A Modest Proposal for Syria

Michael Young | September 17, 2005

My friend Josh Landis has written an op-ed for the New York Times on Syria that, rather unfortunately, seems to downplay the very dire (and self-imposed) situation in which Syria finds itself today, and offers more reasons to dismiss his argument than to support it.

Landis wants the Bush administration to give Syria and its president, Bashar Assad, a chance. He opens by noting that the United States sees Syria as a 'low-hanging fruit' in the Middle East, and wishes to send it down the path to 'creative instability,' resulting in more democracy in the region and greater stability in Iraq. Landis sees this is a dangerous fantasy that will end up hurting American goals. He writes:

Mr. Assad's regime is certainly no paragon of democracy, but even its most hard-bitten enemies here do not want to see it collapse. Why? Because authoritarian culture extends into the deepest corners of Syrian life, into families, classrooms and mosques. Damascus's small liberal opposition groups readily confess that they are not prepared to govern. Though they welcome American pressure, like most Syrians, they fear the deep religious animosities and ethnic hatreds that could so easily tear the country apart if the government falls.

What does he propose? Essentially that the U.S. and Syria talk, because they "have much to talk about: both are trying to solve their Iraq problems. They share a common interest in subduing jihadism and helping Iraq build stability." More importantly, the U.S. has no interest in seeing Assad's regime collapse, because the chances are that ethnic turmoil would result and "would bring to power militant Sunnis who would actively aid the jihadists in Iraq. Mr. Assad is a member of the Alawite minority, a Shiite offshoot that fought a bloody battle against Sunni extremists in the 1980's... It would be suicide for him to provoke Sunnis and extremists while Washington seeks his downfall."

I'm at a loss as to where to begin nitpicking at what Landis says. First off, if it's suicide for Assad to provoke Sunni extremists, then why should the U.S. expect him to help them in Iraq? Indeed, how does this square with Landis' own statement that Assad has an interest in subduing jihadism? Maybe he does; but Landis admits he simply cannot. My own view is that he doesn't want to, because Iraq is the last card he holds in facing the U.S. The situation today clearly shows that, though both sides may be trying to solve their Iraq problems, both define those problems in very different ways.

Secondly, Landis has the instability thing on backwards: Because Assad is from the Alawite minority, dominating a Sunni majority, there is an ingrained instability in the Syrian system that can potentially heighten religious tensions; the problem is not American pressure. Domestic Syrian relations will get worse, if indeed the situation is as bad as Landis describes it, thanks to the fact that an Alawite clique (and indeed now one largely confined to the Assad family and cousins and in-laws) has come to dominate all power in Syria.

Worse, Assad has offered the Kurdish community--the Achilles Heel of any Syrian regime today, because of the pull of Iraq's virtually independent Kurds--nothing but words in recent years, after promising to regularize the status of some 100,000-200,000 stateless Kurds who have virtually no legal or cultural rights.

Third, Landis makes the error of many "Syrianists" by downplaying the role of Lebanon, specifically the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He writes:

Next week, United Nations investigators will begin interviewing top officials in Damascus about the bombing death of the anti-Syrian politician Rafik Hariri in Lebanon, a matter that many expect the United States will bring before the Security Council. Politicians and businessmen alike here are convinced that Washington wants to bring down the regime, not merely change its behavior.

This is deeply deceptive; the Hariri investigation is not an American-Syrian issue; it's an issue between the international community, represented by the United Nations, and Syria. The U.S. is certainly not going to write the report of the German investigator, Detlev Mehlis, which will reportedly implicate very senior members of the Syrian regime, perhaps even the president himself; indeed the report may well already be written--by Syria, which has left a trail of blood and cordite from Hariri's murder scene to the door of the Assad family.

And fourth, Landis' remarks on the authoritarianism in Syrian culture are not only astonishingly simplistic (and insulting to those tens of thousands of Syrians who have spent long spells in Syrian prisons because of their opposition to authoritarianism), but his statement that the Syrian opposition readily confesses it is not prepared to govern is misleading. Yes, they Syrian opposition, grounded down by four decades of dictatorship, is fearful for its country's future, but for heavens sake they're not asking for the regime to remain. They want a peaceful transition away from despotism, not for more legitimacy to be directed Assad's way so that he can perpetuate his power indefinitely, as Landis' proposals would inevitable lead to.

Fear of instability should not be an excuse to stick with the stalemated thuggery we know. Syria's collapse may indeed be very dangerous, but there is a middle ground between dealing positively with a discredited kleptocracy that is also very likely responsible for the murder, in Lebanon, of Hariri, journalist Samir Kassir, former Communist Party leader George Hawi, and several others in recent Beirut bomb blasts; that has not done nothing of any consequence for domestic Syrian reform and democratization; that has looked the other way on foreign "insurgents" entering Iraq (and I'm surprised Landis believes a mound of dirt on the Iraqi border is somehow proof of good Syrian intentions); that has consolidated the power of the Syrian Baath Party, a main barrier to change, on the spurious premise that this can somehow accelerate amelioration; there is a middle ground between dealing with such a regime and pushing for a transition to a more stable leadership without the Assads.

