Tim Cavanaugh | March 16, 2005
Ronald Bailey checks in on American attitudes toward advanced prenatal diagnostic tests.
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Any law that purports to enforce moral standards, whether they're established by God, Gaia, or "the natural order of things," should be viewed as an assault on the First Amendment Freedom of Religion.
Any law that purports to enforce moral standards, whether
they're established by God, Gaia, or "the natural order of things,"
should be viewed as an assault on the First Amendment Freedom of
Religion.
So much for all those laws against murder, rape and theft. I guess
we can keep laws mandating driving on the right-hand side of the
road and Columbus Day as a Federal holiday though.
James-
There are plenty of valid secular reasons for outlawing murder,
rape and theft. Even atheists like me think so.
...70 percent opposed government intrusion into their
private reproductive decisions.
But half of them have no problem asking the government to intrude
on the reproductive decisions of other people when it comes to
abortion.
HAVE there been any arguments against bioengineering technology that don't boil down to either "Humans have no right to play God" or "Humans have no right to interfere with nature?" I haven't heard any; THAT'S what distinguishes opposition to biotechnology with opposition to murder and theft. And I believe THAT is what Larry A was referring to.
I think Bailey should have thrown in some quotations from Leon Kass, chair of The President's Council on Bioethics, to give everyone an idea of what we have to fear from government intervention in the US.
Jennifer,
I believe James is refering to Larry's comment about enforcing
moral standards. Make no mistake, those secular laws against rape,
theft and murder are essentially morally based. Perhaps your
atheist morality places value on a stable society. Whether your
morality is Utilitarian, Pragmatic, Perfectionist, or what have
you, it need not be religious. James is right on the money.
Those acts also violate the rights of the victims, thus making it only moral on the grounds of not violating others rights.
PintofStout,
Correct. To value another's rights is a moral choice. Not all
systems of morality include valuing another's rights. And for what
it's worth, tomorrow I will heartily consume you.
Well, Fella,
I believe the first post, the point of which James missed, was
making that distinction. Legislating morality is assumed to be
someone else's morality that is not commonly shared and in which
nobody else's rights are infringed. It's a subtle, and yet still
pretty obvious argument, that was absurd to interpret in such a
way.
RE: FWIW - Tomorrow is like my high holy day (as a brew-swilling,
music-loving athiest). Green beer is an abomination! Happy St.
Patty's Day.
St. Patrick's day, and all other popular drinking holidays, are commonly referred to by recovering alcoholics and seasoned imbibers alike as "Amatuer Night."
Those acts also violate the rights of the victims, thus
making it only moral on the grounds of not violating others
rights.
What about the rights of the fetus? Are they not violated when one
chooses to "avoid giving birth," to use Ron Bailey's clever
euphemism?
Yes, yes, I know we've discussed this many a time. And I know
that any number of intelligent posters will soon arrive to argue
that a fetus has absolutely no rights.
But to dismiss the possibility that the fetus does have rights as
"ideology" is to ignore that this view has at least as much
scientific basis as its opponents. To cast it aside as "religious
dogma" misses the fact that many arguments for the personhood of
the fetus have nothing to do with religion.
To clarify, my problem lies not with prenatal testing per se, or with biotechnology in general, but with practices that violate an unborn person's right to life.
I apologize for this flurry of posts, but my dark sense of humor
forced me to chuckle at
in order to avoid giving birth to a child with a
life-threatening illness.
So kill them before the illness does, eh?
One fascinating finding was that a majority of Roman
Catholics were in favor of PGD to test embryos for disease genes,
sibling immuno-compatibility, and the presence of adult onset
disease genes. This even though Catholic dogma, to put it mildly,
frowns on assisted reproductive techniques.
It does indeed frown on in vitro fertilization and the like, but as
Catechism of the Catholic Church states in paragraph 2274:
Since it must be treated from conception as a person, the
embryo must be defended in its integrity, cared for, and healed, as
far as possible, like any other human being.
Prenatal diagnosis is morally licit, "if it
respects the life and integrity of the embryo and the human fetus
and is directed toward its safe guarding or healing as an
individual. . . . It is gravely opposed to the moral law when this
is done with the thought of possibly inducing an abortion,
depending upon the results: a diagnosis must not be the equivalent
of a death sentence." [emphasis mine]
The fetus isn't a person, therefore it possesses no
rights.
crimethink,
I am curious about something. What does it profit to deliver a
fetus which will not survive the birth or will not survive outside
the womb (and there are some fairly nasty birth defects where that
is the case)? Indeed, in the case of a fetus say lacking a brain,
why would one want that fetus carried to term?
There are plenty of valid secular reasons for outlawing
murder, rape and theft.
there are also plenty of valid secular reasons for allowing them,
ms jennifer. i think mer wellfellow is right in backing mr james --
these are moral codes of law, not rational.
as Catechism of the Catholic Church states in paragraph 2274:
good point, mr crimethink.
