Second, contrary to confused reports by the general media, this launcher will not be a Shuttle II. Some elements within NASA might like it to be, but the immediate intent of the program is to build a relatively low- cost (not multibillion-dollar) X-vehicle similar to the X- 15--an experimental launcher that will prove out the technologies necessary for a new generation of launch systems to dramatically reduce the cost of space access.
It is expected that these technologies will then be incorporated into an operational system that will be developed with private funding. If the perceived market for this operational vehicle is primarily NASA, then it will indeed become a Shuttle II (and will likely not occur).
On the other hand, if it is designed to satisfy new and growing commercial markets (e.g. low-earth- orbit communications, and my own business, space tourism), then its design will be driven by these market requirements, and it will have much more resemblance in its operations to an airliner than to the shuttle. In either case, any multibillion-dollar investment decision will be based on the demand for launch services, and the money will come from the capital market, not the taxpayer.
Such a program is more in the tradition of the original National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the agency that, with its labs, wind tunnels, and experimental aircraft, provided many of the core technologies that made our nation the leader in military and commercial aviation throughout this century, before it evolved into the present NASA in 1958. While far from ideal, it is a refreshing change from the current disastrous policy of having NASA attempt to develop the operational vehicle and run the airline.
Finally, Mr. Rodgers's discussion of space- based semiconductor manufacturing cannot pass without comment. Accepting for the sake of argument his figure of $500 million for a space shuttle flight (a number which is in continuous dispute), his article would imply first that an entire flight must be dedicated to the purpose of growing gallium arsenide crystals and second, that five such dedicated flights were actually authorized and flown.
Both of these statements are clearly nonsense. Such an experiment would be only one of many on a given flight, probably occurring in the mid- deck of the Orbiter, with the major purpose of the mission determined by the many tons of payload in the payload bay itself, such as a satellite or Spacelab. To charge the entire cost of one, or five, flights to a single mid- deck experiment is, to be as charitable as possible, faulty bookkeeping. But this is what has to be done to come up with a figure of $100 million per wafer. This is surely high by a couple of orders of magnitude. I have no idea what the basis is for his stated eventual cost of $10,000 per wafer--this would depend upon, among other things, the success of the commercial reusable launcher described above in bringing down launch costs. He may be correct that gallium arsenide chip production is not an economically viable space manufacturing business, but he offers little useful information here in making such a determination.
Rand Simberg
President
Interglobal Space Lines Inc.
Redondo Beach, CA
T.J. Rodgers replies: I do not believe any taxpayers' money should go toward "Space Shuttle II" or the "X-vehicle." In the real, non-NASA world, the investment of even a few million dollars typically requires a precise business plan. If Mr. Simberg wants billions of dollars to go into the "space tourism" business, let him find a sucker other than Uncle Sam.
I agree that my applying the full cost of a shuttle flight to the gallium arsenide wafer experiment is bad accounting. But the experiment was one of the primary objectives of that flight. And the gallium arsenide experiment was carried out on a special second space vehicle deployed from the shuttle. The stated $10,000 per wafer manufacturing cost came directly from the group performing the experiment. From my own gallium arsenide work, I know the $10,000 figure is unacceptable--and probably unachievable, based on NASA's financial track record.
Ratings War
Rick Henderson's trend on congressional ratings from the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste (CCAGW) ("Grade Inflation?," Jan.), implied that the 1994 numbers were "fixed" in favor of Democrats. In particular, Dan Mitchell of the Heritage Foundation claimed that CCAGW was "naive or simplistic" with its ratings and clearly had in mind improving Democrats' scores. His false characterization of the ratings must extend to the bipartisan co- chairmen of the Congressional Grace Caucus, along with the Republican and Democratic Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committees, all of whom reviewed the ratings prior to their publication.
Mitchell's charges and your article are outrageous and absurd, especially when your reporter appropriately stated that: "The gap between Democrats and Republicans is fairly consistent with those in earlier sessions of Congress." Then, he went on to fabricate a story where none exists.
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