Landis' problem is that he cannot admit that Assad's hold today is inherently unstable, and that the political elite in Syria, despite what he says, is extremely anxious about Assad's dramatic errors. The regime is not a barrier against disintegration; it is proving to be its catalyst. In politics, relevance is everything. Assad has not become irrelevant because the U.S. and France have made him so; he's become irrelevant because he's made mistake after mistake, marginalizing Syria, losing its hold on Lebanon, playing with fire in Iraq, presiding over continued domestic economic stagnation, and destroying the tenuous domestic balance his father ceded him. And this is the man with whom the international community should be cutting a deal? C'mon.

Comments

|9.17.05 @ 3:34PM|#

In other words, no matter what anyone does, Assad is fucked.

Sounds like the American position in Iraq.

TallDave|9.17.05 @ 4:08PM|#

This line of reasoning sounds eerily familiar. It's the exact same argument that was made for not allowing the Soviet Union to collapse. The first Bush admin was myopic enough to buy it, though in the end it didn't matter.

Meanwhile, democracy proceeds apace in Iraq, and the insurgency gets less popular every day. The only way we can lose now is to give up.

Hell, even if we left today, the Iraqi gov't would probably come out on top, because weak as it is, it now controls the strongest native military force in Iraq and has strong support from the Iraqi electorate.

Note that Iraqis took the lead in the Tal Afar operation. In another year, we'll probably be doing mostly air support.

|9.17.05 @ 4:40PM|#

"Meanwhile, democracy proceeds apace in Iraq, and the insurgency gets less popular every day."

By "democracy" do you mean the well negotiated partition of Iraq?

...did you notice Mr. Young's use of quotation marks around the word "insurgency"?

There's the insurgency--Sunni fundies, old Baath, and their supporters--and then there's the "insurgency"--much of which makes its way through Syria--which isn't internal resistance to an occupation. ...They're foreigners, and it isn't clear to me that "the insurgency" was ever popular among Iraqis.

It also isn't clear to me that the true insurgency--no quotes--ever enjoyed much popularity in Kurdistan or Shiite dominated areas. ...Are you suggesting that the true insurgency is enjoying less popularity among Sunnis than it did before?

...How are you quantifying this declining popularity? My understanding is that the frequency of attacks continues to rise.

"The only way we can lose now is to give up."

Oh my!

I remember one of Warren Buffet's pearls went something like--only invest in a company whose underlying business is so good, even an idiot could run it. ...because, sooner or later, one will.

...The underlying business of the occupation isn't anywhere near that good. I don't know if there's any way to win, but there are lots of ways to lose.

|9.17.05 @ 7:03PM|#

Hell, even if we left today, the Iraqi gov't would probably come out on top, because weak as it is, it now controls the strongest native military force in Iraq and has strong support from the Iraqi electorate.

Good Lord - do you actually believe this? The Iraq "government" controls exactly as much as the Shia and Kurd leaderships allow it to and is universally despised for its weakness, corruption and incompetence. The Iraqi military is shot thorugh with insurgent "plants" and sympathisers (10% or more according to the US military's own estimates) and has so far demonstated no ability to defend its own troops, much less the civilian populace. The most powerful non-US or UK military forces in Iraq remain the Shia Badr Brigades and the Kurdish peshmerga, and that's not likely to change. It was significant that the Iraqi military unit now charged with defending Najaf chanted slogans praising Sistani - that "unit" is probably 90+% Shia militiamen in US-bought uniforms.

As for Iraqi forces "taking the lead" in operations, you may want to take note that its usually the same 10 or 12 battalions that are used in every one of these high-profile assignments, because most of the rest of the Iraqi army is pretty much worthless for anything except photo shoots. My guess is that these same "elite" battalions will provide whoever ends up couping whatever Iraqi regime we leave in place after we bug out in 3 or 4 years.

TallDave|9.17.05 @ 8:45PM|#

By "democracy" do you mean the well negotiated partition of Iraq?

By democracy I mean consensual government, with universal suffrage, a free press, freedom of speech, freedom to protest, and rule of law. If they choose federalism, that's their right as free people.


Good Lord - do you actually believe this?
Yes, because it's true. With 190,000 half-assed troops, it outnumbers the equally half-assed Shia, Sunni and Kurd militias put together. It controls $2.5 billion a month in oil. It is trusted by more Iraqis than any other force.

The most powerful non-US or UK military forces in Iraq remain the Shia Badr Brigades and the Kurdish peshmerga

Ha! One, they're on the side of the gov't, against the Sunnis. Shia have no beef with Kurds or vice versa. Two, they are militia. They are not even a regular army. Why do think Saddam kicked their asses so handily?

The Iraq "government" controls exactly as much as the Shia and Kurd leaderships allow it to

You mean like our gov't controls what Republican and Democrat leadership allow it to?

and is universally despised for its weakness, corruption and incompetence.

Hell, people say the same thing about Bush.

The reality is that polling data consistently show a high level of trust in the new Iraqu forces and gov't.

You're forgetting the last gov't put hundreds of thousands in mass graves. This is a huge step forward. And it's going to work, because freedom and democracy are the right of every human being.

TallDave|9.17.05 @ 8:49PM|#

I don't know if there's any way to win, but there are lots of ways to lose... My guess is that these same "elite" battalions will provide whoever ends up couping whatever Iraqi regime we leave in place after we bug out in 3 or 4 years.

Actually, those attitudes are the only way we'll lose. It's a test of wills. We're fortunate our leadership isn't as weak-willed as some.

TallDave|9.17.05 @ 8:55PM|#

...How are you quantifying this declining popularity? My understanding is that the frequency of attacks continues to rise.

