Julian Sanchez | August 13, 2003
Columnist Will Saletan, who I saw do a really brilliant talk on "framing" in political rhetoric at a Cato University about a year ago, has a series at NPR in which he deconstructs the favored buzzwords of the various presidential contenders. You can also read the analyses at Slate.
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Hmm, for a site that so dislikes Derrida, you do use the term "deconstruct" quite a bit. :)
Derrida, I'm not so big on-- I think Michel Foucault was right to call him a "guerrila obfuscationist"-- someone who uses his own impenetrability as a defense against ever being critiqued or contradicted. But deconstruction is a perfectly useful form of analysis. A lot of theory has gotten a bad rap on the right because of a contingent historical association with bad politics. The next few years will see libertarian and conservative scholars rediscovering the work of a lot of those thinkers who were in fashion in the 80s.
Julian Sanchez,
Well, to be frank, Foucault was wrong. Derrida correctly took
Foucault to task for claiming to write a history of madness in
which he spoke on behalf of the mad as if he had wrote from some
archimedian point outside of madness. And there is nothing
"obfuscationist" about what Derrida has written. In fact, it is
clearly a radicalization of what Saussure (the father of the
structuralists/post-structuralists, though he did not use the term)
wrote in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Now if you are going to use words like "deconstructs," coined by
Derrida I might add, then you are going to have to accept some of
the baggage that comes with that - that language is
constitutionally unstable (making the self unstable I might add),
that reality is a semiological one, etc.
BTW, what "bad politics" are you specifically writing of? The
political notions of continental thinkers are highly varied -
Barthes for example flirted with a whole number ideological
viewpoints; Foucault despised any totalizing ideology (thus he was
an anti-Marxist in this sense); and I don't even know if
Baudrillard has political views.
"Now if you are going to use words like "deconstructs," coined
by Derrida I might add, then you are going to have to accept some
of the baggage that comes with that"
To paraphrase Walter from The Big Lebowski... who's the
postmodernist now? Linguistic essentialism, Jean? Tsk, tsk. Anyway,
I was thinking, for instance, of the anticapitalism of Deleuze and
Guatarri, Baudrillard's disdain of the "consumer society,"
etc.
As for JD, I have trouble taking him seriously after reading Alan
Sokal's biting takedown in "Fashionable Nonsense."
Julian,
Yes, I realized after what I wrote, it was a mistake.
Anyway, how is anti-consumerism "bad politics?"
I believe people don't like Derrida because his ideas are so
frightening. Its hard for people to deal with ideas such as: "From
the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We
think only in signs."
People like and dislike people because they do or do not agree
with them on certain issues they hold dear - whether they (disliker
or disliked) are actually right are not is an entirely different
issue.
That comment doesn't particularly bother me, as it would seem to me
to harken back to Greek thinking (and mine, even if it isn't Greek
and I'm misremembering), that there may or not be Truth or Reality,
but we cannot "know" it in a direct conscious sense - we can only
behave in certain ways, seek out and interpret certain sensations
and information, and use what we learn to attempt to construct an
idea of what reality is really like outside our own individual
perceptions. For an example of how reality isn't directly
available, one can merely consider optical illusions (where clearly
what we see is not precisely what is actually there) and all sorts
of cognitive tricks and foibles (like vertigo, and broken human
intuition on things like statistics and physics, etc).
Whether or not we actually think in signs, however, and what
exactly that means, and just what he takes "signs" to mean, is
beyond me.
I think pomo lit critics, like legal realists, deliberately
overemphasize the difficulty of establishing the meaning of a text.
People who adopt a pose of exaggerated epistemological uncertainty
in reconstructing the original understanding of the Constitution
have a vested interest in muddying the waters.
The one deconstructionist I actually enjoyed reading, because he
was entirely free of deliberate preciousness and obfuscation, was
Stanley Fish. He was an openly cheerful nihilist, who could tell
you in plainly understandable English why no text had a plainly
understandable meaning. And Fish was totally honest; he said that
all discourse was designed to conceal the interests of a privileged
group behind "neutral" or "universal" symbols. When challenged as
to whether this applied to academicians, he immediately replied
that deconstruction was a form of discourse that promoted the power
interests of English professors.
If there "may or not be Truth or Reality," then where did those two terms come from? Why do they even exist? What do they relate to if not the very meaning of their (verbal) "signs"?
Othmar, as reported by Schulz, trumps all of this:
"Waahh-waa, wah, wawawa. Wa? Wahh-wah-wha!"
It is obvious once one has decoded the significanators.
Kevin
Rene:
If there "may or not be Truth or Reality," then where did those two
terms come from? Why do they even exist? What do they relate to if
not the very meaning of their (verbal) "signs"?
They are concepts; the question is whether or not they have some
other form of 'meaning', of existance. For instance, it could
logically/theoretically be that all things are mere social
creations, and that for something to be thought so is sufficient to
make it so; it could be that it absolutely doesn't matter what
anyone thinks about anything, that reality is as it is and thought
and concepts are sepperate and possibly completely uninvolved in
the 'material' world (extreme dualism, kind of); it could be
something else, too.
There are a logically infinate amount of things that could be true,
but to the extent that some are mutually exclusive, not all of them
are true. It is thus a task for us to discover which statements are
true, and which false, and which theories and concepts are the most
useful (particularly when truth or falsehood cannot be ascertained
empirically, such as with heuristic theories, viewpoints, emotional
feelings and reactions, etc), and so on.
That's what I think I meant :)
Plutarck, if "It is a task for [you] to discover which
statements are true ... " how do you intend to do this if (in
your opinion) "truth cannot be ascertained
empirically" in the first place?
