Anthony Randazzo, Michael Flynn & Adam B. Summers from the July 2009 issue
(Page 2 of 4)
Investment patterns suggest that most Americans thought rising stock values and AAA ratings on securitized mortgages were safe financial bets. This overconfidence led most major Wall Street firms to decrease their capital ratios, taking on more debt and decreasing the amount of cash on their balance sheets. By 2007 the investment bank Lehman Brothers was leveraged 30 to 1, meaning just a 3.3 percent decline in asset values would wipe out its capital—which is in fact what happened.
Stock market bubbles. In both the U.S. and Japan, the rapid rise in property values fueled gains in the stock markets. The Japanese stock index Nikkei 225 rose from 13,000 in 1986 to an intraday high of 38,975 by the end of 1989. But the implosion of the property market sent the index crashing. It had dropped to 15,025 by July 1992, and it continued a steady decline throughout the Lost Decade. By April 2003, the Nikkei had fallen to 7,603, less than 20 percent of its peak.
Similarly, the Dow Jones Industrial Average went from 7,489 in July 2002 to an intraday high of 14,115 in October 2007. After that high point, the market began a modest decline, reaching 10,850 on September 30, 2008, then plummeting to 7,552 by November 20. The Dow continued to fall over the ensuing months and closed at 6,547 on March 9. (It has since rallied to just over 8,000.) In the U.S. as in Japan, the quick run-up in stock valuations lured people to invest money they did not have. The result was inadequate risk management, over-leveraged investments, and fragile capital reserves. Investors did not adequately plan for any contingency other than continued high growth and largely ignored those who warned that such growth was not sustainable.
Monetary policy errors. Although private financial institutions played a key role in the booms and busts of both Japan and the U.S., monetary policy was a critical root cause. In both cases, the central bank helped set off a boom in asset prices by expanding credit and driving interest rates to artificially low levels. This encouraged individuals and businesses to take on debt they otherwise would not have accepted and make investments they otherwise would not have considered.
When a central bank inflates the money supply and drives interest rates below those that would exist in a free marketplace, it sends a false signal to businesses to borrow and invest more in capital projects and goods than they otherwise might. Similarly, consumers respond to the signal by taking on higher mortgage and/or credit card debt, saving less, and spending more. Credit binges cannot last forever; when interest rates increase again, the bad investments are revealed, and it becomes painfully clear that much of the outstanding credit cannot be paid back.
Between January 1986 and February 1987, the Bank of Japan cut its discount rate—the interest rate charged by the central bank on loans to its member banks—from 5 percent to 2.5 percent, leading to an increase in real estate and stock market prices. Realizing a bubble was forming, the central bank then raised rates five times in 1989 and 1990, to a high of 6 percent. This increase revealed that many investments were built on extensive, unsustainable debt. Stocks began their long and painful slide.
When a recession began to set in after the 1990 stock market crash, Japan responded by reversing its tight money policy, cutting rates to 4.5 percent in 1991, 3.25 percent in 1992, 1.75 percent from 1993 to 1994, 0.5 percent from 1995 to 2000, and as low as 0.1 percent in September 2001.
A similar pattern took place in the United States. From 2000 to 2002, the Federal Reserve slashed the target discount rate from 6 percent to 0.75 percent. Fearing irrational exuberance, to borrow Alan Greenspan’s famous phrase, the Fed then raised the rate as high as 6.25 percent in June 2006. But now that the bubble has burst and the economy contracted, the Fed has cut the discount rate 12 times, lowering it to the current 0.5 percent. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has repeatedly stated that he sees interest rate cuts as a way to “support growth and to provide adequate insurance against downside risks.”
In both the Japanese and the American cases, post-bubble policy makers believed that lowering interest rates would make credit easier to obtain, thus recreating the environment that had spurred economic growth to begin with. But this meant that the supposed cure for a bubble created by easy credit was to extend even more easy credit.
These rate cuts only perpetuated the distortion of economic decisions and prevented savings, investment, and consumption from realigning with true preferences, as opposed to the illusory ones created by easy credit and artificially low interest rates. The lesson is that when monetary policy is used to “smooth” or “tweak” the market, it inevitably causes unintended consequences that in some cases can be very damaging to long-term economic growth.
