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If There is No Free Will, Is Everything Permitted?
As the brain sciences advance, the space for free will shrinks. Many philosophers, legal analysts, and regular people worry these findings will undercut our moral and legal systems that rely on notions of personal responsibility. If a defendant pleads "not guilty" on the grounds that "my amygdala made me do it," how can we justify punishing him for something over which he had no control?
The New York Times is reporting experiments in which people primed to believe that there is no free will were more inclined to cheat. To wit:
In one [experiment], 30 college students were asked to solve math problems on a computer. Some were first asked to read a passage arguing that most educated people do not believe in free will. The volunteers were told that owing to a computer glitch, the answer would pop up after the problem if they did not the hit the space bar. They were asked to do so but told that no one would know. Members of the group encouraged to doubt free will were more likely to let the answer appear.
In the other study, about 120 students were asked to answer problems on a sheet of paper, with the promise of $1 for each right answer. Those who had read statements skeptical about free will, when allowed to grade themselves and then shred the answer sheet, took more money than they should have, the researchers said.
The findings, they said, raised questions about how human behavior might change if the belief in free will continued to decrease. But they cautioned against reading too much into the results.
But is "free will" really necessary for a system of retributive justice? What is interesting in the above experiments is that the subjects believed that they could not be caught cheating. This illustrates the fact that there is more than a little truth to H.L. Mencken's observation that "conscience is the inner voice which warns us that someone may be looking." The possibility of punishment acts as a deterrent in even a completely deterministic world.
See my column on "Prozac Justice" about some of the pitfalls of moving from a system of retributive justice to a therapeutic state.
Episiarch|2.19.08 @ 10:29AM|#
The volunteers were told that owing to a computer glitch,
the answer would pop up after the problem if they did not the hit
the space bar. They were asked to do so but told that no one would
know.
How dumb do you have to be to not realize this is the
experiment?
This is why I do not put any stock into idiotic tests like
these.
King Anono|2.19.08 @ 10:31AM|#
Interesting finding.
But just like Bailey, my initial reaction was to question why free
will - or a lack thereof - has any bearing whatsoever on our
justice system. Indeed, a deterministic world might INCREASE the
perceived effectiveness of deterrence via criminal punishment.
|2.19.08 @ 10:31AM|#
If we abandon the idea of free will, my pituitary gland made me
do it isn't a defense anymore; its just an explanation.
I think criminals have a lot to fear if the concept of free will
goes away; after all from then on your just naturally criminal and
theres nothing to do for it but keep you under lock and key for the
rest of your life. And all the apologies in the world won't help
since you can't actually reform.
|2.19.08 @ 10:34AM|#
There is no such thing as "free will". Still, we can not help but pretend that there is.
The Wine Commonsewer|2.19.08 @ 10:35AM|#
If there is no free will, then Christians and libertarians are
in the same boat and none of this moralizing matters a fig.
Of course, I have prima facie evidence that there is free
will.
Every time one's mind overrides the body's natural desire to
strangle the living shit out of some asshole that desperately needs
it, you have an example of free will at work.
Or maybe that's just deterrence at work.
robc|2.19.08 @ 10:35AM|#
Rereading for the first time in years the essay I linked to
above I ran into the following, which reminded my of Radley Balko
and Mississippi for some reason:
But that is not the worst. If the justification of exemplary
punishment is not to be based on dessert but solely on its efficacy
as a deterrent, it is not absolutely necessary that the man we
punish should even have committed the crime. The deterrent effect
demands that the public should draw the moral, 'If we do such an
act we shall suffer like that man.' The punishment of a man
actually guilty whom the public think innocent will not have the
desired effect; the punishment of a man actually innocent will,
provided the public think him guilty. But every modern State has
powers which make it easy to fake a trial. When a victim is
urgently needed for exemplary purposes and a guilty victim cannot
be found, all the purposes of deterrence will be equally served by
the punishment (call it 'cure' if you prefer0 of an innocent
victim, provided that the public can be cheated into thinking him
will be so wicked. The punishment of an innocent, that is , an
undeserving, man is wicked only if we grant the traditional view
that righteous punishment means deserved punishment. Once we have
abandoned that criterion, all punishments have to be justified, if
at all, on other grounds that have nothing to do with desert. Where
the punishment of the innocent can be justified on those grounds
(and it could in some cases be justified as a deterrent) it will be
no less moral than any other punishment. Any distaste for it on the
part of the Humanitarian will be merely a hang-over from the
Retributive theory.
robc|2.19.08 @ 10:36AM|#
You can choose from phantom fears
And kindness that can kill
I will choose a path thats clear
I will choose free will
|2.19.08 @ 10:36AM|#
There is no such thing as "free will".
Then do God's will and kill yourself.
Those who say "there is no such thing as free will" think they are
saying something profoundly insightful about humanity, when they
are in fact merely saying something chilling and sad about
themselves.