The fetus isn't a person, therefore it possesses no
rights.
this is a statement of ideology, mr gunnels, not
rationality.
crimethink,
Note that I know someone who was told by her Catholic priest that
she must carry the fetus to term despite the fact that it would not
survive outside the womb.
gaius marius,
Actually its perfectly rational to hold that position. A fetus can
be considered a non-person for a number of perfectly valid
reasons.
gaius marius,
Also note that a fetus minus a brain is clearly not a person, since
it lacks some of the defining characteristics of human personhood
and always will - self-awareness for example. How anyone defends
laws which forbid the abortion of such fetuses is beyond me.
a fetus can also be considered a person for a number of rational
reasons, can it not? a fetus can, after all, be delivered and
survive with care. so to say that a fetus definitively is not a
person is not a perfectly rational position.
but it is a moral one -- just as patria potestas were not
considered emancipated persons under roman republican law for most
of their lives, one can today consider that one becomes an
emancipated person at birth. but i don't think we can pretend that
some empirical barrier exists for personhood, sui juris.
How anyone defends laws which forbid the abortion of such
fetuses is beyond me.
lol -- i haven't taken that position, even if many churches
have.
but i can understand that, if one truly values life above all
things, even the remote possibility of confusion or an error in
diagnosis or medical records that might kill a healthy child is not
worth the risk. again, that is a moral decision with which i find
it hard to argue convincingly even if i disagree.
Indeed, in the case of a fetus say lacking a brain, why
would one want that fetus carried to term?
A fetus which lacks even a brain stem is already dead. If you're
talking about fetuses lacking a cerebrum, yes, that is a difficult
question, but I would say that even such a person has the right to
life.
In any case, such circumstances are extremely rare. You're making
the perfect the enemy of the good here; a pro-life position's
difficulties with ancephalic fetuses hardly justifies the vast
majority of abortions, which destroy a fetus that would have been
able to survive outside the womb.
crimethink:
Your sincerely held moral (but incorrect) view that an embryo (8
cells or so) is a person is, for some of us, a really good argument
for why government agencies shouldn't be allowed to decide such
moral issues for those of us who sincerely disagree with you. In
this case tolerating moral pluralism is the way to keep social
peace.
but i don't think we can pretend that some empirical barrier
exists for personhood, sui juris.
pardon me -- i mean to say once certain minimum thresholds have
been met, such as conception and some measure of normal
development. if we've any interest in empiricism, i don't think
anyone has observed personhood prior to conception. :)
gaius marius,
a fetus can also be considered a person for a number of
rational reasons, can it not?
The difference is how the power of the state is applied.
a fetus can, after all, be delivered and survive with
care.
Depends on the period of the pregnancy.
so to say that a fetus definitively is not a person is not a
perfectly rational position.
Obviously there is a dividing line where a fetus becomes a
person.
but i don't think we can pretend that some empirical barrier
exists for personhood, sui juris.
Well, crimethink believes (as I recall) that such an empirical
barrier exists. I think it exists when the fetus takes on the basic
qualities of personhood.
i haven't taken that position, even if many churches
have.
I didn't state that you had.
if one truly values life above all things
Which is what, a "jacobin" position? :)
Actually its perfectly rational to hold that position. A
fetus can be considered a non-person for a number of perfectly
valid reasons.
Unlike Mr. Bailey constantly does, I do not insinuate that my
opponents on this issue are just ideology-driven religious (or
anti-religious) nutjobs. Yes, I acknowledge that there are
arguments for the other side -- though I ultimately disagree with
them. What I object to is the dogmatic "whatever can be done should
be done" approach evident in many of Ron's articles.
The difference is how the power of the state is
applied.
But that sword cuts both ways; if the fetus is a person, the power
of the state should be applied to protect the fetus' right
to life.
What it boils down to is, you cannot have a functioning society if people are allowed to kill anybody they dislike, or steal anything they wish, whereas you can indeed have a functioning society where women can choose whether or not to carry a fetus to term, of choose to use bioenginerring to improve said fetus. Call it morality or not; I consider it semantics.
crimethink,
If you're talking about fetuses lacking a cerebrum, yes, that
is a difficult question, but I would say that even such a person
has the right to life.
But its clearly not a person and never will be a person since such
an individual will always lack the faculty of reason, one of the
most important requirements of personhood.
You're making the perfect the enemy of the good
here...
Actually, I am bringing a legitimate issue; your dogmatic view just
can't handle it, that's all.
...a pro-life position's difficulties with ancephalic fetuses
hardly justifies the vast majority of abortions, which destroy a
fetus that would have been able to survive outside the
womb.
Nor do they justify laws which would bar a person from seeking an
abortion in such a situation either.
Which is what, a "jacobin" position? :)
lol -- perhaps!