Regulatory Responsibility
The current American debate often falls into broad-brush discussions about whether the nation had “too much” or “too little” regulation. The real issue is how the existing regulatory order helped spawn the financial crisis. We see it doing so in at least a couple of areas:
Capital reserve requirements. In 1988 the Basel I Accord between the Group of 10—which then included the U.S., Switzerland, Japan, Germany, France, and the U.K., among others—set new capital requirements for banks around the world. But the requirements were focused on loan amounts and did not factor in a debt’s underlying risk. In other words, a loan to a sound borrower required the same percentage of capital to be set aside as an equal amount lent to a high-risk borrower. There was already a developing atmosphere of heavy lending and insensitivity to risk, but the Basel requirements rewarded firms for making loans to shaky borrowers because they could earn higher interest rates that way without having to set aside any more capital than they would for loans to safe borrowers.
The chief problem was not that the requirements were too low. It was that the rules created a false sense of security for investors and lenders. Banks were meeting their legal requirements, although it was never clear what kind of debt they were holding capital to cover. Without a standard or competing standards for transparently measuring the value and risks of portfolios, Basel I proved ineffective at preventing systemic rot.
In the United States, when firms calculated their reserve requirements, they were required until recently to mark many assets “to market,” i.e., value them at the price they could be sold for immediately. When asset values started falling, and categories of assets stopped trading, firms scrambled to find capital to shore up their shoddy-looking reserves. The collapse of the government-created mortgage behemoths Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suddenly devalued mortgage-backed securities, and that meant banks holding large swaths of these assets had to come up with millions in cash overnight to meet their capital ratios. Many of the worst or most toxic mortgage-backed securities could not be sold immediately because their values were hard to determine. Under “mark to market” accounting rules, they were in effect worth nothing for the time being.
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My first three cents:
1: Yes, we are going to experience something similar to Japan's
lost decade. It is a direct consequence of our need to de-leverage
and shift towards saving an appropriate fraction of our incomes.
Nothing the government can or should do will prevent this.
2: Randazzo seems to fall deeply into the "The government did X,
then Y happened to the economy, therefore X causes Y" mentality.
This idea is almost always false, as changes made by governments
are almost always tiny relative to the economy. In the short term
and individually, no single policy will have a measurable effect,
and in any case, you don't know what would have happened without
the policy. For example, did Japanese infrastructure spending
prevent the Lost Decade? Obviously not. But did it make it slightly
less bad or slightly worse than it otherwise would have been? Only
God knows. Odds are, it made it slightly less painful...and at
least the Japanese have incredible bridges, dams, roads, and trains
that will last generations rather than the junk we tend to blow our
money on.
3: Long-term growth rates are going to be much lower than current
projections. We should be budgeting for 1% growth, and considering
anything else a bonus.
Randazzo seems to fall deeply into the "The government did
X, then Y happened to the economy, therefore X causes Y"
mentality.
So if the economy does well, it isn't due to the Obamassiah's
economic policies?
So why is President Barack Obama emulating it?
Because he really does believe that central authority drives all
things. The man is a totalitarian, and to a totalitarian, having
his hands all over an absolute ratfuck is better than sitting back
and letting things stabilize on their own.
Also: hi, Chad! This one's not your best. Maybe you could have
tried harder?
So if the economy does well, it isn't due to the
Obamassiah's economic policies?
Odds are, Obama's policies will make things slightly better than
they otherwise would have been, perhaps 2-3% larger GDP. But we
will never know, because we don't know what the GDP would have been
with the status quo or any alternative policy choices.
People who claim that they can discern the impact of policies by
looking what happens to the economy after they are adopted are just
plain wrong. Unfortunately, that includes, well, just about
everyone, because people can ALWAYS find a policy change they don't
like that occured just before the bust, or a policy change that
they did like that occured just before the boom. They can then use
false causalities to harden their beliefs.
You will not find me making such claims. Instead, you will find me
noting that our current economy is a function of a wide variety of
factors, including hundreds of policy decisions made both here and
abroad over many decades. The impacts of any recent policy changes
are almost always minimal and lost in the noise.
As another point. The Democrats and Republicans are arguing over
about 2% of the GDP, as the rest of government spending is pretty
much agreed upon. Do you honestly think that wild fluctuations in
the world economy rest upon what the government does with that tiny
fraction of our economy?
Chad just won't be happy until we're all doing cosplay while being tentacle raped on a bullet train. Deru kui wa utareru, says Hello Kitty via telescreen.
This idea is almost always false, as changes made by governments are almost always tiny relative to the economy.
Um, government spending is what percentage of GDP this year again? That seems pretty huge relative to the economy.
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Um, government spending is what percentage of GDP this year
again? That seems pretty huge relative to the economy.