STATEMENT: "It is hot outside."
[True] or [False]?
(Thermometer shows empirical evidence of 103 degrees.)
ANSWER: [True]
STATEMENT: "I feel hot."
[True] or [False]?
(Thermometer in your mouth shows empirical evidence of 98.9
degrees.)
ANSWER: [True]
I believe that in order for you to be successful at establishing
truth (your awful spelling notwithstanding) it would help if you'd
first put that wine bottle away.
Rene:
You seem to have entirely missed the context and meaning of "truth
cannot be ascertained empirically" - because I didn't say that, and
I think it an utterly absurd and wrong position to begin
with.
Neither of your "STATEMENT"s contradict anything I have said. I
don't see what you're even disagreing with.
My original statement and position was to point out that reality is
not directly available to anyone, as is proven by various
experiments that show that what seems infinately reasonable and
'real' ain't exactly so.
So what you are specifically disagreing with? I'm guessing you took
what I said to mean something other than I said it to mean (sic),
and thus we are arguing over a misunderstanding, not a genuine
disagreement. But of course as one cannot know (in the absolute
sense) whether or not something is right, only whether or not
something is wrong, you'll have to set me straight if I am mistaken
in my perception of the situation.
Kevin Carson,
Well, Derrida openly admits that his own works can be
deconstructed; and that deconstruction as discourse can be as well.
The analogy is to a hyena devouring its innards.
Rene,
Hot in comparison to what? Your scenario requires some objective
criteria for "hotness," so what is it?
First of all, the thermometer in your mouth says nothing about
whether you feel hot or cold. You can't refute someone's
report that they feel hot by pointing out that the thermometer
shows a low temperature or whatnot.
As for the "meaning" of verbal signs, the argument is that the
"meaning" itself just consists of another set of signs. So I say
"hot" and point to a thermometer reading or a subjective feeling as
the "meaning" of hot. But both of those are themselves signs.
Well, I'm sorry. Words are all we've got. Words (symbols, or
"signs" if you will) are the tools of thought. They are just about
the only way we have right now of apprehending reality.
Some might assert that mathematics and music are yet two other
ways. Maybe so. (Einstein and Mozart would agree.) Nevertheless,
between WORDS, MATH, and MUSIC -- those are about the most
effective means we sentient beings have of not only grasping and
understanding our universe, but also for enabling us to fairly well
articulate it and to give it meaning.
I mean, how else ... what kind of semaphores can we rely on to
communicate our meaning and understanding of reality, short of
telepathic transmission?
Sure, we might quibble over the proper use of such indicators, but
ultimately -- considering the marvelous technological ends we have
achieved thus far -- I'd say we've been pretty successful at not
only lending meaning to our reality, but have managed to keenly
articulate it, manipulate it, and, I'd venture to say, even control
it to a great extent.
To then defile such tools of thought by dragging them
through a linguistic mud, and obfuscating it (as Mr. Derision,
excuse me, Mr. Derrida tends to do) is to do a great disservice to
a value that we have striven so long to hone and perfect
(language.)
Consider that it took us at least 100,000 years to do so, I�d say,
let�s concede its efficacy and show it some respect. (Take note,
Plutarck.)
Errr... so where, exactly, is the point of disagreement here? I see vague allusions to a "linguistic mud" but no articulation of any substantive difference in views.
Julian! Damn it! Do we always have to DISAGREE?! What
is this? A battleground? Does H & R stand for Heave & Rip,
or Hustle & Rant, Hump & Rage? What?
Take a deep breath. Go grab a cup of tea over there and sit down.
Put your feet up. Relax, will you?
Niet, Jean! What you say here is fine, if you're Robinson Crusoe
-- if you lived totally by yourself, mumbling abstractions to
yourself, just pissing in the wind.
But the minute you enter the social arena, where you might have TO
COMMUNICATE with others, then there had better be some
agreement as to the meaning of your terms. (That is, if
your intentions are to be successful at obtaining your ends.)
If I want value "X" from you, but approach you with the following
request: "fsdajg erpo
o khsauewq qweth ;lk;lsvj lklsdksdu!" ... then I doubt that I'll be
very successful at obtaining value "X" from you.
If it is my intention to communicate, I had better speak your
language (and vice versa.)
(Notice the "com" in the word "communication.")
Rene,
Hmm, Derrida never implies or argues that language is useless,
which appears to be your argument. In fact, he persuasively argues
that without the semiotics that makes up language we would be lost;
nevertheless its a tool which has flaws, and those flaws lie in its
slipperiness.
A fundamental undedidability is built into language; this is
because once language enjters the public domain the speaker or
writer loses control of it, as it always open to new
understandings, etc. Add to this the fact that Derrida claims that
meaning is never present but always deffered, and you see how
radical, and liberating a notion Derrida's ideas are. Furthermore
to me this ought to be also a very liberating notion to
libertarians I would think; that is fact that language is not
univocal, that each individual brings such a cascade of meanings to
texts, etc.
"To then defile such tools of thought by dragging them through a
linguistic mud, and obfuscating it (as Mr. Derision, excuse me, Mr.
Derrida tends to do) is to do a great disservice to a value that we
have striven so long to hone and perfect (language.)
Consider that it took us at least 100,000 years to do so, I�d say,
let�s concede its efficacy and show it some respect. (Take note,
Plutarck.)"
I haven't a bloody clue what this has to do with what I was talking
about - but it clears up for me that we obviously aren't on the
same page about what each other is trying to say.
"It took us at least 100,000 years to hone the language. Show it
some respect."
BOTTOM LINE: Your syntax is usually awful and your spelling is even
worse, Plutarck.
(Dat's wat da man wuz implying.)
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