No, the frequency of attacks has remained about the same in number. Polling data has shown declining support for the insurgents (gee I wonder why, they've been so helpful to Iraqis). You can see the polls in the Iraq Index from Brookings (a progressive think tank).

|9.17.05 @ 9:57PM|#

Josh Landis is right on target. I am afraid Michael Young, as many Lebanese right-wingers, is blinded by his hatred of the Syrian regime.
The US policy of regime change in Syria will have devastating consequences on the entire Mid East.

TallDave|9.17.05 @ 11:03PM|#

The US policy of regime change in Syria will have devastating consequences on the entire Mid East.

Worse than being ruled by despotic tyrants, or better than that? Just curious.

|9.17.05 @ 11:07PM|#

Thanks for the reference to Brookings. ...I have to admit, I'm seeing some mixed statistic there.

"No, the frequency of attacks has remained about the same in number.

So they're averaging what, like ninety to a hundred suicide bombers a month now?

"Actually, those attitudes are the only way we'll lose. It's a test of wills. We're fortunate our leadership isn't as weak-willed as some."

The triumph of Sie Will! ; )

...I hope our leadership knows how to learn from its mistakes. ...and continuing the fight against an insurgency you can't beat--and I'm not saying we can't beat 'em--isn't a sign of a strong will, it's a sign of willful stupidity.

"I am afraid Michael Young, as many Lebanese right-wingers, is blinded by his hatred of the Syrian regime. The US policy of regime change in Syria will have devastating consequences on the entire Mid East."

From my read on this piece, Mr. Young isn't ignoring the possibility of negative consequences of regime change in Syria. To the contrary, he seems to be well aware of it. He wrote:

"Fear of instability should not be an excuse to stick with the stalemated thuggery we know." ...and, "...there is a middle ground between dealing with such a regime and pushing for a transition to a more stable leadership without the Assads."

Living with the Assads appears to have associated negative consequences for the Middle East too. ...and I'm sure neither of us would cry for the Assads if...

|9.18.05 @ 12:26AM|#

the insurgency gets less popular every day

What else could happen? The only way the "insurgency" could get popular, would be if there were absolutely no alternative to them. Which is not the case.

I wish there was some way to get them to start cutting heads off again. It'd really help them in the polls.

The only way we can lose now is to give up.

This is a little optimistic, I'd say. Odds are in our favor if we're a) willing to spend enough and b) we do things at least half-intelligently.

Our gov't, however, is famously capable of dreaming up -- and then implementing with perfection -- incredibly stupid ideas.

I hope you're right. Because now that we're in Iraq, the alternatives to success are positively frightening. Like it or not, we have to win now.

The alternative now is the very real prospect of terrorists getting control of the world's second largest supply of oil.

Vox P.|9.18.05 @ 1:31AM|#

Who is stronger today in Syria, the Muslim brotherhood or the democratic opposition? It's not clear at all.

If the regime was to fall, there is no guarantee that either of these groups is capable of securing a peaceful transition. What about the tensions between the Sunni majority and minorities like the Alawis? Can the situation degenerate into a civil war? Will the US/UN intervene in this case? Syria is such an opaque country that it is impossible to predict anything.

The regime might be weak, but someone has to challenge it and give the decisive punch to the 'low hanging-fruit'. The Syrian opposition has been virtually wiped out as an organized force. Do you expect a popular uprising in a country where the population is terrorized by the political police? North Koreans (or Iraqis under Saddam) are dying of hunger but still do not dare to challenge their regime because they are too disorganised to do so. A tyranny like the one of Saddam Hussein could have continued forever, even if it was hated beyond imagination. Instead of making itself stronger, the Syrian regime chose to destroy any alternative to it; at the end, this tactic might be very effective.

Vox P.|9.18.05 @ 1:54AM|#

I agree with TellDave on the Iraqi issue. The government is getting stronger, the insurgency is getting weaker, they are fighting in increasingly remote places like Tel Affar near the Syrian border. The attack level doesn't mean anything. It's a sign of desperation IMHO. If you look at the timeline, you can see a serie of political successes, mainly the elections, the formation of a government, the draft of the constitution and the buildup of the Iraqi army and state. Wether you love or hate Bush for launching this war on a weak basis he might win it.

TellDave is wrong on one point only, he says: "Ha! One, they're on the side of the gov't, against the Sunnis. Shia have no beef with Kurds or vice versa. Two, they are militia. They are not even a regular army. Why do think Saddam kicked their asses so handily?"

True, the Sunni guerilla cannot win. It's too weak compared to the other groups.But there is Iran who might want to mess up with the Shia political landscape. Why? First because there's is a dispute with the US about their nuclear program. Second, because they prefer an theocracy run by the clerics where the elected representatives wouldn't hold any effective power. The Iraqi example is a threat to the Iranian model. Iran and Hezbollah are supporting Moqtada el-Sadr who also rejects the democratic system. They may try to destabilize Iraq and attempt to establish Iranian-style regime.

Vox P.|9.18.05 @ 1:58AM|#

I agree with TellDave on the Iraqi issue. The government is getting stronger, the insurgency is getting weaker, they are fighting in increasingly remote places like Tel Affar near the Syrian border. The attack level doesn't mean anything. It's a sign of desperation IMHO. If you look at the timeline, you can see a serie of political successes. There was Bremer, followed by Allaoui, the elections, the formation of a sovereign Iraqi government, the draft of the constitution, the buildup of the Iraqi army and state and now (hopefully) the ratification of the constitution. Wether you love or hate Bush for launching this war on a weak basis he might win it.

