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Brian Doherty returns to John Gilmore's travel-rights groundswell.

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|8.24.04 @ 2:51AM|

What is more important (and discussed at length in Bruce Schneier's book Beyond Fear) is that it's very easy to counterfeit state-issued ID's (there's a big market in college towns since the ID's control access to the bars), and nowhere near enough training of those checking ID's (think of the thousands of airline check-in agents at every airport). Schneier suggests the real reason for the requirement is to allow airlines to enforce their rules about using both halves of round-trip tickets, which may be why airlines are reluctant to point to a government-mandated rule.
There may not be one--it's just a subsidy to the airlines. Anyone who wanted to get on a plane to do mischief would have no trouble coming up with a fake drivers license good enough to satisfy the cursory glances they get (I flew two days ago and noticed how little examination licenses receive by anyone), but it would probably be more trouble than it's worth to use a fake ID just to use half of a round-trip ticket (round-trip tickets are routinely less than one-way tickets). Different class of 'evildoers' involved.

|8.24.04 @ 3:48AM|

I don't agree that anonymity equals privacy. Certainly, historically, individuals had very little anonymity in their day-to-day lives. Perhaps the state was not explicitly tracking individuals but the general culture and all locally communities did so.

Perhaps it just the article but they make it sound as if Glimore believes that people have the right to board any form public transportation in perfect anonymity. Surely that can't be right?

Glimore's entire argument against the no-fly list is based on a misunderstanding of the list is and how it works.

An individual cannot get his removed from a no-fly list because his name isn't on the list instead it's A general name is on the list. Just because a particular "John Smith" is not a terrorist doesn't mean there is not a terrorist out there traveling as "John Smith."

People like Edward Kennedy don't get "their" name removed from list. Instead, they get their full name and identification added to a double-check list that backs up the no-fly list. Other people named "Edward Kennedy" still get checked while the system identifies the good senator and waves him through.

Terrorist have a finite ablity to create false identities, especially ones for international travel and they tend to recycle successful ones. The no-fly list seeks to flag people traveling under the names that have been previously identified as fraudulent.

I really wish people would research the matter before they file lawsuits.

|8.24.04 @ 3:59AM|

Shannon,

I think one of the major points here is that, because the list generically bans all people with a certain name, that it's useless. In fact, it's useless to ask for ID at all, since all any terrorist has to do is to change his alias to "John Smith" or some other very common name. As soon as it turns up in the media that said name is under scrutiny (many people refused transport), he changes it.

|8.24.04 @ 4:34AM|

db,

"In fact, it's useless to ask for ID at all, since all any terrorist has to do is to change his alias to "John Smith" or some other very common name."

Sorry, but your wrong. Terrorist devote considerable resources into creating fake identities. Such identities are not just forged documents but rather a collection of data, called a legend, that makes the identity look real under a wide array of analysis. Often for example, a terrorist will have a expendable cohort travel on the documents first in order to (1) test them and (2) create a data trail for the documents. This takes a great deal of time and effort. It doesn't make a lot of news but several hundred people have been caught, largely in Europe, traveling on forged documents. Most are probably dry runs or economic criminals but it demonstrates that the system is constantly being test.

Peoples names and nominal I.D.'s are just one of an entire range of information that can get an individual singled out. Travel patterns, for example, will also raise red flags. That is what got the nuns frisked sometime back.

|8.25.04 @ 10:18AM|

Certainly, historically, individuals had very little anonymity in their day-to-day lives.

Yeah, that's why a bunch of people decided to create THIS country.

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