Mike Riggs | November 11, 2008
As reason.tv intern Seth Goldin points out, Judge George Wu, who has decided to not let prosecutors inform the jury about Megan Meier's suicide, is the same judge who ruled that Owen Beck (a teenaged amputee with a medical marijuana prescription) couldn't testify in defense of Charlie Lynch, the now-convicted owner of a medical marijuana dispensary. Read Goldin's account of Wu's response to Beck here.
Any thoughts, commenters, on this bizarre paradox?
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Legally, that's perfectly consistent. He didn't allow emotional appeals that had no bearing on whether or not the alleged crime was committed. The fact that it helped one bad prosecution and hindered another bad prosecution doesn't enter into the legal reasoning, it's only noteworthy for us from an admittedly biased, outside perspective.
He wants the jury to focus on whether the crime was committed, not on whether the crime had particularly horrible consequences (in the Lori Drew case) or whether there were particularly good reasons for disregarding the law (in the Charlie Lynch case). Frankly, from a legal point of view, this is probably the right way to go.
I certainly am no legal scholar, but it seems consistent to me.
As others have said, it's consistent. IANAL, but I'd guess it's not far out of the mainstream of legal thinking.
What paradox, he's consistent in his opposition to confusing
juries with the facts.
The difference here is in one case the facts mitigate the crime and
are therefore relevant to the defense. In the other the facts
aggravate the actions of actions of the defendant. Actions which
are not criminal in spite of their consequences.
Our legal common law tradition, recognizes a jury's option to
nullify bad law via acquittal. Defendants should always be allowed
to present mitigating circumstances as part of their defense.
But this legal tradition does not cut the other way. There is no
role for juries to criminalize the actions of people they don't
like.
Both of these rulings were decisions to keep the jury in the
dark about the facts of the case. Sounds to me like Judge Wu wants
the jury to depend entirely on the judge, rather than to make up
their own minds.
-jcr
Warren-
I agree wholeheartedly about how it *should* be. The idea of
keeping jurors as ignorant, passive, and distant as possible
completely undermines their intended purpose as a representative
subset of the community, and arguably even undermines their role as
an integral part of the justice system.
However, how things should be and how they are are two very
different things. As the rules exist now, Judge Wu made legally
consistent and correct decisions.
Well, yeah, it is about keeping them in the dark.
The whole rules of evidence and major parts of the constitutional
law are about keeping juries in the dark, because their job is to
render unemotional verdicts based on evidence considered solid
enough to justify sending someone to jail.
@Warren: defendants can always offer evidence to support
affirmative defenses. "I had a really good reason," if it doesn't
rise to the level of a necessity defense, is not a valid
affirmative defense to any crime.
The judge in both instances excluded evidence irrelevant to whether
all of the elements of the crime charged are present.
Whether you like the law is irrelevant; the judge applied it
correctly.
@JCR: No, the judge wants the jury to make the decision based on
evidence relevant to the elements of the charged crime, rather than
appeals to emotion outside the elements. That is a fundamental
notion of due process.
Jury nullification cuts both ways, folks. Would you be singing
the praises of nullification if a jury refused to convict a cop who
shot someone during a wrong-door raid of murder, because they
thought the law shouldn't apply to him?
What about all that jury nullification that happened down south
whenever a KKK member was prosecuted for crimes against a black
person? Do we have to praise that too?
Let's not be so quick to hitch the libertarian caboose to the jury
nullification train.
No, the judge wants the jury to make the decision based on
evidence relevant to the elements of the charged crime, rather than
appeals to emotion outside the elements. That is a fundamental
notion of due process.
Who could argue with that rather tendentious way to put it?
A broader view of due process, of course, puts the judge in charge
only of the procedural aspects of the case; running the courtroom,
as it were, while the jury is in charge of all the substantive
aspects of the case, rather than merely being asked to tick some
boxes on a form at the end of the trial.
No, the rulings were not consistent. I agree that the judge
properly excluded the suicide evidence. However, he was wrong to
exclude Mr. Beck's testimony as the constitution itself does not
permit the courts to exclude evidence that may have emotional
appeal favoring a criminal defendant. If the framers had desired to
give the courts such power, they would have done so.
Furthermore, if we are truly concerned about affording every
criminal defendant a fair trial, this is a no brainer. The burden
is upon the government to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the accused is guilty. THerefore, any evidence that the
accused seeks to introduce should be examined with our core
princiles in mind. If the testimony of Mr. Beck might (again its
just speculation on the part of the prosecution and the judge)
trigger sympathy for the doctor's plight, TFB. THe process is not
supposed to be "fair" to the crown. Again, there is no founding era
support for the proposition that criminal trials must be conducted
so as to not make it "unfair" to the crown.
Next, nullification priniciples militate in favor of admitting any
evidence that an accused seeks to introduce bearing on the
unfairness or idiocy of the statute in question.
Re: There's absolutely no paradox here.
Paradox: (n) Any person, thing, or situation exhibiting an
apparently contradictory nature.
I don't see the paradox. Judges routinely exclude things from
trials. Often that is done to skew the results a particular way.
Sometimes we approve of that and sometimes we don't.
I'm of the opinion that the whole picture is better than a partial
picture but not many people share that belief.
Mike, yes it is a paradox to us. But the ways of the courts are such that a paradox isn't a paradox because judges always do strange and largely inexplicable things that are then either vilified or justified by the rest of us.