TellDave is wrong on one point only, he says: "Ha! One, they're on the side of the gov't, against the Sunnis. Shia have no beef with Kurds or vice versa. Two, they are militia. They are not even a regular army. Why do think Saddam kicked their asses so handily?"

True, the Sunni guerilla cannot win. It's too weak compared to the other groups.But there is Iran who might want to mess up with the Shia political landscape. Why? First because there's is a dispute with the US about their nuclear program. Second, because Iran is a theocracy run by the clerics where the elected representatives don't hold any effective power. The Iraqi example is a threat to the Iranian model. Iran and Hezbollah are supporting Moqtada el-Sadr who also rejects the democratic system. They may try to destabilize Iraq and attempt to establish Iranian-style regime.

TallDave|9.18.05 @ 2:02AM|#

So they're averaging what, like ninety to a hundred suicide bombers a month now?

Something like that, but keep in mind the military effect of those attacks is negligible. The political effect is actually negative for the insurgency. Their victory can only come from a premature U.S. departure.

Who is stronger today in Syria, the Muslim brotherhood or the democratic opposition? It's not clear at all.

In April 1989 all the leading Sovietologists were saying the Soviet Union was as strong as ever.

When the USSR fell apart there was civil war. Some of it is still going on today in places like Serbia. It's hard to argue they were better off under Soviet rule. I think the same applies in the Mideast today.

|9.18.05 @ 6:17AM|#

Young?s article is valid on many points but only in an ideal world. On the other hand, I am sure he would defend the completely dissolute decision to invade Iraq on the simple foundation that ends justify the means.

I totally agree with him that politics is all about relevance and Syria has lost relevance due to its own mistakes, because allowing foreign countries to play you that way (among other mistakes) is Syria?s responsibility and no one else?s. But there is no doubt that Michael?s ?views? are politically motivated (it wouldn?t be the first time). I don?t hear him barking about the extremely similar authoritarian regimes of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, etc. The only difference is that Syria is Israel?s only remaining Arab enemy.

He also makes a humongous and belligerent bogus declaration when he says ?This is deeply deceptive; the Hariri investigation is not an American-Syrian issue; it's an issue between the international community, represented by the United Nations, and Syria.? OH HELL NO you didn?t, the scary part is I really think he believes this crap. Can anyone recall the last time the UN did anything big without American consent or control on??? The Hariri murder is being overplayed because it can and has hurt Syria and that?s in America?s (and allies) best strategic interest. They are not trying to hurt Syria because of its dictatorship or human rights record mind you; but instead because of its foreign policy. And here is another to ponder; do you see any UN led investigation into George Hawi?s murder? Why is the life of one man worth more than the other? Because of the consequences and how they can be leveraged, not to mention the 4 billion dollar difference in assets.

And please keep in mind one thing, whatever happens, the US is not stupid enough for an all out military confrontation. Nobody would support such a move in or outside of America. Isolating Syria in the long-term wont hurt the leadership but it sure will sting the hell out of the mass public. Destabilizing Syria by using local groups who are willing to employ violence will meet the same fate as the one the Muslim Brotherhood met in the early 80?s. So, like it or not, you will have to deal with the Assad?s for at least the mid-term.

|9.18.05 @ 8:23AM|#

The insurgency doesn't have to be popular for it to be effective. Consider the fact that the IRA, as well as the various loyalist gangs, had a core of a couple thousand active combatants (at most) at any one time. Historically speaking, insurgencies, revolutions, etc. all are undertaken by a minority of a given population.

|9.18.05 @ 8:46AM|#

TallDave,

In April 1989 all the leading Sovietologists were saying the Soviet Union was as strong as ever.

In 1990 I predicted that within a year there would be a coup or some major change in the regime that would attempt to devolve it into a military dictatorship like that found in Poland in the 1980s. Yeltsin had pulled out of Gorbachev's government by that time and left Gorbachev with a rump of hardliners to run the government. A lot of historians of the USSR and (according to one of those historians) at least some CIA operatives in the USSR had similar inklings about the USSR's future at about the same time or earlier. Of course those that headed the CIA at the time had no idea what was about to happen because they generally had their thumbs up their asses.

|9.18.05 @ 8:55AM|#

TallDave,

Something like that, but keep in mind the military effect of those attacks is negligible.

If by that you mean it doesn't actually degrade the fighting strength of U.S. forces that's true. Then, its not designed to do that, so your point is inapposite.

The political effect is actually negative for the insurgency.

Perhaps, but then, the more pertinent question is how well it does in eroding the goodwill to the current puppet-government in Baghdad.

Some of it is still going on today in places like Serbia.

Serbia was part of Yugoslavia, not the USSR. Further, the collapse of Yugoslavia has little or nothing to do with the collapse of the USSR, since one was not aligned with the other. Tito's death and the power-sharing agreement that followed are catalysts for what happened in Yugoslavia.

|9.18.05 @ 9:23AM|#

Will this novel be released in serial form? ;-)

DailyKos has a nice "More Below the Fold" feature.

|9.18.05 @ 10:16AM|#

The war against the insurgents in Iraq is won. This month the US and Iraqi military are conducting mulptiple offensice operations all over western Iraq. But US casualites are on track to be the lowest of the war because Iraqi army is doing the fighting. The insurgents are fucked, they have to fight an arabic speaking army backed by US military close air support.