Federal spending is usually just a bit over 20% of GDP. State and
local push total government spending to just over a third of GDP.
My point is that of this 20%, only about 2% is actually disagreed
upon the political mainstream. What we do with this 2% has
virtually no impact on the world economy.
Odds are, Obama's policies will make things slightly better
than they otherwise would have been, perhaps 2-3% larger GDP. But
we will never know, because we don't know what the GDP would have
been with the status quo or any alternative policy
choices.
Odds are? Really? The "odds are" that the Obama Administration will
create a "Five Year Plan" that will increase economic growth? When
it is the market, individuals acting freely, that has produced the
most wealth in the history of the world why would the odds favor
central planning at this time? Because the administration is going
to put the word "smart" in front of everything? Smart
bureaucrats instead of the normal, self interested kind can handle
it? All they needed was a Messiah to lead them?
When it is the market, individuals acting freely, that has
produced the most wealth in the history of the world
If you count massive amounts of McMansions, SUVs, cheap Chinese
crap, and credit default swaps as "wealth", you might have a point.
Your point would be even stronger if we hadn't borrowed ourselves
into oblivion in order to purchase all this "wealth".
Japan's shinkansen bullet trains will be used by today's children's
children. Your SUV will be obsolete by next summer, when gas is
$4.50 again. Libertarians just can't seem to grasp the difference,
or that free markets overwhelmingly favor short-term
consumption.
But as Anthony Randazzo, Mike Flynn, and Adam B. Summers
write in our July issue, that stimulus did not save the Japanese
economy in the 1990s; far from it. The ensuing period came to be
known as the Lost Decade, characterized by multiple recessions, an
annual average growth rate of less than 1 percent, and a two-decade
decline in stock prices and corporate profits. So why is President
Barack Obama emulating it?
Unfortunately, Japan is the
Lance White of industrialized East Asian democracies; by
extension, South Korea is the Jim Rockford.
That said,
Nouriel Roubini is apparently bullish on the Korean
economy.
Your point would be even stronger if we hadn't borrowed ourselves into oblivion in order to purchase all this "wealth".
The market didn't do that.
Also, re: your size point, 2% of government spending is still huge
compared to any other body which can make a decision in the
national economy.
What's funny is that Lance became Rockford when he got his own private investigator series.
Spoonman | June 2, 2009, 10:11am | #
The market didn't do that.
There is far more private debt in this country than public debt.
What are you talking about?
Also, re: your size point, 2% of government spending is still
huge compared to any other body which can make a decision in the
national economy.
Irrelevant. 2% of US GDP, or few tens of a percent of world GDP,
simply doesn't matter. The world economy does what it does despite
our petty political fights. Anyone who pretends otherwise is simply
seeking illogical justifications for their ideologies.
Let me repeat:
Before ANY boom or bust you can find a:) policies that were adopted
that fit your ideology and b:) policies that were adopted that
contradict your ideology
Most people then pick-and-choose whichever policy and economic
cycle combination fits their beliefs, and assert causality. This is
childish logic.
There is far more private debt in this country than public debt. What are you talking about?
The Federal Reserve's ability to affect interest rates, and
their use of that power to encourage borrowing.
Irrelevant. 2% of US GDP, or few tens of a percent of world GDP, simply doesn't matter. The world economy does what it does despite our petty political fights. Anyone who pretends otherwise is simply seeking illogical justifications for their ideologies.
So you've said. Proof?
doing cosplay while being tentacle raped on a bullet
train
What's funny is that this would probably be a sign of economic
recovery. Well, or the coming of Robo-Aids; your pick.
Chad, what you seem to be arguing is that what will happen will
happen, regardless of which of the two major political parties in
the US controls the government. For once, I agree.
We were set upon this course decades ago, with the outcome
inevitable. I suspect Obama will speed the demise along a tiny bit,
but even if Dole were elected in 1996, or Gore in 2000, or McCain
in 2008, the ultimate outcome was pre-determined by government
policy made long ago: you know, the government policy that
comprises the other 28% of GDP that the two political parties
functionally agree on.
What I'm saying is that focusing on some silly battle between the
two major parties is silly, because they are virtually
identical in terms of what policies they support, differing only on
a small margin. What is needed is for the other 28% of GDP to be
reevaluated. Of course the government will not do this voluntarily,
because government is a ratchet on revenue and power: thankfully,
our debtors will force us to do this, either nicely (by
asking) or not nicely (by destroying the market for our debt). One
way or the other, however, this reevaluation is coming.
