Who Lost Turkey?

What to do about America's unfriendly allies

Doug Bandow | April 1, 2003

(Page 2 of 3)

At the same time, Turkey looks back at the first Gulf War, which was extremely costly. Cutting cross-border trade with Iraq alone is estimated to have run $30 billion. Economic hardship in Kurdish areas bordering Iraq fueled support for the Kurdistan Worker's Party's bitter insurgency, which ended only in 1999 after 15 years of fighting and nearly 40,000 deaths. More broadly, war has discouraged tourism, a critical source of revenue for Ankara. The new conflict will fall on an economy still in crisis after the collapse of the last two years.

There also are geopolitical concerns. Notes Akyuz, "Turkey is concerned over U.S. interests in northern Iraq. How far will Kurds be able to run an independent state?" Turkey fought no less viciously than Iraq against Kurds seeking independence. This issue "shows that there is a growing distrust, a growing confidence problem" between the two governments, Akyuz argues.

It's no surprise, then, that Ankara asked for compensation for its support. So have Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, even though the latter two are at "little risk," notes Akyuz, and the former, many Turks believe, "should pay the U.S. for getting rid of its major threat in the region." Adds Akyuz, the "only ground on which you can see people defending Turkish support for a U.S.-led war" is that "the consequences [of not doing so] would be enormous for the country."

For all these reasons, popular Turkish opposition remained strong. The U.S. "made the mistake of misreading the country and ruling party," he explains. Although it is a single-party government, there is a "coalition within the party," and a number of factions oppose the war.

Washington expected easy approval, and then "panicked when Turkey delayed." Potential aid figures leaked, resulting in hostile cartoons and commentaries, which were reported in Turkey. "There was a huge reaction in Turkey against the Turkey-bashing," says Akyuz. "The pressure and media coverage backfired."

Which often happens in real democracies.

With the defeat of the basing rights proposal, the promise of additional grants and loans has gone a-glimmering. Washington also has muttered about the possibility of being less helpful in Ankara's pursuit of more IMF aid. Indeed, the Turkish stock market dropped more 15 percent the day after the parliamentary vote.

Yet Washington would lose too if it intensified Turkey's estrangement. Ankara is one of the few secular Islamic democracies—along with Malaysia and, after a fashion, Indonesia.

Moreover, the government is now in the hands of a formally religious party that is struggling with responsible governance. In contrast, in most of the Mideast, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, real democracy likely would mean support for radical Islamists and fundamentalists hostile to the West.

In fact, Turkey is poised between two futures. Even the JDP wants Ankara to look west and join the European Union, but Europe remains reluctant to admit the populous, impoverished Muslim state. (Turkey's population of nearly 70 million ranks second only to Germany's.)

EU membership is not only important for its own sake, offering a path to economic opportunity. It is also a possible key for resolving the division of Cyprus and helping Turkey become free as well as democratic. Cyprus has suffered violence and division for four decades; a year of negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations recently collapsed. Ankara seems anxious to resolve the conflict, in part because a modus vivendi would make EU membership more likely. But Turkish leaders fear a nationalist backlash from pushing Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash too hard. Moreover, America's demands over Iraq, added to political reforms and IMF negotiations, may have helped create political overload in Ankara, diverting the government's attention from Cyprus.

In turn, the breakdown in talks has encouraged Europe to back away from Turkey. EU spokesman Jean-Christophe Filori says that "It appears to us very difficult that accession negotiations can start with Turkey in this situation," even though the EU had previously claimed its willingness to separate the issues. (In fact, Cyprus appears as much to be an excuse for as cause of Europe's position.) But this stance, especially if combined with greater distance from America, makes a solution appear even more distant.

The bogging down of Turkish efforts to join the EU is especially disappointing, Because the prospect of EU membership has encouraged Turkey's move toward genuine liberal democracy. Before leaving office last year Foreign Minister Cem worried about Europe's reluctance to embrace Ankara, telling me that "we bring a lot to the EU." True, but the EU also brings a lot to Turkey. There is "a governing crisis in Turkey," contends Dr. Fuat Keyman, a professor of political science at Ankara's Bilkent University: It is necessary to "transform the state and state-civil relations." The outgoing parliament approved a package of reforms involving freedom of expression and criminal justice protections in order to meet EU accession standards. The JDP supported these measures and seems likely to continue the reform process. At least, it will if doing so makes EU membership more likely.

Serhat Buvenc, a professor of International Relations at Istanbul's Bilgi University, argues that the EU is the "fault line of domestic politics." In his view, the prospect of membership "provides sufficient assurance of the survival of reforms." Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi University, puts it slightly differently: "If the EU were to accommodate Turkey, the entire context of politics would change."

Washington can help. Before losing her seat in last November's election, parliamentarian Ayfer Yilmaz said simply: "We want more trade. We want more investment." A luncheon with Turkish businessmen demonstrated unanimity favoring greater access to America's market to help the Turkish economy to recover from a veritable depression. Fikri Sadi Gucum, a member of the board of directors of Cukurova Holding Co., pointed particularly to Turkey's textile industry.