The difference is how the power of the state is applied.
which is fair -- i'm not an advocate for passing laws managing all
of man's actions. but, as was said above, all law is ultimately
moral. there is no self-evident rational goal to outlawing murder
unless you've taken the moral position that the continuation of
society is good, to use the extreme example. so these are
ultimately moral arguments, not rational ones -- and we should not
pretend to be arguing, as the philosophes sometimes did, from
rational bases in which there is a right answer to human questions
as there is a right solution to the quadratic formula. it too
easily leads to intolerance of the other moral opinion.
Obviously there is a dividing line where a fetus becomes a
person.
there may be -- but it is different in every case and changing all
the time, it seems to me, meaning that our knowledge of where it is
is imperfect.
Ron Bailey,
Non-sequitur alert!
Perhaps you could share why my "sincere but incorrect belief" is so
absurd as to be an argument for the other side. Is there a magic
number of cells that makes one a person?
whereas you can indeed have a functioning society where
women can choose whether or not to carry a fetus to term, of choose
to use bioenginerring to improve said fetus.
we can, ms jennifer -- the question is whether or not that's a
society worth living in. you and i happen to think so; but others
may not, and i can't say that they are rationally wrong for
thinking so.
Gary,
I believe Gaius is correct that your assertion is purely
ideological.
"The difference is how the power of the state is applied. "
Correct. If there are rational arguements existing that a fetus is
a person, I believe the state is obliged to honor that persons'
rights, until otherwise is proven, or until a clear definition of
when a person begins, it would be moral to err on the side of
protecting life, as all values derive from life.
Now, there are plenty of persons that cannot survive on their own.
We don't pretend that they are then not persons, do we? Regardless
of the solution of how they can be cared for, they do not surrender
their humanity.
"Obviously there is a dividing line where a fetus becomes a person.
"
If so, and I believe that there is, we must err on the the side of
life until it is definitive.
crimethink,
But that sword cuts both ways; if the fetus is a person, the
power of the state should be applied to protect the fetus' right to
life.
Until the fetus becomes a person, the state should stay out of the
woman's affairs.
Jennifer,
No, see, if got rid of horrible diseases, suffering and pain, we
would be less human. :)
Gary Gunnels,
You acknowledge that there "obviously" is a dividing line where a
fetus becomes a person. Doesn't that mean that by tolerating
abortion at any stage of pregnancy, the state is abdicating its
responsibility to defend the rights of some of the persons who have
crossed that line?
gaius marius,
...all law is ultimately moral.
I don't think that it is. Many laws venal in inspiration, for
example. Of course the inspiration of the law is not its ultimate
judge; to claim otherwise would be an example of a genetic
fallacy.
so these are ultimately moral arguments, not rational
ones
What your a priori starting position is may be based on some
ultimately non-rational position, but what you derive from that
probably does have a rational component to it.
meaning that our knowledge of where it is is
imperfect.
Imperfect knowledge by itself should not be the only reason to act
or not to act.
But its clearly not a person and never will be a person
since such an individual will always lack the faculty of reason,
one of the most important requirements of personhood.
one can say that as though it were self-evident, mr gunnels, but i
have a 31-y/o cousin who would not qualify for personhood under
that moral judgement -- who is loved very dearly by her parents and
family.
making the capacity for reason or the expectation of reason the
standard of personhood justifies "mercy killings" of every
abhorrent kind, it must be said.
"Until the fetus becomes a person, the state should stay out of
the woman's affairs. "
When does a fetus become a person, Gary? Furthermore, why at that
time? I'll bite. I know it's obvious, but fill me in.
Following Gary's circular arguments is making me dizzy...
Gary Gunnels at 3:54 -- A fetus can be considered a non-person
for a number of perfectly valid reasons.
gaius marius at 4:04 -- a fetus can also be considered a person
for a number of rational reasons, can it not?
Gary Gunnels at 4:15 -- The difference is how the power of the
state is applied.
crimethink at 4:21 -- But that sword cuts both ways; if the
fetus is a person, the power of the state should be applied to
protect the fetus' right to life.
Gary Gunnels at 4:29 -- Until the fetus becomes a person, the
state should stay out of the woman's affairs.
You've switched from implying the state should stay out regardless
of the fetus' status (4:15) to admitting that the status is
important (4:29). Which is in agreement with my basic argument.
wellfellow,
I believe Gaius is correct that your assertion is purely
ideological.
Except that he now agrees that there are perfectly rational and
substantiated reasons for holding my positions.
or until a clear definition of when a person begins, it would
be moral to err on the side of protecting life, as all values
derive from life.
All values derive from life? How so? And to be frank, this sort of
reasoning could lead on the sort of tangential snipe hunt that I'd
like to avoid. Indeed, it could very well lead the government to
attack DNR orders for example.
Now, there are plenty of persons that cannot survive on their
own.
Sure, and in many instances, the state forces them to live on
despite their own wishes to die.
Regardless of the solution of how they can be cared for, they
do not surrender their humanity.
I see the nanny-state comin'. Rolling down the bend. Its gonna
force me to stay alive and to cough up the dough to force others to
do the same. Luckily when I decide to croak I can fly to
Switzerland and be done with my mortal coil.