Jennifer|2.19.08 @ 10:37AM|#
If a defendant pleads "not guilty" on the grounds that "my
amygdala made me do it," how can we justify punishing him for
something over which he had no control?
Same way we can justify quarantining a man who, through no fault of
his own, has a deadly airborne-contagious disease that will infect
anyone with whom he comes in contact. If you're a compulsive killer
I don't give a damn if it's because your cerebellum is defective or
your mother didn't love you enough; I just want you someplace where
you can't keep inflicting your problems onto others.
|2.19.08 @ 10:37AM|#
Much like an insanity defense, a defense based upon brain functions wouldn't be a get out of jail free card. Defendants would still be subject to institutionalization until they were fixed, and no longer a threat. The scary part isn't guilty people escaping punishment, but the call to pre-treat people before they commit crime.
Russ 2000|2.19.08 @ 10:39AM|#
If a defendant pleads "not guilty" on the grounds that "my
amygdala made me do it,"
... then I can kill him anyway because MY amygdala made ME do
it.
King Anono|2.19.08 @ 10:40AM|#
Vlad -
I think we're saying that there's no free will because we aren't
spiritualists. If there is no supernatural, how can there be free
will?
And another question: If there is no free will, is libertarian
philosophy negatively impacted? And how so?
Mad Max|2.19.08 @ 10:45AM|#
"my amygdala made me do it,"
Yeah, that's what Darth Vader said. Princess Amygdala made him do
it.
|2.19.08 @ 10:46AM|#
Free will exists. There are people who have been to the abyss and know exactly how black it is. They climbed out because the alternatives to making the right choices are rather grim.
|2.19.08 @ 10:50AM|#
If you're a compulsive killer sex offender I
don't give a damn if it's because your cerebellum is defective or
your mother didn't love you enough; I just want you someplace where
you can't keep inflicting your problems onto others.
We fixed that for you.
|2.19.08 @ 10:54AM|#
If there is no supernatural, how can there be free
will?
Pardon my ignorance, but hat the fuck does that have to do with the
price of tea in China?
King Anono|2.19.08 @ 10:57AM|#
Vlad -
Oh, and I forgot an important component of the challenge. Do not
reference the supernatural in your description of where the free
will resides.
:]
|2.19.08 @ 11:02AM|#
But is "free will" really necessary for a system of
retributive justice?
Eliminating free will unmoors your legal system from any notion of
morality, and opens the doors to such things as collective
punishment.
I mean, if retribution/deterrence is the sole goal and basis for
the punishments meted out by your anti-crime system, and an
individual's responsibility for the crime is a non-factor, then
collective punishment is just the ticket. You get more retribution
and more deterrence.
|2.19.08 @ 11:06AM|#
Ignorance of the future creates an illusion of free will.
Perfect knowledge of the past and the future would reveal the
determined path for everything that happens and every decision you
make.
As for religious free will, it's a rigged game. The will can only
be free in an environment of no consequences. If you must consider
the result of every action, your choice can not be freely
made.
A person who is forced at gunpoint to hand over money during a
robbery would never be told or considered to have made the choice
to hand over his money freely. Decisions to lead a "moral"
life are not evidence of free will if the threat of damnation is
consequence of choosing wrongly.
Free will is letting a dog off of a leash into a fenced-in
backyard. His cage might be bigger, but he's still just as much of
a prisoner.
|2.19.08 @ 11:13AM|#
I cannot tell you where "love" resides. But I know it
exists.
Your punditry is facile.
|2.19.08 @ 11:16AM|#
I don't believe in God, but what does that have to do with the
existence of free will? You're implying that free will is something
God gave us. I say since we invented God, we also invented the free
will He gave us.
We choose to act with civility because we think it is the best way
to advance our lives. Not all of us act a certain way only because
we are afraid of punishment. I know I could get away with things
but I don't do them because I would know that I was now a scumbag,
not because I'm afraid of getting caught. I don't want the inner
feeling that I would have if I was not a good person in my own
mind. When people don't act with civility we punish them, even if
it is just a spanking or our collective snear at them. Our civility
has been molded by everything in our history. Our history includes
the idea that we can choose what we do. That is free will.
The Wine Commonsewer|2.19.08 @ 11:18AM|#
and opens the doors to such things as collective
punishment
Yes, and we've all had a little taste of Well, ladies, Private
Jerkoff fucked up, now down and give me fifty or the public
school counterpart where all the kids get to stay in from recess
because the boys at table two won't stop laughing during
lecture.
|2.19.08 @ 11:18AM|#
How come every time I read one of these debates, only the
criminals are affected by a lack of free will?
If there is no free will, how the rest of us end up punishing the
criminals is ultimately out of our freely-determined control as
well.