Mike Riggs, you've been living in Red vs. Blue America for too long. This is like the conservative commentators who couldn't wrap their minds around the "paradox" of someone being against amnesty for illegal immigrants AND against the Iraq War.
There's only a paradox if you assume judges, or at least this judge, rules based on ideological rather than legal principles. Doesn't look like he does.
Legal babble aside, I'm still not clear why this woman who drove the girl to kill herself wasn't charged with murder.
rhywun, she didn't kill the girl. That seems to be a pretty clear prerequisite for murder.
And yes, I know that the whole concept of "felony murder" blurs the lines on that, but that just means felony murder is a nonsense.
rhywun - Generally, suicide is considered an intervening cause
that would break the chain of causality.
You would have a much better case if Meier were say, seven years
old. But she's thirteen, which means she's adult enough to make
choices.
You would have a much better case if Meier were say, seven years old. But she's thirteen, which means she's adult enough to make choices.
Not in America she isn't - 13 isn't old enough to vote, drink,
smoke, have sex, drive...she couldn't even have made the choice to
see an R-rated movie.
But she's thirteen, which means she's adult enough to make choices.
What JPB said.
Plus, I don't care what age she is--convincing a mentally
unbalanced person to commit suicide must be some sort of crime.
Manslaughter? IANAL, obviously. Just someone outraged that this
woman is getting away with her crime.
Plus, I don't care what age she is--convincing a mentally
unbalanced person to commit suicide must be some sort of crime.
Manslaughter? IANAL, obviously. Just someone outraged that this
woman is getting away with her crime.
She didn't convince her to commit suicide. She's not that
Applewhite dude. She was a bully. Big difference.
She was a bully
While that's true, I don't think the term "bully" is sufficient in
this case. Lori Drew didn't just harass her, Lori Drew pretended to
be a boy her age, flirted with her, and then once the girl was
emotionally invested she attacked her.
13 year olds are free to have sex. Adults are just not free to have sex with 13 year olds.
Lori Drew pretended to be a boy her age, flirted with her,
and then once the girl was emotionally invested she attacked
her
Being a cruel asshole is not a crime. If it were, a lot of us would
be up on charges.
Being a cruel asshole is not a crime.
No, but what you do that makes you a cruel asshole can be
crimes.
Being a cruel asshole is not a crime. If it were, a lot of us would be up on charges.
Perhaps, but people keep comparing this to the way adults treat
other adults, and I think that misses the point.
I'd be willing to bet that while most of us are guilty of being a
cruel asshole from time to time, the vast majority of us aren't
being a cruel asshole to a child.
Being a cruel asshole is not a crime.
Maybe I watch too much Law & Order. Those guys would have her
rotting away in prison by now.
JPB, I'm dying to know how you propose to write a non-vague law that differentiates in general between criminal cruel assholery and non-criminal cruel assholery.
From my point of view, the rulings are inconsistent. Drew is
being tried for violating Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, not for
Meier's death, so her suicide isn't relevant to the case.
Lynch was convicted of selling marijuana. Beck wanted to testify
about the circumstances around which Lynch sold the pot, which
seems perfectly relevant to me.
JPB, I'm dying to know how you propose to write a non-vague law that differentiates in general between criminal cruel assholery and non-criminal cruel assholery.
The same way you write a law that differentiates between statutory
rape and legal sex, the age of the victim.
So you have to ask for ID before you tell a person to go fuck themselves on the Net? You realize that all the Urkobolds would be in jail if Edward were a minor, right?
So you have to ask for ID before you tell a person to go fuck themselves on the Net?
No, but if you knowingly defraud a minor for the purposes of
causing emotional harm, I don't have a problem calling it a
crime.
So it would be against the law to tell kids that Santa is going to put coal in their stockings. I have a feeling, JPB, that your law is going to die a death by a thousand qualifications. There are just too many things that are a normal part of adult-kid interactions that are going to run afoul of it.
So it would be against the law to tell kids that Santa is going to put coal in their stockings
Poor example, parents don't tell kids that to try to hurt
them.
Perhaps I'm just more of an optimist than you are, but I don't see
it being the problem you suggest, and if the best you can come up
with is Santa, I may just be right about that.
Of course they're trying to hurt them. That's the whole point, just like spanking. Now, there's an arguably benevolent purpose for the hurtful actions, but that doesn't change the fact that emotional harm is inflicted.
No, the judge did rule on ideological grounds in the med mj case. Only an idealogue would buy the intellectual dishonesty that undergirds the notion that in America, where the framers ordained that the state is not to stand on an equal footing with the accused, juries should not be able to hear any evidence that the accused seeks to introduce on the issue of nullification.
Many judges are idealogues. Take immunity for example. If a cop breaks into the wrong house and kills both dog and man in a botched drug raid, the cop should face the music. THe framers did not authorize the judiciary to immunize the state employed tortfeasor from exposure to liability. If a judge grants a motion to dismiss filed by the town counsel or the state attorney general on the basis of either qualified or absolute immunity, then the judge is making an idealogical ruling. The judge would be choosing to follow the path laid down by previous ideological courts that chose to disregard the intent of the framers in order to impose their ideology. Making it more difficult to hold Caesar's grubby, parasitic thugs accountable is an ideologically motivated decision.
Now, there's an arguably benevolent purpose for the hurtful actions
And since intent is part of the crime, that's all that matters.
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