"Sure, and in many instances, the state forces them to live on
despite their own wishes to die. "
That doesn't address my point. Does a person have to be entirely
independant to be considered human?
"I see the nanny-state comin'. Rolling down the bend. Its gonna
force me to stay alive and to cough up the dough to force others to
do the same. Luckily when I decide to croak I can fly to
Switzerland and be done with my mortal coil."
I'm not saying you should be forced to live against your will. That
is a non-sequiter.
Imperfect knowledge by itself should not be the only reason
to act or not to act.
surely. but it does give us the certainty of error -- and if we
know we are erring, should we not err with deference?
Many laws venal in inspiration, for example.
sorry - i don't mean to use moral in the sense of opposite of venal
-- i mean moral in the sense of opposite of rational; that is,
irrational and dependent on some value judgement. even venal laws
are moral in this sense, as they value personal or oligarchic
gain.
What your a priori starting position is may be based on some
ultimately non-rational position, but what you derive from that
probably does have a rational component to it.
which is to say, if i read you correctly, that law, to the extent
it might be considered deductive, is deduced from a priori moral
judgements. it is exactly this i mean when i say "all law is
ultimately moral".
crimethink,
I haven't switched at all of course. Good to see that you're up to
old scummy tricks again.
gauius marius,
one can say that as though it were self-evident, mr gunnels,
but i have a 31-y/o cousin who would not qualify for personhood
under that moral judgement -- who is loved very dearly by her
parents and family.
The difference is of course that they voluntarily continued that
relationship. You seem to be thinking that I would demand that the
state demand your cousin's death.
making the capacity for reason or the expectation of reason the
standard of personhood justifies "mercy killings" of every
abhorrent kind, it must be said.
Well, a human being lacking that basic quality differences from a
non-human animal with similar capacity in what way?
"You seem to be thinking that I would demand that the state
demand your cousin's death. "
No, Gary, but if Gaius cousin were mute, you would seem to allow
his parents to execute him.
wellfellow,
Well, I never made "full independence" a criteria for personhood,
did I?
I'm not saying you should be forced to live against your
will.
That's exactly where that line of reasoning goes I am afraid, and
its exactly what folks involved in the anti-abortion campaign as a
rule think. Why do you think the backward Catholic Church opposed
Oregon's death with dignity law for example? When you start
claiming that all life is sacred, that's a clear indication that a
person believes that an individual has no right to choose how they
want to croak. Like I wrote, thankfully I can fly to
Switzerland.
crimethink,
You've switched from implying the state should stay out
regardless of the fetus' status...
I never implied such, sorry. Your "creative interpretations" are
telling though.
...to admitting that the status is important.
Obviously the status is important and I never claimed (explicitly
or implicitly) otherwise.
"When you start claiming that all life is sacred, that's a clear
indication that a person believes that an individual has no right
to choose how they want to croak."
Gary, I'm fine with anyone deciding they want to die. But abortion
is a different issue. Don't pretend it's the same. The fetus hasn't
decided to terminate itself. It is no more or less independant than
many humans among us now, who also can't decide for themselves, yet
we allow them to live.
Does a person have to be entirely independant to be
considered human?
this is the fundamental question. i think it self-evidently
answerable: no. indeed, it's closer to the truth to say that the
completely emanicpated man is exactly not human -- for who would
even know he ever existed? or care?
human animals are social beings by nature -- human individualism
has functional limits, and the capacity for reaching them is not
the sole criterion of human value, it seems to me.
Well, a human being lacking that basic quality differences from a
non-human animal with similar capacity in what way?
and this is where i fear your line of reasoning goes, mr gunnels. i
fully admit to you that humans are just animals. but here we're
making a conceptual leap that makes it acceptable to kill them if
they are "insufficient". worse, i think, you draw a line at the
capacity to reason -- its clearly not a person and never will be a
person since such an individual will always lack the faculty of
reason, -- a very high standard.
how many institutionalized people could acceptably be murdered
under this logic? for, say, reasons of social efficiency? i do not
think this desirable.
No, Gary, but if Gaius cousin were mute, you would seem to allow
his parents to execute him.
in fact she is, mr wellfellow -- she's never uttered a word in her
own defense.
wellfellow,
Well, at least you don't want your grubby little paws on my end of
life decisions. We're making some progress it seems.
But abortion is a different issue.
Well that's so readily obvious its almost trite.
Don't pretend it's the same.
I haven't of course.
The fetus hasn't decided to terminate itself.
As the fetus is a non-person it doesn't get to make the decision;
indeed, even in the world of the anti-abortion crowd it doesn't get
to make the decision, the state or the majority or what have you
does.
It is no more or less independant than many humans among us
now...
But independence is not the key criteria to personhood; or at least
it is not so for me. The ability to reason is.
"Well, at least you don't want your grubby little paws on my end
of life decisions."
LOL
"As the fetus is a non-person..."