So, the people who don't believe in free will can just forget about
it. Everything is exactly as it should be...
|2.19.08 @ 11:19AM|#
Imprisonment and the death penalty don't deter murder, or there wouldn't be so many. Or are you suggesting we would all become murderers, rapists, and thieves if not for those punishments? I disagree we would become bad just because of a present life or afterlife punishment. I think most of us have a desire to be good to each other. That is evidence of free will. I don't think that conflicts with being a libertarian.
|2.19.08 @ 11:19AM|#
King Anono - I think the basic question is - do you think your thoughts are exclusively a product of your brain chemistry, or do you think your thoughts can influence your brain chemistry? I think I can control my own mind (or maybe it's the shrooms talking.)
Bingo|2.19.08 @ 11:20AM|#
I predict quantum-wave decoherence and metaphysics discussions before the 50th post!
|2.19.08 @ 11:24AM|#
"do you think your thoughts are exclusively a product of your
brain chemistry, or do you think your thoughts can influence your
brain chemistry?"
I don't know, but I can't stop jacking off. It's not my brain that
has ultimate control here.
Mad Max|2.19.08 @ 11:24AM|#
I want to get away from this blog, but some overwhelming force compels me to keep posting . . .
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 11:25AM|#
RC Dean,
more deterrence.
Without free will the concept of deterrence is meaningless. Without
free will collective punishment makes even less sense.
King Anono
Determinism is not a logical requirement of atheism.
robc,
Back-to-back CS Lewis & Rush citations.
Sweet dude...
As for the "My Brain made me do it" defense.
This goes away once people realize that "you" are just and
only your brain.
robc|2.19.08 @ 11:31AM|#
NM,
Back-to-back CS Lewis & Rush citations.
Sweet dude...
As I was posting the Rush, I was wondering if that was an all time
first. Just waiting for some one else to notice. I also, within
this same thread made a 3rd eye pineal gland reference. A winner is
me!
Episiarch|2.19.08 @ 11:31AM|#
You're all figments of Descartes' Evil Genius anyway, so who the fuck cares what you all think?
|2.19.08 @ 11:35AM|#
At the risk of being called a hack
"We can't see past the choices we don't understand"
Regardless of the mechanisms that led you to make the choices you
make, the choice is unique to your set of circumstances and nobody
else can go through the same set of "on/off" commands to arrive at
the same decision. we think that one day we'll be able to run a
computer model and know the entire path of a person's life by
understanding all the on/off commands, but I don't think that's
possible. I think we might reach a point where we understand
general trends, but we'll never reach the point of understanding
all of the variables. Just because you say you don't believe in
free will doesn't mean that everything is predetermined. You made a
choice not to believe and that is a form of free will. All the
medical explanations in the world will never reach the point of
total understanding and therefore the truly destroy the belief in
free will.
|2.19.08 @ 11:35AM|#
"Without free will the concept of deterrence is
meaningless"
I don't follow. Why couldn't social sanctions be one of the factors
determining my behavior?
In any case, the great bulk of working philosophers think that free
will is compatible with strict causal determinism (a fortiori it's
compatible with naturalism and atheism). There's something about
sophisticated brains, in humans and probably in chimps and
gorillas, that enables some sort of deliberate control. There's
clearly a difference between my control over my arm and my lack of
control over my kidneys, a difference that can probably be chalked
up to the structure of the brain.
|2.19.08 @ 11:37AM|#
"You made a choice not to believe and that is a form of free
will."
I really doubt anyone has the kind of direct control over their
beliefs that normal people have over their arms and legs.
Hari Seldon|2.19.08 @ 11:40AM|#
I think we might reach a point where we understand general
trends
I agree.
|2.19.08 @ 11:41AM|#
Dave2,
Who does then?
Even if you consider beliefs to be a purely biochemical reaction to
external stimuli, you can't understand all the variables that went
into that reaction and therefore have no way to predict what
circumstances could cause a repeat reaction. Its biological free
will.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 11:45AM|#
Dave2
I don't follow. Why couldn't social sanctions be one of the
factors determining my behavior?
Without free will the concept of deterrence is meaningless, because
you can't deter the inevitable.
some sort of deliberate control
Also known as free will.
the great bulk of working philosophers think that free will is
compatible with strict causal determinism
This requires that your will be allowable as a potential first
cause, no?
|2.19.08 @ 11:46AM|#
Neuronal correlates of "free will" are associated with regional
specialization in the human intrinsic/default network.
Goldberg I, Ullman S, Malach R.
Department of Neurology, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, 6
Weizmann Street, Tel-Aviv 64239, Israel.
Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex
into two complementary networks-an "extrinsic" one which deals with
the external environment, and an "intrinsic" one which largely
overlaps with the "default mode" system, and deals with internally
oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this
hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and
internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an
external cue, and were required to either follow an external
instruction ("determined" condition) or to ignore it and follow a
voluntary decision process ("free-will" condition). Our results
show that a well defined component of the intrinsic system-the
right inferior parietal cortex-was preferentially activated during
the "free-will" condition. Importantly, this activity was
significantly higher than the base-line resting state. The results
support a self-related role for the intrinsic system and provide
clear evidence for both hemispheric and regional specialization in
the human intrinsic system.
|2.19.08 @ 11:49AM|#
"Who does then?"
