The Baghdad War Before the War

An alternative set of reasons to get rid of Saddam

Charles Paul Freund | September 19, 2002

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The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have long been trapped in a relationship that neither party much likes. But because America needs lots of oil, and because the Saudis need security, the two nations have tried to find a way to deal with each other. The terror attacks have shaken this relationship of interdependence. Most of the hijackers on 9/11 came from Saudi Arabia, and much of the money being funneled into global terrorist networks reportedly originates from there as well. If the U.S. seeks ultimately to choke off the finances of Al Qaeda and groups like it, it must first do something about its dependence on Saudi oil. In that sense, the road to Riyadh runs through Baghdad.

So, perhaps, does the road to Tehran. According to numerous accounts, the mullahs' control of Iran has been crumbling for months. Many Iranians have had enough of their failed revolution and their economic stagnation. They've had enough of being arrested for listening to music on the radio, and of being jailed for attending private gatherings where both men and women are present. Iran's revolution is now reportedly so shaky that it may collapse even if the U.S. does nothing in the region. Were the U.S. to succeed in establishing a regime in adjacent Iraq that exhibited at least some democratic values and allowed greater personal freedoms, the fate of Iran's ruling mullahs would probably be sealed, and the future of any future democratic government there bolstered.

A region that features at least relatively democratic regimes in both Iraq and Iran, a Saudi Arabia whose leverage on the West is greatly reduced, and, as Bush put it at the UN, "an independent and democratic Palestine," however that might be achieved, would be a region where modern political values are advancing and retrograde dictatorship and theocracy are declining.

In his UN address, Bush hinted at the outlines of "a very different future" for the Middle East. As he put it, "The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond."

This is an optimistic scenario, of course, and none of it may happen even if the U.S. successfully overthrows Saddam. The Middle East is a notoriously complicated and unpredictable place, and intervention in Baghdad also risks a series of potentially disastrous consequences.

Iraq could fall apart under pressure from Shi'ites in the south (where much of the oil is) or Kurds in the north. A region-wide conflict could develop, especially if Israel is attacked, that the U.S. might be unable to contain. The Saudis and Iranians might respond to developments by raising the price of oil, seriously jolting the world economy. A taste for democracy in the region may translate not into the Turkish model, which has so far absorbed an increase in Islamist political clout. It could lead to something resembling the unending nightmare of Algeria, where the military has taken control to prevent Islamists from assuming power, and Islamists have responded with a campaign of mass murder. "Managing" the region politically might prove far more difficult than conquering any portion of it, and the U.S. could find itself mired in regional conflicts and problems from which it might find it difficult to extricate itself.

The White House appears willing to risk such consequences. Its public reasons for doing so—Saddam's arsenal and his perfidy—haven't convinced everyone that the risks are worth taking. Perhaps it has other reasons.