Among other things, the Foresight guidelines propose that nanotech replicators "must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment." This could be accomplished, the guidelines suggest, by designing devices so that they have an "absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or artificial 'vitamins' that don't exist in any natural environment." So if some replicators should get away, they would simply run down when they ran out of fuel. Another proposal is that self-replicating nanotech devices be "dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation." That would put human operators in complete control of the circumstances under which nanotech devices could replicate. One other sensible proposal is that devices be programmed with termination dates. Like senescent cells in the human body, such devices would stop working and self-destruct when their time was up.
"The moratorium is not a new proposal," says Foresight Institute President Christine Peterson. "Eric Drexler considered that idea a long time ago in The Engines of Creation and dismissed it as not a safe option. With a moratorium, we, the good guys, are going to be sitting on our hands. It's very risky to let the bad guys be the ones developing the technology. To do arms control on nanotechnology, you'd better have better nanotechnology than the bad guys."
Software entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil is confident that nanotech defenses against uncontrolled replication will be stronger than the abilities to replicate. Citing our current ability to reduce computer viruses to nuisances, Kurzweil argues that we will be even more vigilant against a technology that could kill if uncontrolled.
Smalley suggests we can learn how to control nanotech by looking at biology. The natural world is filled with self-replicating systems. In a sense, living things are "green goo." We already successfully defend ourselves against all kinds of self-replicating organisms that try to kill us, such as cholera, malaria, and typhoid. "What do we do about biological systems right now?" says Smalley. "I don't see that it's any different from biotechnology. We can make bacteria and viruses that have never existed before, and we'll handle [nanobots] the same way."
Nanotech theorist Robert Freitas has written a study, "Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by Biovorous Nano-replicators With Public Policy Recommendations," which concludes that all "scenarios examined appear to permit early detection by vigilant monitoring, thus enabling rapid deployment of effective defensive instrumentalities." Frei-tas persuasively argues that dangerous self-replicating nanobots could not emerge from laboratory accidents but would have to be made on purpose using very sophisticated technologies that would take years to develop.
Magic Monopolies
Nanofactories would be magic boxes that could produce whatever a person desired. A world of nanotech abundance would be highly disruptive: If material needs could be satisfied at the touch of a button, who would have to work? Who would own the nanofactories? How would people pay for items produced by nanotechnology? If nanotech works, big changes are in store.
Not surprisingly, the ETC Group's worries in this connection are chiefly egalitarian, specifically that nanotechnology will increase the power of corporations and governments while further immiserating the poor. Yet the new technologies that have been developed during the last two centuries -- antibiotics, electricity, telephony -- have greatly benefited billions, and the main economic problem in the world is that billions are still too poor to gain access to them. Furthermore, new technologies tend to be safer than the ones they replace.
Let's consider a couple of dystopic nanotech visions outlined by University of Saskatchewan sociologist Michael Mehta, an ETC Group sympathizer: "nanopanopticism" and "nanomercantilism."
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham imagined an architecture for a prison he called the Panopticon. In Bentham's prison all the cells are open to surveillance by a single guard hidden in a tower at the center. The idea is that prisoners would behave themselves because they could never be sure they were not being watched. It doesn't take much imagination to see how nanotechnology could shrink video cameras and microphones while vastly expanding the ability to record and store information. In fact, this trend seems unavoidable in the long run. Such technology solely in the hands of governments and corporations would be oppressive.
Mehta, of course, recommends the creation of new regulatory agencies to control nanotechnology and the enactment of new privacy laws to protect against the advent of nanopanopticism. In his 1998 book The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?, science fiction writer and futurist David Brin suggests another way to handle intrusive surveillance: make sure the watchers are watched. Brin persuasively argues that if spies know they are likely to be observed, they will be more restrained. Along with invisible spy devices, nanotechnology will give us tiny sensors that tell people when they're under surveillance. Such spy countermeasures also might inhibit or destroy surveillance devices that approach too closely. There is an added benefit for those who worry that someone might abuse nanotechnology. In a truly transparent society, would-be terrorists who try to build dangerous replicators would always know someone could be monitoring them. In other words, nanopanopticism would deter misbehavior rather than encourage it.
Mehta's other concern is nanomercantilism. He suggests that once a country developed the capability for molecular manufacturing using nanoassemblers, it would lose its incentive to trade. There would be no need to trade raw materials because the feedstocks for nanofactories would be derived from ubiquitous substances such as dirt and air.
In another scenario, Mehta suggests that a nation with nanofactories would become so powerful that it could reduce the rest of the world to the status of colonies. Perhaps the countries or companies that develop assembler technology would build assemblers in other countries and sell licenses to manufacture various objects. Such a world would be a true information economy, with trade consisting chiefly of blueprints for products. Or countries might not want to give assemblers to other countries, in which case assembler products might be modeled on software that works only when a license fee is paid. If the licenses were not renewed, the products would stop working or fall apart.
Like the ETC Group, Mehta evidently believes the creators of assembler technology will want to manufacture artificial scarcities to keep or expand their power or to maintain certain social institutions. Perhaps so. But once it is known that building assemblers is possible, other countries and companies no doubt will embark on crash programs to create their own nanofactories. Assuming that nanofactories really can provide people with anything they need and want, why would anyone care to block access to them by others? To the extent that competition and status seeking are inherent in human nature, those drives in a world of nanotech abundance will have to be satisfied in new ways.
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