No one, it's a natural process. It's not like everything just has
to be under someone's control.
(I admit, of course, that there are indirect methods we have for
deliberately altering our beliefs. I just insist that we have no
direct control)
"Even if you consider beliefs to be a purely biochemical reaction
to external stimuli, you can't understand all the variables that
went into that reaction and therefore have no way to predict what
circumstances could cause a repeat reaction. Its biological free
will."
Even if I accept for the sake of argument that the psychological
processes that produce our beliefs are impossible to fully predict,
it doesn't follow that our beliefs are a matter of free will. After
all, the weather might be impossible to fully predict, but the
weather isn't a matter of free will. A wave function collapse might
be impossible to fully predict, but that's not a matter of free
will.
I mean, some people think unpredictability is a necessary condition
for free will, but it's just false to say that unpredictability is
a sufficient condition for free will.
|2.19.08 @ 11:52AM|#
Ron Bailey,
In other words, are we talking about some version of compatibalism,
incompatabilism, etc. here?
|2.19.08 @ 11:53AM|#
"Without free will the concept of deterrence is meaningless,
because you can't deter the inevitable"
Sure, but the social sanctions in place might be one of the factors
that determines whether someone does X or Y. If you accept
determinism, after all, you accept that there is a causal chain of
events leading to and determining all subsequent events. And the
systems of punishment in place in society might well be part of
that causal chain determining subsequent events.
"'some sort of deliberate control' Also known as free will."
Right, that was my point. Am I missing something?
"This requires that your will be allowable as a potential first
cause, no?"
No, I don't think any compatibilist would say that the human will
is somehow located outside the deterministic system governing the
natural world.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 11:56AM|#
robc,
Just for the record.
You should realize that any quoting of Rush lyrics is an automatic
thread loser...unless done as satire.
When paired with CS Lewis, I just get an image of a guy in his
mom's basement with his bong resting on a copy of Atlas
Shrugged, a 2112 album cover covered with stems and
seeds from some Mexican skunk weed, walls covered with his own
artwork, rendered in magic markers and ball point and featuring
chimera fantasy babes...
Not that CS Lewis hasn't written some very worthy stuff. It's just
the pairing with Rush that makes me think of naive
stonerisms...
"This book dude, he's got it all figured out...dude, see Aslan is
sacrificing himself for our sins."
|2.19.08 @ 11:57AM|#
It seems to me like the argument on free will is a rather
pointless one. While it may be true that a perfect knowledge of
past and present would give you a completely knowledge of the
future, this isn't possible save for some imaginary omniscient
being.
I'm not well-versed in physics enough to properly explain it, but
you run into even bigger problems at the subatomic level, where any
knowledge of a particles positions beyond the probability
of a given location is, I'm pretty sure, not physically
possible.
Free will is an illusion, but it's damn convincing and I believe
it's one we'll never shake off.
Scooby|2.19.08 @ 11:58AM|#
I predict quantum-wave decoherence and metaphysics
discussions before the 50th post!
Would they have shown up if you hadn't mentioned them?
D.A. Ridgely|2.19.08 @ 11:59AM|#
When the experimental data convinces us that free will doesn't exist, will our conviction have been freely made or just one more preordained event? If the latter, will the supposedly underlying truth of the claim have been relevant at all and, if so, will that, too, have necessarily been so or merely a happy coincidence?
|2.19.08 @ 12:00PM|#
It depends on how narrowly you define free will to say that
unpredictability isn't sufficient to prove its existence.
In any case, what is the practical asset in the assertion that free
will doesn't exist if you know that perfect understanding is well
beyond our grasp and that you'll always need a term to describe a
decision made by someone that you can't fully explain or
anticipate.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 12:04PM|#
Dave2,
No, I don't think any compatibilist would say that the human
will is somehow located outside the deterministic system governing
the natural world.
Then if the will (decision) to do something is determined by
something prior to that decision, it is not free will, but simply
the illusion of free will. Your choice is either free (as a first
cause of a causal chain) or determined and not under your control
(i.e., not free).
Otherwise you have defined away the concept of free will and are
talking about something else.
