Transportation Security Aggravation

Debating the balance between privacy and safety in a post-9/11 aviation industry.

Robert Poole & Jim Harper from the March 2005 issue

(Page 6 of 6)

ID-based security is intuitive but deeply flawed. It may supplement, but it will never replace, the proper focus for securing private infrastructure: assessing and addressing the tools and methods terrorists may use.

ID-based or not, the homogeneity of government-provided security can assist those planning a terrorist attack. "Blame" can be spread far and wide, of course, but the uniformity of federally regulated airline security surely helped smooth the 9/11 killers' planning. They knew that, regardless of what airline they chose, they would pass through similar metal detectors and receive similar secondary screening. They knew they would not meet additional security elsewhere in the airport. They knew the cockpits on all the planes would have similar doors. They knew the pilots would not be armed.

A heterogeneous, fully private airline security system would have raised the difficulty level and could have frustrated planning for the 9/11 attacks. Airlines and travelers should be extremely leery of the security and protection offered by government agencies and officials. The veneer of security that comes with officialdom is thin.

On the last of the 9/11 planes, passengers learned that the terrorists were flying commandeered jets into buildings. The airline security system had failed these passengers and compliance with the terrorists would not save them. Taking security into their own hands, they charged the cockpit, saving the lives of others if not themselves. This is far from a satisfying example, but it illustrates the better result when security is provided by interested parties with a real stake in the outcome.�

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