March 7, 2009
Over at The Daily Beast, Reason senior editor Radley Balko tries to figure out why in an important Supreme Court case last week, the Obama administration argued against granting post-conviction defendants the right to test the DNA evidence that could prove their innocence.
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From
an earlier thread on this difficult (to me anyway) case.
I can see the truth in each sides argument. Nobody here wishes to imprison or execute the innocent, but criminal cases do have to come to an end. He was convicted in a legal and allegedly fair trial. He has exhausted all appeals remedies. Nobody is arguing otherwise.
Still, I'd probably vote with Osborne but I'd need some crackerjack law clerks to write up make up my justification. Of course if I were a SCOTUS judge, I'd have a staff full of those.
Y'all do see the dilemma facing a SCOTUS justice here, right?
To that I'll just add that inconsistencies between Obama the
candidate and Obama the president are not unheard of.
'The Department of Justice's action was "pretty disappointing,"
says David C. Fathi of the civil rights organization Human Rights
Watch. "It isn't consistent with Obama's history of fighting for
more access to DNA testing."
'. . . Obama co-sponsored a bill in the Illinois legislature that
ensured access to potentially exonerating DNA evidence. When he ran
for president, his website touted a 1999 article in which Obama
called for more widespread access to DNA testing.
'. . . 'Yet if being able to prove one's innocence is as important
as Obama has said it is, why shouldn't the citizens of Alaska (or
any of the other five states with similar laws) be guaranteed the
same access to testing as the citizens of Illinois?'
I observe that the citizens of Illinois have the right to DNA
testing due to a statute passed by the Illinois legislature. Good
for Illinois, and good for then-Assemblyman Obama for co-sponsoring
that bill. It seems that Alaska, like five other states, doesn't
have a statute like this. This in itself would seem to be a major
difference.
Certainly, a politician should not be reproached for inconsistency
simply because he supports a policy at the state level, but doesn't
want the federal courts to force that same policy on the states
based on Constitutional interpretation. This doesn't mean Obama's
constitutional interpretation in the Osborne case is the right one,
simply that crying 'inconsistency'! is a cheap shot.
'. . . Obama is no federalist. Nor has he, in the past, subscribed
to the sort of "originalist" arguments that say we can't read
rights into the constitution that weren't there in the beginning.
Yet that is the gist of the federal government's brief in Osborne,
which says "There is no tradition in this country of granting
convicted criminals post-conviction access to the prosecution's
evidence locker…. And constitutional rights do not spring into
existence simply because science has advanced."'
Does this mean that a politician who violates federalism in many
areas is bound, for the sake of consistency, to violate federalism
in *all* areas? This would be a dangerous kind of reasoning. Better
to discuss the merits of the case itself.
As to the merits, there's arguments on both sides. The issue is as
to what 'due process' means. The basic principle is that (at least
in the procedural context) there's a right to an adversary hearing
before a tribunal which isn't being a judge in its own cause. The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this, in the post-trial context,
as including, in certain extraordinary situations involving fairly
overwhelming new evidence of innocence, the right to reopen a case.
Since this decision isn't clearly wrong, I'd go with it rather than
asking the Court to overrule itself (plainly wrong decisions are
too numerous to list, but include Roe v. Wade, Wickard, Raich,
etc.)
'The state concedes that more modern DNA testing would establish
conclusively whether Osborne is guilty or innocent, and Osborne's
attorneys at the Innocence Project offered to pay for the $1,000
test.'
If this is a correct summary of the situation, then it would
provide the basis for a narrow holding by the U.S. Supreme Court to
allow DNA testing in this particular instances, without requiring
it in all cases. The state agrees that, if it's not the defendant's
DNA, then the defendant is innocent, and that the testing proposed
by the defendant would show whether it's the defendant's DNA. The
defendant is not asking the taxpayers to pay for the testing. And
it is also my understanding that this kind of testing wasn't
available at the time of the original trial, making it potentially
*newly discovered* evidence which the defendant could not have
procured through reasonable diligence at the time of the original
trial.
The only thing the defendant needs is access to the evidence, not a
subsidy. If the defendant is really innocent, then the test should
prove it. The U.S. Supreme Court would be justified in saying that
the Constitution requires DNA testing in these specific
circumstances.