None of this requires that the human will be outside the natural
system, it just says that the natural system includes subsystems
which are not deterministic. The grounding problem looms large.
|2.19.08 @ 12:05PM|#
D.A. Ridgely,
At this point we should mention the well-worn update of Descartes'
demon - we're all part of a computer simulation.
|2.19.08 @ 12:06PM|#
L_I_T: Ascribing free will is a lot more than ascribing practical unpredictability. Heck, it's a lot more than ascribing real, deep unpredictability. Free will is supposed to be some sort of deliberate control over our actions that makes it appropriate to hold us responsible for our actions. If you just focus on matters of predictability, you're leaving out this important 'up to us' dimension of free will (which is arguably the defining characteristic of free will). Predictability seems like a side issue.
|2.19.08 @ 12:08PM|#
Neu Mejican, you're just begging the question against the compatibilist. If you think determinism is incompatible with free will, then give some support. Don't just assume the incompatibility when that's precisely what's at issue.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 12:08PM|#
Is the concept of time the real reason for the illusion of free
will?
If the temporal dimension is static, then causal chains are
equivalent to spatial extension....
|2.19.08 @ 12:08PM|#
"The possibility of punishment acts as a deterrent in even a
completely deterministic world."
Either you don't mean "completely deterministic," or this makes no
sense. After all, what is free will but the possibility of doing A
instead of B for whatever reason? Look at our overcrowded
prisons. Obviously, many people commit crime in spite of the
possibility of punishment, and many don't in spite of the
possibility of reward. If the possibility of punishment/reward
affects the outcome, then it is a choice, and you've already
obliterated a "completely deterministic" world.
|2.19.08 @ 12:08PM|#
Dave2,
Indeed, a lack of predictability (by humans) would be compatable
with determinism.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 12:11PM|#
Dave2,
I thought I was giving support.
Why don't you give some support for the compatibilist position that
goes beyond saying that freewill and determinism are
compatible?
As you have described it, the compatibilist position is that
everything is determined except for the things that aren't. I would
need something more to work with to refute that claim.
|2.19.08 @ 12:11PM|#
Without free will the concept of deterrence is meaningless,
because you can't deter the inevitable.
Not at all. Deterrence is easily produced/explained by Skinnerian
behavior modification. No free will necessary, just a meat computer
that factors in likely unpleasant consequences of behavior.
"Lack of free will" doesn't equal "inevitable". It just means that
you respond to your environment in rigidly programmed ways. Change
that environment, and your behavior will change. An anti-crime
program is an exercise in changing the environment in order to
change behavior. Collective punishment is a change the environment
that is consistent with an anti-crime program premised solely on
retribution and deterrence.
|2.19.08 @ 12:13PM|#
"Either you don't mean "completely deterministic," or this makes
no sense. After all, what is free will but the possibility of doing
A instead of B for whatever reason? Look at our overcrowded
prisons. Obviously, many people commit crime in spite of the
possibility of punishment, and many don't in spite of the
possibility of reward. If the possibility of punishment/reward
affects the outcome, then it is a choice, and you've already
obliterated a "completely deterministic" world."
Okay, I'll roll with your assumption that determinism is
incompatible with free will. But why think that if
punishment/rewards make a difference, then it's a matter of choice
and free will? Why can't punishment/rewards make a difference in
the same way that every factor in a deterministic system makes a
difference? I mean, the mass of a body makes a difference as to how
other bodies will react to it, but that's not a matter of free
will. Why can't social systems make a difference to how human
organisms react without getting free will involved?
Michael Ejercito|2.19.08 @ 12:13PM|#
But just like Bailey, my initial reaction was to question why free will - or a lack thereof - has any bearing whatsoever on our justice system. Indeed, a deterministic world might INCREASE the perceived effectiveness of deterrence via criminal punishment.
If there is no free will, then you did not choose to type what you
typed.
If there is no free will, then concepts like good and evil become
meaningless.
|2.19.08 @ 12:14PM|#
Dave2,
Predictability is the only practical measure of free will, which is
why I'm using it.
...and regardless of whether its biochemistry or some supernatural
soul that allows us to make decisions, the decision making is still
"up to us". Understanding reasons for making certain decisions may
help create a more useful deterrant system, but to argue that
someone's biochemistry relieves that person of the ability to
personally make decisions through free will or whatever you wish to
call it.
|2.19.08 @ 12:15PM|#
If there is no free will, then you did not choose to type
what you typed.
If there is no free will, then concepts like good and evil become
meaningless.
No and no
Michael Ejercito|2.19.08 @ 12:17PM|#
If a defendant pleads "not guilty" on the grounds that "my amygdala made me do it," how can we justify punishing him for something over which he had no control?
|2.19.08 @ 12:17PM|#
Neu Mejican,
No, if you're a compatibilist determinist, you think that all
events are causally determined. Everything. No exceptions. Every
event is necessitated by the laws of nature together with previous
states of the universe.
But since free will is vaguely understood as the capacity for some
sort of deliberate control over one's actions, and since that vague
characterization says precisely nothing about causal determinism,
it's still an open question whether free will could exist in a
fully deterministic universe. Incompatibilists are free to spell
out a more detailed conception of free will and then try to
demonstrate that it's incompatible with causal determinism. But
until that's done, we have no reason for thinking there's any
incompatibility.