You have yet to demonstrate why this is so obvious. Apparently you
believe that the ability to reason is the determining factor, yet
many humans among us lack that ability. Do you then believe it
would be OK to terminate them? Or does personhood include something
beyond merely the ability to reason? What then?
Unfortunately I have to run, but I enjoy this and am curious as to
what your answer might be, so I'll check back later.
Ta Ta.
PS.
As the fetus is a non-person it doesn't get to make the
decision;
this is predicated on
But independence is not the key criteria to personhood; or at least
it is not so for me. The ability to reason is.
which is purely a moral value judgement. i can with just as much
sincerity say that personhood depends only on a genome that falls
within a certain rangeof variation. so this is ultimately, we can
agree, a moral argument.
where you would (it seems, but correct me if i am wrong) find
voluntary eugenic programs that allow the elimination of those
unable to express a rational argument with the consent of their
guardians, i would not. that is a difference in morality, it seems
to me. i find that position deductively consistent with voluntary
abortion, fwiw.
gaius marius,
Note that it was not I who brought the whole "independence"
criteria.
a very high standard.
The capacity for rational thought or inference or discrimination
isn't a very high standard at all actually. You see persons as
something which resembles a human being in its physical stature, I
argue that being a person is something more than this.
how many institutionalized people could acceptably be murdered
under this logic?
Probably none.
for, say, reasons of social efficiency?
Well, I haven't really addressed the issue of "effeciency" and its
not a concern of mine.
i might also ask: what is reason?
if we are going to predicate personhood on the abstracted concept,
we should be careful to define it.
gaius marius,
which is purely a moral value judgement.
Its where I draw the line between person and non-person. I draw
that line for some valid reasons.
i can with just as much sincerity say that personhood depends
only on a genome that falls within a certain rangeof
variation.
But again, this is where the problem of the state arises.
...find voluntary eugenic programs that allow the elimination
of those unable to express a rational argument with the consent of
their guardians...
Having the ability to reason is a lot more and a lot less than
merely articulating a rational argument. Indeed, that's why 99.9%
of those born are rational creatures.
i find that position deductively consistent with voluntary
abortion, fwiw.
And of course I take no issue with voluntary abortions.
what is reason?
I believe I already provided a definition. Did you find something
lacking in it?
gaius marius,
I have to go away for a few hours. However, I'll try to pick up any
comments you might make when I get back.
Cheers
gaius marius,
And let me note that discussing these matters with you is far more
entertaining than discussing gay marraige with lying,
yellow-bellied POS BillyRay. :)
For all that I am pro-choice, I am troubled by the idea of the
government deciding who is or isn't a person, and who may be killed
with impunity. Baby at birth +1 day is not much different than baby
at birth -1 day. Killing one is okay to many people but the other
is forbidden almost universally.
And before someone claims I am setting up an extreme here, well it
is no worse than the "baby without a brain" argument earlier.
:)
Gary has a good argument for when personhood begins, but I can't
imagine how you measure it. does a 8 month old fetus reason? a 1
month old baby? People in a coma? How do you measure reason
anyway?
Deciding for yourself to die is no problem for me. Deciding someone
else should because they do not meet your immeasurable criteria of
"person" is something I have alot of trouble with.
And yet I am still pro choice. but troubled.
One other thing.... While Gary has a good argument for what a
person is, it certainly isn't the *only* good definition. Who
should decide which definition we use and how it is measured?
"because gary said so" seems like a insufficent
justification.....
I draw that line for some valid reasons.
reasons deduced from moral judgements that you find acceptable, i
think. and no shame in that, for it's what we all do.
But again, this is where the problem of the state arises.
perhaps -- but this seems to put the cart before the horse, does it
not? if one morally defines a person as a genomic type and the
state is therefore obligated to be involved to defend the person
from conception, that is not rationally wrong by that fact alone --
the moral judgement would mean that it is rationally right for the
state to defend a person, and that is a valid argument (even if it
is one with which we might both disagree).
Gary Gunnels,
In response to gaius noting that your position on the fetus' status
was as ideological as mine, you stated that "the difference is how
the power of the state is applied."
If "the difference is how the power of the state is applied," then
the difference is not whether the fetus is a person. Which
implies that the fetus' status is not important to determining
whether abortion should be legal.
> When does a fetus become a person, Gary? Furthermore, why
at that time?
While my name is not Gary, I believe that it doesn't make sense to
give rights to an organism that cannot have feelings, desires or
plans in the first place - in other words any kind of preferences,
no matter how simple, which could be served and protected by those
rights. Hence the question is when does a fetus gain the actual
capacity to have a mind.
The most basic feature of sentience is probably the ability to feel
pain. Fetuses before the 22nd week of pregnancy do not have a
continuous neural connection between their pain receptors and the
pain-processing brain regions. They also don't exhibit regular
brain waves which could possibly sustain consciousness. So, even if
I give fetuses the utmost benefit of the doubt, I have no good
reason to ascribe rights to fetuses pre-22nd week. In fact, newer
research suggests that fetuses may not be conscious until
birth:
http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3194905a7144,00.html
> But independence is not the key criteria to personhood; or at
least it is not so for me. The ability to reason is.
