Julian Sanchez | August 8, 2005
Jonathan Rauch cheers on a lawsuit aimed at the cartelicious deal between the major tobacco companies and state attorneys general.
Help Reason celebrate its next 40 years. Donate Now!
Try Reason's award-winning print edition today! Your first issue is FREE if you are not completely satisfied.
Thanks for the excellent explanation of the Deal,
Jonathan!
Opposition to the settlement could put some of us states'-righters
in an interestingly weird postion. This may be one instance in
which we would want the national government to assert itself more
forcefully. Odd. Politics makes strange bedfellows.
"Coming soon to a courtroom near you: Bambi meets Godzilla. This
week, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a free-market advocacy
group in Washington, filed suit in federal court..."
LOL! Poor little Bambi...
And what was up with that "normally, the shareholders would pay"
paragraph? You people are normally the first to point out that
corporations pass on their costs to their consumers, but now you're
arguing that Big Tobacco screwed their customers, and saved
themselves, by paying the settlement out of taxes at the point of
purchase, rather than corporate profits?
fwiw, how much of a tax/fee/settlement/insert-term-here is paid
by shareholders (out of profits) vs. by consumers depends on market
conditions.
Say that the settlement (or whatever term you prefer) amounted to
(hypothetically) $0.25 per pack of cigarettes. (I have no idea if
that number is accurate, but it will suffice to illustrate the
concept.) If smokers are really loyal to their brands or have a
hard time cutting back, then a company can raise the price per pack
by $0.25 without significant repercussions. Sure, there will be a
drop in demand, which will cut into profits. The lost profits are,
in some sense, the company's share of the settlement, and the total
amount of extra money paid by consumers is, in some sense, the
consumers' share.
However, if consumers are more willing to switch brands or cut
back, then a company that only raises prices by, say, $0.15 per
pack can scoop up customers from the companies that are raising
prices by $0.15 per pack, and make up for the losses per pack by
increasing volume.
So, the lesson is that it's tricky to really say who's actually
paying for something. If the end result of a situation is a big
bite into profits and no significant change in consumer spending
then the costs were effectively passed on to shareholders. If the
end result is no significant bite into profits but a significant
increase in the amount paid by consumers then the costs were
effectively passed on to consumers. And if the result is somewhere
in between, well, the costs were shared.
Let me be clear that this is not a moral
judgement. I've made this point before and somebody jumped
all over me, saying that I'm OK with passing on the costs of a law
to one group but not another. I'm not endorsing the tobacco
settlement (I think the whole thing was ridiculous), and I'm not
expressing a preference as to who should bear the burden. I'm
simply saying that it's not easy to assert that one group or
another is paying for something, because market conditions will
dictate how a cost is divided. If anything, there's a good
libertarian lesson here: Central planners who claim that
the costs of something will fall where they want them to fall are
often fooling themselves. The real world is hard to
predict. Which suggests that maybe central planners should
refrain from imposing costs on people...
I agree, thoreau - not every cost imposed on a corporation will
be passed on, 100%, to the customers.
And not every tax on the customers will come off the corporation's
bottom line.
The way passed-on costs are often described is far too
simplistic.
joe-
Yet, for some reason, whenever I point out that the passing on of
costs is a complicated process that depends on particular market
conditions, somebody jumps all over me.
So, for the record, first let me say that I oppose policies that
impose costs on parties who are voluntarily entering into
transactions that (in the absence of regulation) would not affect
anybody else. Second, I am not expressing a moral preference for
how an unjustly imposed cost should be allocated.
All I'm saying is that anybody, policy-maker or otherwise, who
asserts "These costs always go to consumers" or "These costs always
hurt profits", is trying to claim more omniscience than he really
has.
thoreau,
The reason your such a commie is because you need to take Economics
101. ;-)
The safeguard against "passing costs to the consumer" is
competition. In a competitive market, a company can't simply raise
prices to recoup its legal losses, or it would lose even more money
in lost sales.
The entire point of the MSA, then, was to prevent competition from
saving consumers. Instead of the incumbant companies having to take
their lumps or face new, non-MSA competition, the MSA hamstrung new
entrants to the tobacco business even though the new entrants
never signed the MSA. This allowed the big companies to shift
the costs to the consumer, something that without the
competition-deadening parts of the MSA they couldn't have
done.
This isn't a case of the costs of central planning falling in
unexpected places. The MSA was designed from the beginning to allow
the costs to be shifted to the consumer rather than borne by the
signatory companies.
Grant-
Good point. My statement was more about the general case, where
some people assert that costs are ALWAYS passed to consumers, or
asert (when it's more convenient) that costs ALWAYS come out of
profits.
This one was definitely engineered to remove any uncertainty.
However, I would be reluctant to predict how costs will be
allocated if the agreement is overturned.
The MSA was designed from the beginning to allow the costs
to be shifted to the consumer rather than borne by the signatory
companies.
In light of the joe/thoreau discussion, I think this would be
better phrased as...
The MSA was designed from the beginning to allow the costs to be
more transparently shifted to the consumer rather
than borne directly by the signatory companies
and indirectly by the consumer.
Mr. Gould,
One obvious way for the consumers to avoid the cost, and the
corporations to eat it themselves, would be for the consumers to
stop buying the product.
The confidence with which the you and the cartel ignore this
possibility is indicative of the special nature of the
nicotine-delivery market.
But Joe, the settlement wasn't supposed to be about reducing the
sale of cigarettes.
Big Tobacco was sued for its marketing practices and its
obfuscation of the risks of smoking.
This means that, by definition, a new entry into the market cannot
possibly be guilty of these acts.
Therefore, imposing the terms of the settlement on new entrants is
a savage injustice, and one the states aren't even pretending they
aren't undertaking.
Interesting.
Here Jonathan's hoping that the Supreme Court will shoot down a
scheme whereby states blackmail private tobacco manufacturers with
the threat of lawsuits alleging that the product is harmful. After
all, we're on the side of the consumer, who has to pay the
blackmail, and smaller companies that are extorted into going along
with the deal.
OTOH yesterday Jacob was hoping Congress wouldn't shoot down a
scheme whereby states blackmail private firearm manufacturers with
the threat of lawsuits alleging that the product is harmful. Even
though we're on the side of the consumer, who will have to pay the
blackmail, and small manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who
will be extorted into going along with the deal, the attempted
agreement with Smith & Wesson fell through so the scheme hasn't
succeeded yet.
I think I like Jonathan's take better. "A stitch in time..." and
all that.
Besides, even though it's a long shot remedying the tobacco
financial agreement by ending the payment of extortion seems a lot
more likely than putting gun manufacturers back in business after
they've ben bankrupted.
Site comments/questions:
Media Inquiries and Reprint Permissions:
(310) 367-6109
Editorial & Production Offices:
3415 S. Sepulveda Blvd.
Suite 400
Los Angeles, CA 90034
(310) 391-2245