Michael Ejercito|2.19.08 @ 12:19PM|#
If we abandon the idea of free will, my pituitary gland made me do it isn't a defense anymore; its just an explanation.
And then of course judges can then say that their
pituitary glands make them punish people for acts that are not
their fault.
|2.19.08 @ 12:19PM|#
L_I_T: If you're switching to a predictability-focused conception of free will simply because it's easier to work with, you're still guilty of changing the subject. I could switch to a 'pair of pants' conception of God because it's easier to work with, but then I'm not exactly engaging the central questions about God.
|2.19.08 @ 12:22PM|#
Lost In Translation,
Though I am hardly the first person to point this out, I will note
that the fact that our brains can be damaged and that this can lead
to dramatic changes in behavior says something about the nature of
"free will" to me. Now I suppose one could argue that a "normal,"
non-damaged brain has "free will," but I don't know if I find that
particularly convincing.
|2.19.08 @ 12:24PM|#
Lost In Translation,
Of course I guess my statement is completely discounting any
dualist notions.
Sam Grove|2.19.08 @ 12:24PM|#
Punishing the innocent as an objective lesson teaches the guilty party the lesson: don't get caught.
robc|2.19.08 @ 12:30PM|#
Neu Mejican,
This book dude, he's got it all figured out...dude, see Aslan
is sacrificing himself for our sins.
Nah, with Lewis Im more of a fan of his non-fiction and fiction
like The Great Divorce and Till We Have Faces. Although, I am
looking forward to seeing Prince Caspian in April.
I did set a copy of The Fountainhead on top of my Bible the other
day. I wondered which would burst into flames.
Also not a stoner. Ive never toughed the stuff.
|2.19.08 @ 12:31PM|#
Nick, I agree with most of what you say except for "Imprisonment
and the death penalty don't deter murder, or there wouldn't be so
many."
While imprisonment/punishment may not completely stop murders, it
certainly discourages it. I mean, isnt that the conclusion of the
experiments cited in the article? that people were more likely to
cheat if they knew/thought they wouldnt get caught/punished?
I can tell you that crime/murder has significantly increased where
I live since the current governement has decided to turn a blind
eye. It is quite possible to get away with murder here.
Of course, just because it is possible to commit crimes with a
small probability of getting caught doesnt automatically make me go
out and do it.
|2.19.08 @ 12:32PM|#
Michael Ejercito,
In the absence of supernatural authority, good and evil become
ethical rather than moral concepts. Either your ethics lead you
treat other people as you would or would not be by them or they
don't.
Voluntary commitment to positive (i.e. non-suffering producing)
group ethics (often, but erroneously called morals) determines good
and evil.
And for the cheap seats: It matters more how you treat each other
than rather you follow the rules of a (possibly imaginary) God
whose mind you cannot know.
Sam Grove|2.19.08 @ 12:32PM|#
If there is no free will, then the idea of punishment has no
merit. The agents of the justice system would simply be engaging in
determined behavior which is triggered by an event created by
determined behavior.
If such punishment is performed to deter such acts by others, then
we are expecting them to choose not to engage in those acts based
upon the expectation of getting caught, or to engage in them if
they expect they can get away with it.
If all this was 'determined', then we would have no cause to ever
think about or discuss such matters.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 12:35PM|#
Dave2,
some sort of deliberate control over one's actions, and since
that vague characterization says precisely nothing about causal
determinism
Introducing "vague" into the argument means that the compatibilist
determinists are not even attempting to put together an
argument.
If there is a sufficient conceptual distance between "deliberate
control" and "causal determinism" to say that something else caused
my deliberate decision then you are talking gibberish. The fact
that language allows for concepts to be characterized with a
variety of terms does not make those concepts vague. Control
implies that you can determine between choices. Deliberate control
= causal determinism. That means the agent with deliberate control
has free will and their deliberate decisions are not entirely
determined by something outside themselves (as much influence as
the environment has on their decisions, if they have control, their
actions are not entirely determined by any force outside
themselves).
Compatibilist determinist arguments need to begin with some
demonstration of how two incompatible concepts can live comfortably
next to each other.
They are making the extraordinary claim. The burden of proof is on
them, not the standard assumptions.
|2.19.08 @ 12:38PM|#
"Though I am hardly the first person to point this out, I will
note that the fact that our brains can be damaged and that this can
lead to dramatic changes in behavior says something about the
nature of "free will" to me"
Hormones affect the brain, so does this mean I am absolved of any
wrongdoing while I'm PMSing? I so, woohoo!! (my husband will be
pissed).
|2.19.08 @ 12:40PM|#
As for the issue of punishment, it's all in how you view the
criminal justice system. My conception is that it exists to remove
people dangerous or destructive to other people and property. If
you hurt someone because you just felt like doing or it because of
a chemical imbalance or a brain injury, it's all the same to me.