As to writing a broader rule and requiring DNA testing in all cases
where the defendant has already been convicted, I'm not sure that's
a good idea. That would tend to take the Court out of the realm of
constitutional interpretation into the realm of legislation. Due
process generally refers to the trial procedure at the original
trial.
Back in the late eighteenth century (when the due-process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, predecessor to the 14th Amendment's Due
Process clause), the opportunities for post-trial proceedings based
on new evidence, in the criminal context were more limited than
today, though they did exist. If you were convicted of a
misdemeanor, the sentence would soon be over, and even if the
misdemeanor involved something sexual, you wouldn't be on an
offenders' registry for the rest of your life. If you got convicted
of a felony, the technical punishment was death, although certain
first-time felons could avoid that through invoking 'benefit of
clergy,' which meant you get branded on the thumb and released.
After you're executed or branded, what would be the point of
post-trial proceedings? Could the court un-execute you or un-brand
you?
I understand that there were new-trial motions available for both
criminal and civil cases under the common law, but how many of
these motions were based on new evidence rather than some legal
error at the initial trial? I guess I'd have to look that up,
wouldn't I.
Yes, I'm an original understanding (not original intention) kind of
guy.
Also, under the common law, the executive would often commute death sentences to something less, like transportation, and if the defendant is innocent, he might have an interest in getting his conviction set aside so that his (lesser) punishment could be set aside. Imagine being banished to colonial Georgia for a crime you didn't commit!
(Not because Georgia is a Southern state, but because colonial Georgia started out as a colony run by philanthropists, of the kind whose social musings had a hard time being translated into reality - not the kind of government you might want to live under)
Oops, I see that the case I alluded to, Herrera v.
Collins, didn't say there was a Constitutional right to a new
trial based on overwhelming new evidence of actual innocence. The
court said that, assuming there was such a right, the supposed
right didn't apply in the prisoner's case.
And here is Scalia's
concurrence in Herrera, for what it's worth.
Mad Max,
This goal went unfulfilled as Georgia was ultimately not
settled by debtors or convicts.
Wow, the wiki on Georgia history is atrociously bad,I really hope I
don't know who wrote it,but the above statement from there is
entirely correct. Georgia was not a penal colony,nor was it settled
by debtors.No one was forcibly transfered to the colony.GA did have
to "transfer out" some Moravians for being pacifist communists.
Constitutional rights and SCOTUS be damned. New evidence has
appeared which has the potential to clear an innocent man, or
provide confirmation of guilt. How in good conscience can someone
oppose that? I've just scanned this so there may be extenuating
circumstances but I can't imagine what they would be.
Isn't a criminal trial supposed to be a procedure to discover the
truth of the matter? Or is it a game where the object is to get the
most points?
Isn't a criminal trial supposed to be a procedure to
discover the truth of the matter?
Is that what they teach in the "short bus" civics class?
Odious as the state of Alaska's actions here are in denying the
prisoner this chance to exonerate himself at no cost to the state,
the Obama administration is right (I suspect for entirely the wrong
reasons) to maintain that the federal government has no
jurisdiction under the constitution to force Alaska to allow this
testing.
Now, if only Obama actually had deeply held convictions on the
rights of states to do as they pleased unless the federal
government had enumerated powers under the constitution to step in,
and was reluctantly upholding that principle at all costs -- but
that is so clearly not the case.
SIV,
Fair enough. I was trying to remember my grade-school textbook
instead of updating my knowledge before posting.
It is my sincere hope that this move and other tramples upon liberty will cause libertarians (and anyone who cares about liberty) who voted for Obama in 2008 to not make the same mistake in 2012. I know he is a good speaker but do not let the Sirens tempt you into violating your principles. Perhaps, like Odysseus's crew you should put wax in your ears when he speaks and instead read the transcript of his speech - or you could just following along with him reading his teleprompter.
Here's another problem with the 9th Circuit decision, as
discussed in
this amicus brief filed on behalf of the victim.
Mr. Osborne has bypassed the usual route for those who were
convicted in state court and want to challenge their conviction in
federal court. Instead of filing a habeas corpus petition, he has
filed a 1983 civil-rights action.