The war in Iraq has always been a brilliant strategic move. JIhadis used to go to Afghanistan for training, now they go to Iraq to die.

For a look at operations in Iraq this month go here:

http://63.247.134.60/~pobbs/archives/001736recap_september_operations_in_iraq.html

For US casualties here:

http://www.icasualties.org/oif/

Vox P.|9.18.05 @ 11:44AM|#

Innocent Criminal you're making me laugh. There are different levels of democracy just like there are different levels of dictatorship. You're comparing Syria to Jordan and Marocco? Try North Korea for a change. The examples you used, while not democracies, are heavens compared two Syria and countries that are attempting to reform and modernize. And don't give me this resistance to Israel crap.

Bottom line is that the Mehlis investigation has been created by the security council and the guy has to report to the security council only. Not to France, not to Germany, not to the US but to a council composed of 15 countries of which 5 are permanents and 10 that are elected. So yes, it's an issue between Syria and ther international community now.

"Can anyone recall the last time the UN did anything big without American consent or control on??? " Yes: 2003, Iraq war.

|9.18.05 @ 3:28PM|#

TallDave,

No, Yugoslavia wasn't aligned with the USSR you twit. I mean, my goodness, Yugoslavia was a founding member of the "non-aligned" movement in the early 1960s. Come up up with a better example instead of butchering the historical record with your ignorance.

|9.18.05 @ 3:32PM|#

TallDave,

True, it could succeed with either popularity or overwhelming military effectiveness.

Actually, it doesn't need either to succeed.

It's not clear what it's designed to do strategically...

Sure it's clear. It's designed to create divisions within society, undermine the puppet government in Baghdad, etc.

|9.18.05 @ 8:25PM|#

With 190,000 half-assed troops, it outnumbers the equally half-assed Shia, Sunni and Kurd militias put together.

Holy Christ, do you actually believe this? The Peshmerga are some of the best-trained forces not just in Iraq, but in the entire region. They've been fighting constant war on three fronts for over 20 years. The Shi'a aren't as well trained, but, unlike the government militia they by and large actually believe in what they're doing. That you can call them half-assed with a straight face just demonstrates how ignorant you truly are.

Shia have no beef with Kurds or vice versa. Two, they are militia. They are not even a regular army. Why do think Saddam kicked their asses so handily?

Do you know anything at all about Kurds or Kurdistan? Right now it's expedient for the Shi'a to join with the Kurds against the Sunni, but if Iran said the word then they'd sell their "allies" south in a heartbeat. And, Saddam beat both groups down because the CIA promised support to both groups should they move against the government. The support never came, and so Saddam used his helicopter force to cut them down. And, before he did, they had taken 14 of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Maybe you could actually read up on what happened in the past before you make outrageous and disgraceful comments about the present?

|9.18.05 @ 8:28PM|#

Yugoslavia ,like India was clearly "non-aligned" against the US

|9.18.05 @ 8:56PM|#

paul nelson,

It was also clearly non-aligned against the Soviets.

|9.18.05 @ 9:52PM|#

Like a lot of people, TallDave tried to steal a base by lumping the international jihadi campaign being imported into Iraq with the indigineous insurgency. The former is very unpopular, the latter has significant support among the Sunni populace.

The military and ingelligence agencies recognize this difference, and also recognize that driving a wedge between the two groups, and thus isolating the jihadis, is essential for success. However, in order to win debates with domestic opponents, people like TallDave work to fudge this distinction. I think it says a lot about such people's priorities.

Vox P.|9.19.05 @ 4:21AM|#

"Holy Christ, do you actually believe this? The Peshmerga are some of the best-trained forces not just in Iraq, but in the entire region. "

The Peshmergas? Well their name sounds exotic but they are just a bunch of poor people with Kalashnikovs, not an elite force.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:19AM|#

Like a lot of people, TallDave tried to steal a base by lumping the international jihadi campaign being imported into Iraq with the indigineous insurgency.

Yeah, that's because they're ummmm... working together. Sheesh.

The former is very unpopular, the latter has significant support among the Sunni populace.

Well, the "national resistance" (as it's stated in polls) polls very badly in national polls. They have zero support from 80% of the populace. It's hard to say how much support they have from Sunnis, but it's telling we had Sunnis in Tal Afar asking for coalition help. Remember, the Sunni resistance offers very little besides murder and thuggery.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:22AM|#

Hakluyt,

You clearly don't know much history. Yugoslvia was intentionally modeled on the Soviet Union and that's where they got their military arms.

|9.19.05 @ 10:25AM|#

"Yeah, that's because they're ummmm... working together."

In some areas they are. In some cases, they each work independently. In others, they are actively hostile to each other, to the point that firefights have broken out. Whattsamatter, they all look alike to you?

"Well, the "national resistance" (as it's stated in polls) polls very badly in national polls." On the other hand, every single seat won in the last election was won by a candidate who ran on getting the United States out of Iraq.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:34AM|#

Shem,

The Peshmerga are some of the best-trained forces not just in Iraq, but in the entire region. They've been fighting constant war on three fronts for over 20 years.

Yes, and they've been losing for 20 years. Why do you think the US is so incredibly popular in Kurdish areas? They're tired of getting their asses kicked by real armies.

That you can call them half-assed with a straight face just demonstrates how ignorant you truly are.