You still get removed from a society you are trying to harm.
As for punishment, I'm a fan of Conventry.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 12:52PM|#
Dave2,
FWIW, the problem with the compatibilist determinist position is
the belief in determinism, an outdated clock-work view of the laws
of nature.
If the universe is a single determined causal chain, there is no
free will.
If it is a dynamic probabilist system there can be many overlapping
causal chains...allowing for free will to exist in sufficiently
complex agents.
|2.19.08 @ 12:56PM|#
Neu Mejican,
I think you're misunderstanding some key terms. I take it you're an
incompatibilist: you think that causal determinism is incompatible
with free will. But you write: "Control implies that you can
determine between choices. Deliberate control = causal
determinism."
In any case, it's not true that compatibilist determinists
(so-called "soft determinists") fail to give a more detailed
account of free will. Plenty of them do. Harry Frankfurt, John
Martin Fischer, Susan Wolf, Daniel Dennett, etc. The point is just
that the everyday notion of free will is, it seems, not detailed
enough to run into conflict with causal determinism. Given this,
the assumption that free will is incompatible with causal
determinism should be set aside, at least temporarily. That is, at
least until incompatibilists provide arguments for incompatibilism
(and they do: Peter van Inwagen, most famously).
You hint at an argument when you say that free will requires that
one's decisions not be ultimately determined by something outside
oneself. But that's clearly a question-begging assumption.
|2.19.08 @ 12:59PM|#
Neu Mejican,
Even if the clockwork universe has been debunked by quantum
mechanics, that's not of any obvious relevance to free will. After
all, if deterministic processes are problematic for free will,
random processes are just as bad: you could hardly hold someone
responsible for a decision produced by a random quantum event. This
point goes back at least to Hume: even if the universe is
indeterministic, that in itself doesn't solve the problem of free
will.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 1:17PM|#
Dave2,
It is clearly not the case that I am confused about the
terminology.
Although I may be guilty of not communicating effectively with
you.
If the "everyday notion of free will" is not sufficiently well
defined to create problems, then it is also not sufficiently well
defined to be compatible with anything in a meaningful sense.
|2.19.08 @ 1:23PM|#
When you write "Deliberate control = causal determinism" despite
being an incompatibilist, I think you've misunderstood
something.
So maybe it's not sufficiently well-defined. I never said we should
sign on to compatibilism. Just that we should set aside
incompatibilism pending further investigation.
Zeb|2.19.08 @ 2:05PM|#
I think that the concept of free will is a lot less interesting than most people want it to be. Free will vs. determinism is a false dichotomy. I have free will because if I decide to do something (I will it, if you will), then as long as I am not physically constrained from doing it, I will do it. What else can free will be? Decisions do not just come from nowhere. My choice to do or not to do something doesn't magically appear out of the spirit realm, it is the result of what is already in my mind and my experience. Free will in this sense is perfectly compatible with a completely deterministic world.
|2.19.08 @ 2:19PM|#
Something, I don't know what, myseriously forced me to post
this. Fate, kismet, quatum physics, or Satan.
Or I just chose to.
|2.19.08 @ 2:23PM|#
Though I am hardly the first person to point this out, I
will note that the fact that our brains can be damaged and that
this can lead to dramatic changes in behavior says something about
the nature of "free will" to me.
It doesn't say much to me. A damaged brain can just be exercising
free will in a different way.
|2.19.08 @ 2:35PM|#
As the brain sciences advance, the space for free will
shrinks. Many philosophers, legal analysts, and regular people
worry these findings will undercut our moral and legal systems that
rely on notions of personal responsibility.
Science is only confirming what i have always known to be
true....that i am the only being in the universe with free will and
all of you are drones.
Now as the only being with free will I command all you drones to
stop regulating and taxing me!
|2.19.08 @ 2:38PM|#
R.C. Dean,
Sorry, but could you flesh that out a bit? If our behavior changes
due to an injury to the brain how exactly is that an example of
exercising free will in a different fashion? It seems to me that it
is a manifestation of a change in "programming."
|2.19.08 @ 2:49PM|#
This illustrates the fact that there is more than a little
truth to H.L. Mencken's observation that "conscience is the inner
voice which warns us that someone may be looking.
What a whole bunch of crap...of course there is someone watching
when you do something wrong....you are watching yourself.
The Wine Commonsewer|2.19.08 @ 2:54PM|#
Something, I don't know what, myseriously forced me to post
this. Fate, kismet, quatum physics, or Satan.
Everything is happening as it is supposed to....
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 3:52PM|#
we should set aside incompatibilism pending further
investigation
That's a cop out.
re: Deliberate control = causal determinism
I am working with the semantic components of the terms here.
Deliberate aligns with determine.
while control aligns with cause.
The debate is about where the control lies...is it in the
individual or not.
