Gone With the Vote

For the GOP in the South, Re-construction isn't quite over.

John J. Pitney, Jr. from the February 2003 issue

(Page 2 of 2)

Still, no Southern state has an African-American majority, and not one has elected an African-American senator. The situation is different in House races. African-American Democrats can win in majority or near-majority African-American districts, which are largely the product of the Voting Rights Act. But by packing African Americans into majority-minority districts, the act also left neighboring districts whiter and more Republican, a process that cynics call "bleaching."

As a result, Southern Republicans can prevail either when African Americans make up a small share of the electorate or when Republican candidates win an overwhelming majority of the white vote. The first condition applies in many House races but not in Senate races. Most Southern GOP senators win because of huge white majorities. In 2000 Mississippi Sen. Trent Lott lost the African-American vote 87 percent to 11 percent but won re-election by carrying 88 percent of the white vote.

Such huge majorities are hard to achieve against a Democrat who can reach beyond African Americans. Many Southern Democratic politicians have learned the trick of building biracial coalitions, which is why they aren't extinct. For instance, Hollings beat Inglis by combining 90 percent of a high black turnout with 39 percent of whites.

Knowing that a tough Democratic challenge might lurk around the next corner, conservative Republican senators resort to shoring up their support by playing the pork game that Hollings has mastered. Even Phil Gramm, a rhetorically staunch free market economist, was never shy about claiming credit for the booty he brought home to Texas. By contrast, Sen. Mack Mattingly of Georgia largely ignored local concerns in favor of high-minded issues such as the line-item veto. He lasted one term.

The Black brothers make their points about the state of Southern Republicans with a wealth of data from elections and public opinion surveys. Though the book's elaborate details might make slow going for many readers, it will serve as a valuable resource for scholars and political activists.

Nevertheless, the book has its lapses. The Black brothers refer to the Republican Party of the Civil War era as "deliberately founded on sectional rather than national interests." Though it is true that the Republicans of the time had no appeal in the South, it is downright weird to refer to the limitation of slavery as a "sectional interest."

More significantly, the authors fail to develop a major implication of their own analysis. Mobilizing the African-American vote is now a key element of Democratic strategy, especially in statewide races. A common tactic is to demonize Republicans as racists, citing their opposition to racial preferences.

In 1999 Florida Gov. Jeb Bush announced his One Florida initiative to end racial preferences in government contracts and state university admissions. The initiative pre-empted a stronger measure that national anti-preference activist Ward Connerly was seeking to put on Florida's ballot. Republicans feared the Connerly measure would stoke strong opposition and hurt their party. As it turned out, Bush's One Florida hurt them anyway. Democrats used it to inspire anger among African-American voters, who turned out in high numbers and nearly tipped the state to Al Gore in 2000.

Even before this incident, Republicans in the South (and elsewhere) had grown increasingly gun-shy on the preference issue. Last June, Gov. Bush signed a bill creating the Florida Minority Business Loan Mobilization Program, which Connerly denounced as a new racial preference that backtracked from One Florida.

A half-century ago, Southern Democrats campaigned by opposing color-blind laws, stirring up racial fears, and silencing those who opposed them. They still do.

Comments

nfl jerseys|11.13.10 @ 12:30AM|#

bnkh

log in or register to reply