LOL You clearly haven't been following Iraqi history the last 20 years. They got massacred by Saddam when they rose up against him. They got massacred again by the U.S. when Sadr tried his half-assed rebellion. The kill ratios were 100:1. Oh, they "believe in what they're doing?" Yeah, that and 5 bucks might get you a latte. They're poorly trained, poorly led, poorly equipped, and poorly armed. They have no armor, no air support, no artillery. They are not a real military force, and I defy you to produce an iota of evidence (i.e., success against a real military) that says otherwise.

but if Iran said the word then they'd sell their "allies" south in a heartbeat.

That's just asinine wishful thinking by Iraq doomsayers. Yes, they have things in common with Iran. No, they don't take orders from Tehran.

|9.19.05 @ 10:34AM|#

TallDave,

Hah! Following WWII Yugoslavia relied heavily on Western countries (including the U.S.) for arms imports into the 1960s. During the 1960s they did import arms from the USSR as well, but that relationship was never an exclusive one like that say that of Poland with the USSR, and Yugoslavia never accepted any conditions on the use of imported arms (that's why a TOW missile agreement with the U.S. broke down in the 1980s). In the 1980s at least 1/4 of its arms exports came from the U.S.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia also had its own robust domestic arms industry and was in fact a significant arms exporter (especially to third world trouble spots).

|9.19.05 @ 10:35AM|#

In the 1980s at least 1/4 of its arms imports came from the U.S.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:38AM|#

Joe,

Your argument lacks a point. You admit they're working together, and they're both unpopular anyway. Why do think all the Al Qaeda attacks originate from Sunni areas? Only the Sunni resistance is working with Al Qaeda Conflating them is not only reasonable, it's ridiculous to do otherwise.

Of course, everyone wants the U.S. out of Iraq, including us. Do you see the gov't asking us to leave?

|9.19.05 @ 10:38AM|#

Yugoslavia exported everything from attack helicopters to frigates.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:40AM|#

In the 1980s at least 1/4 of its arms imports came from the U.S

link

After the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 improved bilateral relations, the Soviet Union became Yugoslavia's main supplier of arms and equipment. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia received Soviet T-34 and T54 /-55 tanks, first-generation antitank guided missiles, Osaclass missile boats, and MiG-21 fighters. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union sold Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters and SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. Since 1985 Yugoslavia has received a license to produce a domestic version of the Soviet T-72 tank for its own use and for export. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was one of only a few countries to be sold the new Soviet MiG-29 fighter. At an estimated cost of US$20 million per aircraft, however, the MiG-29 was considered too expensive for Yugoslavia to purchase more than a few as models for its own aircraft industry.

Purchases from the Soviet Union had the advantage of sparing Yugoslavia the scarce hard currency (see Glossary) reserves required as payment by Western suppliers. The Soviet Union also provided generous credit and repayment terms. Civilian authorities in Yugoslavia voiced serious concerns about the political influence gained by the Soviet Union from such favorable terms. Arms sales and frequent contacts had the potential to build a constituency favorable to the Soviet Union in the YPA and its leadership. In any event, the situation in 1990 preserved some of Yugoslavia's previous dependency on good relations with the Soviet Union.

|9.19.05 @ 10:40AM|#

TallDave,

You need to realize that Yugoslavia dealt with the USSR at arms length for all of its post-WWII history. Indeed, that was a center-piece of Tito's plan to keep Yugoslavia independent of any of the two super-powers.

|9.19.05 @ 10:42AM|#

TallDave,

The information you provided doesn't undermine my statement. Maybe something on point would help your cause. :)

|9.19.05 @ 10:43AM|#

TallDave,

From the link you provided:

Between 1983 and 1987, Yugoslavia bought US$600 million in arms abroad. The Soviet Union supplied 75 percent of this amount and the United States 23 percent, with the remaining 2 percent supplied by ten other countries.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:43AM|#

Hakluyt,

If that's not a Soviet client state, I don't know what is. If you don't recognize that as being relevant, you need psychological help as well as history lessons.

|9.19.05 @ 10:46AM|#

TallDave,

Yes, a Soviet client state which in the 1980s got almost 1/4 of its arms imports from the U.S. That makes sense. :)

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:47AM|#

Hakluyt

Basic math seems to elude you as well. They got the other 3/4 from the USSR.

Sheesh.

|9.19.05 @ 10:48AM|#

TallDave,

At an estimated cost of US$20 million per aircraft, however, the MiG-29 was considered too expensive for Yugoslavia to purchase more than a few as models for its own aircraft industry.

|9.19.05 @ 10:49AM|#

TallDave,

Again, what is a Soviet client state doing getting 1/4 of its imported arms from the U.S.? Answer the question. Just admit you used an erroneous example and move on.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:50AM|#

Hakluyt,

Were they building any U.S. tanks or aircraft?

Your battle against common sense is impressive, but foredoomed to failure.

|9.19.05 @ 10:53AM|#

TallDave,

Civilian authorities in Yugoslavia voiced serious concerns about the political influence gained by the Soviet Union from such favorable terms.

More importantly, what is a client state doing with individuals voicing these sorts of concerns? I can't recall similar statements by officials in Poland, Hungary or Bulgaria.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:53AM|#

Again, what is a Soviet client state doing getting 1/4 of its imported arms from the U.S.?