The answer the compatibilist determinists (softies?) want to make
is "sorta?" Not really a useful position unless you take the next
step and explain the details of how the will is or is not
constrained.
The everyday notion of free will is that an agent can be the first
cause of a specific class of events, their own actions...that the
agent can determine/control whether or not the action will occur.
In the everyday notion of determinism, the individual does not
determine if the action will or will not occur.
An uninteresting version of determinism simple says that all things
have causes in the previous history of the world and that includes
the choices that people make (c.f., Zeb's comment above which
limits determinism to things that physically restrain you-which
assumes that thoughts/decisions/brain processes are not
physical?).
|2.19.08 @ 3:55PM|#
Sorry, but could you flesh that out a bit?
Sure.
(1) Your brain is different from mine. You act differently than I
do. That doesn't cast any doubt on the existence of free
will.
(2) Your brain is different now than it was when you were a kid.
You act differently now than you did then. That doesn't cast any
doubt on the existence of free will.
(3) Your brain will be different in 40 years than it is now because
of natural aging processes. You will very likely act differently
then than you do now. That doesn't, etc.
(4) Lance Armstrong had some pretty major brain surgery. His brain
is different now, and he became a much better cyclist after the
surgery. How does that cast any doubt, etc.
IOW, I don't see how Different Brain + Different Behavior = No Free
Will.
|2.19.08 @ 4:13PM|#
R.C. Dean,
In other words, I don't see where you explaining how a change in
brain state that changes behavior - specifically an injury -
doesn't undermine the concept of free will?
|2.19.08 @ 4:17PM|#
One issue that people here have not brought up (that I have noticed at least) is that of what one might call "weak free will." Where "free will" might exist but is often or most of the time wiped out by various determinate forces.
.|2.19.08 @ 5:09PM|#
Just curious... (I have yet to run across a satisfactory
explanation of free will or no free will myself, number one being
an adequate definition of what free will actually is)
How do both sides of this argument explain creating something new?
IE, creating music, literature, paintings.
As a computer programmer with some background in artificial
intelligence, there's no way a computer could do these things (at
least at the moment) beyond something like stringing random musical
notes together & then checking whether that sequence sounds
"good" or not, and "good" would have to be defined by humans
anyways.
Maybe I'm completely off base -- but I tend to look at those sorts
of things as acts of free will.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 5:24PM|#
Calidore,
I think Dave2's soft determinism is equivalent to what you are
calling weak determinism. But he hasn't been too willing to
clarify, preferring, it seems, to leave it up to further
investigation.
The crux of the issue, imho, is the grounding problem. If we can't
start new causal chains, or modify the course of existing causal
chains, then we don't have free will. If we can, then we can
discuss the degree of control that we might have (how strong our
free will is).
I think we do have free will, but that it is constrained by many
factors, so a weak free will concept seems most likely to be the
actual case.
|2.19.08 @ 5:26PM|#
This is a very interesting topic for me. Thanks for posting it,
Ron.
I mean I know it was your fate to post it and that there was
nothing literally in your control that you could do about it, or
for that matter anything else that you do, but it was my fate that
I felt like thanking you for it.
What I mean to say is that all of the particles that are
collectively vaguely known as me had reached a state from their
previous historical interactions with other particles that I will
vaguely call the rest of the universe where my particles' combined
interaction over a period of time is something that I label "saying
thanks".
I suppose a vague collection of particles could say that my vague
collection of particles chose to say thanks. But if so, that other
vague collection would have been fated to be wrong.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 5:28PM|#
I don't see where you explaining how a change in brain state
that changes behavior - specifically an injury - doesn't undermine
the concept of free will?
Just because a mind reacts in part due to the internal
configuration of its parts, does not mean that it is not choosing
between options. A brain injury might remove free will, but the
fact that a change in brain state results in a different choice
does not, as far as I can see, have any bearing on the existence of
free will.
Neu Mejican|2.19.08 @ 5:49PM|#
This point goes back at least to Hume: even if the universe
is indeterministic, that in itself doesn't solve the problem of
free will.
No, but it opens up a potential path/lever for choice. If you think
of existence as a static 4-D space with no probabilities (no flow
of time), there is no room for free will. In a world of probability
rather than static determinacy there is the possibility of
choice...whether that is through some multi-verse interpretation,
or some other mechanism.
This makes me think of Penrose and maybe Wolfram...
http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-23-penrose.html
Something about the limits of computation and complexity.
The Wine Commonsewer|2.19.08 @ 6:57PM|#
Calidore, if you are speaking of significant brain injury, I can
see where it may change a person into someone they weren't, but
they will still have the capacity to act on will or whim. Unless
they're in a vegetative coma. Their actions may be entirely
irrational or irritating to those around them, but it is still an
act of free will.
My grandmother made a conscious decision to make the soup in a
Tupperware bowl. That wasn't random synapses firing, nor was it a
sound decision, but it was her decision nonetheless.
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