I'd say it's the ability to have preferences about future outcomes,
which requires some time-awareness and the ability to have at least
a rudimentary sense of self. Both of which are necessary (though
not sufficient) preconditions for reason as I define it.
Deciding for yourself to die is no problem for me. Deciding
someone else should because they do not meet your immeasurable
criteria of "person" is something I have alot of trouble
with.
when you can't choose, who better to choose for you than
your mother? certinaly the state is not in a
better decision to make that choice better than she.
Having the ability to reason is a lot more and a lot less
than merely articulating a rational argument. Indeed, that's why
99.9% of those born are rational creatures.
this is why perhaps we should more carefully posit a definition. it
may be both more and less, but what? :)
i tend to think that reason is the logical deduction of principles
from enumerated observation.
but the usefulness of reason is thusly highly circumscribed -- and
hume did his level best to destroy even that much at its root by
inconveniently noting that induction by enumeration is not valid --
essentially that principles derived of reason are not, in fact,
knowledge. so i wonder if there isn't more to your intended
meaning.
btw, i can't help but notice that this is not a negative answer to
the question of whether your stated position would allow for
guardian-voluntary eugenic programs of those incapable of
reason.
Some features of reason are necessary (but not sufficient) for personhood... no? That's enough to solve this little quarrel over embryos.
crimethink,
You are clearly (whether purposefully or not) misunderstanding my
meaning then. I continue to maintain what I have stated about the
nature of the fetus, etc., and have never wavered from that
position.
gaius marius,
I'm still curious as to what problems you have with the definition
I have posited.
Rikurzhen,
That's an interesting insight.
worth repeating...
jon: I'd say it's the ability to have preferences about future
outcomes, which requires some time-awareness and the ability to
have at least a rudimentary sense of self. Both of which are
necessary (though not sufficient) preconditions for reason as I
define it.
gaius marius,
Well, presumably a person incapable of reason wouldn't know any
better either way; dead or alive their condition would be the
same.
I'd say it's the ability to have preferences about future
outcomes, which requires some time-awareness and the ability to
have at least a rudimentary sense of self.
we can say, mr jon, that this (which is a value judgement) is the
starting point of a person -- and we can further say that
Fetuses before the 22nd week of pregnancy do not have a continuous
neural connection between their pain receptors and the
pain-processing brain regions. They also don't exhibit regular
brain waves which could possibly sustain consciousness.
... but what do we really know? we, after all, cannot really
conclusively put causation to the electrochemical signals an ekg
reads and pain-consciousness, can we? we can only assume they are
interrelated in some manner, and it is not clear how. so an honest
scientist must admit that there is room for speculation.
furthermore, beyond the empirical, what if consciousness really did
begin at conception? i fully agree that i cannot provide a rational
basis for this judgement, but neither can i be proven wrong if i
posit so. one may say that nothing that cannot be demonstrated
should be accepted as truthful -- but then, there is a great deal
of the world that we cannot rigorously demonstrate which we presume
to be, even under the auspices (questionably, imo) of
science.
so i think the depth of meaningful argument can easily go beyond
what we have observed about fetuses without becoming willfully
obtuse.
gaius marius,
The only other option to trying to divine a dividing line as I have
is to merely state that anything that has roughly the same genetic
code as I and comes out of a female human's womb is a person. But
ultimately I can't see a Christian accepting a naturalistic
argument, and I have a hard time supporting it because being a
person is more than those things.
Maybe this will be clearer. Why should we pass
laws?
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness."
Nothing there about keeping them on the straight and narrow.
I'm still curious as to what problems you have with the
definition I have posited.
only that i cannot state it with confidence. :) is it that reason
is the logical deduction of principles from enumerated
observation?
presumably a person incapable of reason wouldn't know any better
either way; dead or alive their condition would be the same.
but if they are capable of feeling -- of receiving affection and
reflecting it? or, less than affection, even simple sensation? or,
yet more primitively, kantian transcendence independent of
sensation? certainly one would not have to be capable of deduction
to experience these things, and they may be worth living for, could
they not?
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men
i think the straight and narrow starts with "secure", mr a.
:)
i have to run out until tomorrow, but i don't mind saying that this
is the best thread yet here, and i'm truly appreciative of you fine
people. i'll check back in tomorrow (or tonight if i can't help
myself).
gauis marius,
Ahh, either you missed it or I wasn't clear enough about my drawing
out a definition. I believe I wrote that reason means something
along these lines: the capacity for rational thought or inference
or discrimination.
I have a problem with making the definition of a "person"
dependent on "the ability to feel pain" or "the ability to
reason."
If you take this literally, then you could claim an adult under
anethesia is no longer a person. Then you terminate it as legally
as you could terminate a fetus.