The problem with this is that Congressional policy seems based on
the idea that the way to challenge your state-court conviction in
federal court is to file a habeas petition. Congress has provided a
detailed statutory framework for how federal courts handle these
sorts of habeas petitions so as to properly respect the authority
of state courts. More importantly from the victim's standpoint,
Congress has given crime victims specific rights in habeas
proceedings filed by their alleged victimizers, like the right for
the victim to be treated with respect and have her privacy
respected, and to be notified by the court of her right to
participate in the proceedings.
These rights don't apply to suits actions under 1983, so allowing
suits like Osborne's would basically allow convicts to do an
end-run around specific Congressional protections of victims'
rights.
The significance in this case is that the 9th Circuit has done more
than merely call for testing the semen in the condom found at the
rape scene. The 9th Circuit also seems to have called for testing
which on certain DNA material belonging to the victim, as well as
on her clothes, and then to turn over these results to the defense
experts.
Not much respect for privacy there - and the necessity seems
doubtful, if we assume that testing the semen in the condom would
by itself be sufficient to confirm Mr. Osborne's claims of
innocence. Imagine a court letting some convict's lawyer rummage
through your DNA, when there is no showing that this would even
help the convict. And the victims seems concerned that testing DNA
on her clothes would disclose the identity of other
(non-rape-related) sex partners.
Why would convicts use the habeas corpus route, with its statutory
protections of victims' rights, if they could use some other
procedure where the courts aren't required to respect victims'
rights?
So how about Baltar outing Starbuck? What a dick.
Well, I think it reasonable to assume that she thought that's what
would eventually happen if she revealed her predicament to him, and
really was there a better time than that?
Raivo Pommer
raimo1@hot.ee
Teuer Geld
Er beruft sich hierbei auf ein Urteil des Landgerichts Coburg (Az.:
23 O 426/08). In dem Fall hatten der Beklagte und seine Ehefrau
zusammen einen Kredit über 21 000 Euro aufgenommen. Als sie sich
scheiden ließen, vereinbarten sie, dass die Frau den Kredit
zurückzahlen werde. Im Gegenzug verpflichtete sich der Mann, zwei
weitere Darlehen zu begleichen.
Diese Absprache teilten sie auch der Bank mit. Als die Frau die
Tilgungen nicht leistete, kündigte die Bank das Darlehen und
verlangte vom früheren Ehemann den offenen Schuldbetrag von 16 400
Euro. Zu recht, urteilte das Gericht: Denn die Absprache zwischen
den früheren Eheleuten schütze den Beklagten nicht. Maßgeblich sei
allein das Vertragsverhältnis zwischen der Bank und dem Mann. Der
Beklagte sei durch die Scheidung oder die Abmachung der Eheleute
untereinander nicht von seiner Schuld gegenüber der Bank
befreit.
On the plus side, our new Messiah says he is screwing up because he's already overwhelmed by the job of being President and can't even handle visits from allies. So that's good news.
Fenfi,
I admit I am not that familiar with European divorce law but are
you saying that Osborne is not protected because in filing under
1983 he is no longer protected in the same way that the former
spouses were not protected in Landgericht Coburg? Is that the
parallel you are trying to make?
On the plus side, our new Messiah says he is screwing up
because he's already overwhelmed by the job of being President and
can't even handle visits from allies.
It's almost like he has no executive experience besides running a
campaign.
"It's almost like he has no executive experience besides running
a campaign."
He ran a campaign? When was that?
Expensively money It appoints itself here on a judgement of the regional court Coburg (Az.: 23 O 426/08). In the case the defendant one and its wife had taken up together a credit over 21,000 euros. When they let themselves separate, they agreed that the woman will pay the credit back. In response the man committed himself to settle two further loans. This arrangement they communicated also to the bank. When the woman did not carry the repayments out, the bank quit the loan and required of the former husband the open sum of a debt of 16,400 euros. Rightfully, the court judged: Because the arrangement between the former married people does not protect the defendant one. Relevant is alone the contractual relation between the bank and the man. The defendant one is not liberating by the divorce or the agreement of the married people among themselves of its debt opposite the bank.
huh?
Odd, no, that Obama is exquisitely sensitive to state's rights
when those rights involve the state's exercise of power over its
subjects, but is not so sensitive when those rights involve the
state declining to follow his lead?
That whole liberaltarian thing, not working out? Is it too early to
say that he's just not that into us?
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