Letters

From the March 1994 issue

(Page 4 of 4)

One of Loren Lomasky's criticisms of James Q. Wilson's book is curiously anatomical: the failure to identify a discrete organ of moral sense. The criticism is unjustified. On page 24 Wilson identifies the limbic area of the brain as the probable seat of the moral sense. More significantly, he specifies the organ metaphorically on page 238, where he refers to the "teachings of the heart."

Wilson uses a wide variety of synonyms for the word sense to tell the reader that it is not to be interpreted in the same way as those senses for which there are receptor organs like the eyes, ears, and nose. One is the plural form senses. Another is sentiments. On page 239 he accepts somebody else's "intuitions" as a possible synonym, and he refers to Aristotle's "natural striving" on page 236. The synonym predisposition occurs frequently, and there are various extended phrasal characterizations, as in his reference to "habituation operating on a human nature innately prepared to respond to training."

In short, it is perfectly clear that the word sense is not used in the sense of sensory organ in this most sensible book. Wilson's point is that we have something other than reason and other than the teachings of our individual cultures that impels us to do good things. The evidence that Wilson adduces for this something won't go away, whatever you call it.

Richard L. Leed
Professor of Linguistics
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY

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