 
necessarily defined by some relation to &quot;common good.&quot;

&lt;p&gt;Only with the onset of the &quot;procedural republic&quot; at mid-century and later, says Sandel, did 
politics come to be understood as neutral among competing definitions of the good, a neutrality that 
confined political action largely to furtherance of rights, along with the provision of commercially 
measurable program benefits demanded by constituents. Politics, in Sandel's view, divorced itself 
from moral purpose, and collective formation of value standards was ruled out of bounds. At the 
end of the 20th century, then, the term &lt;em&gt;public philosophy&lt;/em&gt;  verges on the oxymoronic. Sandel's 
presentation of this theme through careful and provocative review of this century's judicial rulings, 
especially those relating to religious liberty, is compelling.

&lt;p&gt;Sandel's basic supposition can scarcely be challenged. Empirically, persons are &quot;situated 
selves&quot; who are defined by both externally observable and subjectively sensed qualities that have 
never been explicitly chosen and that cannot be shucked off by an act of will.

&lt;p&gt;The issue of import is normative rather than positive. How and to what extent should persons, 
in both their private and public interactions, act as if they are unencumbered members of an 
inclusive political community (for example, the nation-state) that is itself much larger than any of 
the communities that might command their loyalties? Is social cohesion in the inclusive polity 
advanced or retarded when persons succumb to communitarian arguments that suggest the 
abandonment of any illusion of neutrality or nominal equality? Philosophers who stress the value 
of particularized community, as such, in settings where political and communal membership 
boundaries do not roughly correspond may promote breakdown in the minimal &lt;em&gt;modus vivendi&lt;/em&gt; that 
exists. For example, if racially based jury nullification was at work in the O.J. Simpson criminal 
trial, doesn't that assertion of black solidarity undermine a larger sense of community? Sandel does 
not respond, either explicitly or by implication, to these concerns that might be raised by defenders 
of procedural liberalism.

&lt;p&gt;Albert Hirschman's wonderful triadic title, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674276604/reasonmagazineA/&quot;&gt;Exit, Voice, and Loyalty&lt;/a&gt; (1976), offers a useful 
framework within which to discuss Sandel's argument. The presumed absence of political exit, 
along with the powerlessness of political voice in large-number settings and the necessarily diverse 
loyalties to many communities, creates the environment from which procedural liberalism almost 
inevitably rises to dominance. So, for instance, if any parents of children attending mandatory 
public schools find prayer offensive, the most likely outcome is that all prayers will be prohibited. 
In an environment without exit, failure to maintain political neutrality among competing 
conceptions of the good must involve coercive intrusion. But the very maintenance and 
enforcement of neutrality weakens any sense of community that members of the inclusive polity 
may have once possessed. The singular word &lt;em&gt;America&lt;/em&gt; in Sandel's subtitle might be read to suggest 
that a sense of national community must, somehow, be reinvigorated.

&lt;p&gt;Any such suggestion may be challenged, however, if political exit is introduced by the 
presence of effectively federalized structures that allow citizens to opt out of certain situations. 
Political authority need not be concentrated in a single government in America, or anywhere else. 
Power can be devolved to competing units within inclusive territorial jurisdictions. Potential 
mobility among competing political units, among the separate states in the United States, which are 
integrated in the country-wide economic nexus, may offer protection (beyond threshold limits) 
against political exploitation in any of several dimensions, including attempts to impose community 
values. The potential for exit allows at least some matching of personal loyalties and politically 
promoted common values, and some relief from the abstracted neutrality of procedural liberalism. 
Mormon values may, in fact, be good for Utah, but they remain so only because those who do not 
share these values can move elsewhere at nonprohibitive cost.

&lt;p&gt;The classical liberal spin that I have put on the communitarian argument here may not be fully 
acceptable to Sandel. Nonetheless, he should be sympathetic, as long as there are competing 
definitions of the good to be sought in collective association. Sandel does not elevate value 
pluralism to a central place in his discussion, however, so it is not clear how he would respond to 
this argument. He does not explicitly recognize the value of exit as a means of minimizing political 
exploitation, whether economic or moral. His gestures toward federalist alternatives stress instead 
the participatory advantages of smallness.

&lt;p&gt;A related weakness in Sandel's whole construction lies in his failure to appreciate the 
categorical distinction between market and political interdependence. He emphasizes the 
powerlessness of the individual in each setting. He does not recognize that, as individuals become 
increasingly dependent on &quot;the market,&quot; they become correspondingly less dependent on any 
identifiable person or group. In political action, by contrast, increasing dependence necessarily 
becomes increasing subjection to the authority of others.

&lt;p&gt;But on the whole, and despite Sandel's likely academic prejudices, he does not draw back 
from the ultimate implications of his diagnosis. He underscores the vulnerability of the centrally 
directed welfare state in the absence of national community, and he does not romanticize about 
national purpose. Instead, he states that there &quot;is reason to consider the unrealized possibilities 
implicit in American federalism. We commonly think of federalism as a constitutional doctrine that, 
once dominant, has recently been revived by conservatives who would shift power from the 
federal government to the states. But federalism is more than a theory of intergovernmental 
relations. It also stands for a political vision that offers an alternative to the sovereign state and the 
univocal political identities that such states require. It suggests that self-government works best 
when sovereignty is dispersed and citizenship formed across multiple sites of civic engagement. 
This aspect of federalism informs the pluralist vision of republican politics.&quot;

&lt;p&gt;Principles of political economy, supplemented by modern public choice theory and confirmed by 
recent historical experience, tell us that a reduction in the size and scope of the federal leviathan will 
generate higher rates of economic growth and increase the wealth of the nation while  at the same 
time expanding the liberties of people. This book suggests that genuine devolution will also serve 
to restore some of the long-lost civic virtues. It remains to be seen whether the intersecting and 
partially complementary arguments of communitarians, classical liberals, libertarians, and the new 
federalists will carry the day against a mutually exploitative and bureaucratized stasis that can no 
longer rely on an ideological crutch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
<guid isPermaLink="false">30121@http://www.reason.com</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 01 Feb 1997 00:00:00 EST</pubDate><author>info@reason.com (James M. Buchanan)</author>
</item>
			<atom:link href="http://reason.com/staff/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
			</channel>
		</rss>
  		