Of course, you could argue that in the case of an anesthetized
adult, the inability to feel pain or reason is a temporary
condition.
Of course, in the vast majority of instances, you can say it's only
temporary in the case of fetus too. (Just give it maybe a few weeks
for the pain, a couple-few years for the ability to reason.)
I certainly don't consider that an embryo is a person. For one
thing, persons have a determination of gender. I don't think that
embryos do. But the way that I arrive at my pro-choice position is
that I start with a belief that all relationships should be
voluntary. So if the only way for the fetus to survive is by the
mother's cooperation, and the mother declines, an abortion is
certainly justified.
It seems ethically less sound if the fetus can survive. But in this
case, does there not have to be someone willing to care for the
fetus to take away the ethical sanction of the abortion?
Hey, I'm going to throw out something.
A "person" and a "human being" are not necessarily the same
thing.
An intelligent E.T. would not be human, but it probably would be a
person. Some people think the great apes and dolphins might be
persons.
At the same time, a very young fetus, with no brain or ability to
process sensations/experience, is almost certainly a human being
but may not be a person.
The definition of a "person" is a bit elusive. That's probably
because, at the present, most or all of the beings we believe to be
"persons" are also human beings. Therefore it is difficult to
separate the definition of one from the other. Right now most
attempts at defining a "person" are based on rather subjective
criteria, like "ability to reason." But these criteria do not fit
all human beings (such as very young children, those temporarily
unconscious, etc.) It's fuzzy.
The definition of a human being can be based on something more
objective -- biology. We can define a human being as "a creature
with a full set of human DNA." That's sort of a tautology as
phrased, but I'm not a biologist or geneticist, so I don't know how
to phrase it better. But I think a pretty objective, scientific
definition could be phrased.
So the central issue of abortion is not "Is the fetus a person?"
(fairly subjective and poorly defined criteria" but "When is it
permissible to actively terminate the life functions of a human
being?" A person or not, the fetus is a human being as defined
above from time conception is complete. And whatever you law you
make regarding the permissibility of abortion is, you probably want
to base it on the more objective, simple (even if simplistic)
criterion than the more vague, subjective criterion.
Because you want your law to be as simple and as objective as
possible, so it's easier to tell when you've violated it.
PS: There will still be fuzzy cases, such as an embryo with massive
genetic damage, and somehow we've got to tweak the definition of a
human being to exclude ordinary body cells (except for sex cells,
they have a full complement of human DNA too) from an actual human
being as an individual. But it's too late at night for me to finish
reasoning this out.
Stevo:
Right now most attempts at defining a "person" are based on
rather subjective criteria, like "ability to reason." But these
criteria do not fit all human beings (such as very young children,
those temporarily unconscious [..]
Stop! The reasoning faculty of the temporarily unconscious hasn't
vanished into thin air just because their brains have switched mode
for a while. The synaptic network constitutive of their personality
is still in place and enabling them to reason again. By contrast,
an embryo can't wake up and decide what to have for breakfast. Of
course, if you insist to equate an egg with a chicken, an acorn
with an oak, a virgin with a mother and a zygote with a person just
cuz they might eventually become all that...
The definition of a human being can be based on something more
objective -- biology. We can define a human being as "a creature
with a full set of human DNA."
Turning biochemistry into morality is rather arbitrary than
objective. Why should I care if something has human DNA or not?
Even the shed hair follicles on our pillows fit that definition as
advanced cloning technology could theoretically make them into
independent human beings. I'd be more inclined to legally protect
Koko the Gorilla and the friendly aliens who just landed in my
flower bed (er, make that active imagination) than the human
zygotes freeze-stored in a fertility clinic.
from the article:
four-fifths of respondents worried that PGD would increase
discrimination against the disabled
Speaking of imagination, this widespread notion seems based in
ill-conceived Gattaca-like extrapolations rather than reality.
Surely a sane and remotely educated person can tell the difference
between their fellow citizen -- afflicted with heritable ailment or
not -- and an embryo undergoing PGD, as opposed to mistake people
for their genes. Almost everyone I've talked to agreed that their
respect for people suffering from genetic disorders is totally
unrelated to their attitude toward PGD, especially when taking the
time to think the issue through more carefully. Has the
long-available medical option to abort a foetus with a serious
developmental disorder increased the tendency to blame the disabled
for their fate? No, society has altogether become more tolerant and
caring of disabled people during the past few decades, not
less.
the capacity for rational thought or inference or
discrimination.
the next question then is: what is rational?
i would submit that 'rational' means logical, deductive -- from the
sensible, the empirical.
the capacity for deduction of secondary principles from primary
observation is, however, perhaps only a part of what it means to be
human. it may be a necessary condition for the highest order of
being under some (your, gg?) value judgements that we would
associate with enlightenment principles. but many (including, i
think, most of the participants of the counterenlightenment) would
find reason to be insufficient -- even, in the most extreme but
influential examples, finding ratiocinative thought particularly
inhuman. herder, i think, wrote that "i am not here to think -- but
to be, feel, live!"
now, we may disagree with the emotionalism and particularity and
rejection of classification and rule-dogma of sturm and drang --
but how are we to say it is wrong? how does one conclusively deduce
that moral autonomy (ie, personhood) is conditional on rationality
alone? could not the mere existence of an emotional impulse be
sufficient?
as an aside, if we consider that the emphasis on autonomy is a
modern development, i think it helps to contextualize the catholic
stance -- as catholicism, being premodern in its influences,
decidedly deemphasizes autonomy for social fealty.
