Letters

From the July 1997 issue

(Page 2 of 3)

But his argument rests on a pair of what philosophers call persuasive definitions: definitions that incorporate the conclusion one is trying to establish. Defining self-interest as economic gain, and benevolence as the willingness to forgo such gain, Lomasky leaves himself a pretty short step to the conclusion that benevolence is not in our interest. But these definitions, which he does nothing to justify, are at odds with the Objectivist analysis of self-interest and benevolence that I developed in the book.

I cannot reproduce those analyses in a letter, but even a casual reader of Ayn Rand must know that Objectivists do not equate self-interest with economic gain. Self-interest includes "the terms, methods, conditions, and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan" (in Rand's formulation), including such values as enduring personal relationships and such virtues as integrity and justice. Nor is this conception of self-interest a stipulation; it is grounded in Rand's analysis of value.

On a related front, Lomasky criticizes me for confusing benevolence and justice (a distinction I took considerable painsto draw in the book), citing my definition of benevolence as "the commitment to achieving the values derivable from other people in society by treating them as potential trading partners." Living by trade rather than plunder, he argues, is the virtue of justice, not benevolence. I agree.

But benevolence goes beyond mere respect for rights; it means projecting ways to exploit the positive potential represented by other people. Justice is exercised in evaluating and complying with the terms of actual trades; benevolence in the openness to possible trades and to the potential of others to enrich our lives.

Finally, among all the forms and occasions of benevolence that I discuss, Lomasky takes exception to my analysis of why it is in our interest to help others in emergencies, like stopping for a stranded motorist. This is a complicated problem, which I do not claim to have solved completely. But it won't be solved with a tunnel-vision conception of self-interest in terms of concrete, range-of-the-moment benefits, as reflected in Lomasky's statement that "the egoist will be pleased if others stop when her car breaks down, but if she's rational she will not stop for someone else."

A rational egoist knows that help is not likely to be forthcoming when he needs it unless there is a general social practice of providing such help. And so, not thinking it rational to count on luck, he will consider whether there is anything he can do to promote this general practice. The answer, contrary to Lomasky, is yes. A general social practice is sustained by the acts of individuals, each of whom sets an example for others. The probability is vanishingly small that I will set an example, through my benevolence, for the very people who may someday be in a position to help me.

But that is not the point. The trade I engage in is not with those particular individuals; it is with everyone else in my society. It is a kind of informal insurance policy against unexpected risks, mediated by custom rather than contract.

These considerations do not solve the Prisoner's Dilemma problem that Lomasky poses. But without the narrow conception of self-interest on which he relies, it is not clear how significant that problem is.

David Kelley
Executive Director
Institute for Objectivist Studies
Poughkeepsie, NY

In his interesting review of David Kelley's booklet on benevolence, Loren Lomasky is too sweeping when he suggests that Randians, as a breed, are rude as a matter of course. A brief check of Internet discussion groups will confirm that rudeness as a trait of ideological zealots is not specific to Objectivists. It should also be conceded that much has changed in the Objectivist movement over the past 30 years, for the better.

Lomasky seems to assert that a policy of benevolence cannot spring from a
policy of self-interest, and, further, that self-interestedness as such cannot encompass anything more than narrow calculations of the moment. But why? Everyone is conscious at some level of how he treats others, and habitual incivility or discourtesy toward others must have a negative effect on his own character and on the willingness of others to deal with and
befriend him. Otherwise the rest of us would not be shying away from dyspeptic Randroids. Certainly, a person may pursue his self-interest in ways that do not actually achieve his self-interest and well-being; what he should do instead, then, is pursue it in a better way.

When Lomasky merely equates altruism and benevolence, he muddies the waters. An altruistic defense of virtue must founder because it treats the well-being of the morally choosing individual as either irrelevant, or subordinate to the needs of others.

Under altruism, for a given ethical actor the goal of ethics becomes severed from the goal of the actor's own life. If others come first, when and by what criterion is an individual ever entitled to look to his own needs? Usually, the resolution is a tacit détente between altruistic sentiment and self-interested reality. But this is an unstable détente and does not provide any definite guidance in actually living a life.

David M. Brown

New York, NY

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