Evolutionary Ecology

A new environmental vision

Lynn Scarlett from the May 1996 issue

(Page 5 of 5)

The same kind of evolution occurred among dentists in their use of mercury amalgams. The government did not ban the use of such amalgams. However, dentists found ways of minimizing exposures to the mercury vapors created during the preparation of amalgams, and some dentists turned to substitutes. Trade associations, trade unions, professional organizations, and consumer groups often promote these kinds of changes by monitoring safety issues relevant to their members.

Whether uniform standards ought to be considered will be a function of the level of consensus regarding whether some action should be taken; the clarity of knowledge about the causation of a problem; and the level of risk associated with the problem. Where problems are indivisible, risks posed by the problem are extremely high, and causes of those risks are well-understood, public rules offer a plausible solution.

Clearly, an environmental vision based on evolving institutions will not please everyone. It acknowledges tradeoffs among values, and it admits both the necessity and the limits of political decision making--positions guaranteed to upset both traditional environmentalists and free market absolutists. It does not promise a perfect world, merely a slowly improving one. And it faces squarely the underlying problem with current environmental regulations: Centralized, top-down rule making is ill-suited to addressing environmental problems in a complex, dynamic world in which most relevant information is location-specific and different people have very different priorities.

Applying such a vision cannot be a matter of waving a single legislative wand. Three decades of statutes have created layer upon layer of regulations. But Congress could start with a few basic reforms. The National Environmental Policy Institute is exploring ways to craft a single statute that would phase in devolution of most environmental decisions to states. The concept is worth pursuing. Devolution to states does not really go far enough, since, ultimately, what is needed is further decentralization to local communities and, where feasible, privatization of environmental decisions. But devolution to the states is a good place to start in any reform agenda.

Similarly, Congress needs to get the EPA out of the business of prospectively approving state and local environmental protection programs. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, Congress sets air-emission standards and states are delegated responsibility for developing State Implementation Plans. Using computer models and other criteria, the EPA assesses those plans to determine whether they comply with federal law. States get full emission-reduction "credits" when the EPA's computer models show a state program achieving over time some estimated pollution reduction. But this means the EPA's assumptions about everything from population growth to commuting patterns, not actual pollution levels, determine the outcome. The process prevents experimentation. It locks states into using technologies or programs that the EPA thinks--but has not necessarily demonstrated--will work. Eliminating the prospective approval process would give states the latitude to design programs they believe will achieve emission reductions, and to evaluate and adjust those programs based on real-world data.

Above all, what is needed is a fundamental shift away from an approach that is primarily regulatory and punitive to one that emphasizes bargaining, improvement in information flows, and incentives for stewardship. The 1995 House proposals regarding takings compensation are essential to realigning the incentive equation.

Turning environmental policy in the direction of more bargaining is likely to require experimentation and many varied measures. But a place to start is in revising approaches to environmental enforcement. Current approaches have blurred any distinctions between intent and accident; the line between civil and criminal cases is not always clear; sentencing guidelines bear little logical relationship to the scope of alleged crimes.

In recent soul-searching, business leaders and legislators who led the 1995 regulatory reform effort of the 104th Congress opined that their reform vision was the right one. It was, they concluded, only their message that was inadequate. This self-appraisal is too generous.

Their message was inadequate because their vision was not well thought out. Pieces of that vision--such as the need to realign private incentives through takings compensation--were on target. But bills to require cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment really targeted only a symptom--high costs and skewed goals--without looking at the more fundamental problem. Would-be reformers adopted a mirror image of their opponents' technocratic, top-down approach without thinking seriously about how to ensure environmental protection in a world in which environmental goods are widely valued.

The movement toward environmental reform will not, however, disappear. And, in the long run, the past year's setbacks may provide an important opportunity: an occasion to reflect seriously not only on the politics of environmental regulation but on the alternatives to traditional methods. We have a chance to get it right this time, but only if we are willing to invest in developing a dynamic vision.