Gary Gunnels,
I continue to maintain what I have stated about the nature of
the fetus, etc., and have never wavered from that
position.
Would you mind letting us know what that position is, then? You've
said both that the fetus is absolutely not a person, and later that
obviously there is a dividing line where the fetus becomes a
person. Unless you mean to say that that dividing line is obviously
birth -- a claim which you have not supported with any evidence --
these statements contradict each other.
If I'm wrong, don't just say so, show us where I'm going
wrong.
when you can't choose, who better to choose for you than
your mother? certinaly the state is not in a better decision to
make that choice better than she.
You should have been Andrea Yates' defense lawyer at the trial for
her murdering her five kids. I mean, what business does the state
have butting in when she chose death for her children.
You should have been Andrea Yates' defense lawyer at the
trial for her murdering her five kids. I mean, what business does
the state have butting in when she chose death for her
children.
The difference is that Andrea Yates killed her out-of-the-womb,
on-the-ground, actual children - not five potentialities.
Gary Gunnels,
"The difference is how the power of the state is applied."
"I see the nanny-state comin'. Rolling down the bend."
"Indeed, it could very well lead the government to attack DNR
orders for example."
You fall into this trap fairly often, of basing your decisions of
truth and falsehood on the imagined political convenience of that
statement. What are you, a Marxist? ;-)
One quarter of children in this country live in poverty? Does
hearing that fact scare you, because of the political conclusions
some people might draw from it? To effing bad. Your discomfort
doesn't change reality.
Stevo and Boone,
Boone:
The reasoning faculty of the temporarily unconscious hasn't
vanished into thin air just because their brains have switched mode
for a while. The synaptic network constitutive of their personality
is still in place and enabling them to reason again.
But Stevo could have chosen the example of a permanently damaged
brain in which the reasoning faculty is destroyed. Of course there
is the practice of euthanasia in these circumstances.
Question:
Are there ethical arguments against aborting a very early
fetus/embryo that do not obtain against euthanasia? Why is
euthanasia OK but abortion not?
(Like anyone's going to see this ....)
Generally, people who advocate or tolerate active euthanasia, or
even "withdrawal of extraordinary means of life support and letting
the nature take its course," can do so because they see the
person's life as in the process of ending anyway. The person is
believed to be beyond recovery. Their impairment is not believed to
be temporary, but permanent.
However, I don't think anyone would advocate euthanizing a person
if doctors were pretty sure that person would again be capable of
reasoning, and living without life support, in about nine months --
and steadily gain in mental and physical ability thereafter.
If you try to argue, "If it's acceptable to euthanize people
because they are impaired, then it's OK to terminate a fetus
because it's (for the time being) impaired," you're essentially
arguing, "We have a window to stop this life before it has a chance
to 'get better.' " If the fetus is a human life, I don't think we
want to start arguing that we can terminate lives because of a
temporary lack of this or that ability.
Hi, Sol, I enjoy your posts.
The difference is that Andrea Yates killed her out-of-the-womb,
on-the-ground, actual children - not five
potentialities.
So what is the substancially tranformative event that changes a
fetus from a "potentiality" to an "actual"? Is it the act of coming
out of the womb? Is a bullet in a gun merely a "potential" bullet,
while only a bullet that is fired an "actual" bullet?
Turning biochemistry into morality is rather arbitrary than
objective. Why should I care if something has human DNA or
not?
Why should people care about respecting the rights of
anything just because it's human? Including you or
me?
It at least sets a floor for "what has rights that should be
respected" if we say, "Being an individual being with human DNA" is
a sufficient condition for having rights. It need not be a
necessary condition -- we can also recognize that Koko and
E.T. might have rights. But making "being an individual being with
human DNA" would be a fairly objective criterion for protecting the
rights of all human persons, at least.
Even the shed hair follicles on our pillows fit that definition
as advanced cloning technology could theoretically make them into
independent human beings.
Yep -- theoretically, as you say. But there's a difference between
a shed cell that might potentially become a developing
human individual, if you actively intervene and
transform it into one ... and a fetal human that's already
developing just nicely post-conception as long as you don't eff
with it.
I would say that if you recognize human rights in a naturally
conceived embryo, then you should recognize the same rights in an
artificially created embryo ... after you have applied
your advanced cloning technology and make a hair follicle into a
human embryo. But you don't have to extend rights to the hair on
your pillow prior to that transformation.
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