Trying to play it's main ally against that ally's enemy, obviously. Welcome to Cold War politics 101.

According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, between 1967 and 1976 the Soviet Union supplied 93 percent of Yugoslavia's arms

Again, that sure sounds like a client state.

The Soviet Union was always Yugoslavia's main supplier. Yugoslvia was deliberately modeled on the Soviet Union. They were always closer to Soviet ideology. They collapsed at the same time.

I don't know how much more obvious it can be.

|9.19.05 @ 10:55AM|#

TallDave,

Your inability (or flat out yellow-bellied unwillingness) to answer my question is telling.

Again, what is a Soviet client state doing getting 1/4 of its imported arms from the U.S.?

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:55AM|#

More importantly, what is a client state doing with individuals voicing these sorts of concerns?
Again, welcome to Cold War politics 101.

Were they a satellite like Ukraine or Poland? No. Were they more closely aligned to the USSR than the West? Unquestionably, by every measure.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 10:56AM|#

Hakluyt,

Your inability to read is more telling. I answered that question three times already.

|9.19.05 @ 10:59AM|#

TallDave,

Trying to play it's main ally against that ally's enemy, obviously. Welcome to Cold War politics 101.

That doesn't make it much of a client state then. The term client state connotes some sort of abject dependency after all. The ability to play off parties against each other signals something else entirely. You've just fisked your own argument I am afraid.

The Soviet Union was always Yugoslavia's main supplier.

Your website doesn't say that.

Yugoslvia was deliberately modeled on the Soviet Union.

So is the PRC. Does that make the PRC a Soviet client state? Hardly. the whole 'modelled' on argument was weak from the start.

|9.19.05 @ 11:01AM|#

TallDave,

I can quite obviously read, you twit. I swear, this hamhanded insult always makes me laugh because its silly on its face.

No, you only answered it once. You avoided it on all other occassions. We cross-posted on the one occassion you did actually answer it.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:04AM|#

Well, it's nice you've learned to read, if not to stop embarassing yourself with ridiculous arguments.

|9.19.05 @ 11:09AM|#

"You admit they're working together, and they're both unpopular anyway."

No, TallDave, I stated that the international jihadists were very unpopular, but that the local Sunni/Baathist/Nationalist/Whatever the Hell insurgency - which make up the vast majority of the anti-US forces - has considerable support within the Sunni community.

Hakluyt, teh Yugos was commies and teh's all you need to know.

|9.19.05 @ 11:09AM|#

TallDave,

You're the purveyor of ridiculous arguments I am afraid.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:10AM|#

Hardly. the whole 'modelled' on argument was weak from the start.

Well, that's according to wiki:

"On January 31, 1946 the new constitution of Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, modeling the Soviet Union, established six constituent republics and two autonomous province:"

So I guess you can take your silly argument up with them.

The term "client state" re the Cold War is generally taken to mean economic/military dependence on either the U.S. or Soviets. In that binary choice, one would have to be insane to say Yugoslavia was more a client state of the USA than the USSR.

|9.19.05 @ 11:11AM|#

joe,

Oh, they were most definately communists, but the idea that Yugoslavia was a client state of the USSR is flat out silly.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:13AM|#

I stated that the international jihadists were very unpopular

They're both unpopular.

has considerable support within the Sunni community.

You're basing this on what? Obviously the jihadis also have considerable support in Sunni areas, or they wouldn't able to operate so freely there as opposed to everywhere else.

|9.19.05 @ 11:15AM|#

TallDave,

The Wiki article specifically mentions that the differences in construction came about in 1948. You can read certainly, but your reading comprehension skills can seriously be questioned.

One would have to be quite silly to assume that all nations were client states of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.

|9.19.05 @ 11:19AM|#

So let's see here. Yugoslavia is a client state which has its own robust arms industry, was singificant arms trade without nations outside the Soviet bloc, has a sytem of economic organization quite different from the USSR (indeed, unique in the communist world), etc. Yes, it sounds like they were wholly dependent on the USSR - not.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:19AM|#

Hakluyt,

Your arguments are a rich source of amusement. So, your assertion is the collapse of Yugoslavia had nothing to with the collapse of the USSR? And, despite being modelled on and never getting less than 75% of their arms from USSR, it's not fair to say they were "clients?"

|9.19.05 @ 11:20AM|#

Of course it's flat out silly! Tito was a huge thorn in Stalin's side, precisely because the Yugo communists refused to subordinate themselves to Moscow. Sort of like Albania, except Tito's government was marginally better than post-Stalin Russia, whereas Hoxha's (?) was marginally worse.

TallDave gives the game away with his "binary choices" argument. There weren't only binary choices during the Cold War - ask India, or China, or Osama bin Laden! Maybe he should have taken Cold War 102. His analysis of Cold War politics founders on exactly the same "with us or against us" shoals as his analysis of the Iraqi insurgency, and the overall state of global security in the post-9/11 world.

"Obviously the jihadis also have considerable support in Sunni areas, or they wouldn't able to operate so freely there as opposed to everywhere else." Not so. The terrorist practices they're using can be carried out, and a movement maintained, in the absence of popular support - look at the London subway bombers. Look at the Weather Underground.