We'll be lucky if the US goes through only two lost decades.
*Lucky*.
In a similar sense, even the warnings of those of us who predicted
this are irrelevant: I suspect I've helped some people on a small
margin avoid financial ruin when the day of reckoning comes for the
dollar, but I have no illusions that my advocacy has had any
substantive effect on the overall political composition of the
country or will in any substantive way impact the final destruction
of the dollar, the (hopefully final) discrediting of central
banking, or the lower rates of growth of government during the
coming retrenchment and rebalancing of the world economy. These
things will happen the way they will happen because the numbers
don't allow them to work out any other way: we are armed only with
a coffee mug against a rising tide.
Odds are, Obama's policies will make things slightly better
than they otherwise would have been, perhaps 2-3% larger
GDP.
Funny, that's not what the CBO said. Their take, as I recall, was
that the stimulus package would be a net negative in the long
run.
The world economy does what it does despite our petty political
fights.
To me, this sounds like a reason for the Almighty State to back off
and do very little. To Chad, it is a reason for the Almighty State
to grow, expand, borrow, and spend like crazy.
"McMansions, SUVs, cheap Chinese crap" Chav sure does like typing this. I think it's his catchphrase. Suck a fat one, you twat.
Japan's shinkansen bullet trains will be used by today's
children's children. Your SUV will be obsolete by next summer, when
gas is $4.50 again. Libertarians just can't seem to grasp the
difference, or that free markets overwhelmingly favor short-term
consumption.
Oh, sure, since a few governmentally controlled infrastructure
investments are good then 3 or 4 trillion a year must be
great?!
My SUV? Bullet trains? You don't even realize that there will be
very few children of the children of the Japanese to ride those
trains.
Spending more than you have is a Leftard practice, not a
Libertarian one. You are claiming that there is either "Five Year
Plans" or "short-term consumption" and never the twain shall meet.
Fiscal Responsibility doesn't include pissing away more money than
you have times ten. Or perhaps the government would limit what I
can consume based upon their superior wisdom? Based upon "need"?
You know the mantra
From each according to his ability and to each according to his need?
Two word re: Japan and bullet trains: population density. And credit-default swaps are not market inventions.
I think the case for not spending the money on infrastruture
would be stronger if we didn't have bridges collapsing, or a
highway system that gets a "D". If I remember correctly we need to
spend 2-3 Trillion just to get our current system back in
shape.
See once you build stuff you have to maintain it. Moreover, you
need to set aside more money to build it again once you can't
repair it anymore.
CA is a great example, we built highways, and universities etc, now
everything is falling apart becuase we didn't spend the money to
maintain it.
Americans have been living beyond their means for a long time, and
it's going to suck now trying to pay everything down, and fix
everything that's broken.
With the amount of money government at all levels currently takes in, they could afford to fix every piece of infrastructure several times over. Cut spending and leave us alone.
I suppose that's true. If we didn't spend any money on SS, or
Medicare for a couple of years we could fix everything. But that
seems unlikely.
Besides the military nothing else even comes close.
"If you count massive amounts of McMansions, SUVs, cheap Chinese
crap, and credit default swaps as "wealth","
McMansion = home that someone owns, rather than living in a
government housing project. Owning a home is wealth.
SUV = car that someone owns, rather than standing in a blizzard
hoping that the bus gets there before someone steals the food from
the bags you're carrying. Owning an SUV is wealth.
Cheap Chinese crap = things that people buy, rather than doing
without. Owning things is wealth.
Default credit swaps = a government-created fiasco. This is not
wealth.
Banks have huge debts, but they're getting a helping hand from
the federal government. If you have overwhelming debt--perhaps from
bad investments, or maybe a job loss, a medical crisis or just
plain overspending--you're probably on your own. Check the website
http://obamadebthelp2009.blogspot.com
to see if they can help. I am glad I did read it before I talk to
my CC company and it helped - Jane Jim, California
Kroneborge: you are SO RIGHT about the need to maintain
infrastructure once it is built.
In my opinion, this is one thing that separates reasonable
transport management from idiotic one.
From this point of view, Germans, Danes, Swiss or Japanese have
reasonable, rational transport management.
My own country (Czechia) is a fencesitter, swaying dangerously to
the idiotic half.
From what I have heard of California, it is way beyond the
fence.
That's sick. Didn't economists study Japan's problem back in the
90's? History repeats itself. But sometimes we can learn from past
mistakes can't we.
I read something that more than 25% of mortgages are upside down.
That will take years to recover.
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