There are two problems here, one semantic, the other conceptual. The words evolved, mature, and adequate are subjective, yet they presume a priori, objective agreement on their meaning. The criticism is hardly a plea for watered-down relativity: No one can avoid feeling, for example, that Somalia--the example is Conquest's --is at a somewhat earlier stage of national evolution than Switzerland, whatever that may mean. But who formally determines such things? When one resorts to the concept of "adequate nations," there is a discernible sense that someone, somewhere is handing out certificates to those deemed fréquentable. There is a gatekeeper here, and Conquest fails to explain who it is, though anyone can guess.
Then there are those exasperating "pirate states." The "and so on" Conquest tags onto his gallery of rogues is a tad self-defeating, as it implies roughly the same blamelessness as "the usual suspects." It also speaks to a peculiar mindset prevalent in the mid-1980s, when "terrorism experts" roamed the corridors of Washington in search of handouts to finance their ghoulish pseudo-science. That Conquest should find himself in such company is deplorable.
The problem is that he never really considers the innate abrasiveness of America's global reach. One needn't alight from the left to see that America is the main enforcer of a global status quo, that the ensuing equilibrium often favors it, and that this situation produces disturbing inconsistencies: Turkey can murder its Kurds, but Iraq cannot; Israel and Pakistan can possess atomic weapons, but Iran and North Korea cannot; Russia can ruthlessly crush a domestic national insurrection, but Serbia cannot.
One hastens to append a disclaimer: Avoid drawing policy guidelines from such sophistry. The depravities of some states need not imply that all should be allowed to abuse their powers until universal consistency is imposed. Yet by sidestepping frustration with America's global conduct, by accepting without dissent "we and they" categorizations, Conquest takes the easy route, one that will appeal to those who assume that an international Pax Americana is absolutely divine.
That's a pity because Conquest is, at least culturally, ecumenical: He is ever mindful and tolerant of the effect cultural variances have on political and economic systems. Yet for a rare instance in Reflections we hear the fighter-bombers on a sortie against the pirate state's nerve center, in the background the grunting acquiescence of a Rush Limbaugh.
One of the more engaging sections of Reflections shows Conquest lashing out at the aberration of European unity. Europe, he reminds us, is just another Idea, one that has spawned a tentacular bureaucracy and that seeks to impose on the divergent European states a counterfeit uniformity. Conquest does a service in bringing the debate back to the realm of culture and politics, since the aficionados of Europe mainly use economic arguments to justify what is at heart a political and cultural phenomenon.
Conquest writes, "It might be argued that real knowledge of, even affection for, continental Europe makes one reject a light-minded and premature political unity." What Conquest apparently desires --and the key word here is affection--is a genuine harmony of interests built against the backdrop of a time-tested, historical understanding of Europe's cultural and political diversity.
Where Conquest is unconvincing is in his determination that Europe is "a bloc hindering the development of free trade, being from the global point of view a large-scale special interest (or set of special interests)." Because of this, he continues, the European Union has divided the West and is "in effect anti-American."
The implications are fascinating: Conquest posits a transnational Western interest, but avoids inquiring whether this may, perchance, also represent a "large-scale special interest" of the kind which might hinder free trade. Nor would devotees of the free market understand what is wrong with special interests, since the moment grander motivations, such as Western unity, are injected into the marketplace, there is a distinct possibility that ideology will follow.
To Europe, Conquest prefers a structure which "would be natural rather than artificial, going with the cultural grain rather than cutting across it." His proposal is for an association of English-speaking countries--the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, perhaps Ireland (if the restive Irish agree), the nations of the Caribbean and the Pacific, and maybe a few more. One hesitates to repeat that this too may emerge as a special interest group, though the accusation of divisiveness is easily dispensed with: Conquest considers his Association the first step in the formation of a grander global collectivity bringing together democratic countries. It is too early to outline the degree of unity in such a congregation, Conquest explains, but it would be stronger than an alliance and weaker than a federation.
What is one to make of what seems a harebrained idea? Conquest's tone may suggest to some readers that he is endorsing the notion of a "clash of civilizations." The accusation would be unfair. For Conquest to argue that a "united and peaceful world" is possible suggests that he has a far less Hobbesian worldview than those who believe in the inevitability of cultural antagonism. Indeed one would have thought less fanciful a man who spent such time counting bodies. Yet Conquest's proposal is not self-evidently insensible--unity is always easier, and preferable, among those of like minds and habits.
However, one wonders what would really happen if transnational, culturally homogenous communities begin forming on every side. Would the result be unity and peace, or conflict on an ever grander scale? Nowhere does Conquest explain what mechanism would drive international unification.
It is to Conquest's credit that he casually opens himself up to such reproof. For if his distaste is for transcendent Ideas, he very much fancies the free exchange of ideas. Reflections echoes to the sounds of a thousand controversies, past and future, which Conquest so engagingly distributes as possible guides out of the intellectual labyrinth at this rotation of century. One need not follow his path, nor does Conquest impose one. His is a more benign tyranny: It merely requires a clarification of one's own thoughts.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time.
nfl jerseys|11.14.10 @ 10:21PM|#
gjcgf