But a quasi-military force like the "real" insurgency does require a degree of popular support.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:22AM|#

I didn't say I was asserting it was a binary choice, I said that's the accepted usage.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:23AM|#

The terrorist practices they're using can be carried out, and a movement maintained, in the absence of popular support

If that's so, why aren't they operating in Kurdish and Shiite areas? I think you would have to agree that at least 90% of their activity is in Sunni areas. That implies Sunni support.

|9.19.05 @ 11:26AM|#

TallDave,

So, your assertion is the collapse of Yugoslavia had nothing to with the collapse of the USSR?

Yes. They were quite independent of one another. The break-up of Yugoslavia started in 1980 due to the death of Tito and was finally consumated in 1991. That other shit was happening in Eastern Europe at the time has little to do with the internal dynamic going in Yugoslavia in the 1980s; ethnic tensions that would tear the country apart were there whatever else was going on in Eastern Europe.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:28AM|#

Hakluyt,

Well, enjoy your little fantasy world. Meanwhile, sane people will accept that the collapse of the USSR was intimately connected to the very proximate collapse of their Yuglosavian clients, enough so that they can be viewed as the same event.

|9.19.05 @ 11:31AM|#

"If that's so, why aren't they operating in Kurdish and Shiite areas?"

They are. There was a huge bomb in Irbil a couple of weeks ago. They were also carrying out mass slaughters of Shia until recently.

But everybody knows the big game in Iraq is Baghdad. It has 1/4 of the country's population, fer Chrissakes! (You might want to remember that that next time you feel like making a statement about 90% of the country being stable.)

In addition, with the Sunni insurgency concentrated in the Sunni areas (which sort of figures), the Americans and Iraqi recruits and "collaborators" (really just guys looking for work, mostly) are concentrated in that same area.

And even if the small amount of local support they do have is Sunnia Arab (which would make sense), that doesn't suggest that most or even many Sunni Arabs support them. Most of the Weather Underground's support could be found in and around New York City and California, but that does not mean most or even many (or even a significant number of) New Yawkers and Californians supported them.

How many Floridians supported the 9/11 "pilots?"

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:34AM|#

Joe,

And even if the small amount of local support they do have is Sunnia Arab (which would make sense), that doesn't suggest that most or even many Sunni Arabs support them.

The problem is, those arguments apply to the non-jihadi Sunni insurgents too. It's a Sunni insurgency, aided by Sunni jihadists. One is probably less popular than the other, but neither offers much to Iraqis, and there's extensive cooperation.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:36AM|#

Wiki seems to think the two collapses were related enough to mention in the same sentence, implying causality.

Following the "fall of Communism" in the rest of Eastern Europe, each of the republics elected a new government democratically, but the unresolved issues remained.

|9.19.05 @ 11:36AM|#

You're both wrong, and both right, about Yugoslavia's collapse. After Tito died, there was a bit of a rapproachement between the Yugos and Moscow - largely because they realized the danger of their ethnic divisions, and realized that without the honored leader of the partisans holding them together, they needed some other force. But even then, Yugoslavia remained more independent than Poland, East Germany, or Czecheslovakia.

So the collapse of the Soviet Union did play some role in hastening the collapse of Yugoslavia, but that neither changes the reality of the Yugos' nonaligned status through the Cold War, nor make the collapse of the Soviet Union the major proximate cause of the Balkins Breakup.

|9.19.05 @ 11:42AM|#

TallDave,

Meanwhile, sane people will accept that the collapse of the USSR was intimately connected to the very proximate collapse of their Yuglosavian clients, enough so that they can be viewed as the same event.

Heh. The quoted language from wiki doesn't say this. Ask yourself a question. What happens to Yugoslavia if Tito is alive in 1991?

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:44AM|#

If you look at the non-jihadi Sunni insurgency with more granularity, you'll find there are some tribes who support it and some who do not. Those that support the insurgency tend, with some exceptions, to be the same ones offering shelter to jihadis. Those that support the new democratic government tend not to.

|9.19.05 @ 11:46AM|#

TallDave,

Nice selective quoting; here is more what wiki says:

After Tito's death in 1980, ethnic tensions grew in Yugoslavia. Some members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drafted a memorandum in the 1980s that opposed the policy of the federation and promoted Serbian nationalism. The ethnic Albanian miners in Kosovo organized strikes which dovetailed into ethnic conflict between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority in the province.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:47AM|#

Hakluyt,

A better question would be what if the USSR had not collapsed? Do you really think they'd have been holding elections in Yugoslavia?

|9.19.05 @ 11:52AM|#

TallDave,

Nice attempt to avoid my query.

Do you really think they'd have been holding elections in Yugoslavia?

Holding elections isn't the only way that Yugoslavia could have broken up. Indeed, as the real way it broke up was by military force, that seems to be the most important consideration.

TallDave|9.19.05 @ 11:59AM|#

LOL Your query wasn't as relevant as mine, since my original assertion involved the USSR not Tito.

But if you want an answer, I think he'd have suffered the same fate as Ceaucescu and the other dictators who fell during the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.

But I'm sure you'll disagree, living as you do in your little fantasy world where all that had nothing to do with Yugoslavia.

|9.19.05 @ 12:31PM|#

"A better question would be what if the USSR had not collapsed? Do you really think they'd have been holding elections in Yugoslavia?"

Probably not, because the chaos caused by the fracturing along ethnic lines would have been put down by the Soviets, not NATO. But yes, Yugoslavia would have broken up regardless.

Joshua Landis|9.22.05 @ 8:12AM|#

Dear Michael and all, I have posted my reply to your criticism on Syria Comment. Check it out.
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/index.html